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Buy the latest up-to-date copy of this book, "Clash of Civilizations and the International Military Industrial Complex"

The Euro-Atlantic-Asiatic Area

 

Military Industrial Complex

 

 

By Chairman MacLaughlin

 


 

Table of Contents

1)     Introduction

2)     Mutually Reinforcing Institutions

3)     Enlargement

4)     Three Pillars

5)     Industrial Consolidation

6)     Cooperation

7)     Bibliography


 

 

Introduction

It makes sense that one of the main functions of government is the protection of the citizens with police and military and so a portion of any budget includes substantial support for protection/security. Also history has shown that unprepared nations often lose wars while prepared nations fare better.

Militaries look to the industrial capacity of their nation for the equipment and weapons and resources to wage future wars and a lot of the military budget is spent on contracts with private firms who provide weapons and services.

Those industrial companies that have military and government contracts as a key part of their revenue of course seek to continue the relationship with spare parts, repairs, and more new gadgets to keep sales going.

Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961

�My fellow Americans:

Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor.

This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.

Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all.

Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the Nation.

My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years.

In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the Nation should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.

II.

We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

III.

Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology -- global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger is poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle -- with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research -- these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs -- balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage -- balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

IV.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system -- ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

V.

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we -- you and I, and our government -- must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

VI.

Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war -- as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years -- I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

VII.

So -- in this my last good night to you as your President -- I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.

You and I -- my fellow citizens -- need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals.

To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America's prayerful and continuing aspiration:

We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.�

Today

Forty years on, it is surely fitting to look afresh at Eisenhower's warning, and to appraise the present and future of the military-industrial complex. At first glance, Dwight David Eisenhower seemed an unlikely candidate to launch a blistering critique of the military-industrial complex (a phrase coined by Eisenhower's speechwriters Ralph Williams and Malcolm Moos). As a four-star general and a hero of the Allied assault against Hitler, he certainly believed in maintaining a strong military. And although Eisenhower tried to hold the line on military spending, his administration still maintained an annual military budget ranging from $42 billion to $49 billion-three to four times higher than defense spending during the brief postwar demobilization. As the historian Blanche Wiesen Cook has remarked, it is not as if Ike was a raving peacenik: his doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation increased the risk of nuclear war, and his administration's support for coups d'�tat that helped install repressive regimes in Iran and Guatemala undermined the stability of the Persian Gulf and Central America, even as they tarnished America's reputation as a force for democracy.

Yet in retrospect, it was precisely Eisenhower's martial posture that gave authority to his warning about the growing influence of the military-industrial establishment. As the late Washington columnist Lars Erik-Nelson noted in his last published essay, Eisenhower's speech was not just a rhetorical throwaway meant to steal the thunder of the incoming Kennedy administration: it was deeply felt, grounded in his own bitter experiences. �In the 1956 elections, conservative Democrats, egged on by officials in the air force, accused Eisenhower of permitting a "bomber gap" by refusing to fund their new B-70 bomber. And in 1960, Richard Nixon, who served eight years as Eisenhower's vice president, was excoriated by his Democratic rival John F. Kennedy for allowing a supposedly dangerous "missile gap" to develop between U.S. and Soviet forces. The bomber gap proved a figment of the fevered imaginations of the weapons boosters, while the missile gap was real enough-though it was a gap that dramatically favored the United States, not the Soviet Union, as hard-line Democrats like Kennedy and Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson had maintained.

If an Eisenhower could not rein in the military lobby, small wonder that Bill Clinton, perceived as a draft-evading child of the 1960s, let the Joint Chiefs have their way. Clinton bequeathed his Republican successor a Pentagon budget not only higher in constant, 2001 dollars than it was when Eisenhower sounded his alarm, but also higher than the budget that Donald Rumsfeld presided over during his first stint as secretary of defense in the mid-1970s. The United States has no superpower adversary, as it did then, yet we spend more on our military forces than eight runner-up nations combined. As for the so-called rogue states, or "states of concern" as former secretary of state Madeleine Albright called them, the United States now spends 22 times as much as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba combined. And the United States and its closest allies, including the NATO member-states, Japan, and South Korea, currently account for nearly two-thirds of global military spending, a much greater proportion than obtained during the Reagan buildup of the 1980s, when the United States and these same allies accounted for just over half of total expenditures.

Given these realities, Clinton's Pentagon budget was as much testimony to the enduring power of the military-industrial complex as it was to the military capabilities of potential adversaries.� Like Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush may surprise us by being more skilled in the arts of political communication and less rigid in the implementation of major policy initiatives than seemed possible at first glance. Or, like William Jefferson Clinton, he may permit his national security policies to be distorted by pressures brought to bear by the military-industrial lobby. Informed speculation needs to begin with a review of what candidate Bush said during campaign 2000.

George W. Bush's only comprehensive defense policy speech, delivered at the Citadel on September 23, 1999, serves as a touchstone for his administration's early moves. He set three ambitious goals: 1) to "renew the bond of trust between the American President and the American military"; 2) to "defend the American people against missiles and terror"; and 3) to "begin creating the military of the next century."

Bush proposed restoring trust by increasing military pay and benefits and by clarifying the mission of U.S. forces to "deter...and win wars," not to undertake "vague, aimless, and endless deployments." The latter phrase signaled the new administration's reluctance to send U.S. forces on open-ended peace-keeping missions like the Clinton administration's deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo. Candidate Bush gave few specifics on his second promise but indicated that as president he would make substantial new investments in anti-terrorism efforts and "deploy anti-ballistic missile defenses, both theater and national," at the earliest possible date. And he promised "an immediate, comprehensive review of our military" designed to "challenge the status quo and to envision a new architecture of American defense for decades to come." Beyond marginal improvements, he urged the replacement of existing programs "with new technologies and strategies" aimed at creating forces that would be "agile, lethal, readily deployable and require a minimum of logistical support."

To achieve this leaner, meaner, more mobile military, Bush suggested it might be necessary to "skip a generation of technology" in certain systems. These were fighting words for the military, the arms industry, and their allies in Congress. Skipping a generation implies canceling one or more big-ticket systems, such as the Lockheed Martin F-22 fighter, the Boeing/Textron V-22 Osprey (half airplane, half helicopter), or the United Defense Crusader artillery system. That would mean sacrificing jobs and contracts now to husband resources for novel future systems-a perfectly reasonable management strategy, and arguably the only way to make room in the budget for Bush's ambitious missile defense system, plus tens of billions in research and development money for the next generation of weaponry.

The alternative to killing the Pentagon's sacred cows would be to seek a massive increase in military spending-in the range of $50 billion to $100 billion annually-that would cover costs of pork-barrel schemes already in the budget and simultaneously provide funding for missile defenses and new-wave weaponry. �An increase on that scale, however, would conflict with Bush's commitment to a multi-year, $1.6 billion tax cut. For the moment at least, the Bush team has decided against such a defense-funding boost until it has more clearly defined its priorities.

In sum, Bush's military vision portends a substantial increase in missile defenses, new investments in smart maneuverable weapons and weapons platforms, and a major increase in military pay and benefits. These large expenditures would be offset by a reduction in U.S. overseas deployments and the cancellation of one or more costly Cold War weapons programs. Were Bush to "skip a generation" of big-ticket conventional weapons, he might be able to keep his campaign promises without breaking the bank. But if he gives in to pressure from Senate Republican leader Trent Lott, Lockheed Martin, and the Joint Chiefs, he would face a stark choice: either sacrifice his high-tech reform agenda or seek a politically controversial boost in the Pentagon budget. The guerrilla war between the administration and the military-industrial complex over what kind of buildup America should pursue is already under way, and the outcome will depend on whether the president can win key battles over spending against a Republican-controlled Congress.


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The Mutually Reinforcing Institutions; OSCE, NATO and CoE:

The concept of "mutually reinforcing institutions" in the security field previously referred to as "interlocking institutions", can be traced back to the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation issued at the NATO Summit Meeting in November 1991. The Declaration recognized that the challenges which would have to be faced in the new Europe could not be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. NATO countries would therefore work towards a new European security architecture, based on principles established by the United Nations Charter, in which NATO, the CSCE (later OSCE), the European Community (later the European Union), the WEU and the Council of Europe would complement each other and in which other regional frameworks of cooperation would also play an important role.

 

OSCE

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization in the world with 55 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative: comprehensive in dealing with a wide range of security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, democratization, election monitoring and economic and environmental security; co-operative in the sense that all OSCE participating States have equal status, and decisions are based on consensus.� The OSCE headquarters are located in Vienna, Austria. The Organization also has offices and institutions located in Copenhagen, Geneva, The Hague, Prague and Warsaw.�

The fact that a number of OSCE participating States border the Mediterranean, and that the countries of the Mediterranean region share historical, cultural, economic and political ties with the OSCE region, makes clear that there is a Mediterranean dimension to European security.� At the 1999 Istanbul Summit Meeting of OSCE Heads of State and Government, the participating States reiterated their commitment to strengthening relations with the Mediterranean Partners.� In addition to the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, the OSCE maintains a special relationship with three other states: Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand.

The Organization employs about 4,000 staff in more than 20 missions and field activities located in South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They work 'on the ground' to facilitate political processes, prevent or settle conflicts, and promote civil society and the rule of law.

The operational strengths of the OSCE are primarily linked to non-military tasks such as conflict prevention, post-conflict rehabilitation, democratization, and human rights and election monitoring. However, the Charter confirmed that the OSCE could decide to play a leading role in peacekeeping when participating states judge it to be the most effective and appropriate organization. Furthermore, the OSCE could play a role by mandating and requesting support from other organizations and/or states for conducting peacekeeping operations on its behalf. In accordance with the Platform for Cooperative Security, the OSCE could also provide a coordinating framework for such efforts.

The REACT Initiative aimed to provide the OSCE with a tool to address problems before they became crises and to deploy quickly the civilian component of a peacekeeping operation. This rapidly deployable capability covers a wide range of civilian expertise to assist in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Participating states identify readily - deployable individuals with expertise in a variety of relevant areas (e.g.: human rights monitoring and election organization and monitoring).

Significant landmarks in the evolution of the OSCE's (formerly CSCE's) work on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) include the 1986 Stockholm Document, which was later expanded and improved in the Vienna 1990 and Vienna 1992 Documents. At the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in July 1992 the participating states decided to establish a CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) in Vienna, tasked with promoting a security dialogue and conducting negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence and security building.

The Forum was inaugurated on 22 September 1992. Over the next two years, in accordance with a mandate agreed upon at Helsinki entitled �Program for Immediate Action�, negotiations took place in the Forum on a series of documents addressing arms control issues, disarmament and confidence and security- building measures, security enhancement and cooperation and conflict prevention.

In the light of the Program for Immediate Action, two further elements were agreed in December 1994 in the run-up to the CSCE�s Budapest Summit: a new version of the Vienna Document (Vienna Document 1994), subsuming the earlier Stockholm and Vienna Documents and incorporating the Defence Planning and Military Contacts and Cooperation texts agreed in 1993; and a Document on the Global Exchange of Military Information. The Summit Document itself incorporated new Principles Governing Non-proliferation and took the important step of agreeing a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which included significant new commitments on the Democratic Control and Use of Armed Forces. An updated version of the Vienna Document was adopted at the Istanbul 1999 OSCE Summit.

In 1999, the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation also decided to explore methods to control trafficking of small arms and light weapons. In November 2000, it adopted an important document setting norms and standards of transparency on holdings and transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

In the field of conventional arms control, the opening of the CSCE Summit in Paris on 19 November 1990 saw the signature by 22 members of NATO and the (then) Warsaw Treaty Organization of the far-reaching Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which limits conventional forces in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The Treaty entered into force on 9 November 1992. Its signature was followed by negotiation of the CFE-1A Concluding Act, which introduced limitations on military personnel as well as establishing additional stabilizing measures. This was signed in the framework of the CSCE Helsinki Summit Meeting on 10 July 1992.
Negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty to the changed situation in
Europe began in May 1996 and concluded with the signing by 30 signatory states of an Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty at the OSCE Summit Meeting in Istanbul in November 1999.

The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement mandated negotiation of CSBMs amongst the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of an arms control r�gime amongst the parties to the Dayton agreement itself. These were negotiated under OSCE auspices in 1996. Personal Representatives of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office chaired the negotiations and have assisted with their implementation. A cell within the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna has responsibility for organizing the necessary inspections, in which various OSCE participating states have taken part.
Cooperation between the OSCE and NATO is best exemplified by the complementary missions undertaken by both organisations in the Balkans.

In 1996 the OSCE organized general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the Dayton peace agreement and, in September 1997, it organized the ensuing municipal elections. In 1997 the OSCE Chairman-in-Office's Personnel Representative assisted in finding a political solution to the crisis in Albania. The OSCE monitored the resulting elections. In each instance, the tasks of the OSCE were facilitated by the security provided by NATO.

The Kosovo crisis raised OSCE-NATO cooperation to new levels, reflected in particular in cooperation between NATO and the OSCE�s Kosovo Verification Mission in 1999. The NATO-led Kosovo force (KFOR) has continued to support the OSCE - and other organizations involved in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo - by providing the secure environment necessary for them to carry out their work.

The Kosovo conflict and international intervention to end the conflict and to rebuild peace and stability combined to create one of the greatest challenges the OSCE has faced. Developments in the province continue to represent major demands on the Organization in terms of resources, personnel and time. From January to March 1998, the OSCE mounted a Kosovo Verification Mission to monitor compliance on the ground with the cease-fire agreements reached as a result of NATO intervention in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1199. NATO conducted a parallel aerial surveillance mission. Both missions were endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1203.

NATO also established a special military task force to help with the emergency evacuation of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, if renewed conflict placed the Mission at risk. The OSCE Mission monitored human rights violations on both sides of the ethnic divide, concluding that there was overwhelming evidence of suffering on the Kosovo Albanian side at the hands of the Yugoslav and Serbian military and security apparatus.

At the beginning of 1999, the situation in Kosovo flared up again with acts of provocation on both sides. Some of these incidents were defused through the mediation efforts of OSCE verifiers but in mid January 1999, the situation deteriorated further with the escalation of the Serbian offensive against the Kosovar Albanians. On 20 March 1999, the Kosovo Verification Mission was forced to withdraw from the region, when obstruction by Serbian forces rendered it impossible for it to fulfill its task.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) was established to take the lead role, within the overall framework of the United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK), in matters relating to institution - and democracy-building and human rights. The OSCE Mission has since established a number of field offices and regional centers around Kosovo and is working together with NATO and other international and non-governmental organizations to build a democratic, stable future for Kosovo. Its work involves promoting the development of democratic political party training activities; building contacts with non-governmental and civil structures; addressing human rights issues and helping to integrate human rights training and protection into social structures; participating in development of judicial institutions and in police education and development; assisting in addressing the problems of civil and electoral registration; and helping to establish media and broadcasting structures which support freedom of press and information activities in Kosovo.

Although the roles of the Atlantic Alliance, the OSCE, and other international organizations contributing to the wider Euro-Atlantic security framework remain quite distinct, practical cooperation and support between them has served to strengthen their respective contributions.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and its successor SFOR have continued to cooperate closely with the OSCE in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. IFOR supported the OSCE in its preparations for elections and provided security and logistical support.

IFOR and SFOR both supported the OSCE in further practical ways in the context of the implementation of Article II (CSBMs) and Article IV (Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreements) of the Dayton Agreement by providing relevant data on weapons cantonments. SFOR has also provided logistical support for arms control implementation, for example by transporting heavy weapons from cantonments to destruction sites.

 

NATO EAPC and the NATO-Russia Council

When the 46 ambassadors of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) meet, they take it for granted that they will be able to debate and discuss the most pressing security issues of the day in an open and constructive environment. But just a little over ten years ago, diplomats from countries that belonged to the Warsaw Pact � which represent close to half of today's EAPC members � were unable even to enter NATO headquarters. If they wished to deliver a message, they were obliged to leave it at the front gate. This contrast illustrates the evolution of Euro-Atlantic security in the past decade and, above all, the way in which an Alliance strategy built around partnerships has altered the strategic environment in the Euro-Atlantic area.

In addition to hosting the EAPC, a dynamic, multilateral forum for the discussion and promotion of security issues, NATO is the focal point of a web of interlocking security partnerships and programs. The Alliance is working via the Partnership for Peace to help reform militaries and assist the democratic transition in much of former Communist Europe. Moreover, special bilateral relations have been forged with both Russia and Ukraine, the two largest countries to emerge out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. And a security dialogue is ongoing with an increasing number of countries in the Mediterranean region.

Today, 27 Partners use this institution to consult regularly with the 19 Allies on issues encompassing all aspects of security and all regions of the Euro-Atlantic area. In addition, Allied and Partner militaries exercise and interact together on a regular basis. And some 9,000 soldiers from Partner countries, including about 4,000 Russians, serve alongside their Alliance counterparts in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

In the wake of a visionary speech by then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in September 1996, which proposed the creation of a new security forum, NATO undertook a major examination of its partnership strategy. One of the prime aims of this process was to ensure greater decision-making opportunities for Partners across the entire scope of the Partnership. The other was to seize the opportunity to focus the Partnership ever more closely on operational issues. The outcome was the creation of the EAPC and an Enhanced and More Operational Partnership.

On the political-consultation front, it now made sense to move beyond the NACC and to build a security forum to match the increasing sophistication of the relationships being established through the Partnership for Peace. Rather than define its membership by who used to be NATO's adversaries, a new cooperative body needed to encompass all Euro-Atlantic countries wishing to build a relationship with NATO. This new body could include traditionally neutral countries, which had proved to be valuable members of the Partnership for Peace, such as Austria, Finland and Sweden, who were not full members of the NACC.

In moving beyond the NACC, the EAPC represented a commitment on the part of NATO to involve Partners ever more closely in Alliance decision-making processes. It would also provide a framework for involving Partners more closely in consultations for the planning, execution and political oversight of what are now known as NATO-led PfP Operations. As the multilateral body pulling the threads of the Partnership together, the EAPC retained the NACC's focus on practical political and security-related consultations. But it expanded the scope of these consultations to include crisis management, regional issues, arms-control issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, as well as defense issues, such as defense planning and budgets, including defense policy and strategy. Civil-emergency and disaster preparedness, armaments cooperation and defense-related environmental operations made up an impressive list.

In addition to traditional consultations, the EAPC has carved out a role for itself in helping address major issues of concern to both NATO members and Partners. It has achieved this by making the most of the flexibility provided by a minimum of institutional rules to adopt innovative approaches to security issues. Use has, for example, been made of open-ended working groups, enabling those countries most concerned to take initiatives and prepare work for the full forum. The EAPC has also encouraged its members to look at issues from new angles, rather than seeking to resolve long-standing sticking points, an approach that has proved fruitful where other organizations have the recognized lead responsibility.

When an escalating crisis is under discussion, all EAPC members are involved. If NATO believes that troops may need to be deployed, the North Atlantic Council, NATO's highest decision-making body, can recognize Partners who declare an intention to contribute to the force. These Partners are then able to exchange views with Allies and associate themselves with the first stage of planning for an operation. They will also be consulted on the plan for the operation and be involved in the force-generation process, when the commander draws up the composition of the force

Once Partner contributions are accepted, discussions on the operation can take place between NATO and those contributing Partners. Meanwhile, the full EAPC is still involved in general discussions on the particular operation and the political circumstances surrounding it. While troop-contributing Partners are consulted to the maximum degree possible, final decisions still need to be taken by the Alliance, upon whose assets such operations depend. This consultation process continues for the duration of an operation, ensuring that Partner voices are heard when important decisions are taken.

The contribution of Partners to the peacekeeping operations cannot be overestimated. Indeed, it could be argued that NATO's involvement in bringing peace to Kosovo would not have been possible without Partner participation. Not only have Partners provided valuable political support, but also mission-essential assets for NATO's use, including the use of airspace during the air campaign and vital logistics bases to sustain lines of communication for KFOR. As the relationship between Allies and Partners grows, it is increasingly possible to speak of a shared community of values underlying these practical undertakings. In the ten years since the inception of the NACC, Partnership has evolved to become a fundamental feature of Euro-Atlantic security.

