Knowing (and not knowing) the south

8 nov 2004

When Deputy Supreme Commander Sirichai Thanyasiri took over the Southern Border Province Peace-Building Command one month ago, he said: “I admit that I don’t know who the enemy is but I will try my best to get them.” His ignorance must now have disappeared. Arrayed against him is virtually the entire Muslim population of the far south, and large numbers in Islamic communities across the world.

Knowing what is really going on in the far south has been a major problem all along. Soon after the weapons’ theft of 4 January 2004, Thaksin complained that he received conflicting intelligence from different agencies involved. Later he said he had to develop his own sources and make up his own mind. Police and military have fought “information wars” in the public media. Key intelligence posts have been rejigged several times.

But the value of information lies in the way it is interpreted. Thaksin’s view has been filtered through his own preconceptions. He seems to have a narrow view of man as an animal interested only in wealth and power. He has difficulty understanding people whose worldview is different to his own – whether that is a Pak Mun fisherman who values a river for itself, or a Pattani Muslim who values his religious beliefs and cultural heritage.

On brief occasions over the past year, he has opened up to the idea that the southern problem has cultural, religious, historical and social aspects. But increasingly he has clung to the view that only two things matter. First, there is an economic problem resulting from longstanding lack of development funds. Second, a small group of conspirators take advantage of this economic problem because of their “bad intentions” (which he constantly cites without ever explaining what he means). The first problem has to be solved by money, and the second by force.

Early in the year, he was at least prepared to listen to proposals for political approaches to the problem. But gradually his options have become narrower. He allowed the military to scrunch Chaturon’s plan. He dismissed Chavalit’s suggestion for using existing administrative options in a creative way to give more local self-government. He recently responded to Mahathir’s suggestion for greater autonomy by totally misrepresenting it as in breach of the Thai constitution. These alternative ideas may or may not have value. But the absolute refusal to allow them any space means there is only one way forward -- a military solution, the use of violence.

As a result of this perception, Thaksin is no longer master of the military, but its captive.

The incidents at the Krue Se mosque and Tak Bai share a tragic pattern. In both cases, there are clear traces that some people were trying to manufacture an incident of martyrdom. In both cases, the military performed their role in the tragedy exactly according to the script. They went ahead and created lots of martyrs. Whoever was writing this script knew that it would work because they knew the Thai military. It has been the military leaders who have consistently stamped on plans for political solutions, conciliation, or intermediation. In an arena of violence, they are the experts and hence they are in charge. By campaigning so successfully for a military solution, they have gained the initiative. By failing to champion any political solution, Thaksin has forfeited any role for political leadership. Hence he is now in the military’s grip.

Knowing what is happening is important. Making sure that the mass of the people do not know what is happening is important too.

The reaction of people to the Tak Bai incident depends a lot on what people know about it. Within Thailand, beyond the readers of a handful of newspapers, people have seen a version which the government wants them to see. Outside the country, and among the few with access to international media, the experience has been very different. Especially on BBC television, they saw shooting, beating, kicking, and transport of people as animals in graphic detail. When viewers then heard Thaksin describe the authorities’ treatment as soft, and claim the deaths resulted from an error of judgement for which nobody was responsible, the only possible reaction was confusion and disbelief.

And this has shaped their actions. Foreign investors have responded by voting with their portfolios – withdrawing 6 billion baht in a week. Ordinary Muslims in neighbouring countries are appalled. Mahathir’s suggestion may irritate Thai nationalists, but it reflects feelings of humanity which (like television images) are not restricted by national boundaries.

One major reason why such incidents happen is because government believes it can control the knowledge about them. If everybody had seen the BBC images of Tak Bai (and the footage of the October 1976 killings, the May 1992 killings, the Hat Yai beatings, etc., etc), reactions would be different. As long as Thailand’s media is controlled (largely by the military), such incidents will recur. The demand for removal of the electronic material from state control swelled after the military shot protesters on Bangkok streets in May 1992, but was then delayed, derailed, and finally sabotaged. Getting media reform back on the agenda is necessary to stop this gloomy sequence.

Keeping people in the dark further ensures that the military approach to the southern problem faces no serious challenge, no serious alternative. Thaksin has now called on the people of the south to forget the past and unite. But unite around what? The stress on a military solution over recent months has accelerated polarization, and destroyed any middle ground.

Ever since the far south was captured by the Bangkok armies around two centuries ago, the area has risen in revolt roughly once every twenty years. Unless someone tries to understand why that has been the case, then there is no chance of breaking the sequence. The only major difference in this reiteration is that the escalation could go much farther. That bit of knowledge ought to concentrate the mind.