From populism to pop-pop-pop-ism

17 March 2003

Rangers are reported as having been responsible for a number of robberies, kidnappings, and acts of terrorism in recent years. A more recent development is the appearance of ‘death squads’ (also known in some localities as 'hunter killer units’. 'ruthless hunter units’, 'death squad infernal units’) set up by provincial police authorities to pursue criminals without due process of law. There are indications that these units have been responsible for a number of deaths and disappearances.

Villagers in many areas recall innocent farmers being killed in fields and swiddens by government troops literally ‘headhunting’ for bounty and preferment.

It is a complex and even paradoxical phenomenon too, for it is also linked with a new round of assertive military involvement in a political discourse in which some sectors of the military argue for withdrawal from politics, and some assert renewed claims to be the preeminent social force for democracy.

At the outset we must note the very widespread legal and illegal distribution and possession of firearms in Thailand, and the existence of a large number of people willing to act as ‘gun hands’ (mu pun), that is to say, to carry out killings on behalf of others, often for a quite small fee which may vary according to the rank or importance of the victim. Also most of the killings are shootings, at close range, and by such a third party, and frequently with military weapons such as the Ml6 and AK47 automatic rifles.

There is a large number of cases reported, officially and in the press, as revenge killings or the result of private feuding between rival political and commercial interest groups, in provincial towns and rural areas. But very often it is the outspoken critic of vested interests and malpractices who is killed (whether provincial newspaper reporter, teacher, development worker, elected member of national or provincial assembly etc.). And not infrequently the hired hand is identified as being a member (on or off duty) of one of the official or semi-official organizations we have discussed. Lack of concern to pursue investigation, or failure to produce, much less charge and convict, suspects is a feature of most cases.

Extra-judicial killings include those of persistent offenders carried out with the approval sometimes of whole communities, which are tolerated by the police; those carried out by the police themselves, other than with legal sanction.

In this case the victim is often someone who has been critical of local power interests, and whose death is passed off as being that of a drug-trader suspect, or alternatively, as having been caused by drug-traders.

All the above was written 20 years ago* about the military's suppression campaign in the northeast after the collapse of the communist insurgency. Chang Noi just changed "communist" to "drug trader" in the last sentence. The point is: what is happening today is nothing new.

The Thaksin government is a collection of big businessmen banded together to overcome the economic crisis. They need the state to fend off outsiders, and to quell the rising level of protest and defiance, particularly in the countryside. At first, the government promised a new "social contract". It devised "populist" policies based on what people wanted. And it delivered them, often in the teeth of bitter criticism. For all this, the Thaksin government deserves praise for breaking the political mould.

But since the mid-point of its term, there has been a definite increase in the government's readiness to use violence, particularly against little people who stand in its way. It disposed of the complex Pak Mun issue by a summary judgement, then forcibly threw the protestors out of the city. The Hat Yai demonstration against the gas pipeline was attacked (no other verb qualifies) by the police, causing injury and property damage. Then the government unleashed the shooting war against petty drug users and traders. It doesn't matter who is pulling the trigger. The government does not intend to verify whether the dead were guilty, or investigate who is responsible for the killing. The deaths are government policy.

The first casualty of this violence is the truth. The southern demonstrators are "anarchists". Members of the National Human Rights Commission deserve impeachment for something akin to treason. All critics must be in the pay of the drug lords. Every day we listen to ministers offering explanations which are as creative and convincing as Rakkiat Sukthana's explanations about the sources of his wealth.

The old security state and its networks of official and semi-official violence have not been dismantled. General Chavalit and General Thammarak helped to plan and execute the 1980s repression described in the quotation above. They are now helping direct the drug campaign.

One enduring feature of this military thinking is the belief in a blood sacrifice. In 1973, General Praphat Charusathien said, "We might have to sacrifice about 2 percent of the hundreds and thousands of students for the survival of the country." General Suchinda Kraprayoon, a leader of the 1991 coup junta, said: "If the stability of the throne or the security of the nation were placed in serious jeopardy in the future we will intervene to save 40 million even if it means killing 100 or 200 thousand". The present government, like everyone else, knows many of the dead are petty users and traders who deserve no more than minor punishment. Others are undoubtedly totally innocent. They are a sacrifice to the belief in the efficacy of violence.

This use of violence intimidates everybody. It is a highly efficient way to engineer the dutiful society which this big business government wants. The strategy was similar twenty years ago. The 1973-6 era founded a culture of questioning, creativity, and debate. Those who think society must be controlled and led found this assertive civil society too difficult to manage. It's the same today.

*Andrew Turton, Limits of Ideological Domination, 1984