Partnership for Peace

Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a major initiative introduced by NATO at the January 1994 Brussels Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The aim of the Partnership is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe. The Partnership for Peace Invitation was addressed to all states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 1 and other states participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 2 able and willing to contribute to the programme. The invitation has since been accepted by a total of 30 countries. The accession to the Alliance of the three former PfP countries Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland brings the current number of PfP participants to 27. The activities which each Partner undertakes are based on jointly elaborated Individual Partnership Programmes.

The PfP programme focuses on defence-related cooperation but goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership between each Partner country and NATO. It has become an important and permanent feature of the European security architecture and is helping to expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe. The programme is helping to increase stability, to diminish threats to peace and to build strengthened security relationships based on the practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles which underpin the Alliance. In accordance with the PfP Framework Document which was issued by Heads of State and Government at the same time as the PfP Invitation Document, NATO undertakes to consult with any active Partner if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

All members of PfP are also members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) which provides the overall framework for cooperation between NATO and its Partner countries. However, the Partnership for Peace retains its own separate identity within the framework provided by the EAPC and maintains its own basic elements and procedures. It is founded on the basis of a bilateral relationship between NATO and each one of the PfP countries.

 

NATO-Russia Council

 

�At the start of the 21st century we live in a new, closely interrelated world, in which unprecedented new threats and challenges demand increasingly united responses. Consequently, we, the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation are today opening a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to our security. As participants of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, we reaffirm the goals, principles and commitments set forth therein, in particular our determination to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security and the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible. We are convinced that a qualitatively new relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation will constitute an essential contribution in achieving this goal. In this context, we will observe in good faith our obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security.�

�Building on the Founding Act and taking into account the initiative taken by our Foreign Ministers, as reflected in their statement of 7 December 2001, to bring together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at twenty, we hereby establish the NATO-Russia Council. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest. The NATO-Russia Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.�

�The NATO-Russia Council will serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. It will operate on the principle of consensus. It will work on the basis of a continuous political dialogue on security issues among its members with a view to early identification of emerging problems, determination of optimal common approaches and the conduct of joint actions, as appropriate. The members of the NATO-Russia Council, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations, will take joint decisions and will bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. Each member may raise in the NATO-Russia Council issues related to the implementation of joint decisions.�

�The NATO-Russia Council will be chaired by the Secretary General of NATO. It will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defense Ministers twice annually, and at the level of Heads of State and Government as appropriate. Meetings of the Council at Ambassadorial level will be held at least once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as needed, including extraordinary meetings, which will take place at the request of any Member or the NATO Secretary General.

To support and prepare the meetings of the Council a Preparatory Committee is established, at the level of the NATO Political Committee, with Russian representation at the appropriate level. The Preparatory Committee will meet twice monthly, or more often if necessary. The NATO-Russia Council may also establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate. Such committees and working groups will draw upon the resources of existing NATO committees.�

�Under the auspices of the Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet. Meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, meetings at military representatives level at least once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as needed. Meetings of military experts may be convened as appropriate.�

�The NATO-Russia Council, replacing the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, will focus on all areas of mutual interest identified in Section III of the Founding Act, including the provision to add other areas by mutual agreement. The work programs for 2002 agreed in December 2001 for the PJC and its subordinate bodies will continue to be implemented under the auspices and rules of the NATO-Russia Council. NATO member states and Russia will continue to intensify their cooperation in areas including the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies. This cooperation may complement cooperation in other fora. As initial steps in this regard, we have today agreed to pursue the following cooperative efforts:�

  • Struggle Against Terrorism: strengthen cooperation through a multi-faceted approach, including joint assessments of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, focused on specific threats, for example, to Russian and NATO forces, to civilian aircraft, or to critical infrastructure; an initial step will be a joint assessment of the terrorist threat to NATO, Russia and Partner peacekeeping forces in the Balkans.
  • Crisis Management: strengthen cooperation, including through: regular exchanges of views and information on peacekeeping operations, including continuing cooperation and consultations on the situation in the Balkans; promoting interoperability between national peacekeeping contingents, including through joint or coordinated training initiatives; and further development of a generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations.
  • Non-Proliferation: broaden and strengthen cooperation against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means of their delivery, and contribute to strengthening existing non-proliferation arrangements through: a structured exchange of views, leading to a joint assessment of global trends in proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical agents; and exchange of experience with the goal of exploring opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on protection from nuclear, biological and chemical agents.
  • Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures: recalling the contributions of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and reaffirming adherence to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a cornerstone of European security, work cooperatively toward ratification by all the States Parties and entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, which would permit accession by non-CFE states; continue consultations on the CFE and Open Skies Treaties; and continue the NATO-Russia nuclear experts consultations.
  • Theatre Missile Defense: enhance consultations on theatre missile defense (TMD), in particular on TMD concepts, terminology, systems and system capabilities, to analyze and evaluate possible levels of interoperability among respective TMD systems, and explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation, including joint training and exercises.
  • Search and Rescue at Sea: monitor the implementation of the NATO-Russia Framework Document on Submarine Crew Rescue, and continue to promote cooperation, transparency and confidence between NATO and Russia in the area of search and rescue at sea.
  • Military-to-Military Cooperation and Defense Reform: pursue enhanced military-to-military cooperation and interoperability through enhanced joint training and exercises and the conduct of joint demonstrations and tests; explore the possibility of establishing an integrated NATO-Russia military training centre for missions to address the challenges of the 21st century; enhance cooperation on defense reform and its economic aspects, including conversion.
  • Civil Emergencies: pursue enhanced mechanisms for future NATO-Russia cooperation in responding to civil emergencies. Initial steps will include the exchange of information on recent disasters and the exchange of WMD consequence management information.
  • New Threats and Challenges: In addition to the areas enumerated above, explore possibilities for confronting new challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic area in the framework of the activities of the NATO Committee on Challenges to Modern Society (CCMS); initiate cooperation in the field of civil and military airspace controls; and pursue enhanced scientific cooperation.

The members of the NATO-Russia Council will work with a view to identifying further areas of cooperation.

The tragic events of September 11 were a stark reminder of the need for comprehensive and coordinated action to respond to common threats. In a joint statement after an extraordinary session of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) on 12 September 2001, united in their anger and indignation at the barbaric attacks on the United States, NATO and Russian representatives called on "the entire international community to unite in the struggle against terrorism".

The Allies and Russia were quick to recognize and seize the opportunity to boost NATO-Russia cooperation. On 3 October 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson met in Brussels to discuss possibilities for deepening NATO-Russia cooperation. Further high-level contacts � including another meeting between Lord Robertson and President Putin in November in Moscow � paved the way for the initiative announced by Foreign Ministers at the 7 December meeting of the PJC in Brussels, to give new impetus and substance to the NATO-Russia partnership by creating a new NATO-Russia Council to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action on a consensus basis. PJC Foreign Ministers pledged to develop the necessary arrangements in time for their next meeting in May 2002 in Reykjavik, Iceland.

After intensive but constructive negotiations, Foreign Ministers of NATO member states and Russia approved a joint declaration entitled "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality" at their meeting in Reykjavik on 14 May 2002. This was formally adopted and signed by Heads of State and Government and the Secretary General of NATO at their Summit meeting in Rome on 28 May 2002. Heads of State and Government also agreed to an ambitious work program for the remainder of 2002.

The Summit meeting in Rome took place one day after the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Founding Act, providing an opportunity to underline the achievements of the past five years and look back on the remarkable transformation in NATO-Russia relations and the Euro-Atlantic strategic environment since the end of the Cold War.

Council of Europe

Any European state can become a member of the Council of Europe provided it accepts the principle of the rule of law and guarantees human rights and fundamental freedoms to everyone under its jurisdiction.

The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organization which aims:
- to protect human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law;
- to promote awareness and encourage the development of Europe�s cultural identity and diversity;
- to seek solutions to problems facing European society (discrimination against minorities, xenophobia, intolerance, environmental protection, human cloning, Aids, drugs, organised crime, etc.);
- to help consolidate democratic stability in Europe by backing political, legislative and constitutional reform.

The Council of Europe should not be confused with the European Union. The two organizations are quite distinct. The 15 European Union states, however, are all members of the Council of Europe.

The Palais de l�Europe in Strasbourg (France) is the Council of Europe�s headquarters.

The Council of Europe covers all major issues facing European society other than defense. Its work program includes the following fields of activity: human rights, media, legal co-operation, social cohesion, health, education, culture, heritage, sport, youth, local democracy and trans frontier co-operation, the environment and regional planning.

- The Committee of Ministers is the Council of Europe�s decision-making body, and is composed of the foreign affairs ministers of all the member states (or their Permanent Representatives).
- The Parliamentary Assembly is the Organization�s deliberative body, the members of which are appointed by national parliaments.
- The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe is a consultative body representing local and regional authorities.
Governments, national parliaments and local and regional authorities are thus represented separately.

The Council of Europe�s work leads to European conventions and agreements in the light of which member states may subsequently harmonize and amend their own legislation to comply with them. Some conventions and agreements are also open for adoption by non-member states. The results of studies and activities are available to governments in order to foster co-operation and social progress in Europe. The Council of Europe also adopts Partial Agreements, a form of "variable geometry" co-operation, which allow a number of states to carry out a specific activity of common interest with the consent of other members.

By granting consultative status to over 350 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Council of Europe is building a real partnership with those who represent ordinary people. Through various consultation arrangements (including discussions and colloquies) it brings NGOs into intergovernmental activities and encourages dialogue between members of parliament and associations on major social issues.

Approximately 1300 international civil servants recruited from the member states make up the permanent staff of the Organization�s secretariat which is headed by the Secretary General.� The Council is financed by the governments of member states whose contributions to the organization�s budget are calculated in relation to their population and wealth. The 2002 budget is approximately Euros 169 million. The Council of Europe�s official languages are English and French, but the Parliamentary Assembly also uses German, Italian and Russian as working languages. Other languages may be interpreted during debates, under certain conditions.

How it works
The main component parts of the Council of Europe are:
� the Committee of Ministers, composed of the 44 foreign ministers or their Strasbourg-based deputies (ambassadors/permanent representatives), which is the Organisation's decision-making body. It is currently chaired by
Luxembourg.
� the Parliamentary Assembly, grouping 612 members (306 representatives and 306 substitutes) from the 44 national parliaments and Special Guest delegations from the two candidate States.
� the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, composed of a Chamber of Local Authorities and a Chamber of Regions. Its current President is Herwig van Staa (
Austria)
� the 1300-strong secretariat
Ordinary budget
In 2002, 169,000,000 euros.
Some practical achievements
� 186 legally binding European treaties or conventions, many of which are open to non-member states on topics ranging from human rights to the fight against organised crime and from the prevention of torture to data protection or cultural co-operation.
� Recommendations to governments setting out policy guidelines on such issues as legal matters, health, education, culture and sport.
The pan-European dimension
� Since November 1990, 20 countries from central and eastern Europe have joined the Council of Europe: Hungary (1990), Poland (1991), Bulgaria (1992), Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Romania (1993), Latvia, Albania, Moldova, "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and Ukraine (1995), the Russian Federation and Croatia (1996), Georgia (1999), Armenia and Azerbaijan (2001), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002).
� Applications for membership from
Monaco (21 October 1998) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (9 November 2000) are pending.

- In 1989 the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly introduced "Special Guest" status to forge closer links with the parliaments of central and eastern European states which are seen to be moving towards democracy and which accept United Nations and OSCE human rights commitments. Today, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (22 January 2001) has Special Guest status. Special Guest status granted to Belarus in September 1992 was suspended on 13 January 1997.

- The Council of
Europe has various know-how programmes totalling, in 2000, some 11 500 000 euros to promote democratic and legal reform in central and eastern Europe. They also cover local government and management of justice and prison departments.
- The Council of
Europe and the European Commission co-finance programmes in Albania and the Russian Federation. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine have also benefited from them in the past. A new programme has been set up since 2001 for Moldova and North Caucasus.
- The Council of Europe Activity Programme, setting five main Objectives within a Strategic Plan for the Organisation which was adopted during the 104th ministerial session (Budapest, May 1999), includes around 20 cooperation programmes that are also open to non member states, as well as conventional activities which have been conceived in the perspective of a "Great Europe without divisions".

The Council of Europe in an enlarged Europe

The arrival of the Russian Federation in February 1996 meant that the institution had finally become fully pan-European. Henceforth, more than 700 million citizens would be concerned in building the new Europe. The Council's activities are now having to adapt to an environment that is not only wider and more diverse but also more complex and less stable. This is changing the nature of its co-operation programs.

Support and monitoring activities are being strengthened. More attention is being paid to what happens on the ground, for example via confidence measures or campaigns to combat intolerance. New priorities are emerging such as migration, corruption, the right to be granted nationality, social exclusion and minorities. The dual machinery for protecting human rights will be replaced on 1 November 1998 by a single Court, housed in the Human Rights Building designed by the British architect Richard Rogers and inaugurated in June 1995.

At the same time several other European or North Atlantic institutions have been increasing their co-operation with the countries of central and eastern Europe, offering the prospect of closer integration. The work under the auspices of the intergovernmental conference of the European Union and NATO summit held in Madrid, show that European co-operation will continue to develop.

Cooperation between the mutually reinforcing institutions

  ������������� The OSCE�s co-operation with other relevant international organizations is based on the Platform for Co-operative Security, the Operational Document of the Charter for European Security, adopted at the 1999 Istanbul Summit, which calls for �[strengthening of] the mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between those organizations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area.� The Platform specifies a wide array of consultation mechanisms and modalities for co-operation with international organizations and institutions and serves as the framework for OSCE�s co-operation with its partners. In line with the mechanisms laid out in the Platform for Co-operative Security, the OSCE continued co-operation with its partners at the headquarters level throughout the reporting period.

The OSCE�s co-operation with its partner organizations is chiefly carried out through the External Co-operation Section in the OSCE Secretariat. As an integral part of the Office of the Secretary General, the Section assists him in maintaining relations with the external partners of the OSCE by serving as the first point of contact at the headquarters level. In accordance with PC.DEC/364, adopted on 29 June 2000, it is responsible, together with other sections of the Secretariat, �for the implementation of the modalities of co-operation in accordance with part II of the Operational Document of the Charter for European Security.� In carrying out this task, the Section takes charge of headquarter-level meetings with organizations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area. The External Co-operation Section also ensures continuity, coherence and oversight of efforts with regard to co-operation with external partners. Moreover, it has a growing responsibility for making other organizations and institutions more aware of OSCE�s work and for seeing to it that that work receives adequate and accurate recognition in the declarations and working documents of partner organizations and institutions.

Co-operation at the headquarters level includes a number of high-level consultations, expert-level meetings, bilateral meetings and cross-representation at relevant meetings. Exchanges of information on topical issues and discussion of potential areas of co-operation are high on the agenda of these meetings. Meetings at the headquarters level respond to developments in the field and provide the political platform for field activities. Political consultations carried out at the headquarters level are designed to enhance and complement the activities in the field. The increase in visits of high-level representatives of our partner organizations to the OSCE Permanent Council meetings in Vienna and to other similar political forums is of particular importance.

One of the highlights of OSCE�s co-operation with its partners at headquarters level is the annual Tripartite High-Level Meeting. Since 1993, the Tripartite High-Level Meeting has taken place annually between the Chairmen and Secretaries General of the OSCE and the Council of Europe (CoE), as well as the Director General of the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), in order to better co-ordinate action in areas of common concern. Its expanded participation now includes various UN specialized agencies as well as the European Commission (EC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

This year, the partners in the tripartite process, namely, the OSCE, the CoE and the United Nations and its specialized agencies, met in Vienna on 16 February. The Meeting was hosted by the OSCE, which was represented by the Secretary General and a Representative of the Chairmanship. As in the past, the EC, ICRC and IOM were also invited. The Meeting focused on progress toward peace and stability in South Eastern Europe, especially the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the Caucasus. The partners also discussed human dimension issues, including intolerance, racism and trafficking in human beings. They agreed to pursue closer co-operation and exchanges of information in a number of areas in South Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

Among the items discussed was the report of the Target-Oriented Meeting at expert-level on good governance. This meeting was held on 15 February 2001 in Vienna and co-chaired by the Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and the OSCE Co-ordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities. The case studies on Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) served as background against which the tripartite Target-Oriented Meeting reached agreement that the main components of good governance are transparency and access to information, rule of law and human rights, public participation, accountability and predictability. Recognizing good governance as the key to a successful transition process, the participants agreed to promote and build good governance following the examples of Georgia and BiH.

In this Meeting, it was pointed out that international organizations need to co-ordinate their activities better, not only by sharing information, but more importantly by sharing complementary agendas, and also by maintaining sufficient contact between headquarters and field offices. The discussions focused on the need to improve the flow of information and the process of consultation among partners in order to foster synergy at both the field and the headquarters levels, thus making it possible to convey a clearer and stronger message to countries in transition. The participants in the Meeting also discussed conflict prevention and the economic and environmental aspects of conflict prevention, in which the OSCE plays a significant role.

In addition to the Tripartite High-Level and Target-Oriented Meetings, the OSCE met with its partners in working-level meetings. With a view to strengthening co-operation at the headquarters level with partner organizations and institutions, preparation is under way for working-level consultations, not previously held, with the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The staff-level meetings that already take place with the CoE, NATO and the EU afford opportunities for discussions on operational matters at the expert and working levels, while at the same time enhancing headquarters relations.

In response to the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, there has been an increase in the number of high-level and staff-level meetings with the EU, NATO and the CoE to co-ordinate implementation of the Framework Agreement. The purpose of these meetings was to discuss the organizations� planned activities, to explore areas where co-operation could take place, and to review the Task Force Essential Harvest in the period during and after the security situation. While the EU has the overall co-ordinating role, it is envisaged that sub-groups would be chaired by other international organizations taking the lead in a given area, based on their comparative advantages.

The Operations Centre of the OSCE Secretariat held several working-level meetings with representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EC and the European Council Secretariat in Brussels from 14 to 16 May. The international partners discussed the status of the politico-military and crisis management structures being set up by the EU and ways of improving co-operation mechanisms between the OSCE and partner organizations, in particular in the field of information sharing and crisis-management exercises.

Furthermore, working-level meetings were held between staff members of the OSCE Secretariat, the EC and the European Council Secretariat, and NATO on 9 and 10 July 2001 in Brussels. The principal aim of these meetings was to discuss, at the operational level, specific areas for co-operation and ways to enhance and intensify it. Discussions focused also on co-operation in the field, in particular in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the Caucasus and Central Asia and on police-related activities. Additionally, briefings were provided regarding institutional reorganization. As a follow-up visit and in regard to the issue of civilian crisis management and civilian police, a delegation of staff members of the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit of the EC visited the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna from 3 to 6 September 2001.

The OSCE Secretariat organized an informal meeting with heads of delegation on 29 October 2001 to evaluate the progress made in implementing the REACT and Operations Centre concepts. Experts from partner organizations also attended in order to contribute to a pragmatic and ongoing exchange of information and reflect on OSCE�s experience. The participants identified and discussed, at a strategic level, good practice and lessons learned during the implementation period

On 3 and 4 July 2001, the first co-ordination meeting, convened by the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) took place in Vienna with the participation of high-level representatives of the field offices and headquarters of UNHCR, IOM, the CoE and the OSCE. The representatives discussed co-operation and co-ordination modalities in the region of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with respective roles and country programs in mind, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts and improve interaction among the partner organizations.

A first follow-up Joint Regional Meeting took place in Tbilisi, Georgia, on 4 October 2001. Representatives from UNHCR, IOM, the CoE and the OSCE participated, with UNDP as an observer. The participants discussed issues regarding problems of refugees, displaced persons, migration and asylum. Furthermore, an OSCE/UNHCR/IOM Joint Regional Meeting for Central Asia took place in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on 23 October 2001. In addition to reviewing modalities of co-operation on the ground and matters of common concern such as trafficking in human beings and cross-border issues, the developments in Afghanistan and the risk of an increased influx of refugees were focused on.

