The board, the management, and the lollipops

20 February 2001

Thaksin’s cabinet has four parts—the boardroom, the management, the lollipop men, and the mush. The last part is the filler. Howls from press and public helped Thaksin veto some obvious gangsters. But the quota system is intact. Factions bargained hard for cabinet allocations equivalent to their numbers. So we still have mush. They will look nice in the uniforms.

The boardroom. Thaksin has said he will govern like a CEO. He has allotted the core portfolios to people who are long-standing associates. His college chum, Purachai, has interior. His old friend and political secretary, Somkid, has finance. His legal adviser, Pongthep Thepkanchana, has justice. His business rival-turned-ally, Adisai Bodharamik, has commerce. His tax adviser, Suvarn Valaisathien, has deputy commerce. This group is the inner boardroom of Thaksinland Inc. By pure chance, this group also oversees all issues relating to the CEO’s management of his wealth—tax evasion, stockmarket irregularities, and constitutional illegality. Those expecting Thaksin to disappear in a puff of smoke should stop holding their breath.

The management. Thaksinland Inc is a family business. But today even family businesses need professional managers. So the CEO has installed a cadre of professional managers and technocrats in several posts. Some of these are ex-bureaucrats, like Suchart Jaovisith, who have both specialised knowledge and the experience needed to manage the workforce (i.e. the bureaucracy). Others are professionals like Kasem Wattanachai in education and Surapong Seubwonglee in health. Prapa Panyachartrak in agriculture is actually a farmer—a blinding innovation.

The lollipops. Thaksin rose to power with the support of three parties from the old politics—New Aspiration, Chat Thai, and Snoh Thienthong’s Wang Nam Yen group. These three have been rewarded with lollipops. The juiciest (defence) has gone to New Aspiration and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. Kickbacks on arms purchases may be more difficult in these days of public scrutiny. But the military still has a massive budget for construction and procurement. More importantly, it still runs the borders. In his previous tenures as defence minister and prime minister, Chavalit opened border crossings for profitable trade, and hosted defence/trade missions to neighbouring countries. Large tracts of Burmese forest were clear-felled. Some of those who profited are still part of the TRT-NAP parliamentary alliance.

The Wang Nam Yen group has been rewarded with next juiciest lollipop, agriculture. Procurement schemes and price subsidies have proven very lucrative in the past. During his last tenure of this post, Chucheep Hansawat was responsible for a famous fertiliser scheme.

Chat Thai joined Thaksin’s coalition rather late and had weaker bargaining power. It has to be content with a few popsicles.

The lollipops are supposed to keep these factions occupied, comforted, and quiet. Look our for some heavy licking. The smaller parties spent heavily in the election and achieved meagre returns. Their future depends on whether these investments prove profitable. All three groups also got a deputy ministership for a party financier. Besides, the grip on these lollipops may be temporary. Thaksin has announced that posts may be rotated. Behind each lollipop-holder there is a long queue. Many of the thirsty will argue, "If Chucheep ‘Meatballs’ Hansawat can get agriculture, then why not me?" This is a powerful argument. Chucheep contributed little to the party standing as his relatives and friends failed miserably in the election. During his previous tenure of an agriculture portfolio, he was pulled out of negotiations with the Assembly of the Poor because his total ignorance of agricultural issues was getting in the way.

Of these four parts, the boardroom is the most important. Thaksinland Inc is a conglomerate of several of Thailand’s biggest business interests. Thaksin himself is the country’s biggest individual entrepreneur. The largest business group, CP, is represented in the cabinet by its long-standing political lobbyist, Pitak Intravitayanant. The head of the CP group endorsed Thaksin before the election, as did the head of the largest bank, Bangkok Bank. The chief of one of the largest manufacturing groups has the industry ministry, and the head of one of the largest media empires is deputy commerce. The biggest consumer goods company, Sahapat, is linked through Somkid, the company’s long-standing consultant. Other coalition MPs have interests in property, construction, hotels and, of course, meatballs

This takes us back some fifteen years. During the mid-1980s recession, many big businessmen entered politics. But after the boom took off, they concentrated on making money. Now times are tough again. These companies have been battered by the crisis and think they deserve help. Also, these are the survivors of the crisis and are well-poised to benefit from the massacre of their rivals. Thai Rak Thai may highlight its social policies, and may indeed be serious about them. Social harmony is good for business. But this government is the Assembly of the Rich, and the boardroom will have shareholder interests at heart.

The real policy programme probably reads like this. Bail out the banks. Carve up the telecoms sector. Crush media liberalisation.

The model is Malaysia. For many years, Mahathir and his pals have run Malaysia as if it were a business—their business. Thaksin has expressed his admiration for Mahathir. Somkid has written articles about Thailand Inc, and running a country like a business. Surakiart talks about reorienting regional foreign policy to economic ends.

In the Malaysian model, opposition is managed by manipulating the judiciary and suppressing the media. Thailand is already moving in the same direction. Over the last five years, politicians have begun throwing court cases about to block opposition and intimidate enemies. Will Thaksin’s legal entanglements push this to another level? Thaksin’s purchase-and-purge of ITV means that the electronic media are safely under control. The press will be more difficult. Thaksin will try using cash, but it may not work. Thai journalism came of age fighting dictatorship. The money politics of Thaksinland is a more complex and dangerous enemy than the generals. The pen proved mightier than the sword. But will the pen be mightier than the wallet?