Managed democracy, from 1976 to 2006

 8 january 2007

The coup was enthusiastically welcomed by the Bangkok middle class. The man chosen to be prime minister was known to enjoy the trust of the king. The coup group tore up the existing constitution and set out a long programme to create a replacement. They explained that the coup was needed because of social division, and they promised to bring about national reconciliation.

19 September 2006? Yes, but it also fits 6 October 1976 (though that coup differed by being much bloodier). The 1976 era was also the last time Bangkok suffered from bombs targeted at ordinary people to stir up political tension. Most significantly, both coups were set against the background of a deep rift in society along the fault line between city and village. 

In detail, the politics of this divide were immensely different in the two years. In 1976, Bangkok felt threatened by a Maoist insurgency with links to revolutionary regimes across its eastern borders, a peasant movement which used grassroots organization and mass demonstrations to demand debt relief and tenancy, and a student movement which sympathized with rural demands and gave them extra ideological force. In 2006, Bangkok felt threatened by a political leader and political party which had built unprecedented support in the rural areas of the north and the northeast by delivering a range of populist programmes, and promising even more.

But the similarity between the two events, and the fact many of the key players today were also part of post-1976 events (in more junior roles), makes it worth looking at what happened after the 1976 coup.

After 1976, the establishment solution was a formula of “managed democracy” with three main parts: constitutional engineering to produce a system that was democratic in form but insulated against the risk of mass takeover; military oversight of political activity from top to bottom; and a public campaign for national unity around the institution of the monarchy. Probably, the first two parts are being used again.

The constitution under which parliament resumed in 1979 brought back an elected lower house, but with two key provisions. The prime minister did not have to be an MP. The Senate was appointed, and had veto power over the budget, no confidence motions, economic bills, and matters of national security. The first provision in effect allowed the military to appoint the prime minister for the next nine years, and also to fill several other key ministries (interior, foreign). The Senate, packed with generals, senior bureaucrats and sympathizers, gave the military premier a cushion against any opposition.

It is no surprise that both these provisions have been advocated openly and strongly by members of the current coup group or their close associates.

After 1976, the military set out to oversee political activity from top to bottom. Again, we can already see clear parallels in the aftermath of the 2006 coup. Martial law has been retained in the upcountry areas considered “sensitive.” The army has set up a force of 13,625 troops backed with a budget of half a billion baht to police political activity at the grassroots. The coup group has talked of converting village officers back from elected representatives into appendages of the bureaucracy so that they can act as the “eyes and ears” of government – a piece of vocabulary which comes right out of the post-1976 era.

The coup leaders have also been holding mass rallies in “sensitive” provinces, at a time when no others are allowed to hold such meetings. They are building direct links between the army and local leaders. There are also military efforts to manage civil society groups through a mixture of cooption and intimidation, which again recalls the situation which prevailed from 1976 to the mid 1980s. Finally, there is a plan to revive ISOC, the agency which coordinated the post-1976 campaign of military oversight. The head of the junta has talked of remodeling ISOC on the model of the US Department of Homeland Security.

Will it work? The intervening three decades have seen big changes. The massive increase in wealth has seen a multiplication in the size and number of the interests which are protected and promoted by political means. People have become better educated, more politically aware, more sensitive to issues of rights and liberties. Surveillance and suppression may be no easier to resist than they were thirty years ago, but they will be much more strongly resented. The fact that the expression of rural discontent has moved from the revolutionary cell and street demonstration to the electoral process is a form of progress which makes democracy much more difficult to manage.

In truth, the Sonthi coup fits into a longer sequence running from 1947 through 1957 and 1976 to 2006. In each case, the political establishment decided that the democratic process was not working properly and had to be halted and redesigned. In each case, politicians who had won power through the electoral process, by fair means or foul, were somehow deemed to be a danger to the country – too weak, too strong, or too something. In each case, support from royalist figures helped to legitimate the hiccup in Thailand’s political history. And in each case, key figures ended up in virtual exile.

Looking back over the whole sequence from 1947 through 1957 to 1976 carries another message. The coup was only a beginning. The coup makers soon fell out. After 1947, the royalist and militarist partners in the coup soon diverged, and a series of after-shocks brought the military to dominance. After 1957, Field-Marshal Sarit installed a military premier but then carried out a second coup against his own nominee. After 1976, the military again removed the civilian premier, and the after-shocks continued through coup, counter-coup and failed coup for the next nine years.

It looks like Thai politics will be in turmoil for a while. But when and how will it recover some stability?