A co-operative relationship with the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies has been very fruitful during the past year. On 6 and 7 February 2001, the OSCE Secretary General attended the Fourth High-Level Meeting between the UN and Regional Organizations on Co-operation for Peace-Building. Eighteen delegations from regional and sub-regional international organizations participated in the Meeting. It addressed the issues of peace-building in all its aspects, including the conflict prevention and post-conflict phases, taking specifically into account the interaction and co-operation of international organizations, and the principles and modalities guiding this co-operation. The OSCE, represented by the Secretary General and the Ambassador of Romania in New York, Mr. Sorin Ducaru, took an active part in the deliberations and distributed background documents on OSCE tools, experiences and activities.

During the visit, the OSCE Secretary General met separately with Secretary-General Kofi Annan and other UN officials, including Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette, and Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs Kieren Prendergast. The meetings focused in particular on areas in which the two Organizations co-operate directly, including the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The participants discussed the situation of southern Serbia, activities of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation in Georgia and the political processes there, including a follow-up to the joint OSCE/UN assessment mission to Gali, and joint assessments of the situations in various regions.

The OSCE Secretary General also had meetings with the Secretaries General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), H.E. Abdulah Belkeziz, and of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), H.E. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, and with the Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), H.E. Yuri Yarov, in order to discuss matters of common interest.

In co-ordination with the UN the OSCE offered to take the lead in holding the first regional follow-up meeting to the Fourth High-Level Meeting between the UN and Regional Organizations in Vienna in 2002. The agenda will focus on specific regional dimensions of co-operation in peace-building with participation of representatives from regional organizations in Europe. Preparations, which have included consultations with the Director-General of the UN Office at Geneva and representatives of the UN Department of Political Affairs, are under way.

The OSCE Secretary General and staff of the OSCE Secretariat attended the Balkans Operational Agencies Co-ordination (BOAC) Meeting that took place on 27 February 2001 in Brussels. The meeting, chaired by UN Special Envoy for the Balkans, Mr. Carl Bildt, and hosted by the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, was also attended by Foreign Minister Anna Lindh of Sweden representing the EU Presidency, Secretary General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana, and EC Commissioner for External Relations Mr. Christopher Patten. Issues related to southern Serbia were addressed, including adjustments of the Ground Safety Zone and other measures to defuse tensions and promote confidence and stability in the region. On 22 March 2001, another BOAC meeting was convened, chaired by Ms. Frechette, the UN Deputy Secretary-General, in Brussels. This meeting was attended by representatives of the OSCE, the EU, the CoE, the EC, NATO, UNHCR and other UN specialized agencies.

On 18 April 2001, the OSCE Secretary General met with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Ruud Lubbers, in Geneva to discuss issues related to the situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and in Chechnya. He also met with the Assistant High Commissioner, Mr. Jessen-Petersen, and with the staff of the Emergency Response Unit to discuss the new approaches to staffing, security and rapid response capability developed by the OSCE and UNHCR.

As part of the on-going effort to promote co-operation between the two organizations, the High Commissioner visited the OSCE in Vienna and addressed the OSCE Permanent Council on 18 October 2001. In his speech, Mr. Lubbers spoke of the far-reaching scope of the co-operation between the OSCE and UNHCR that has been developed over the past years. In addition, he highlighted some of the areas in which the two organizations are facing common challenges such as issues related to refugees and xenophobia, and he emphasized the need for refining the co-operative relationship in order to successfully address these challenges. In his concluding remarks, the High Commissioner urged that the OSCE and UNHCR should avoid duplication of responsibilities and efforts by clearly defining roles and responsibilities. In particular, he stressed how important it was for the two organizations to complement each other in their respective areas of expertise.

The co-operative relationship between the OSCE and the Council of Europe (CoE) has been facilitated by the �2+2� high-level meeting, held annually since 1993 between the Chairmen and Secretaries General of the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

This year, the meeting was convened for the first time in a �2+2/3+3� format, which included the Presidents of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the two organizations. This �trilateral approach� makes a valuable contribution to identifying solutions to common challenges. The meeting was held in Bucharest on 11 April 2001, chaired by the Chairman-in-Office, Romanian Foreign Minister Geoana. The focus of the discussion was on co-ordination of policies and potential areas for co-operation in the field between the two organizations. The participants stressed that the work of the two organizations in areas of common interest should continue to be guided by the principles of complementary and mutual reinforcement, as set forth in the Common Catalogue of Co-operation Modalities signed by the Secretaries General of the CoE and the OSCE on 12 April 2000, following last year�s �2+2� meeting. The �2+2�/�3+3� process continued at the high-level follow-up meeting on 30 October 2001 in Vaduz, Liechtenstein, where the primary focus of discussions was on the co-ordination of activities in the fight against terrorism. Participants agreed to undertake joint efforts in addressing the root causes of terrorism, including through multicultural and inter-religious dialogue. They underlined their solidarity with the international coalition to fight terrorism and its supporters.

At the invitation of the Council of Europe, a �2+2� meeting took place at the level of senior officials in Strasbourg on 20 July 2001. The agenda of the meeting focused on an exchange of views on developments since the Bucharest high-level �2+2�/�3+3� meeting. Among the items discussed were the developments in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, the Caucasus, Ukraine, Belarus and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as human dimension issues, REACT and election observation matters.

A working-level follow-up at the senior level took place at the OSCE Secretariat on 30 August 2001. The aim of the meeting was to hold informal consultations on the implementation of the Framework Agreement (FA). This meeting was of great importance in determining the steps required and identifying the areas of co-operation for fulfilling the requirements of the Agreement in the most efficient way. Participants included representatives of the OSCE institutions, the OSCE Chairmanship, the CoE, the EC and the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje.

At the invitation of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Mr. Walter Schwimmer, the OSCE Secretary General addressed the 108th Session of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers in Strasbourg on 11 May 2001. In his speech, the Secretary General touched on issues of democratic stability in the Balkans and the situation in the Caucasus. In addition, the Secretary General took advantage of his stay in Strasbourg to meet and discuss with a number of participating Ministers of Foreign Affairs. On 9 November 2000, the Secretary General had also attended the 107th Session of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers. In his statement he, inter alia, reconfirmed the need and willingness of the OSCE to co-ordinate closely with the CoE activities of the two organizations concerning counter-terrorism.

The Secretary General of the Council of Europe visited Vienna on 12 July 2001 to address the OSCE Permanent Council and to meet bilaterally with the OSCE Secretary General. In his address to the Permanent Council, Secretary General Schwimmer spoke about the core areas of CoE activity, including promotion and defence of pluralistic democracy, human rights, minority rights and the rule of law, and the CoE�s increased co-operation with the OSCE in areas of conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. For instance, the Secretaries General of the OSCE and the Council of Europe exchanged letters on 15 February 2001, endorsing mutual co-operation between the two organizations with regard to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The agreement identifies areas of close co-operation and co-ordination between the heads of the respective operations in Belgrade, including their work programmes. To facilitate this co-operation at the outset, the CoE shared the OSCE�s office space from March to July 2001.

In the bilateral meeting between the Secretaries General on 12 July 2001, the focus of discussion included Chechnya and Belarus, as well as the issue of co-locating in the OSCE Offices in Baku and Yerevan. Based on this discussion, an agreement was signed between the OSCE and the CoE on 26 September 2001, establishing the presence of CoE human-rights and rule-of-law officers respectively in the OSCE Offices in Baku and Yerevan. Moreover, the CoE continued the positive and valuable practice of seconding experts to the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, specifically to the Judicial Institute and in support of civil administration. This practice supports the effort to share limited resources and enhance pragmatic co-operation in the field.

Co-operation between the CoE and the OSCE continued to develop through OSCE�s participation in the Council of Europe Ministers� Deputies Rapporteur Group on Relations Between the CoE and the OSCE (GR-OSCE). The GR-OSCE meetings provide an important instrument for reviewing and exchanging ideas on co-operation between the CoE and the OSCE. Additionally, two reports were published with an overview of co-operation by the CoE with the High Commissioner on National Minorities and with the Representative on Freedom of the Media.

Similarly, co-operation with the European Union (EU) continued to expand throughout the reporting period. At the political level, the national delegation of the EU member State holding the Presidency of the EU speaks at OSCE meetings on behalf of the European Union. This enables the consultations between the EU, the OSCE Chairmanship and the Secretariat to proceed on a regular basis. In parallel to the working-level meetings that take place regularly, high-level meetings and presentations by representatives of the EU and the OSCE have supported a more open dialogue and a better understanding of each other�s activities. The importance has also been emphasized of the practice of meeting at least once with each EU-Presidency to discuss matters of mutual concern and to enhance the co-operation between the EU and the OSCE.

On 7 November 2000, at the invitation of the French EU-Presidency, the Secretary General addressed the EU working group on the OSCE in Brussels. He also met with Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU General Affairs Council, as well as with Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO. In addition, he held talks with the Director and staff members of the Policy Unit of the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, and with the Director and the staff members of the General Affairs and Multilateral Relations Directorate of the European Commission, reconfirming the working relationship between the EU and the OSCE staff, at both the headquarters and the field levels.

The EC Commissioner for External Relations, Mr. Christopher Patten, addressed the OSCE Permanent Council on 20 November 2000. In his address, the Commissioner gave a comprehensive overview of the close co-operation between the EU and the OSCE in many regions and activities. Recognizing the security threats emanating from South Eastern Europe as the primary challenge to the organizations over the last few years, Mr. Patten emphasized the importance of building sustainable democratic institutions and establishing the rule of law. In his speech, the Commissioner also acknowledged the positive role of the OSCE in preparing candidate countries for accession to the European Union, in particular through the work of the ODIHR, the HCNM and the RFM.

The OSCE Secretary General also held a bilateral meeting with Commissioner Patten and several senior staff members of the European Commission in Brussels on 7 May 2001. They discussed areas for further co-operation between the EU/EC and the OSCE and ways to achieve it. As a result, there was some basic agreement on how the EC and the OSCE would operate in a crisis.

Furthermore, on 18 January 2001, The EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, H.E. Javier Solana addressed the OSCE Permanent Council. He outlined the evolving role of the EU in crisis management and underlined the need to develop a solid partnership between the OSCE and the EU in that field. He stressed that the security challenges experienced over the past decade demonstrated clearly that no single organization or institution was in a position to meet those challenges alone.

On 29 January 2001, during the Swedish EU Presidency, the OSCE Secretary General visited Stockholm and had consultations with the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ms. Anna Lindh, and other EU staff members. The meetings covered a wide range of topics related to conflict prevention and civilian crisis management mechanisms, including REACT, ways and means of enhancing OSCE/EU co-operation in these fields, OSCE police-related activities and OSCE activities in the economic and environmental area.

At the invitation of the Swedish EU Presidency and Ambassador Bjurner, Chairman of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), the OSCE Secretary General visited Brussels, where he met with the Committee at a working lunch on 27 February 2001. During his stay, the Secretary General also had meetings at the European Commission, External Relations Directorate General and Security Committee, and discussed co-operation between the EU and the OSCE relating to civilian crisis management.

On 17 May, the Secretary General met again with Ambassador Bjurner and discussed the work of the EU on conflict prevention and possible areas for OSCE-EU co-operation. In addition to the contacts of the OSCE Chairmanship and the OSCE Secretariat with future EU Presidencies, Ambassador Bjurner encouraged Secretariat-to-Secretariat contacts between the two organizations. He also spoke in favour of visits by OSCE heads of missions to the EU Political and Security Committee, which would give the EU member States a better understanding of the various situations in the field.

The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ms. Anne Lindh, visited Vienna and addressed the Special meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council on 27 June 2001. Referring to positive developments in joint efforts of the two organizations in Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Minister also discussed further principles and modalities of OSCE-EU interaction for increased co-operation in a number of substantive and geographical areas. She identified several key areas for co-operation such as development and co-ordination of crisis management tools, ensuring of interoperability through compatible methods and standards and EU support for OSCE activities in geographic areas where the OSCE has an extensive field presence. Regarding crisis management, Minister Lindh mentioned the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, which had been endorsed by the European Council in G�teborg earlier in the month. The Programme, she pointed out, will for example strengthen the EU�s conflict-prevention mechanism by setting clear political priorities for preventive actions, developing preventive strategies for regions and countries and making better use of the political dialogue.

In the context of increasing co-operation in a number of substantive and geographical areas with the Presidency, the EU Council Secretariat and the Commission, the OSCE Secretary General also met on 27 June 2001 with Mr. Brian Crowe, Director General and Head of the Directorate General for External Relationships of the Council�s Secretariat. Accompanied by his colleagues representing, inter alia, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and the Situation Centre and Military Staff, Mr. Crowe came to Vienna for extensive consultations at the Secretariat. Discussions included co-operation on institution building and good governance and possibilities for future regular staff talks, shared training programmes for staff and short-term exchanges of staff.

On 28 September 2001, upon invitation by the Belgian EU Presidency and Chairman of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) the OSCE Secretary General addressed a working lunch of the Political and Security Committee of the European Union. On this date, the Police Adviser from the OSCE Operations Centre attended an expert-level meeting in which technical aspects of co-operation with the EU on the implementation of the Framework Agreement were discussed. In addition, a meeting was held with the Director General, Mr. Brian Crowe, who is responsible within the Council Secretariat for developing policies regarding terrorism. He briefly outlined the first steps that the Council Secretariat, in co-operation with the European Commission, is taking to develop new policy instruments.

Co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been very active during the reporting period. The partnership between NATO and the OSCE is largely influenced by practical co-operation in the field and supported by high-level and senior staff meetings at the headquarters level. The co-operative relationship was further strengthened by the signing of an exchange of letters between the two organizations on the contribution of NATO to the security of international monitors in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 11 October 2001.

On 2 November 2000, for the first time the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, addressed the OSCE Permanent Council. He discussed various ways in which the two organizations had increased their co-operation, their comparative advantages and ways to further improve that co-operation. Citing the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo as valuable examples of co-operation on the ground, Lord Robertson encouraged further co-operation between the two organizations at the institutional level. The Secretary General emphasized the need to enhance the co-operation through informal personal contacts, an increase in the number of mutual visits by senior officials, regular briefings on NATO activities at the OSCE Permanent Council and the holding of joint NATO/OSCE staff seminars on key issues such as civil-military relations, public security in peacekeeping operations and early crisis management. In conclusion, the Secretary General said that he considered closer NATO-OSCE relations to be a strategic imperative in the European security framework.

At the invitation of NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, the OSCE Secretary General travelled to Brussels on 17 May 2001 to address the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) meeting. Speaking of the importance of cross-representation at the field level, the Secretary General mentioned as an example OSCE�s active representation at the crisis management exercise CMX 2001, where it participated alongside the Political Response Cell staff. Previously, the OSCE presence at the CMX exercises had been confined to observing. He also made reference to OSCE�s support in the implementation of confidence-building measures in southern Serbia and KFOR-OMIK co-operation in the Kosovo-wide elections, and underlined the importance of co-operation between the two organizations, as well as the EU, in finding common approaches and positions.

During his visit, the OSCE Secretary General also had a meeting with NATO Deputy Secretary General Balazino, in which he discussed the situation in South Eastern Europe, in particular southern Serbia. He briefed Ambassador Balazino on OSCE activities there, including preparations for police training and the elections in Kosovo.

The OSCE and NATO continued to enhance contacts at the headquarters working level through regular staff meetings. During the reporting period, the two organizations held joint staff meetings on 6 November 2000 and 28 March 2001. The participants briefed each other on their areas of activities and also discussed the situations in conflict regions, such as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovo, and ideas for improved co-operation between the two organizations. In addition to regular staff meetings, a number of co-ordination meetings took place regarding the implementation of the Framework Agreement. These meetings often included representatives from the OSCE, the EU, NATO, UNHCR and the CoE.

A concrete example of this co-operation is the joint EAPC-OSCE Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Baku, Azerbaijan, on 21 and 22 June 2001. The Governments of Switzerland and Azerbaijan jointly hosted this Workshop. The OSCE Secretary General delivered the opening address at the event, and urged the two organizations to continue their co-operation in this field and to establish pilot projects on small arms issues.

Co-operation between the OSCE and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has developed considerably over the past few years in the field activities where the two Organizations� mandates intersect. On 30 August 2001, the Director General of IOM, Mr. Brunson McKinley addressed the OSCE Permanent Council. In his statement, he acknowledged that the OSCE�s focus on security in its broadest sense made it an excellent forum for discussion on the migration issues that impinge on many aspects of stability and security. He pointed out that the area of the greatest co-operation between IOM and the OSCE was measures to counter trafficking in human beings, especially in view of IOM�s active role in the Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings chaired by OSCE/ODIHR in the context of Working Table III of the Stability Pact. In conclusion, the Director General spoke of further areas of co-operation such as capacity building in migration management and stabilization through local governance, and pointed out that there is �little that IOM does that is not applicable to the OSCE area.� The Memorandum of Understanding signed on the same day was just one more formal acknowledgement of the growing relationship between IOM and the OSCE.

On 25 October 2001, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Jakob Kellenberger, addressed the OSCE Permanent Council. He underlined the strong partnership of the ICRC with the OSCE, in particular with regard to field operations. In his speech, he gave a detailed account of the interaction between the two organizations where both have established field presences. In addition, he stated: �If some of our challenges can be met more easily in the OSCE area than in other parts of the world, it has quite something to do with the existence of the OSCE and its activities�. Following the address to the Permanent Council, a bilateral meeting took place between the OSCE Secretary General and Dr. Kellenberger. The discussion further highlighted areas of co-operation regarding security matters and training in the field. A special focus was on the current situation in Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries which are members of the OSCE.

The importance of regional and sub-regional co-operation is highlighted as a factor in enhancing security across the OSCE area, which serves as a catalyst for integration of countries into broader structures. Links between the OSCE Secretariat and regional and sub-regional organizations continued to develop along the lines set out in the Platform for Co-operative Security.

On 22 June 2001, at the invitation of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the OSCE Secretary General attended the Ministerial Session of the Central European Initiative (CEI) held in Milan. He delivered a statement and concluded by inviting counterparts on the CEI side to discuss areas of possible co-operation.

The OSCE Secretary General met with Ms. Helle Degn, Commissioner on Democratic Development of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), on 29 March 2001. They discussed ways and means of promoting co-operation and exchanges of information between the OSCE and CBSS.

The Secretary General of the Council of Collective Security (CCS), Mr. Nikolajenko, visited Vienna on 13 June 2001 to meet with the OSCE Secretary General. He briefed the Secretary General on the recently held summit of the Council in Yerevan, in which the participants agreed to enhance co-operation in addressing new threats and challenges, such as terrorism, trafficking in narcotic drugs and organized crime, as well as in the political area. They also expressed willingness to enter into a more systematic dialogue with the OSCE in order to reach common positions on different aspects of security.

At the invitation of the Organization of American States (OAS), the OSCE Secretary General participated in and delivered a statement at the Conference on the Role of Regional and Multilateral Organizations in the Defense and Promotion of Democracy. This Conference took place in Washington, D.C, from 19 to 21 February 2001.

The OSCE�s comprehensive approach to security means that it must concern itself with economic and environmental issues. Co-operation with other international organizations thus includes addressing economic and environmental challenges to security by intensifying contacts on this matter. The main instrument in the OSCE�s economic and environmental dimension is the Office of the OSCE Co-ordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA). During the reporting period, the OCEEA developed co-operative working relationships with a number of other international organizations in order to strengthen joint efforts and to inject greater resources into field operations for use in their economic and environmental activities. These efforts have included several rounds of formal and informal consultations with the UNECE, UNDP, UNEP and other UN specialized agencies, both at the headquarters level and in the field, as well as the EC, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the CoE, the World Bank and NATO.

