The important election is the next one

6 January 2001

Over the last few weeks, Bangkok has been full of foreign journalists all asking the same question. Is this election really a big change? Or will it be business as usual? The best answer is a paradox. Yes, it is a big change. But it hasn’t really happened yet.

In many western countries, the process of transforming money politics into workable electoral democracy took a long, long time. In Britain it began in the 1780s, and ended with the post-Poulson local government reforms in the 1970s. In Italy, it began after the first world war and still isn’t complete. Thailand is replaying these histories in fast-forward mode.

A huge amount has changed in the past decade. The 1997 constitution has rewritten the rules of the political game and rejigged the structures. But the bigger change has been in popular attitudes. Earlier Thailand could be imagined as a relatively apolitical society—a passive people governed by a benign monarchy and paternal bureaucracy, with a toy parliamentary democracy that need not be taken too seriously. Some people still cling to this image of a country managed by an all-powerful elite in the background. But it no longer makes sense. At all levels, people have begun to demand access to power. Some with their tongues. Some with their wallets. Some with their feet.

As a result, the last couple of years have seen some unprecedented events. Mass demonstrations. Big government projects blocked by local protests. Officials and politicians pinioned by scandal. Two ministers howled out of office by popular disgust. The second most powerful figure in the government felled by the anti-corruption commission.

The new rules are part of this. But the new, assertive public opinion is the most important part. Consider how the Election Commission has been working since the Senate polls almost a year ago. The Commission has enormous formal power. But it knows it cannot operate unless it reflects public opinion. So it has developed a clever technique. Before any major move, a Commissioner meets the press and casually mentions what it is planning to do. Then the Commission waits for the feedback. Only then it acts.

Amid all this change, there is one element that has lagged behind: the political leaders, political parties, and political culture. Thai Rak Thai was the only party which responded to the demand for something new. At the outset, it promised real innovation. But over two years, it evolved into something very familiar, very old-fashioned, packed with some of the wickedest figures still alive and active in Thai politics. At this election, all the major parties look much the same: a coalition of big business interests allied with a coalition of provincial strong men, prepared to invest lots of money to gain power. In the end, the only things new about Thai Rak Thai were the trimmings: a policy platform, slick campaigning, and spectacular war chest.

The result has been ironical but inevitable. Thaksin has become both the symbol and the victim of the previous decade of change. More than anyone else he has come to represent the popular demand for a new politics. But at the same time, more than anyone else he has been pinioned by the new rules and new public opinion which demand new standards of political behaviour.

The result is uncertainty. At every pre-electoral poll, between 20 and 60 percent of people said they had not made up their mind or might still change it. Many opinion leaders suggested that the best response was to “elect not to elect”. A lot of people are saying: I expect something new, but this isn’t it.

This will have many consequences which will make the next few months very messy. The election rules have several technical problems simply because they are newly drafted. More importantly, the new government—of whatever party—will have to manage an avalanche of inflated expectations. The crisis stirred up a lot of new grievances and demands. The election campaign turned into a competition between rival populist agendas. Poverty, drugs and corruption are going to disappear. The bureaucracy will be magically transformed into a public service. The economy will boom. Education will cost nothing. Debts will dissolve. Baht will rain from heaven. Happiness will rise like a monsoon flood.

After all of this, the new government’s honeymoon will last a nanosecond. And when it fails to “lead the Thai people out of poverty” (Thaksin) within a few months, the reaction will be severe.

Moreover, any new political system needs practice. You don’t get it right first time. Nobody could judge in advance how much the new electoral rules would really change the election result. Nobody knows how much the new parliamentary structure will change how government functions. Clearly many politicians have invested just as much as ever in the effort to get elected this time. But will the payback be as good now there are fewer ministerships, less patronage for MPs, tighter corruption controls, the chance of a “red card”, and a much more watchful press and public? The real threat to money politics is not the stern hand of the law, but the changing economics of investment and return.

In many other countries, after major political reforms there were several general elections in quick succession. This could be the pattern here. Between the passage of the constitution and this 2001 election, the political parties and the political culture failed to respond to the pace of change. But this election and the next parliamentary session will be a learning experience. The collision between old political culture and new public expectations will be played out over the next few months. The changing economics of money politics will become apparent. The political parties and the political culture will start to change.

This election is not the really important one. The next one may be. And it will probably happen soon.