A coup by other means?

17 August 1996

In the 7 years since he quit the army and formed the New Aspiration Party, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh has had one ambition: to become prime minister. Today, he may be closer than ever. So what is General Chavalit? A politician who used to be a soldier? Or a soldier disguised as a politician? Would the rise of Chavalit be just another shuffle of the parliamentary pack. Or would it be a coup by other means?

A coup in Thailand is much more than tanks in the streets and uniforms in government house. A coup marks the return of a long and deep tradition. A post-coup government has a certain style which everybody understands, and many still support.

For more than half a century, military leaders argued that government is best left to "disinterested professionals", as opposed to "interested politicians". Through control of the media, they made sure everyone heard their argument, and often. With the electronic media still under tight controls, the message is still there, though often today in subtle guise.

Many have bought into the argument. Of course, many soldiers support the idea of a military-led government. So do many civilian bureaucrats who resent having to deal with politicians. Also many companies which have grown skilled at dealing with military governments. Also many others who have simply succumbed to the propaganda.

Professor Chai-Anan proposed that Thai politics revolves round a "vicious cycle". On the upswing, elections are held, parliaments function, liberties increase. At the same time political in-fighting swells, corruption multiplies, and scandals rage. Eventually the military steps in, to restore order and discipline. Parliament is closed or limited, dissidents are stifled, liberties are curtailed. After a time, social pressures force the military to lighten up, and the cycle starts anew.

The idea of a "cycle" suggests the process is repetitive. In fact, each rotation has been very different. But Professor Chai-Anan’s model captures the tendency of Thai politics to oscillate between the two extremes. Much that is happening now resembles the prelude to previous coups. Constant political in-fighting. Escalating charges of corruption. Protests by labour and villagers. Direct attacks on such hallowed institutions as police administration and military budgets.

But the debacle of 1991-2 has ended the era of the "traditional" coup, with tanks in the streets, oom-pa-pa music on the radio, a khaki cabinet, and fine words about the military’s duties to the nation. The success of the 1991 coup was a strategic disaster for the army. As an institution, the army lost a large measure of popular respect, and a great deal of its political role. As individuals, senior officers lost access to power, position and income-earning opportunities on a large scale.

So the cycle may be swinging round to the point which once would have been punctuated by a coup. But the generals know that a traditional coup will no longer work. Has this given Chavalit a historic role: the mailed fist inside the soft pudgy glove, the leader of a coup by other means?

In many ways, Chavalit is a curious candidate for the role. He was never a mainstream soldier. He was a staff officer rather than a field commander. He never had the backing from field units which traditionally has been the base for coups. In the late 1980s, he was easily brushed aside by the 1991 coup group because he lacked any solid military backing.

Moreover in the view of the average flat-headed soldier, Chavalit has always been too much of an "intellectual" or "ideologue". During the communist insurgency, he was involved with debriefing communist defectors in order to build a better counter-insurgency strategy. He was part of the group which advocated fighting communism by political means, and which borrowed some strategies from the communists themselves.

This group argued that communism had made headway in Thailand because Thai society was unfair, and that much of that unfairness grew out of business exploitation. His group proposed that the army should combat communism by controlling all political activity, and by reducing business exploitation. The group came out strongly against old-style "business soldiers" - generals who worked hand-in-hand with big corporate interests for immense mutual profit. They also criticised the self-interest of politicians. Chavalit once referred to Thailand’s political parties as "trading companies".

Right up to 1992, Chavalit appeared to be a different breed of political soldier. He founded a full-scale political party. He put his policy emphasis on rural issues. In the crisis of May 1992, he was aligned with the anti-military angels.

But since then, Chavalit has grown more and more like the military politicians of the classical style.

He has concentrated on building his power base outside the parliament, in the ranks of the armed forces.

He has become the leading advocate for long-standing military issues. He backs the campaign for more arms budgets. By bluff and bluster, he defended the military heads from the "ignominy" of being summoned before the house budget committee.

Through the Veterans Organisation, he is trying to increase the military’s involvement in lucrative areas of the economy such as telecommunications and banking.

Through the satellite scheme and the plans to allow new players into the telecommunications industry, he has opened up possibilities for large-scale earnings. He no longer talks of businessmen as a dangerous social force. "What is the role of politicians," he said very recently, "if not to help businessmen."

If events are looking ever more like a classic pre-coup phase, and if Chavalit is behaving ever more like a classic politico-business general, then we could guess that the rise of Chavalit could lead to classic post-coup politics. Suppression of labour organisations. Tighter controls on the press. A moratorium on projects for constitutional and administrative reform. A larger role for men-in-uniform in the life of the nation. Favours for those companies which have learnt over decades how to manoeuvre for the patronage of such regimes. In today’s environment, these shifts would have to be managed with some grade and subtlety.

Chang Noi notes: Chavalit is not just another politician. Nor should he be dismissed as simply an opportunist. Through the twists of history, he has become the torch-holder for one of the major traditions in Thai political life.