As part of the OSCE�s co-operation with other financial institutions, the OSCE Secretary General met with Mr. Mats Karlsson, the Vice President for External Affairs and UN Affairs of the World Bank, on 21 February 2001. They discussed matters of common interest for the two partner organizations.

On 10 May 2001, the Secretary General of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, visited the OSCE Chairmanship and the Secretariat/CPC. The OSCE Secretary General held a meeting with Mr. Costa during which they discussed, among other things, modalities of co-operation between the OSCE and EBRD based on shared values and objectives and specific situations.

As part of its ongoing activities, the OCEEA organizes the annual OSCE Economic Forum. The Forum offers a framework for dialogue between senior representatives of OSCE participating States, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, the business community, academics and the media. From 15 to 18 May 2001, the Ninth Meeting of the OSCE Economic Forum was held in Prague on the theme, Transparency and Good Governance in Economic Matters. Recognizing transparency and good governance as key to security and stability in the OSCE area, the participants in the meeting agreed that stability and economic development should be enhanced by creating suitable institutions and putting into practice the right policies at the national and global levels.

During the reporting period, the OSCE�s co-operative relationship with the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe grew significantly. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, since its adoption at the EU Ministerial Conference in Cologne in June 1999, has been operational under the auspices of the OSCE. It serves the international community by providing a forum for close co-operation among the EU, the CoE, the UN, NATO, the OECD, the international financial institutions, the regional initiatives and the countries of South Eastern Europe to achieve the objectives set out in the Stability Pact.

The relationship between the OSCE and the Stability Pact plays a major role in the long-term stabilization of countries and the region, which is the purpose for which the Pact was instituted. The OSCE�s experience in activities in all the OSCE dimensions enables it to react efficiently in conflict prevention and post-conflict situations. Moreover, the OSCE�s focus on field activities places the Organization in a unique position to resolve crises and problems in South Eastern Europe.

The growing importance of the co-operation between the OSCE and the Stability Pact was demonstrated by the appointment of a Special Representative of the Chairman-in-Office, Ambassador Alexander Rondos, on 6 February 2001. Speaking at the OSCE Permanent Council on 31 May 2001, Ambassador Rondos conveyed his initial views to the participating States. as the Chairman of Working Table I, on Democratization and Human Rights, he recognized the importance of emphasizing minority questions, ethnic relations and cross border co-operation in the Working Table.

The OSCE successfully leads the Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings under Working Table III, and assists the Gender Task Force under Working Table I. In this regard, the OSCE Secretary General had a meeting in Vienna on 16 July 2001 with the Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings, Dr. Helga Konrad. Among the issues discussed was PC decision No. 426 of 12 July 2001, on Trafficking in Human Beings, and possible co-operation with the Task Force in its implementation, as well as administrative support for Dr. Konrad�s office. The Gender Adviser of the Secretariat works in close co-operation with the Co-ordinator of the Task Force and her office on issues such as training and frequent exchanges of information. In particular, with regard to actions to be taken by international staff members when encountering victims of trafficking.

On 11 October 2001, the Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Mr. Bodo Hombach, addressed the OSCE Permanent Council. The Co-ordinator spoke of his efforts in preparation for the Regional Conference to be held in Bucharest on 25 and 26 October 2001 and for its role in encouraging the Stability Pact Partner Countries to commit themselves to a reform agenda and to measures for regional co-operation. In addition, Mr. Hombach briefed the PC on major developments regarding the Stability Pact during the past year and on its successful co-operation with the OSCE in various areas of common concern.

The Romanian Chairmanship hosted the second Stability Pact Regional Conference on 25 and 26 October 2001. The meeting focused on the status of the various programmes supported by donors, on progress made in developing new strategies within the Working Tables of the Stability Pact and on the process put into place by key actors in order to channel donor resources to the Stability Pact priority areas. The Regional Conference was co-chaired by the World Bank and the European Commission and was organized by both Institutions, with the Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact and the Romanian Government.

Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the OSCE Chairmanship established a Working Group on Terrorism, chaired by the Danish delegation to the OSCE. To support this Working Group, the OSCE Secretary General created a Task Force on Terrorism in the Secretariat. Through this framework, the OSCE Permanent Council plans to submit a draft text of a declaration on combating terrorism for adoption at the Ministerial Meeting in December 2001, as well as recommendations for an OSCE plan of action. In this process, existing international commitments adopted within the OSCE, the UN and European regional organizations were considered in order that the OSCE contribution would constitute �value added� to the existing international efforts against terrorism. On 17 October 2001, the Working Group on Terrorism convened with experts from UN ODCCP, the CoE, the EU and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). The experts presented an overview of existing commitments and activities regarding combating terrorism.

The Government of Kyrgyzstan will host the Bishkek International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia: Strengthening Comprehensive Efforts to Counter Terrorism. This Conference is a follow-up to the UN ODCCP/OSCE Chairmanship conference on countering drugs, organized crime and terrorism, which took place on 19 and 20 October 2000. The Bishkek Conference will be jointly organized by the OSCE and UN ODCCP and will take place on 13 and 14 December 2001.

In this regard, the OSCE Secretary General met with the Executive Director of UN ODCCP, Mr. Pino Arlacchi, on 10 October 2001, to discuss preparations for the Bishkek Conference as well as the two organizations� activities and plans for countering terrorism. Furthermore, in preparation for the Conference, many working-level meetings were held with ODCCP. A Reinforced Preparatory Meeting took place on 5 November 2001 in Vienna with a view to ensuring a thorough preparation of the forthcoming Conference in Bishkek. Participants also included experts from international organizations.

The OSCE Secretariat organizes regular seminars and conferences on OSCE-related issues, which are open to delegates from OSCE participating States, the OSCE�s Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation and Partners for Co-operation, representatives of international and non-governmental organizations and OSCE institutions and field activities. These seminars afford an opportunity for dialogue and a cross-fertilization of ideas and recommendations for future activities.

In this context, four seminars took place during the reporting period. The OSCE-Japan Conference 2000 on Comprehensive Security in Central Asia - Sharing OSCE and Asian Experiences was held in Tokyo on 11 and 12 December 2000. This conference was the first joint OSCE meeting with Japan and at the same time the first with one of its Asian Partners for Co-operation.

On 20 and 21 March 2001, the OSCE-Korea Conference 2001 took place in Seoul. This seminar focused on tools successfully brought to bear by the OSCE to reduce armed conflict in Europe, notably in the spheres of CBMs and CSBMs, and their possible applicability in northeast Asia.

An OSCE Seminar on Preventive Functions of the OSCE: Experience, Possibilities, Tasks took place on 8 and 9 October 2001 in Kiev. Co-operation among international, sub-regional and non-governmental organizations as well as with academic institutions was a core theme of the Seminar. The OSCE Secretary General stated that �the code-word is partnership, especially among main actors working together in specific situations in the �Euro-Atlantic-Asiatic� area.�

The annual Mediterranean Seminar was held in Dubrovnik, Croatia, on 30 and 31 October 2001, on the topic Implementation of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension Commitments: the OSCE Experience and its Relevance for the Mediterranean Region. This Seminar provided the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation as well as other participants in it an opportunity to exchange views and ideas on applicability of the OSCE�s economic and environmental activities in the Mediterranean region.


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NATO and EU Enlargement

 

European Union

 

Eastern Europe will be included in EU and probably NATO as well as full members, uncertain is whether CIS states will also become full members.� Russian President Putin has been saying little on the subject of enlargement, and this is a big change from previous loud criticism.

��������������� While enlargement of the EU and NATO will take place separately and in parallel, the two effects complement each other and we could see almost all of the new nations in both organizations.� Russia in private and public diplomacy has been reserved, but the issue of letting say, Ukraine into the western alliance would cause them to react.� Many of the Caucasus nations and Central Asian nations will probably not get into the EU.

Europe has witnessed some major events in recent years. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the resulting end of the Cold War have profoundly altered the existing geopolitical order, marking the end of the old models for the international balance of power. The process of European integration has also gathered pace sharply.

Against this new backdrop, the process of enlargement to include central and eastern Europe, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey represents an historical undertaking for the European Union. An enlarged Union with, in its initial phase at least, over 100 million new citizens will promote trade and economic activity and give fresh impetus to the growth and integration of the European economy as a whole. The accession of new Member States will enhance the Union's weight and influence internationally.

Whatever happens, the issue of enlargement will dominate EU policy in the coming years. The central and eastern European countries, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey are, in principle, all starting out on equal terms. However, economic and political realities in these countries are often very different. This presents the Union with unprecedented institutional and political challenges.� Although its population could rise by over 25% to 500 million with the first wave of accessions, its total GDP will grow by no more than 5%. Notwithstanding the enormous efforts undertaken by these countries, their integration into existing programs and structures will be a very delicate task.

1. The Association Agreements (Europe Agreements)

The already considerable volume of trade between ten Central and Eastern European countries (excluding Albania and all successor states of the former Yugoslavia other than Slovenia) and the European Union was boosted with the signing of the Association Agreements (also known as Europe Agreements).

These form the legal framework for association between the applicant countries and the European Union and cover their political and economic relations. Their objective is to provide an appropriate framework for the applicant countries' gradual integration into the Community. Europe Agreements have been concluded with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The Association Agreements' objective is to establish a free-trade area by 2002 liberalizing trade in industrial products and providing a basis for economic co-operation in a large number of sectors. The Association Councils also provide a forum for discussion at ministerial level of the progress made in preparing for accession. The Agreements cover the main areas in which the Community acquis is to be adopted. They are being used to help the applicant countries draw up schedules for incorporating the acquis and transposing the Community's legal rules into their national law prior to accession.

The Association Agreements with Cyprus, Malta and Turkey cover the same fields as those with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (with the exception of political dialogue) and are aimed at establishing a customs union. In 1995, Turkey signed a customs union agreement with the European Union.

The associated countries and the European Union

Country

Association Agreement signed on

Accession application submitted on

Association Agreement
OJ reference

Bulgaria

1-3-1993

14-12-1995

OJ L 358, 31.12.94

Cyprus

19-12-1972

3-07-1990

OJ L 133, 21.05.77

Czech Republic

6-10-1993

17-1-1996

OJ L 360, 31.12.94

Estonia

12-6-1995

24-11-1995

OJ L 68, 9.3.98

Hungary

16-12-1991

31-3-1994

OJ L 347, 31.12.93

Latvia

12-6-1995

13-10-1995

OJ L 26, 2.2.98

Lithuania

12-6-1995

8-12-1995

OJ L 51, 20.2.98

Malta

5-12-1970

3-7-1990

OJ L 61, 14.3.71

Poland

16-12-1991

5-4-1994

OJ L 348, 31.12.93

Romania

8-2-1993

22-6-1995

OJ L 357, 31.12.94

Slovakia

6-10-1993

27-6-1995

OJ L 359, 31.12.94

Slovenia

10-6-1996

10-6-1996

OJ L 51, 26.2.99

Turkey

12-9-1973

14-4-1987

OJ 217, 29.12.64

The first accession criterion (political criterion), which concerns, notably, respect for democracy and human rights, appears to have been met by all countries except Slovakia where, in the Commission's view, the rule of law and democracy is not sufficiently rooted in political life and there is insufficient protection of minorities. Consequently it was excluded from the first wave of applicants.

The economic criterion: the five countries chosen are considered to have viable market economies and Slovakia is very close to this goal. As regards the second requirement under this criterion - capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union - the Czech Republic and Slovenia are considered to have made the greatest progress and Hungary and Poland appear to be proceeding apace with restructuring with Estonia following up the rear.

Agenda 2000 also establishes a financial framework for supporting the pre-accession process in the applicant countries. EUR 21 billion is provided in pre-accession aid to the Central and Eastern European countries for the period 2000-2006. This takes three forms:

  • the Phare programme: EUR 10.5 billion (EUR 1.5 billion a year). Since 1997 this has focused on the two main priorities for adoption of the Community acquis;
  • aid for agricultural development totalling EUR 3.5 billion (EUR 500 million a year);
  • structural aid amounting to EUR 7 billion (EUR 1 billion a year) to be used primarily to help applicant countries comply with Community infrastructure standards in the transport and environmental sectors. It will also be used to familiarize these countries with structural project procedures.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

New members

Heads of State and Government issued invitations to seven countries to begin accession talks to join the Alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The countries are expected to join NATO in 2004.

Alliance leaders approved a package of measures aimed at ensuring that NATO has the tools it needs to meet the �grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 21st century�:

  • NATO Response Force � a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed;
  • Streamlined military command � NATO�s command structure will be restructured into a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command structure, in order to meet the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. There will be two strategic commands, one operational �the strategic command for Operations (Europe), and one functional � the strategic command for Transformation (United States).
  • Prague Capabilities Commitment - individual Allies have made firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in areas key to modern military operations, such as strategic air and sea lift and air-to-ground surveillance;
  • Defense against new threats � an agreement was reached on a military concept for defense against terrorism and five specific initiatives in the area of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defense were endorsed to enhance the Alliance�s defense capabilities against weapons of mass destruction. Heads of State and Government also decided to strengthen NATO�s defense against cyber attacks and initiate a missile defense feasibility study.

 

Nation

 

Region

Military Budget $b

 

OSCE

 

NATO EAPC

 

COE

Albania

S.E. Europe

0.3

Member

Partner

Member

Andorra

Europe

0

Member

 

Member

Armenia

Caucauses

0

Member

Partner

Member

Austria

EU

9.6

Member

Partner

Member

Azerbaijan

Caucauses

0.3

Member

Partner

Member

Belarus

East Europe

0.7

Member

Partner

 

Belgium

EU

3.9

Member

Member

Member

Bosnia and Hercegovina

Balkan

0

Member

 

Special Guest

Bulgaria

Central Europe

0.5

Member

Partner

Member

Canada

N. America

7

Member

Member

Observer

Croatia

Balkans

0.3

Member

Partner

Member

Cyprus

Mediterranean

0

Member

 

Member

Czech Republic

Europe

1.2

Member

Member

Member

Denmark

EU

2.8

Member

Member

Member

Estonia

Baltic

0

Member

Partner

Member

Finland

EU

3

Member

Partner

Member

France

EU

33.2

Member

Member

Member

Georgia

Caucauses

0

Member

Partner

Member

Germany

EU

27.3

Member

Member

Member

Greece

EU

6.2

Member

Member

Member

Holy See

Europe

0

Member

 

Observer

Hungary

Central Europe

0.8

Member

Member

Member

Iceland

Europe

0.2

Member

Member

Member

Ireland

EU

2.4

Member

Member

Member

Italy

EU

23.2

Member

Member

Member

Kazakhstan

Central Asia

1

Member

Partner

 

Kyrghyz Republic

Central Asia

0

Member

Partner

 

Latvia

Baltic

0.1

Member

Partner

Member

Liechtenstein

Europe

0

Member

Partner

Member

Lithuania

Baltic

0.1

Member

Partner

Member

Luxembourg

EU

0.2

Member

Member

Member

Malta

Mediterranean

0

Member

 

Member

Moldova

East Europe

0

Member

Partner

Member

Monoco

Europe

0

Member

 

 

Netherlands

EU

7

Member

Member

Member

Norway

Europe

3.4

Member

Member

Member

Poland

Europe

3.2

Member

Member

Member

Portugal

EU

2.4

Member

Member

Member

Romania

Central Europe

1.6

Member

Partner

Member

Russia

Central Asia

6.3

Member

Associate

Member

San Marino

Europe

0

Member

 

Member

Slovakia

Central Europe

0.4

Member

Partner

Member

Slovenia

S.E. Europe

0.5

Member

Partner

Member

Spain

EU

7.3

Member

Member

Member

Sweden

EU

3

Member

Partner

Member

Switzerland

Europe

21.6

Member

Partner

Member

Tajikistan

Central Asia

0

Member

Partner

 

Turkey

Central Asia

7

Member

Member

Member

Turkmenistan

Central Asia

0.1

Member

Partner

 

Ukraine

East Europe

1.4

Member

Associate

Member

United Kingdom

EU

33

Member

Member

Member

United States

N. America

297

Member

Leader

Observer

Uzbekistan

Central Asia

0.6

Member

Partner

 

Yugoslavia

Balkan

0

Member

 

Special Guest

 

 

 

 

 

 

Algeria

Mediterranean

 

Med Partner

Med Partner

 

Egypt

Mediterranean

 

Med Partner

Med Partner

 

Israel

Mediterranean

 

Med Partner

Med Partner

Observer

Jordan

Mediterranean

 

Med Partner

Med Partner

 

Morocco

Mediterranean

 

Med Partner

Med Partner

 

Tunisia

Mediterranean

 

Med Partner

Med Partner

 

Mexico

N. American

 

Observer

 

Observer

Japan

Pacific

 

Special Relations

 

 

Republic of Korea

Asian

 

Special Relations

 

 

Thailand

S.E. Asian

 

Special Relations

 

 

 

NOTE: The membership list shows that the same nations are in each other�s institutions.


 

Buy the latest up-to-date copy of this book, "Clash of Civilizations and the International Military Industrial Complex"

The Three Pillars of Security N. America, Europe and CIS CSO

North American Pillar

The United States is the biggest military spender in the world. In 2002, the US Congress debated a Bush defense budget of $343.2 billion, an increase of $32.6 billion over the previous year. The increase would bring US military spending to more than half of all discretionary spending.

The largest defense corporations are also based in the United States. In arming the US, the so-called "Globocop," corporations derive the most benefit because they are lavished with billions to come up with lethal weapons, surveillance equipment, tanks, submarines, ships and airplanes designed for a seemingly never-ending war.

While many sectors in the US are suffering from the economic crunch, top weapons manufacturers are awaiting new orders, hiring new people, looking for new investments and gaining attention on the stock market.

The bond between the US military establishment and defense corporations brought to existence the "military-industrial complex" moniker. But beyond being a label, the phrase resonates with the power and influence of a partnership that has sustained America's arms superiority and aided its economy.

Muscle of the US Economy

The military industry is a dominant player in the US economy. Military orders drive America's manufacturing sector. More than one-third of all engineers and scientists in the US are engaged in military-related jobs. Several sections of the country and a number of industrial sectors, particularly shipbuilding and aerospace, are greatly dependent upon military spending or foreign arms sales.

The Department of Defense (DoD), together with the top defense corporations - or what is known as the "military-industrial complex" - controls the largest coordinated bloc of industry in the US.

In 2001, after taking into account the emergency anti-terror funding and supplemental appropriations to finance the war in Afghanistan, the Pentagon's budget amounted to some $375 billion. In addition to the rising annual Defense budget, military spending also eats up much of the budgets of the Department of Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. At present, it consumes about 55% of the federal government's discretionary expenditures. Roughly 75% of federal research and development expenditure is devoted to military projects.

The top aerospace and defense corporations, consisting of 11 companies, employ 901,258 people.� These corporations mostly rely on DoD contracts. Most of these companies are also among the top defense corporations in the whole world.

It is not surprising, therefore, that many Americans and their elected representatives support continued Pentagon spending. The military industry has become a huge and untouchable jobs program employing directly and indirectly a large number of blue-collar workers and a rising number of technical professionals. Defense workers are kept in line by the fear of job loss and ensuing economic crisis. This threat is also used to frustrate efforts to scale back military production or to convert it to socially useful purposes.

Historically, the US economy shook off economic depression during World Wars I and II as establishments and factories vigorously worked to support the American war machine. For a superpower like the US, war is an avenue leading out of an economic slump since practically all economic sectors become engaged in the country's war efforts. Aside from boosting the local economy and generating jobs, the US also earned from selling weapons to its wartime allies.

Exporting War

With the end of the Cold War, and the Reagan weapons buying binge of the 1980s started to slowdown, US weapons manufacturers began to give more attention to foreign markets as a way to sustain their profit margins.

In pursuit of easy profits, practically all major weapons producing companies worldwide are collectively pushing to boost their exports. US companies gained market dominance, cornering 40-50% of the total global weapons market in the 1990s.

Companies like Lockheed Martin and Boeing have realized that the only way to expand their exports beyond present levels is to open up new markets, by eliminating existing restrictions of potential recipient states, or seek new government subsidies that can be used to create more "cash paying customers" (i.e., foreign clients that use US-supplied "cash" to buy American weapons).

