CHANG NOI

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Reforming
the police
12 May 1998
There is now a real opportunity to reform the police. The traffic police scandals caught fire so easily because there was no revelation, no surprise, no secret. Anyone with a vehicle has had to pay "informal tax" to the police at some time. The saying "in the army seniors take care of juniors, in the police juniors take care of seniors" has the status of a proverb. Few doubt that the highway police extort money and pass it up to their bosses. But if the scandal results only in a clean-up in the traffic police, then a great opportunity will be lost. The highway extortion is only one part of police revenue-gathering activities. At least three others are worth mentioning: 1) many businesses including gold shops and entertainment outlets have to pay regular protection fees; 2) many illegal businesses like gambling and prostitution are "licensed" by regular payments to the police; 3) police officers are often found in illegal businesses, especially drugs, the sex trade, and human trafficking. Since the scandal broke, several senior police figures have wrung their hands in public about the need for reform. But they claim the institution is basically fine. The problems, they argue, arise from a minority of "bad" officers. This can be fixed by improvements in recruitment and training. The Interior Minister has informally endorsed this view. But the problems run much deeper. Consider just the scandals of the last few years. The Saudi jewelry scandal revealed gangs of police officers fighting and killing one another over some very valuable loot. The Lang Suan massacre allegedly happened because one officer lost patience with the massive revenue-gathering at a provincial police station. The Golden Pig affair suggested several senior officers were involved in the gambling business. It may be true that most of the 200,000 plus police officers are good and honest people, and that these scandals are the work of a bad minority. But it is the structure and culture of the police service which attracts, nurtures and often protects this minority. Any real reform has to attack the structure. How did the police get to be like this? Four factors in the service’s history helped to shape the structure. First, the force was created around a century ago as part of the general centralisation of government power, and as a specific device to control the Chinese angyi (secret societies). From the beginning it was more like an army of occupation than a community-based service. Second, also from the beginning government skimped on the budget and expected the police to supplement by informal revenue-gathering. Third, during the Cold War the police was extensively militarised to fight communists. Fourth, also during the Cold War, some senior officers developed illegal business rackets, especially drug trading. Junior officers are so poorly paid that they are easily socialised into a culture of corruption. As one officer wryly commented: a new recruit may start out pure white, but will begin greying before he is out of the police school, and get steadily darker from then on. The force is top-heavy. Too many senior levels have too little to do except manage the informal revenue flows. The highway scandal revealed a massive paperwork operation to disguise the misallocation of revenue from fines. The junior traffic policemen’s complaint that they were short-changed by their bosses is not unique. Past investigations have found senior officers pocketing allowances and bonuses due to their subordinates. Authority within the police is very centralised. This promotes corruption, nepotism, and abuse of power. It also makes it impossible to build any significant relationships between local police units and the communities they serve. The public feel helpless in the face of police misconduct. There is no channel of public recourse. Senior officers and ministers usually defend the institution against criticism. It took the very new factor of independent electronic journalism to prise the lid off. This state of the Thai police is far from unique. Many countries have gone through a similar stage. In the US and Europe, reform of similar police problems was a major issue earlier this century. World-wide there is a lot of learning on how to tackle these problems. The difference is that in Thailand there has been no government with a political willl to do anything about it. Reform of the Thai police must certainly include adjustments in recruitment and training, but must also go far beyond: -Pay and equip the junior officers properly, and so remove the rationale for the regular and irregular bonus systems. -Rationalise the top-heavy structure through an enforced early retirement scheme. -Decentralise the control structure and move towards the model of a community-based police force. -Demilitarise by adjusting ranks, uniforms, and many aspects of the police’s internal culture. -Enforce a better code-of-conduct, but offer an amnesty. The amnesty is a very eloquent device. It says: we will not harass you for mistakes of the past, because often those mistakes were intrinsic to the system and culture, rather than the failings of individuals; but now the system has changed so individual conduct must change too. -Provide a better channel for public recourse against police actions. -Decriminalise petty illegalities which offer opportunities for revenue-gathering. Many other countries have reformed laws on gambling, liquor and prostitution to bring the law into line with social reality and so remove opportunities for widespread police corruption. Most of these reforms have been recommended by past investigations. But dictatorial governments thought reform unnecessary (this sort of police force suited them), and democratic governments have found the topic too dangerous. Reform will only come about through popular pressure. It will not be easy and it will take time. But it has to start at some point. At least now the topic is up for discussion. This is a great opportunity. |