The absence of a compelling reason for NATO expansion is more than offset by the strong desire of powers-that-be to see the alliance broadened. While military contractors are looking for new markets, the Pentagon is seeking a new mission.

The military-industrial complex needs a mission to justify its continued dominance, and NATO expansion is a good candidate to fill that role. The September 11th attacks gave the military-industrial complex further justification for increased military production and an excuse to use war to boost the sagging US economy.

Oil Connection

Behind the "war on terrorism" that the US supposedly waged against Afghanistan are corporate interests involving oil. Without doubt, the military-industrial complex has a stake in expanding areas to be exploited for oil as well as protecting US oil sources.

According to Ahmed Rashid, Central Asia correspondent for the Daily Telegraph and the Far Eastern Economic Review, Afghanistan is the "shortest route to the Persian Gulf from the gas resources of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - from Northern Central Asia and Western Central Asia. It is far shorter than the routes through Iran, the Caucuses or China. Any pipeline would pass through only two countries, whereas at present the pipeline is passing through seven or eight countries." Thus, Afghanistan would be the best option for interested oil companies if it were brought under control.

Both competing oil companies - Bridas (Argentinian multinational) and Unocal (American company) - had very close relationship with the Taliban. In fact, the US government supported the Taliban's rise. There are a number of reasons why America supported the Taliban.

Rashid said one reason was that "the Taliban was vehemently anti-Iran and anti-Shia, and this was the time of the dual containment policy when the US was trying to hold in Iran and Iraq. And the Taliban fitted the bill very well. Secondly, two US allies in the region, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, were supporting the Taliban. The third reason is that the US wanted to build this pipeline. There was a lot of support from the Pentagon and the State Department for the Unocal effort."

Another analyst, Prof. Michael Klare, said the root of the war in Afghanistan lies in America's efforts to dominate the oil resources of the Persian Gulf. The US is protecting its interests in Saudi oil by defending the royal family from being overthrown by extremists like Bin Laden and replaced by a more doctrinaire Islamic rule.

The nature of US protection for Saudi Arabia has evolved over time. At first, it was provided through indirect forms of support such as military advisers and arms aid. The direct presence of US military forces began to increase over the years. Today, the US has between 5,000 and 10,000 soldiers on Saudi soil, and a much bigger number offshore, on ships and the island of Bahrain.

According to Klare, "the royal family has always provided US interests a privileged position with respect to Saudi oil supplies, in terms of both the access to oil and the pricing of oil."

In the OPEC, the Saudi royal family has maintained warm relations with the US by keeping prices at a level that does not burden the US economy so much. There is apprehension that if the extremists took over, they might deny US access to Saudi oil and/or increase prices, and thus result in an even worse economic situation than the US is suffering at present.

Afghanistan is not the first time that the US has gone to war because of oil. The US got involved in local conflicts in other countries because of its interest in petroleum resources. It had been enmeshed in the internal politics of Iran (it had very close relations with the overthrown Shah). Klare said, "Historically, (the US) has been involved in conflicts in Mexico over oil. (It is) now involved in Colombia in a conflict that's as much about oil as it is about drugs." This is because the US views oil as a national security concern. Thus, its foreign and military policies involve the protection of its oil sources.

Exciting Days for War Business

In December 2001, the US Congress debated a Bush defense budget of $343.2 billion, an increase of $32.6 billion over the previous year. The increase would bring military spending to more than half of all discretionary spending.

This is good news to the weapons industry. While many sectors in the US are suffering from the economic crunch, top weapons manufacturers are awaiting new orders, hiring new people, looking for new investments and gaining attention on the stock market.

A defense analyst with the Lexington Institute said, "The whole mind set of military spending changed on September 11. The most fundamental thing about defense spending is that threats drive defense spending. It's now going to be easier to fund almost anything."

These are fruitful times for companies like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman and Boeing. The war in Afghanistan is definitely a success despite friendly fire incidents, bombing accidents, mounting civilian casualties and the recent crash of a $280 million B-1 bomber. The Bush administration is already targeting new countries for military action, with Somalia, Yemen and Iraq topping the list. Indeed, this is a satisfying time to be in the war business.

"For a long time, (the defense industry) just didn't seem like a sexy area that has a lot of legs to it," said a partner at one options trading firm. But all that has changed. In response to investor interest, stock exchanges are thinking about creating a new Defense Index.

While Congress worked out the versions of the military budgets, weapons manufacturers and their supporters are confident that it will be big. "With the [Bush] administration, we'll see a rebuilding of the military to bring it back to where it was eight years ago," said defense analyst Paul Nisbet. "We'll see a considerable appreciation in defense stocks, as we saw in the Reagan years."

On January 17, 1961, in a nationally televised address delivered four days before John F. Kennedy's inaugural, Dwight Eisenhower spoke about the perils of the "unwarranted influence" exerted by the "military-industrial complex." Four decades have passed and the military-industrial complex - a phrase coined by Eisenhower's speechwriters Ralph Williams and Malcolm Moos to describe the link between the US military establishment and the arms industry - has survived and gained dominance.

The US war industry flourished during the Cold War, especially in the Reagan weapons-buying spree years. Although weapons procurement eventually did wind down, the US military budget is still bigger than it was when Eisenhower warned about the military-industrial complex in 1961. The US military budget amounts to more than $270 billion per year, which in constant dollars remains near the peacetime Cold War average during the period of intense US-Soviet rivalry (1950 to 1989).

Running out of enemies

Without the rivalry from Russia, where is the threat that justifies spending hundreds of billion dollars every year on war and preparations for war? The Pentagon's answer is simple: there is no longer one powerful adversary to contend with, but US forces still need to be equipped to fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously against "rogue states" like Iraq and North Korea.

According to Michael Klare, author of Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, Colin Powell devised the "two war strategy" once he realized that the United States was "running out of enemies" large enough to justify spending hundreds of billions on the Pentagon every year.

The United States currently spends 19 times more on its military forces than all of the Pentagon's so-called rogue states - Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea - combined. In fact, the United States and its key allies (NATO, Japan, and South Korea) now account for 62% of total global military spending, up from about 50% in the mid-1980s. In short, despite repeated calls for higher military spending to remedy the alleged "readiness crisis" facing US forces, the United States and its allies currently account for a much higher share of global military spending than they did at the height of the Reagan military buildup in the mid-1980s.

The bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998), the missile tests by Iran (July 1998) and North Korea (August 1998), the NATO's air war in Kosovo (inaugurated on March 24, 1999), and the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon (September 11, 2001) make US military buildup appear reasonable, and defense corporations are only too happy to produce more lethal weapons.

Corporate War Profiteers

A look at the huge corporations and their sphere of influence in the military establishment and Congress sheds light on how enormous is the power wielded by the arms industry.

At present, Lockheed Martin is considered as the top weapons manufacturer in the US. Lockheed Martin was created by merging Lockheed with Martin Marietta, Loral Defense, the General Dynamics combat aircraft division, and scores of other military companies to create a $35 billion behemoth that received over $18 billion in Pentagon contracts.

Proof of its power, Lockheed Martin and its allies in the weapons industry have aggressively pushed for favorable treatment from the federal government in the form of special subsidies, lucrative contracts for well-funded weapons systems, and important changes in US policies on arms sales and military technology transfers.

The military merger boom that resulted in an "improved" military-industrial complex began during the Clinton administration. Then Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Undersecretary of Defense William Perry decided to encourage mergers of defense firms. In a meeting that Lockheed Martin's Norman Augustine refers to as the "last supper," Perry bluntly told industry executives that the Pentagon would not be ordering enough ships, planes, and tanks to support the number of major military contractors that had been sustained by the Reagan military buildup.

Funding for weapons procurement, while still high by historical standards, was declining significantly from the humongous levels they had reached during the Reagan years. Hence, the Pentagon budget could no longer support the same number of major defense contractors in the way it did during the Reagan military boom.

Furthermore, the Pentagon was in the process of decelerating production for current-generation systems like the F-16 fighter and the M-1 tank to make room for next-generation systems like the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. Cutting down the overhead by reducing the number of underutilized military factories was the official rationale behind the merger move.

Defense corporations and their allies in Congress fiercely resisted closing weapons production lines. Instead, they retrenched workers even as industry profits hit near-record levels and industry executives earn generous bonuses and huge salaries.

Interlocking Interests

The consolidation of the weapons industry gives arms companies greater leverage over the Pentagon. The Department of Defense has so few options left when it comes to procuring a major weapons system. In 1998, when the Pentagon awarded a $1.6 billion contract for the so-called "systems architecture" for a National Missile Defense system, the competition pitted Boeing against a partnership called United Missile Defense, a team-up composed of Lockheed Martin, TRW and Raytheon. When Boeing won the contract, TRW and Raytheon immediately switched teams and became major subcontractors for Boeing on the project.

In the area of combat aircraft, Boeing is in partnership with Lockheed Martin on one major system (the Air Force's F-22 stealth fighter plane) and in competition on another (the next-generation Joint Strike Fighter). These interlocking business relationships create an atmosphere wherein it often makes more sense for the defense mega-corporations to team up and wield their enormous political clout to increase the Pentagon budget.

Post 9-11

Although Bush and his top advisers keep on harping that their global campaign against terrorism will be a "new kind of war," the largest beneficiaries of the new weapons spending sparked by the September 11 attacks arethe big defense contractors like Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.

Bulk of the new funding will be channeled to longstanding pet projects of the military-industrial complex and not to finance anti-terrorism equipment or techniques. According to analysts, renewed Pentagon spending will only benefit existing systems, many of which were designed during the Cold War and have little or nothing to do with the fight against terrorism.

The weapons industry's main agenda of recent years - a massive, across-the-board increase in military spending - has taken a giant leap forward after September 11. Within days of the attacks, Congress signed off on a $40-billion package for reconstruction and anti-terrorism efforts. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has compared the war on terrorism with the Cold War, and a $400-billion military budget is in the offing. Increased military activities are also expected to invigorate the US economy since more weapons projects mean more orders for the manufacturing sector.

US as Globocop

Beyond corporate and institutional pressure for perennially high military spending, there is also a strategic rationale - the idea that the United States should retain the capability to serve as some kind of "Globocop." The US has taken upon itself the task of maintaining "order and stability," especially in the perpetuation of "free markets."

The US is already providing military assistance and special operations advisors to the Philippines in the war against the Abu Sayyaf group, which the US says has links with Osama bin Laden. In Yemen - where Bin Laden attacked the USS Cole that killed 17 American sailors in 2000 - Yemeni Special Forces, US-trained and armed with tanks, helicopters and artillery, attacked a local al-Qaeda organization. Other potential targets include Somalia, which is accused of hosting terrorists, and Iraq, which is accused of developing weapons of mass destruction.

Global force projection remains the focus of Pentagon's strategy and budget. In places where there are critical resources or potential US investments at risk, such as the Persian Gulf and the oil-and-gas-rich Central Asia, the Pentagon is preoccupied with providing weapons and training, arranging access to bases, and prepositioning troops and equipment in preparation for a possible military intervention at any time.

Meanwhile, war and war preparation mean more profits for US defense corporations. These companies expand, hire more workers, embark on more projects, and help prop up the US economy. But as the US military-industrial complex grows, so does the danger of unprecedented annihilation of innocent people.

TOP US DEFENSE CORPORATIONS

Lockheed Martin

Lockheed Martin is the world's largest weapons manufacturer, a major player in the areas of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense. The company got over $15 billion in contracts from the Pentagon in 2000, plus an additional $2 billion for nuclear weapons design work from the Department of Energy.

Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for the Trident II Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), a multiple-warhead, long-range missile that is produced for deployment on the Trident submarine. The Trident II is the only long-range U.S. nuclear missile currently in production.

Even as it profits from working on the next generation of nuclear weapons, Lockheed Martin is also heavily invested in ballistic missile defense.

Lockheed Martin's global presence stems from its role as the world's largest arms exporting company. Its most lucrative export item is the F-16 combat aircraft. The company has sold over 3,000 F-16s to overseas customers since the mid-1970s, and the client list for the plane includes Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Egypt, and Venezuela. Lockheed Martin F-16s are co-produced in 10 countries, including Turkey, where an F-16 assembly line in Ankara employs 2,000 workers.

In late 2001, the company won what has been touted as "the largest defense contract in history," a $19 billion development contract for the $200 billion Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. Plans call for producing variants of the JSF for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines, as well as for the Navy and Air Force of the United Kingdom. Other countries that have been discussed as potential customers for this "world aircraft" are Germany, Turkey, and Israel.

Boeing

 

The Boeing Company is the 800-pound gorilla of US aerospace. The firm is the world's largest aerospace company, the #1 manufacturer of commercial jets (barely ahead of Airbus), and the #3 defense contractor behind Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. It has two major segments: commercial airplanes and Integrated Defense Systems. Boeing's commercial aircraft include the 767, 747, and the 737; military aircraft include the F/A-18 Hornet strike fighter, the F-15 Eagle fighter-bomber, the C-17 Globemaster III transport, and the AH-64D Apache helicopter. Boeing's space operations include communications satellites, Delta rockets, missiles, the International Space Station, and the Space Shuttle (with Lockheed). 

Boeing is best known for its planes, but its Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) unit -- formed when Boeing combined its Military Aircraft & Missile Systems and Space & Communications units -- has all the neat stuff. It includes military aircraft (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, F-15E Eagle, C-17 Globemaster III, AH-64D Apache Longbow, and V-22 Osprey) as well as missiles (Harpoon, SLAM-ER, THAAD), airborne lasers, and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV). IDS also makes the Delta family of launch vehicles, is NASA's prime contractor for International Space Station, supports the Space Shuttle program (a joint venture with Lockheed Martin), and makes satellite-based information and communications systems.

Boeing Integrated Defense Systems (IDS), based in St. Louis, is a $23-billion business with capabilities in defense, intelligence, communications and space. Boeing Integrated Defense Systems is a recognized leader in providing end-to-end services for large-scale systems that combine sophisticated communications networks with air, land, sea and space-based platforms for global military, government and commercial customers. With more than five decades of expertise and the ingenuity of 78,000 employees, IDS is well positioned to continue to grow its business and become the world's premier space and defense company.

Boeing is the world's biggest commercial jet producer, NASA's largest contractor, one of the Pentagon's top contractors, and the US's largest exporter. Boeing and its subsidiaries employ almost 200,000 people in 60 countries and 26 American states, with customers in 145 countries, and manufacturing operations throughout the US, Canada, and Australia. Major operations are in Seattle, Washington; Southern California; Wichita, Kansas; and St. Louis, Missouri. Boeing has recently expanded or opened offices in Brussels, Tokyo, Beijing, Hong Kong, London, Paris, Moscow, Ghana and South Africa. Since 1997, when Boeing acquired defense giant McDonnell Douglas, Boeing has ranked as the Pentagon's No. 2 contractor, second only to Lockheed Martin.

After the September 11th attacks, Boeing's stock plummeted 16.8%. Sales to commercial airlines constitute 60% of Boeing's business. With decreasing orders for commercial aircraft, Boeing expects to lose production of more than 1,000 airplanes. Hence, Boeing is anticipating having to lay off as many as 30,000 employees by the end of 2002.

Although it is not specifically involved in the development of nuclear weapons, Boeing's lead role in the National Missile Defense (NMD) system will have an impact on the future role of nuclear weapons in the US and in the world. Boeing's Space and Communications Group division is involved in everything from operating the Space Shuttle, to creating new satellite-based information and communications services, and overseeing many of the missile defense programs.

Together with Textron, Boeing is developing the troubled V-22 Osprey aircraft for the Marine Corps, while Sikorsky and Boeing have joined together to build the RAH-66 Comanche combat helicopter for the Army. Buying nations include the United Kingdom, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Greece, South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil.

Boeing also has a role in the development of each of the three next-generation fighter aircraft, all of which were conceived during the Cold War. These include the $62 billion F-22 being built with Lockheed Martin for the Air Force, the $46 billion F/A 18 E-F Super Hornet being built by Boeing for the Navy, and potentially the $200 billion Joint Strike Fighter to be used by the Marines, Navy and the Air Force. Both Boeing and Lockheed Martin had been competing for the JSF contract. In late October 2001, the Pentagon awarded the JSF contract to Lockheed, but there has been discussion of sharing some of the work with Boeing.

Selected Products and Services

737-700 Airborne Early Warning & Control System (AEW&C)

Boeing is under contract with Australia and Turkey to design and develop AEW&C systems for those nations� defense forces.

767 Tanker/Transport

The 767 Tanker/Transport is the reliable, low-risk solution for air-refueling and transport needs for military services around the globe.

AH-64D Apache Longbow

The AH-64D Apache Longbow is the most lethal, survivable, deployable and maintainable multimission combat helicopter in the world.

Airborne Laser

As the prime contractor for the U.S. Air Force Airborne Laser program, Boeing will conduct the program definition and risk reduction phase.

AV-8B Harrier II Plus

The multimission Harrier II Plus� unique vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing capability and around-the-clock availability allows the Harrier to perform most missions from anywhere in the world where other tactical fixed wing aircraft can�t operate.

Boeing 376, 601, and 702 satellites

Boeing Satellite Systems is the world�s largest manufacturer of commercial communications satellites, and a leader in military communications.

C-17 Globemaster III

The C-17 Globemaster III is the most advanced, versatile airlifter ever made. It is capable of flying long distances, carrying 169,000 pounds of payload and landing on short, austere runways close to the front lines.

C-32A Executive Transport

The C-32A is a specially configured Boeing 757-200 for the U.S. Air Force. The aircraft provides safe, reliable worldwide airlift for the Vice President of the United States, U.S. Cabinet members and other U.S. government officials.

C-40A Military Transport

This modified 737-700C jetliner increases the logistical capabilities of the U.S. Navy�s worldwide fleet. It can be configured as an all-passenger, all-cargo or combination of the two.

C-40B Executive Transport

The C-40B is a specially modified Boeing Business Jet that provides high-performance, flexible, cost-effective airlift support for the Commanders-in-Chief, senior government leadership and team travel.

CH-47 Chinook

The CH-47 Chinook is the world�s most reliable and efficient heavy-lift helicopter, operable in both military and civil missions.

Delta family of rockets (Delta II, III, IV)

The Boeing family of Delta launch vehicles has been designed to meet the needs of commercial and U.S. government launch customers. The expendable rockets offer a variety of launch options that can lift payloads weighing 900 to 13,000 kg to orbit.

Explosive Detection System machines (EDS) and Explosive Trace Detection Machines (ETD)

The U.S. Department of Transportation awarded a contract to Boeing to install and maintain EDS and EDT machines at all 438 U.S. commercial aviation airports by Dec. 31, 2002. The contract also calls for the Boeing team to train approximately 30,000 airport baggage-screening employees, and has options to support the fielded equipment for up to five years after the contract completion date.

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet

The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the cornerstone of U.S. naval aviation and the nation�s newest, most advanced strike fighter. Designed to perform both air-to-air and ground attack or strike missions, the Super Hornet provides all the capability, flexibility and performance necessary to modernize the air or naval aviation forces of any country.

F-15 Eagle

The F-15E Eagle is the world�s most capable multirole fighter and the backbone of the U.S. Air Force fleet. The

F-15E carries payloads larger than any other tactical fighter but retains the air-to-air capability. It can operate around the clock and in any weather.

F-22 Raptor

Boeing is teamed with Lockheed Martin, UTC Aerospace and the U.S. Air Force to develop the F-22 Raptor as a replacement for the F-15C. The fast, agile, stealthy F-22 will take over the air superiority role with Air Combat Command starting in 2005.

Future Combat Systems (FCS)

Boeing was recently awarded a contract for the FCS program, which is a networked system of improved communications links and lighter, more mobile armored vehicles.

Future Imagery Architecture

In 1999, a Boeing-led team was awarded the FIA � space imaging - contract from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO.

Global Positioning System

Boeing has built a total of 40 GPS satellites and is under contract to build six follow-on Block IIF satellites with an option for additional vehicles. Boeing is also under U.S. Air Force contract to lead the ground control segment of the GPS constellation.

Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Boeing is the prime contractor for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, which is designed to defend the U.S. from a limited ICBM attack. The program includes development, testing and integration of all GMD elements.

International Space Station

Boeing is the prime contractor to NASA for the design, development and on-orbit performance of the International Space Station. The first components were joined in orbit in 1998.

Joint Tactical Radio Systems

Boeing was recently awarded a contract to develop the JTRS, a family of software programmable radios that will provide military commanders with significantly improved voice, video and data communications capability across the armed forces.

Military Aerospace Support

Military Aerospace Support is unique in the aerospace industry � a single organization offering the full spectrum of product and services to reduce life-cycle costs and maximize readiness of military aircraft in service with operators around the globe.

Munitions (SLAM-ER, CALCM, JDAM, Harpoon)

A world leader in all-weather precision munitions, Boeing covers a wide spectrum of strike weapon capabilities. These include the Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM), Brimstone and improved Harpoon missiles.

RAH-66 Comanche

The Boeing-Sikorsky team is developing the RAH-66 Comanche, a twin-turbine, two-seat, armed reconnaissance helicopter slated to enter service with the U.S. Army in 2006.

Sea Launch Company, LLC

Sea Launch is an ocean-based commercial launch service that provides a heavy-lift capability coupled with direct equatorial insertion into geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). The international partnership includes Boeing Commercial Space Company, RSC Energia, Kvaerner, the international Norwegian-based industrial Group, SDO Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash.

Space Shuttle

The Space Shuttle is the world�s only operational, reusable and human-rated launch vehicle. Boeing builds, maintains, modifies and, as a United Space Alliance partner, operates the Shuttle systems. Boeing also builds, tests and maintains the Shuttle�s main reusable liquid-fueled rocket engines.

T-45 Goshawk

The two-seat Goshawk is the heart of the integrated T-45 Training System, which the U.S. Navy employs to prepare pilots for the fleet�s carrier-based jets.

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle

The Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) could significantly increase combat effectiveness while reducing the overall costs of operations. The UCAV has a stealthy, tailless, 27-ft. airframe with a 34-ft. wingspan. Its initial mission is suppression of enemy air defenses.

V-22 Osprey

In partnership with Textron, Boeing developed the revolutionary V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. Combining the speed and range of a turboprop and the vertical lift of a helicopter, the V-22 can carry up to 24 troops or 20,000 pounds of cargo at twice helicopter speeds.

 

Raytheon

Raytheon is the third largest defense contractor in the United States, behind Lockheed Martin and Boeing. The Massachusetts-based conglomerate received more than $6.3 billion in Pentagon contracts in 2000, accounting for over 37% of the firm's $16 billion in revenues. By its own accounting, the company is involved in over 4,000 weapons programs. As its VP for Business Development Tom Culligan puts it, "As a top tier defense electronics company, our forte is to be a provider to major platform manufacturers, which means you see Raytheon's brand name everywhere - from tanks and rifles to ships, aircraft and UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles)."

Raytheon's best-known product is probably the Patriot air defense missile, which received massive publicity during the 1991 Gulf conflict when it was used to defend against Iraqi Scud missiles.

Another high-visibility system produced by Raytheon is the Tomahawk land attack missile, which company promotional materials describe as "the US Navy's weapon of choice." According to Raytheon, "Tomahawk has played a crucial role in several theater operations including: Operation Desert Storm, Bosnia, Iraq and Kosovo. Over 300 Tomahawks were used in Operation Desert Storm alone. Since Desert Storm in 1991, more than 1,000 Tomahawks have been fired..."

Other Raytheon missile systems include the AIM-65 Maverick, an air-to-surface missile that the company describes as "the most widely used precision guided munition in the free world.integrated on virtually every fighter aircraft in the free world ranging from the F-4 Phantom, F/A-18 Hornet, F-16 Falcon, AV-8B Harrier, the JAS-39 Grippen, and most recently, the P-3C Orion"; the AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile; and the top-of-the-line AIM-120 AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile), which has been sold to the US armed forces along with more than 20 other nations, including recent controversial offers to Thailand and the United Arab Emirates.

Raytheon also specializes in radar, surveillance, and targeting systems that are used on most US-produced combat aircraft, including the Air Force F-15, F-16, and F-22 fighter planes; the Navy's V-22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft; and the US Special Forces AC-130U and AC-130H airborne gun ships which have been heavily utilized in the war in Afghanistan. Raytheon calls this latest line of equipment "the Terminator family of targeting systems."

The company is also a major arms exporter, with billions in overseas arms sales in the past decade to a client list that includes Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Singapore, Greece, Taiwan and South Korea.

General Dynamics

General Dynamics (GD) is headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia, and employs approximately 46,000 people worldwide. GD and its subsidiaries have facilities throughout the United States, including Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maine, Massachusetts, California, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Ohio, Washington, North Carolina, and Virginia, and international offices in Italy, England, and Canada.

Defense contractor General Dynamics brings it on by land, air, and sea. It operates in four areas: marine (warships and nuclear submarines), aerospace (business jets), information systems and technology (command and control systems), and combat systems (tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, and munitions). General Dynamics' Electric Boat subsidiary builds nuclear submarines (Seawolf, Ohio, Los Angeles classes); Bath Iron Works builds DDG 51 destroyers and LPD 17 landing craft; Land Systems builds the M1 tank and Abrams combat vehicle; and Gulfstream Aerospace makes business jets. General Dynamics derives almost 60% of its revenue from the US government.  

General Dynamics has leading market positions in shipbuilding and marine systems, land and amphibious combat systems, mission-critical information systems and technologies, and business aviation. The company is a leading supplier of sophisticated defense systems to the United States and its allies, and sets the world standard in business jets. It has four major business segments � Aerospace, Combat Systems, Information Systems and Technology, and Marine Systems.

Our major products include the Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyer, Abrams M1A2 digitized main battle tank, the Stryker wheeled assault vehicle, medium-caliber munitions and gun systems, advanced fiber-optics products, Sect�ra secure encryption wireless phones, and the Gulfstream IV-SP� and Gulfstream V� business jets. On our drawing boards and in our test facilities are 21st century platforms and systems like the Gulfstream V-SP�, U.S. Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), Navy SSGN guided missile submarines and the next-generation communication systems for military and select commercial customers.  Additionally, we manage satellite ground stations, supply construction material in the Midwest, and service a variety of business aircraft.  

General Dynamics was officially established February 21, 1952, although it has organizational roots dating back to the late 1800s. The company was formed after its predecessor and current operating division, Electric Boat, acquired the aircraft company Canadair Ltd. and began building the first nuclear-powered submarine, USS Nautilus.

Through the years, General Dynamics has applied the wisdom of its experience and insight to recognize and act on change to build its position in the defense and technology business sectors. Building upon its marine business, the company added its first Combat Systems business unit, Land Systems, in 1982; its first Information Systems and Technology business unit , Advanced Technology Systems, in 1997; and returned to the aerospace business with Gulfstream in 1999.

Today, General Dynamics has leading market positions in business aviation and aircraft services, land and amphibious combat systems, mission-critical information systems and technologies, and shipbuilding and marine systems. The company is a leading supplier of sophisticated defense systems to the United States and its allies, and sets the world standard in business jets. It is headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia, employs approximately 54,000 people worldwide, and has four main business segments: Aerospace, Combat Systems, Information Systems and Technology, and Marine Systems.

GD operates in four main areas:

Marine Systems - producing warships and nuclear submarines
Aerospace - making business jets
Information Systems and Technology - designing command and control systems
Combat Systems - making tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, weaponry, and ammunition

General Dynamics' subsidiary, Electric Boat of Groton, Connecticut builds the Seawolf attack submarines; Bath Iron Works of Bath, Maine builds the DDG 51 destroyers; Land Systems of Sterling Heights, Michigan builds the M1 tank; and Gulfstream Aerospace of Savannah, Georgia makes business jets. GD Marine Systems is the U.S. Navy's leading supplier of combat vessels - including nuclear submarines, surface combatants, and auxiliary ships.

General Dynamics Armament Systems (GDAS), a division of General Dynamics, bought Saco Defense in June 2000. Saco Defense, one of the world's leading producers of small and medium caliber machine guns and cannon barrels and specializes in automatic weapons for the military, is now called General Dynamics Weapons Systems.

Most recently, GDAS was awarded a $39 million contract from the US Army for M2 machine guns, gun bolts, and barrels. The company also received a $126.4 million order from the US Army and Air Force for HYDRA-70 rocket systems, with a maximum potential value of $1.2 billion over the next five years.

The US government has facilitated the sales and giveaways (through its Foreign Military Sales and Excess Defense Article programs) of M60 machine guns to Panama, Peru, Colombia and Jordan; and M2 machine guns to Egypt, Greece, Thailand and Tunisia.

Northrop Grumman

Northrop Grumman is a Los Angeles-based company that manufactures planes and bombers dropping munitions on Afghanistan, including the B-2 bomber, the F-14 fighter. The company also makes the much-praised unmanned Global Hawk. The $10 million per copy Global Hawk has been deployed to Afghanistan despite the fact that it had not completed its testing requirements.

In addition to its planes and bombers, the company's Maryland based Electronic Systems division makes high tech systems like the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), a control center and a huge radar disc mounted atop a Boeing 707, which serves "as the airborne nerve center for a military air campaign."

Northrop Grumman is also responsible for ALQ-15 jamming device, used to protect jets from enemy radar-guided missiles. As David Steigman, senior defense analyst for the Teal Group, boasts, "Northrop Grumman's role is supplying the command control communications and the intelligence surveillance systems to find the bad guys and bop them in the head."

When Wall Street opened again on September 17, 2001, Northrop Grumman was ready to bob those bad guys and its stock had risen 16% to $94 a share in anticipation of the coming war. Two days after bombing in Afghanistan began, Northrop Grumman's stock had reached a three-year high of $107.60 a share on the New York Stock Exchange. The future looks bright and the company has job openings for more than 1,000 employees. According to a recent article in the financial magazine Barrons, Northrop Grumman is now seeking $2 billion in loans and equity investment to expand business opportunities and acquisitions.

(((UTC Aerospace)))

put a page on united technologies

(((Textron)))

put a page on Textron

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(((Honeywell)))ED

 

Bombardier in Canada

Bombardier makes the goods to get people moving. Its Bombardier Aerospace subsidiary (65% of sales before it bought Adtranz) is the world's #3 maker of civil aircraft behind Boeing and Airbus; the #1 regional aircraft maker (Canadair, de Havilland), ahead of Embraer and Fairchild Dornier; and one of the two largest makers of business jets (Challenger, Learjet), along with Gulfstream. Its Bombardier Transportation division -- which added DaimlerChrysler's Adtranz rail systems unit in 2001 -- is the world's largest producer of railway equipment. Other Bombardier subsidiaries produce Ski-Doo and Lynx snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, and Sea-Doo personal watercraft. The Bombardier family controls the company.  

Bombardier Aerospace, Defence Services is a respected expert in Fleet Management and Aviation Training Management. By tailoring our capabilities into customized solutions, we help customers extend the service life of military aircraft, enhance operational requirements, and reduce fleet operation and support costs.

 

 

European Pillar

There is also a very important change inside NATO and between NATO and the EU which I shall mention below: Maybe you have heard of a "European Pillar", a "European Security and Defense Identity", "Common Security and Foreign Policy" or "Common Security and Defense Policy" and other phrases describing the emerging European Military Industrial Complex.

For a number of years, the European Union has been building a common European security and defense policy. An important stage was reached at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, where EU leaders set themselves the goal of developing a rapid reaction force by 2003. This force would consist of 50,000 - 60,000 troops, in addition to air and naval elements, and would be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for up to a year. It would be used by the European Union for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking - these are the "Petersberg tasks" as agreed by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992, which were subsequently incorporated by the European Union into the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.

Allied leaders meeting in Washington in April 1999 expressed their readiness, in light of St. Malo and subsequent developments in the European Union, to define and adopt the necessary arrangements to allow ready access by the European Union to NATO collective assets and capabilities for crisis management operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily. Meanwhile, major shortfalls already identified in European defense capabilities were confirmed during the Kosovo crisis.

EU summits in Cologne in June 1999 and Helsinki in December 1999 led to important decisions on strengthening the EU's common European security and defense policy (ESDP) and the development of an EU rapid reaction capability by 2003. The first EU High Representative for Common and Security Policy, former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, took office in October 1999, filling the post for the first time since its creation by the Amsterdam Treaty. Shortly after, he was also appointed Secretary General of the WEU.

EU leaders at Helsinki acknowledged the Alliance's role in crisis management, making clear that their objective in developing an EU rapid reaction capability has no bearing on collective defense but is designed to enable the European Union to mount and lead crisis management operations in response to international crises, where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. Those of the Western European Union's functions needed to take on the Petersberg tasks are being taken over by the European Union. However, the collective defense commitments of the WEU's modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 are unaffected and will in future be safeguarded by a residual WEU secretariat, as was decided at the WEU ministerial meeting in Marseilles in November 2000.

EU-NATO relations develop

The starting point for Allied discussions on the practical military aspects of developing the NATO-EU relationship, in particular EU ready access to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, is set out in paragraph 10 of the Washington Summit Communiqu� in the following terms:

a.       Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;

b.       The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;

c.        Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;

d.       The further adaptation of NATO's defense planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

In parallel to the first discussions in the EU-NATO ad hoc working groups, interim security arrangements between NATO and the EU Council Secretariat entered into force at the end of July 2000, facilitating the exchange of classified information. The EU-NATO working group on Security Arrangements is working towards a permanent security arrangement between the two organizations.

The decisions taken at the EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999 mark a significant change in the evolution of European security arrangements. The EU's intention to absorb the Western European Union (WEU) in the near future, to create a European rapid reaction corps of 50,000 - 60,000 troops by 2003 for operations such as peacekeeping and regional crisis management, and to set up the appropriate decision-making structures (including a Standing Committee on Political and Security Affairs, a Military Committee, and a military staff) indicate the Union's new determination to become a serious security actor in its own right.

In addition to national units, a number of multinational formations have been designated as Forces answerable to EU

 

EU and NATO
adopt framework for co-operation

 

A joint declaration adopted by the European Union and NATO on 16 December has opened the way for closer political and military co-operation between the two organisations.

The landmark Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) provides a formal basis for co-operation between the two organisations in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. It outlines the political principles for EU-NATO co-operation and gives the European Union assured access to NATO�s planning and logistics capabilities for its own military operations.

NATO and the EU have successfully collaborated in crisis management before, most notably in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1), but a formal framework for co-operation did not previously exist.

�I have said many times standing here that NATO-EU co-operation works in practice, but has not yet worked in theory,� said NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at a press conference. �Today�s declaration and the work completed over the weekend completes that. We will work in practice and we will work in theory as well.�

EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION,

  • �Welcome the strategic partnership established between the European Union and NATO in crisis management, founded on our shared values, the indivisibility of our security and our determination to tackle the challenges of the new Century;
  • Welcome the continued important role of NATO in crisis management and conflict prevention, and reaffirm that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members;
  • Welcome the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose purpose is to add to the range of instruments already at the European Union�s disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis management operations, including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged;
  • Reaffirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management;
  • Reaffirm their determination to strengthen their capabilities;

Declare that the relationship between the European Union and NATO will be founded on the following principles:

  • Partnership: ensuring that the crisis management activities of the two organisations are mutually reinforcing, while recognising that the European Union and NATO are organisations of a different nature;
  • Effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency;
  • Equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO;
  • Respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and NATO;
  • Respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which underlie the Treaty on European Union and the Washington Treaty, in order to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force, and also based on respect for treaty rights and obligations as well as refraining from unilateral actions;
  • Coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations;

To this end:

  • The European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing the relevant Nice arrangements, as set out in the letter from the EU High Representative on 13 December 2002;
  • NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevant Washington Summit decisions, and is giving the European Union, inter alia and in particular, assured access to NATO�s planning capabilities, as set out in the NAC decisions on 13 December 2002;
  • Both organisations have recognised the need for arrangements to ensure the coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to the two organisations, with a spirit of openness.�

Germany and France have agreed to cooperate on a spy satellite system that would cut Europe's reliance on US military intelligence and revives an idea previously shelved as being too expensive. Following a summit in the German town of Mainz the French and German leaders said Berlin would acquire an all-weather radar satellite system while Paris would bring its optical satellite system into the joint project.

"Germany and France intend to develop an independent European satellite reconnaissance system," a statement said after German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder met France's President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. Plans for an independent statellite system were hastened following European reliance on US satellite information during last year's outlaw war against Yugoslavia.

JDAMs

Most of the 30,000 bombs dropped by the US on Yugoslavia were Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) ordinance. JDAM's are precisely guided to their targets by satellite signals day and night in any weather as opposed to laser-guided munitions which are affected by heavy cloud and rain.

"We recognised in Kosovo that we have to be able to stand on our own two feet in the area of European reconnaissance. We can't rely on delivery from outside of Europe," one German official source said.

In other words the EU wants the ability to bomb who it likes when it likes without relying on US technology.

Satellite plans relaunched

Mr Schroeder's conservative predecessor Helmut Kohl pulled out of an ambitious European satellite programme with France in 1997, citing budget constraints. France was especially keen to build the Helios II and Horus satellites to make Europe independent of Washington's superior "spy in the sky" capabilities and made the project a symbol of Europe's drive for its own military identity, apart from NATO.

Germany has changed its mind since the technology is now cheaper and because the United States refused to share all its satellite intelligence with its EU allies during last year's murderous attacks in the Balkans. During the Yugoslav conflict Germany also used unmanned drones launched from bases in Macedonia to gather aerial reconnaissance but some crashed and they could not operate in poor weather.

Arms consolidation drive

The drive towards creating a single military-industrial complex in Europe was also strengthened when German Defense Secretary Walther Stuetzle announced that Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands have ordered 366 NH90 military transport helicopters for around �6 billion.

The Eurocopter unit of European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) - a merger of DaimlerChrysler's aerospace unit, France's Aerospatiale Matra and Casa of Spain - has a 63 per cent share of the NH 90 project. The NH 90 has become one of the world's most drawn out military equipment programs which began in the 1980s with the multi-billion pound Eurofighter.

Washington has attempted to slow down European arms consolidation by linking up the US arms giant Raytheon with the French arms group Thales. However, the Pentagon is very nervous about sharing sensitive information with Thales, particularly around air defense command systems.

Military hardware slush funds

Another signal that the European arms manufacturers are gearing up for an intense arms race is the building up of offshore slush funds, to pay huge "commissions" to win contracts, to avoid new anti-corruption rules. A London conference on financial crime heard OECD chair of a working party on corruption Mark Peith say: "many companies are building slush funds because they want to retain the option to bribe."

The tradition of bribing countries to buy huge amounts of armaments has been long employed by the US military-industrial complex. For instance US defense secretary William Cohen secured sales of �2,000 million of Lockheed Martin military hardware to Egypt last year by offering huge "commissions" including �1,000 million in US military "aid."

Franco-German axis

It seems that the axis driving the eurofederalist juggernaut is keen to block further US advances in the growing arms race between Washington and Brussels. The EU mandarins are also determined to increase their own military capability in order to outflank their US imperial rival in the race to grab control of the world's resources for their own empires.

Thales

Surface-to-air missile systems
Thales is one of the world.s leading specialists in land-based and naval anti-air systems for the very short-, short- and medium-range segments of the market. Thales' involvement ranges from missile production (the VT1, Starstreak missile developed by its Northern Ireland subsidiary, and the Hellfire and Longbow missiles being produced under US licence) to integration of very short-, short- and medium-range missile systems and fire control radars.
. Medium range: Thales is taking part in major European missile system programmes, including the PAAMS project to develop an anti-air missile system for future French and Italian frigates, and the French-Italian Future Surface-to-Air Family (FSAF) programme, which enters production in 2002. For this programme, Thales is developing the Arabel fire control system. The naval version of Arabel will be used to protect the aircraft-carrier Charles-de-Gaulle and Saudi Arabia's Sawari 2 frigates, and the land-based version will ultimately equip the successor to the Hawk system.
. Short range: Thales offers the most advanced missile system currently available on the market, the Crotale NG (New Generation). This system is designed for the air defence of civil and military sites as well as the protection of armoured and mechanised land forces. It is currently in service with the French Air Force and Navy and several export customers. Both the naval and land-based versions use the VT1 hypervelocity missile.

In the very short-range market, Thales, the No. 2 missile manufacturer in the United Kingdom, has supplied over 60,000 missiles to sixty armed forces worldwide. In 2001, the company continued to work on a contract awarded by the UK Ministry of Defence to supply the new laser-guided Starstreak missile.

The company has also been selected by Lockheed Martin to produce its Hellfire and Longbow anti-tank missiles, which have been selected by the United Kingdom for its Apache helicopters.
Armaments and propulsion

In armaments, TDA, a 50/50 subsidiary of Thales and EADS, specialises in four main areas: air-launched weapon systems (rockets and bombs), munitronics or munition electronics (guided munitions, fuses for artillery shells and bombs), weapon and missile components (warheads, safety-and-arming units, non-lethal weapons), and land-based weapon systems (mortars and munitions, anti-tank systems).

Thales' propulsion business is conducted by Bayern Chemie/Protac, jointly owned with EADS GmbH, which supplies solid-propellant rocket motors for major European tactical missile programmes (MBDA), air-to-air missiles (Magic, Mica), ground-to-air missiles (Crotale, Shahine and Patriot), anti-radar (Alarm) and anti-tank programmes. Bayern Chemie/Protac is developing and producing the solid fuel ramjet for the European Meteor programme.

As designer, prime contractor, systems integrator and value-added service provider, Thales proposes a wide range of airborne system solutions to meet the needs of operational forces for intelligence, surveillance missions and airborne combat.
Intelligence

Thales won the prime contractorship for the French Navy's Minrem joint ship-borne electromagnetic intelligence programme under an innovative contract including the construction of both the hull and the payload.

This new award follows the recent delivery of the Sarigue electronic intelligence aircraft, for which a major through-life support contract was also signed in 2001, and confirms Thales' leadership in electromagnetic intelligence gathering.
Deliveries of Astac tactical intelligence pods to a number of countries continued, and deployment by their armed forces is well underway. In addition, Thales was selected to supply electronic intelligence systems to the British Army.
Surveillance

Thales has been selected with a number of partners to develop, produce and test a ground surveillance system demonstrator for Europe based on active phased array technology. At the same time, the UK authorities have selected Thales to design and develop a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) pod demonstrator for the Royal Air Force. Thales also continued to supply MSTAR battlefield surveillance radars to a number of countries.

In Indonesia and Japan, the Group won two important contracts for maritime patrol systems. These contracts illustrate the growing importance of this business, for which Thales recently established a global centre of excellence in Canada.
Combat

Air: Thales is a major partner on the Rafale programme. The French defence procurement agency's award of the development contract for the Rafale F2 standard is a major landmark in the development of the French combat aircraft.s weapon system. The Group is developing the Rafale's "core system".  At the same time, Thales is investing in the development of an active antenna that will enable the Rafale to stay ahead of the competition.

Thales is taking an active part in developing the Mk2 standard of the Mirage 2000-5, an aircraft that has demonstrated its exceptional qualities in combat on several occasions. The Mirage 2000-5 is either on order or already in service in a number of countries.

Naval:   As the world's No. 1 exporter in the electronic warfare market, Thales is the prime contractor of choice for electronic warfare systems for the most recent naval vessels around the world: selected by Brunei for its Waspada ships, and by the UK for Type 45 destroyers, Thales will also be working through a joint venture with Elettronica to equip the French-Italian Horizon frigates.

Land:  Thales delivers onboard computers for GIAT Industries' Leclerc tank.

Missiles:  Thales confirmed its leadership in electromagnetic seekers by signing a major cooperation agreement with MBDA. The two groups will pool their competencies to produce seekers for the Aster, Mica and Meteor missiles. In all, 6,000 missiles will be produced by Thales and MBDA together.  Thales has also been awarded the contract for the Mafis fuse to equip the US Navy.s JSOW (Joint Stand-Off Weapon).

The world market for defence communications and information systems is worth an estimated 10 billion euros a year. This market is currently experiencing strong growth, driven by increasing demand for interoperability and for new services requiring higher levels of systems integration. A number of battlespace digitisation programmes are taking shape in different parts of the world, drawing extensively on the latest commercial telecom and Internet technologies.

Thales was selected to produce the Aristote tactical network, which is designed to provide end-to-end communications between operational units in external theatres of operation and commanders in France. As well as conventional voice, fax and data, the new system will support IP (Internet Protocol) traffic for future tactical Internet applications. For France's new Syracuse III satellite programme, Thales was selected by Alcatel Space to develop the ground segment as well as security equipment for both the ground-based systems and satellites.

The Group is a founding member of the company that was appointed prime contractor in early 2001 on the multinational TACOMS Post 2000 programme to define future NATO interoperability standards for tactical communication systems.

Thales is working on Command Control and Information System (CCIS) programmes in a number of countries, including Belgium and Canada. In 2000, the company was awarded the contract for the second version of the French Army's SICF system, to be delivered in 2003. France also launched production of the Atlas automated artillery fire support system, confirming the systems dimension to the Group's capabilities in battlefield communications and command.

In early 2001, the company won a contract to provide new functions, including tactical Internet services, for the successful PR4G tactical radio, which has been selected by more than 30 countries. The contract includes an order for a new, lightweight version of the radio designed to accommodate future software radio standards.

Electronics accounts for a growing proportion of naval equipment expenditure worldwide and is now worth roughly as much as the platform and propulsion system combined, or an estimated 30% of the total cost of a submarine, 40%-50% of the cost of a frigate, and 60% of the cost of a patrol boat.

The agreement to set up a joint company with the French shipbuilder DCN was signed in April 2002. The new company will pool the partners' skills and resources in marketing and prime contracting for warships and naval combat systems for export programmes, cooperation programmes, and national programmes with export potential. This alliance illustrates Thales' ability to strengthen its ties with major platform manufacturers without the burden of industrial integration, and also offers a response to the globalisation of the defence market while taking strictly national considerations into account.
Surface naval businesses

Thales is currently prime contractor for the Sawari 2 programme, which involves supplying three frigates to Saudi Arabia, equipped with the Arabel multi-function anti-air fire control radar and the Aster missile system. This nine-year contract follows the Sawari 1 programme, for which Thales is now providing logistics support.

The Group is a partner on the French-Italian Horizon programme. France and Italy have already ordered one frigate each, with orders for their second frigates expected later.

Thales is currently engaged in several programmes as prime contractor and combat systems integrator:
. the TFC programme being conducted by the Netherlands (LCF frigates), Germany (F124 frigates) and Canada;
. the programme to equip four Meko A-2000 class corvettes for South Africa;
. PAAMS (Principal Anti-Air Missile System), which is being developed jointly by France, Italy and the United Kingdom for their new-generation air defence frigates.
Underwater activities

Thales is a global front-runner in underwater combat systems and the world's leading exporter of sonar systems. Its industrial facilities are located in Australia, France and the United Kingdom.
For submarines, in 2001, Thales booked orders for three sonar suites for the Royal Navy's new Astute class submarine. In Australia, the group is a member of the alliance in charge of upgrading the combat systems on Collins class submarines. The company is also taking part in a number of export programmes, supplying sonar systems for Pakistan's Agosta submarines and Chile's Scorp�ne submarines.

For surface vessels, the Royal Norwegian Navy's new frigates will be equipped with the Captas Mk2 low-frequency towed array and a Sph�rion 4131S sonar.

France and Italy have also chosen Thales, in partnership with WASS (Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei SpA, a Finmeccanica company) to supply hull-mounted sonars for their Horizon frigates.

In Australia, the company is continuing the upgrade of six FFG7 frigates.

Multidomestic Strategy

Thales pursues an aggressive merger and acquisition strategy in which it seeks domestic markets by buying out the local companies in several nations.� Included in the portfolio are:

 In-flight entertainment business of B/E Aerospace Inc. (51%) � United States
 African Defence Systems (80%) � South Africa
 AIM-CMF software engineering - Switzerland
 AlliedSignal Aerospatiale Canada (electro-optics division) - Canada
 ADI (50%) - Australia
 Avimo (optronics) (25%) - Singapore/United Kingdom
 Samsung Electronics (defence businesses) (50%) � Republic of Korea
 Embraer (5.7%) - Brazil
 Shorts Missile Systems (increase from 50% to 100%) � United Kingdom
 Siemens (power grid tube business) - Germany
 L-3 Communications: joint venture in TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance) systems � United States
 Quintec Associates � United Kingdom
 Racal � United Kingdom

BAE

BAE SYSTEMS is a global systems company dedicated to making the intelligent connections needed to deliver innovative solutions to our customers.� Their world-class capabilities combine key in-depth skills in naval platforms, military aircraft, electronics, systems integration and other technologies. This enables BAE to offer outstanding complementary capability to international customers across the main defense sectors, the commercial world, as well as in the civil aircraft market.

BAE�s network of nearly 100,000 skilled and talented people of numerous nationalities work together to provide this synergy of systems integration and best practice for customers.

 

On 27 April 1999 British Aerospace plc (now known as BAE SYSTEMS plc) agreed with The General Electric Company, plc (GEC) the proposed merger of GEC's defence electronics business, Marconi Electronic Systems, with BAE SYSTEMS. The military aspects of the merger were subsequently considered by Her Majesty's Government under UK merger control law. To remedy or prevent possible adverse effects of the merger, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry requested the Director General of Fair Trading to seek Undertakings from BAE SYSTEMS concerning the conduct of business by the new commercial entity.

In order to meet this remit, Undertakings were given by BAE SYSTEMS which were accepted by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.

BAE works with a huge community of partners and participating in joint ventures - collaborating with corporations such as Astrium, AMS, MBDA, Airbus, STN Atlas and Saab as well as working closely with major U.S. platform and sub-system manufacturers such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon. The number of joint ventures and joint projects runs into hundreds.

MBDA is a leading global player in the design and manufacture of missile systems. The company offers a comprehensive product portfolio incorporating today's most advanced technology. The complementary range of weapon systems offered by MBDA ensures the most appropriate, accurate and reliable solution to each operational requirement in the air, on land and at sea.

MBDA is the result of the merging of Matra BAe Dynamics, EADS-Aerospatiale Matra Missiles and the missile activity of AMS. BAE SYSTEMS holds a 37.5% interest in the company.

MBDA is able to:

�                        Satisfy the requirements of the world's three armed forces with 32 missile programmes currently in production and a further 23 in development;

�                        Arm all the European platforms;

�                        Act either as prime contractor or principal partner in the development of the major European co-operation programmes;

�                        Continue research and development into future programmes such as anti-ballistic missile defence and Future Offensive Airborne Systems (FOAS).

Visit MBDA's web site www.mbda.net

AMS is a major European Joint Venture owned equally by BAE SYSTEMS and Finmeccanica, and a world leader in the provision of integrated defence and electronic systems. A multinational company based in the UK, Italy, Germany and the United states, AMS has an annual turnover in excess of �1.2bn, an order book of �4bn and a customer base in well over 100 countries. AMS operates in the fields of;

�                        Air Defence and Battlefield Systems

�                        Air Traffic Management Systems

�                        Naval Systems

�                        Simulation and Synthetic Environments

�                        Systems Integration

Customer Support and Training

STN Atlas Elektronik GmbH, Bremen, with its naval systems, simulation systems and land and airborne systems divisions is one of the leading German companies in the field of defence electronics and systems engineering. The company operates internationally with about half of its turnover with customers abroad. BAE SYSTEMS has a 49-percent stake in the company.

Technological activities at STN Atlas range from signal processing to radar technology, navigation and communication, hydroacoustics, sonar and high-frequency technology, optics/optronics through to unmanned aerial vehicles, digital visual systems (virtual reality) and command and weapons control systems. Based on its wide-ranging systems capabilities, the company also acts as prime contractor for system management, integration and logistics tasks in various areas.

Gripen International is the company which acts as a prime contracting organization, responsible for marketing, selling and supporting the Gripen fighter worldwide. Gripen International is owned jointly by SAAB AB of Sweden and BAE SYSTEMS of the United Kingdom. The company was created in September 2001 as a natural progression from the marketing Joint Venture between SAAB AB and BAE SYSTEMS established in 1995. Gripen International combines the strength of its two shareholder companies, which are among the world's most experienced and respected manufacturers of combat aircraft and defense equipment

Gripen is the first of the new generation, multi-role combat aircraft to enter service. Using the latest available technology it is capable of performing an extensive range of air-to-air and air-to-surface operational missions and employing the latest weapons. Gripen is designed to meet the demands of all current and future threats, while at the same time meeting strict requirements for flight safety, reliability, training efficiency and low operating costs. Gripen is in service with the Swedish Air Force, and has also been ordered by the South African Air Force and the Hungarian Air Force.

Visit the Gripen web site at: www.gripen.com

In line with BAE SYSTEMS' objective to improve shareholder value through consolidation of the aerospace and defence industry, it announced the purchase of a 35 percent share in Saab AB in April 1998. This strengthens ties between the two companies and enables a consumer strategy to be pursued in a number of business areas including combat aircraft, aerostructures, guided weapons, asset management and training systems.

Visit Saab�s Web Site (www.saab.se)

Astrium is the largest space company in Europe and is 75 percent owned by EADS and 25 percent owned by BAE SYSTEMS. Astrium specialises in science programmes, civil and military Earth observation and communications satellites and ground systems, navigation constellations, launchers and space infrastructure.

Astrium has been prime contractor for more than 50 communications satellites. It provides complete turnkey satellite systems, including network control stations, ground terminals and communications services. The Company has in-house capability for satellite payloads and spacecraft platforms, and a wide range of space and ground equipment.

Russia/CIS������ Collective Security Organization Pillar

The CIS Collective Security Treaty (CIS CST) signed in Tashkent in 1992 is receiving a face lift. Russian President Vladimir Putin is urgently exerting pressure on his Russophile allies to transform the CIS CST into a military alliance modeled on the former Warsaw pact, rather than the mere piece of paper which has existed. The first step in this direction was the re-naming of the CIS CST as the CIS Collective Security Organization (CIS CSO) in May.

The 12 states of the CIS have long been divided into two groups. Led by Russia, the Russophile group consists of Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and the de facto Russian protectorate of Tajikistan. All six states favour close CIS integration in the economic, political and security spheres and therefore are members of the CIS CSO and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC).

Both the CIS CSO and the EEC are Putin's still weak alternatives to NATO and the EU respectively. Of the CIS states only Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan have expressed an interest in joining NATO. Of these Ukraine is the most likely candidate in five to 10 years and after President Leonid Kuchma, who is persona non grata at NATO, retires from office in 2004. Georgia and Azerbaijan are unlikely NATO candidates because large proportions of their territories are occupied by separatist forces covertly supported by neighboring states and Russia.

Of those CIS states which are not members of the CIS CSO or the EEC, Moldova now has a communist president and communist-dominated parliament. Although Moldova still adheres to its neutrality and has ruled out joining the CIS CSO, it has informally agreed to join both the EEC and the Russian-Belarusian union if Ukraine does so first.

Ukraine's powerful elites are under intense pressure by Putin to join the EEC, but are not considering either of the two other structures.�� Sources predict that as relations will continue to sour with NATO and the US, Ukraine - which is not one of the 12 states set to join the EU between 2004-2007 - will most likely join the EEC in the next two years as Kuchma serves out his term of office.

Although six CIS states have not expressed an interest in Putin's twin projects of the CIS CSO and EEC, they are subject to varying degrees of Russian pressure and covert operations. Russia continues to maintain military bases in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, making their room for maneuver outside Russia's sphere of influence difficult.

At the October CIS summit in Chisinau, Moldova, Putin unveiled plans to deepen the integration of the security forces of the CIS CSO. He insisted these documents should be ratified by their respective parliaments no later than May 2003, to prevent them stalling and the documents being ignored, which is the case for most CIS texts signed at summits. At the Chisinau summit CIS CSO members signed a Charter and legal framework.

Unlike the Western system, the Russian Military Industrial Complex (MIC) is organized into several and, in the main, distinct components: R&D, design and prototyping, direct manufacture and some indirect sub-contracting factories to the main factories. All these units are very much bigger than in advanced industrial countries (AIC) and are, for that as well as for other structural reasons, extremely inefficient.

Secrecy, Soviet/Russian habits of exaggerating and producing data without proper foundation all make it hard to determine, with even sensible accuracy, the size and numbers involved in the defense industries. ï¿½ ���������������

These dinosaur MIC factories represent a massive section of the resources of Russia. In Soviet times the State was primarily organized for military purposes and the sums allocated were around a third of GDP. This figure is now probably between 7-9% of GDP, which itself is around 40% of what it was, ie the current defense expenditure lies between 1/8th and 1/10th of the Soviet figure. Hardly any of that is spent on new material purchases but most of the key R&D and design centers receive enough funds to survive; they of course keep on claiming that the figure is woefully inadequate. None of the factories have been closed or liquidated in spite of the fact that they are bankrupt, as Russian commentators regularly report.

Nothing practical has happened during the 12 years of talk about converting the MIC to making more civilian goods, to rescuing them from making persistent losses. Indeed one must conclude that the Russian leadership has every intention of retaining the old soviet structure, size and organization of the MIC in spite of a drastically reduced State budget and income. They propose to finance this ostensibly through income from export of arms; the receipts of roughly $2Bn yearly do not make this possible. One may confidently guess at their reasons:

* Military expenditure embraces most of the spend on "science", prestige space projects and a highly visible armed force. These elements traditionally command the respect of a vociferous and perhaps significant section of the population, especially its communist adherents, nationalists and chauvinists who would like to believe that the role of Russia as a Great Power requires foreigners to respect and fear the Armed Forces of Russia.

* The MIC embraces the least bad elements of Russian manufacturing industry; apart from military applications, there is little else of note in Soviet/Russian civilian science nor in the design of civilian products and systems. Soviet Russia has earned only 10 Nobel prizes in natural sciences, the same as Holland with a twentieth of the population.

* The leadership, whether military, political or scientific and technical, is accustomed to the past, which by its own lights delivered successfully the demands of the regime.

* They regard all western advice as motivated by the will to destroy the basis of science and technology and more especially of the military potential based on the MIC.

* They seem to be afraid to make the fundamental changes necessary, partly because the process will take several decades and this does not match the traditional Russian desire to do everything quickly.

* They fall into a familiar trap; thinking that they need huge investments and new technology to convert their defense factories successfully. They have a history of throwing money lavishly at the factories; these were usually hugely over-invested with new equipment which was often misused. It is true that the average MIC factory is a poor place and in an AIC would be closed, the equipment sold at auction, the site razed to the ground and the work force retrained and dispersed. But Russian realities do not allow that as a first step. It is indeed possible, given the necessary authority, for a competent Chief Executive Officer to return a profit reasonably quickly. But there are few if any CEOs who really could perform in a competitive market fashion.

* It is also possible that they realize that they are incapable of undertaking the necessary reforms at the base of affairs on their own. They would need a long period of foreign expertise applied within the MIC. Russians are often proud, sensitive and insecure and such a step would require them to swallow their pride, however tactfully the job were to be done. Unfortunately much of the work, for example by consultants appointed and funded by the EU program TACIS, has been demonstrably inappropriate to the local circumstances. As a consequence, little progress has been made.

This is a tragedy for Russia. The end result of successful reconstruction would be to equip Russia with a far more effective defence industry, whose real costs would be well below those currently ruling; furthermore they would possess a wide range of separate prime contractors of civilian products and services and a normal structure, as in the AICs, of suppliers and sub-contractors to both the military and civilian producers capable of competing for their own and foreign civilian markets.

The consequence of their present stance is that the MIC will continue to stagnate, to be under employed, to be a massive drain on the resources of the state budgets at every level and to divert badly needed resources from the essential tasks required to reverse the negative trends in real wealth and health of the nation.

However, the MIC will remain capable of:

* responding to the scenario set by the MOD for imaginative ideas for novel and advanced weapon systems. Fewer may be offered than in Soviet times for the military to choose from but some internal discipline will not be detrimental to the end result.

* delivering for export, to the MOD as well as to the para-military organs of the State as many weapons and equipment as demanded, if and when finances allow.

This capability will be worse than it was when ruled by the inefficient but still operating Soviet parameters of the industrial organisations. Good ideas were always degenerated and constrained by industrial performance in Soviet times. The system will have deteriorated further, for reasons discussed below.

There is, however, one significant source of improvement which we must be aware of, namely the fact that the fSU is now barely constrained from acquiring the latest electronic components, as well as other high-tech components for weapon systems. These will be incorporated in C3 equipment and in systems for control of machinery. They can also buy most "state of the art" laboratory instrumentation and production equipment. It is possible but unlikely that the Russian system will, unaided by the transfer of "soft technology", become competent at getting the results from their purchases of laboratory and production hardware to which we are accustomed. The upshot is that modern equipment will be installed in military hardware but the high reject rates experienced in the factories will only very slowly approximate to standards of the AICs.


 

Ulan-Ude Aviation Industrial Assotiation

was founded SO years ago and specializes in manufacturing of updated modifications of MI-8T helicopter and trainer/attacker SU-25 UBK. U-UAIA pays special attention to fitting its shops with modern

equipment and bringing in new technological processes which enable to manufacture a wide variety of consumer goods of the highest quality.

Nizhny Novgorod Aircraft Building Plant "Sokol" Joint-Stock Company

- is one of the biggest enterprises of aircraft industry in Russia, known world-wide as a manufacture of MiG aircraft.

The Institute of Aircraft Equipment (NIIAO),

as a leader in Russian aviation industry, is responsible for research and development of airborne equipment and integrated avionics systems for aircraft and helicopters.

"Samara Machine-Building Design Bureau" Joint-Stock Company ("SMBDB")

possesses modern production and test bases and has an experience in the design of aircraft gas-turbine and piston engines, gas-transfer units and electric generators.

Kazan Helicopter Plant

is one of the primary manufacturers of medium-sized helicopters in the world. Main product of the company is the Mi-17 helicopter, widely known upgrade of the Mi-8, which have gained an excellent reputation during operation all over the world. Also Kazan Helicopters launched the development of completely new light helicopter, designated "ANSAT" and together with Mil Design Bureau and Eurocopter Mi-38 medium helicopter.

Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association

There are few, if any, aircraft manufactur-ing companies in Russia's eastern part and even in the whole of the Asian-Pacific region, which can compare in terms of technological stan-dards and scale of production to the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association (its Russian acronym KnAAPO), one of the recognized leaders of the Russian aircraft industry.

"Irkutsk Aviation Industrial Association" Open Joint Stock Company (IAIA)

is a well-known manufacturer of the state-of-the-art aircraft. The IAIA has supplied thousands of aircraft to the Russian Air Force and made a great contribution to the defence potential of the country.

Rockets MDB �Raduga�

Kamov Company

was created with the task of developing helicopters for the Navy. Today the design bureau develops experimental and prototype rotorcraft, makes helicopter modifications and produces in quantities some of the types.

Gromov Flight Research Institute

Disposing of high scientific-engineering potential FRI has the possibility to perform effectively scientific, research and test work in the interests of the development of aviation science and technology.

Joint stock company "Avialeasing" Corporation Ltd.

was founded in April 1996 by such aviation industry giants as Joint Stock Company "Perm Motors Plc.", Joint Stock Company "Aviadvigatel Plc." and specialising consultancy firm "Ural Consulting." The Corporation is a company taking up the rear in production and financial cycle of enterprises of aviation and technical complex in a number of republics and regions in Russia, tightly cooperating with local authorities.

Beriev Aircraft Company

is the world leader in development of amphibious aircraft.

Aviacor � Aircraft Works Corp., JSC

has proven itself to be in the vanguard of the russian aircraft industry. The enterprise primarily deals in manufacturing of heavy civil aircraft.

Rybinsk Motors JSC

is a diversified engine manufacturing company. For 70 years the key activity of the company has been the production of aircraft engines.

Tupolev's ASTC

"SUKHOI" Aircraft Military and Industrial Complex

consolidates the designer and series plants producing the "Su" type aircraft. "SUKHOI" Aviation Military Production Corporation (AVPK) enterprises develop and manufacture mostly aviation technical applications of military purpose.

"Russian Aircraft Corporation "MIG",

is the first Russian aircraft manufacturer who has obtained the license and right to participate in military and technical cooperation with foreign countries and independently trade with defense products of their own on the world market as well as to import similar products.

State Research Institute of Aviation Systems (GosNIIAS)

is a Russian research center of aviation industry. Many airborne systems in operational have gone through the complete cycle of design and development at GosNIIAS.

Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute TsAGI

As a result of many years of intensive research and successful coupling of the achievements of designing new aircraft of world standards, the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI) gained the highest scientific potential and great practical possibilities for the development of aviation and aerospace technology.
   TsAGI scientists and specialists are prepared at the highly professional level to implement research and development in the area of aviation science and the creation of new pioneer projects.

Research Institute of Aviation Industry Economy

The Institute begins its history with the organization in 1965 of the Major information computing center (MICC), and with entrusting the Institute with the tasks on information support of the work of the central staff of the Ministry of aviation industry.

"Aviapribor" Corporation

is the leader among the Russian aviation industry in development, production and support of avionics for aircraft of any class and any mission. More than 30% of all Russian avionics is manufactured by the enterprises of Aviapribor Corporation.

 


 

Description of the Russian MIC

The Soviet MIC probably employed on military work 12-16 million people out of the working population of 67.7 million; probably half that number directly in the factories of the prime contractors. It employed over two thirds of all qualified scientists and engineers (QSE). These, according to figures given by a deputy Minister for Science in 1995, amounted to 2.7 million in 1991. Post Soviet Russia, with an able-bodied population of around 71 million, retained between 60-80% of these totals; half in the Moscow Region and another quarter in the St Petersburg Region. Nearly all the R&D and design Institutes are there, with manufacturing scattered all over the former Soviet Union. The defense budget for equipment, on R&D and all phases up to and including manufacture in Soviet times was secret. One recent article gave the following analysis, in percentage terms of the defense budget for 1991 and 1995: Equipment 36.3% and 18.8%; R&D 13.6% and 18.8%; Manpower 38.6% and 54.6%. But there is no provenance for these data and therefore little credence can be given to them.

Official Russian pronouncements on the MIC, in common with other matters, provide figures that vary according to the speaker and his purpose in making the statement. Current estimates for the MIC of the Russian Federation lie between:

* 2,700 and 4,000 factories

* 4-6 million employees. In December 1997 Ya Urinson said that there are more than 2 million direct employees in 1,700 firms in eight sectors which will be given priority (out of a total work force of about 40 million).

* 200-400 R&D establishments. There are other estimates from equally knowledgeable Russian leaders of the MIC. For example in 1995 Viktor Glukhikh, then the hardened, Cold-War dedicated chairman of the State Committee for the defence industries - since abolished - quoted 660 military scientific institutes. To these must be added the many institutes of the Academy of Sciences, sections of so-called civilian institutes of higher education involved in research and teaching.

* between 800,000 and 1.2 million QSE (out of 2.7 million total in the last years of the USSR). If indeed we accept the figure of 80% working for the military then the USSR QSE in that role numbered 2.16 million. Other reports say that between 800,000 and 1.2 million have left military work since then. This would leave between 1-1.2 million in post. This correlates quite well.

Many of the R&D and design Institutes are now "hollow", like the Armed Forces themselves, with fewer staff. The intention is not to close or merge them, but to maintain their skeleton existence in the hope of later expansion again to support only the military.

Regional distribution

Russia has retained practically the whole of the creative and intellectual ability of the USSR to conceive, design and make a prototype of weapons and weapon systems. It has, however, lost to the newly independent States a significant part of raw material deposits, their primary conversion into semi-finished technical materials, assembly factories and component manufactures. The loss of Baykonur to Kazakhstan is also important for the testing of ICBMs and space work. This has resulted in an expensive rental deal between the two States and also some improvisation to substitute other stations within the Russian Federation. Also lost is the vertical structure of command within Russia and also within the old USSR from Ministry to operating unit, with its system of instructing them to make products and transfer to specified users. The factories have to make horizontal arrangements between themselves. Much of this is arranged through the inefficient system of barter or paying by issuing IOUs. The Russians have been trying hard through the economic committee of the CIS to revive the Soviet structure of cooperation. Belarus, Ukraine and Russia have given formal approval but there is a long way to go before this will produce practical results.�

Many of the uranium mines were in Siberia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; one was in Estonia. Many of these were closed even before the USSR collapsed. In 1990 20,000 tonnes was produced but the demand was only 9,000 tonnes. All the enrichment plants were in the RF, mostly in 10 closed cities. These have no other employment.

Much of the electronics industry was in Belarus and in Ukraine which produced low grade silicon. Many western specialists have worked in these factories; their standard is depressingly poor; most of their products are uncompetitive. These factories depended on gold and other minerals from Siberia. Russia was building a replacement factory in Krasnoyarsk.

There is a heavy concentration of shipbuilding in Ukraine but this depends on engineering supplies from across the USSR, especially Russia. There is also a large tank factory and a missile factory in Ukraine as well as the Antonov aircraft design, R&D and manufacturing complex. Russia is trying hard to persuade the Ukrainians not to compete but to collaborate with them in arms exports.

Rather than to name the regions with a heavy concentration and dependency on the MIC, it was easier to identify the Regions of Russia that had few if any defence industries. These are: Kuban, Kuzbass, Tyumen, Bashkiria, Northern Siberia, Yakutia and Kamchatka.

On average the share of the MIC in the regional industry lies between 30-40%, rising to 50-60% in some cases. Udmurtia was an extreme case, where 14 defence factories produced 80% of the whole industrial output of the Republic. They will have suffered accordingly from the decline.

One speech forward, two steps back on the conversion road

From the Gorbachev era onward the Government has talked a lot about their determination to "convert" the MIC to make more civilian goods for income and profit. The Soviet MIC made not only war materiel but also nearly all the equipment that the Soviets regarded as "high technology". This included washing machines, TV, cameras, more recently computers and applied electronics. The range was restricted, quality low, design obsolete and indifferent, workmanship poor. They represent poor "value for money". Consequently these goods could only be sold to people who knew no better or who had no other choice. Now they do; the richer people buy products from AICs and the poor from China, Vietnam and the like, mostly brought in by the "shuttlers" - individuals traveling and trading, usually liberally lubricating their passage across frontiers. Their trade is not small: some estimates suggest some billions of dollars. The MIC has no ability to design and make things for a competitive market and as a result they have lost nearly the whole of their market to imports.

Conversion was another of the slogans to which the Soviet people had become accustomed. The Russians have had several goals for conversion: firstly to turn more of the MIC over to designing and making civilian products. This is even more of a failure than it has been in the West. Secondly to reorganize the MIC along AIC lines, including:

* Linking design, R&D with manufacture. This has always been the case with some sectors of the MIC, especially in aerospace and personal weaponry. Not much progress has been evident elsewhere.

* Concentrating lead factories with subsidiaries to emulate the AIC system of widespread sub-contracting. Again not much movement is evident here; prime contractors still prefer to make many components and articles outside their core competence. This includes making pallets and packing cases.

* Improving their access to finance and presumably to financial skills through Financial-Production Combines. Having in mind the reluctance of Russian banks to invest in their own economy and their absence of investment skills, this is an unpromising road. The union of the MIC with financial institutions on the other hand adds to its political 'networking' and therefore influence within the ruling political and commercial elite.

* Designating lead priority areas which will supposedly receive preferential financing, tax privileges etc. The problem here is exacerbated by the designation of practically every significant sector as a "priority".

The MIC was the best of Soviet industry and the Russian leaders believed that a factory making tanks, aircraft or rocket engines could turn over, due to the "high educational standards of the scientists and engineers and the highly skilled workforce" to making high quality saleable civilian products. A few years later they began to realise that without application on the spot of foreign skills, such as marketing, design etc, they were not going to succeed. Consequently they tried to attract foreign firms to "invest new money and technology in to the old military and other factories". Like so many western ignoramuses about manufacturing industry, they believed that these two ingredients alone would solve their problems and convert their industry into a force capable of competing in the world markets.

The west responded by funding and sending not only employees of the management consulting firms but also engineers and technically and commercially orientated industrialists to work as advisers at the invitation of the governments and general directors of the MIC in Russia and other former soviet countries.

Over the last ten or so years some competent western industrial engineers worked in and visited MIC factories in various industrial sectors. The factories are just that: lacking the normal functions of a commercial firm, based on manufacturing, in an AIC, such as R&D, design, marketing, business planning, technical service to customers, quality assurance, relations with suppliers, a proper financial department. The design bureaux are mostly separate but even when they are contained within the firm as in MiG-MAPO, for example, they lack experience of designing for markets other than the military. When they are ordered or impelled to design civilian products they start without the experience of decades of foreign firms occupied in that business and consequently cannot design products which are competitive. The Russian press has been full of examples of such wasted efforts. Many of their engineers are reported to despise civilian work as a prostitution of their skills.

The aircraft industry is, however, one area which has worked hard at both collaborative and competitive projects with the West. Its several reorganizations have resulted in a slimmed-down, more efficient industry. Even here, however, they can talk glibly of the need for 50-70 different types of aircraft.

Experience shows that the factories are not in a condition to start new production aimed at competing in civilian markets. This is in spite of the fact that the basic stock of machine tools is adequate, some indeed is modern. The problems lie elsewhere, above all in the mentality of managers, engineers and the work force. The buildings allow considerable waste of energy, as does the incorrect use of electrical and other equipment. The layout is poor, there is a paucity of mechanical handling. Very few of these factories would justify foreign investment; it would certainly be more profitable to start again on a green field site, using foreign directors and senior managers, with their own systems for effective control, supervision and profit, importing raw materials and components, and the establishment of distribution and after-sales networks.

Of the negative features the most important is the attitude of many of the top level staff who are steeped in a culture which sees the successful methods of the advanced countries as likely to lead to the collapse of the defence industries. Most people in high places in politics, the military and industry as well as the ordinary factory designer and engineer looks with suspicion on advocacy of, for example, reduction in size of design offices, R&D Institutes and of the production factories and also their combination. The idea of closing hopeless units and redirecting their resources to profitable use is anathema. This has been advocated as a shock approach, not in a sensible, gradual manner. Consequently the idea was dismissed out of hand.

Even when a few general directors welcomed and were willing to embrace essential foreign methods, it was clear that there was a reluctance both amongst their juniors and seniors in Ministries of Industry and Defense to allow those changes to take effect.

One must conclude that there are people at every level, especially at the highest level of government, who have no intention of abandoning the old Soviet system, numbers and inflated size of the R&D, design institutes and the factories. This is in the face of a shrinking of military orders in Russia to 16% of the 1990 totals and the almost complete absence of official finances to support the factories which were, or should have been, almost idle. The civilian output of the factories, which in the last years of the USSR occupied about 40% of their capacity, has also fallen to about 15%, thus the factories are only using 30% of their potential.

By 1996 it was obvious that the Governments concerned wished to re-establish the links between the various units of the MIC which had been snapped by the break up of the USSR in 1991. Admittedly the separation was not conducive to provide even the level of efficiency and effectiveness that prevailed in the Soviet MIC.

An important MIC executive tacitly admitted recently that the definition and purpose of "conversion" had changed since Gorbachev's day when he wrote "Conversion means the production of dual use goods which can easily be adapted from civilian purposes to military and vice versa. That and nothing else."

"Science" as an ikon and as a source of military excellence

Science, along with the Orthodox Church and the Army, forms a triple base which must be supported to regain the Glory of Mother Russia as a Great Power. Expenditure on science, it is said in papers like "Rossiyisskaya Gazeta", not to mention the nationalistic press such as "Zavtra", is essential in order that the people can once again be proud of Russia. The former, for example, is currently running a campaign for Russia to fund a new space shuttle which will "bring back to Russia a new exploration vehicle for the 21st Century. Russia was first into space and with this project will regain its rightful place as the world's leading power in the Cosmos". The paper appeals to ordinary listeners, who, poor deluded fools, are urged to send the paper their savings to fund the project which "the Government and the Fat Cats are too unpatriotic and selfish to support."

In truth, Soviet and present Russian science has done little of note or value except to serve the military. From many sides, not surprisingly including the Academy of Sciences, come pleas to support fundamental science, which is seen as the Glory of Mother Russia as well as its backbone for the future. Fundamental science has been little more than a cloak for long range brain storming and thinking about advanced weaponry. Otherwise it has provided internal relief for academics to write papers whose main value has been publication in learned journals. Association with current scientists is depressing; they seem never to have identified or solved important practical questions. They have been isolated from the world's literature for decades; this, coupled with a lifetime of subjection to propaganda concerning the uniqueness and superiority of Soviet science, leads many of them to claim advances and inventions that "have no analogy in the world".

This would be no worse than in other countries were it not for the absence of the application of good science in the practice of medicine, engineering and agriculture.

The current regime seems quite oblivious to the idea of re-training and redirecting its theoretically orientated people to collaborating with people on the ground, solving their real problems and helping to improve the national economy. Such a policy is treated with contempt in every layer of society. No one is suggesting that it is necessary to commercialize all science, but only a sensible balance between targeted R&D and curiosity led investigations which may or may not yield something useful in the future. One is driven to conclude that there will be no change of heart in this sector either; 'science' will continue to demand financial support from the State and return very little. It remains a prestige area and an essential in the minds of the rulers and others for the development of Russia as a formidable Power deploying a frightening array of weapons superior to the rest of the world.

Foreign sales of Russian arms

Arms exports are handled by a Government firm 'Rosvooruzheniye'. Its provenance is interesting. In Soviet times arms exports were handled by the enigmatically named engineering directorate of the Ministry of External Trade. After the fall of the USSR this became 'Oboronexport' (defence exports) and the 'Special Technical Directorate' of Spetsvneshtekhnika (special technical exports). These organisations became 'Rosvor'. Rosvor's reporting authority has varied between ministries and the President himself. It served a wide range of powerful interests. Rosvor is almost a monopoly. It is 100% state owned but the arms contractors are represented. It has some subsidiary firms; one 'Promexport' deals with spare parts and service, 'Russian Technology' with licensing of intellectual property. 'Rosvor' answers through the coordinating inter-departmental council whose head was in 1997 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and his deputy Ya Urinson. Managerial changes will continue.

94% of legal arms exports are reported to pass though its hands; another nine arms manufacturers are entitled to trade abroad on their own account. 'Rosvor', as it ia sometimes described, conveniently means Russian thief. It is often accused of doing just that, taking the proceeds, paying its huge bureaucracy, including serving military officers salaries ten times those paid in the arms factories and R&D offices. Rosvor is credited with paying meticulously its taxes to the Federal Government, thus keeping the top people sweet. Factory directors complain that they get only a small fraction of the proceeds and then very late. Many of them want to bypass Rosvor and some get that authority.

Heads of Rosvor can enrich themselves in anticipation of the sack. Kotelkin, who came from running the MAPO Bank, was appointed in 1994 and was sacked in summer 1997 two days after Yel'tsin had praised him and Rosvor. He had conveniently transferred to a new firm 'Kargotrans' all the assets and business of Rosvor's transportation business. Its director is Yeremichev, Kotelkin's former deputy. It is reported that large sums in dollars have gone to Cyprus.

The Government is relying on foreign arms sales to finance the MIC, to keep it going at its soviet level in the hope of reconstituting the whole soviet MIC by agreements within the CIS. In this way they believe they will be able to rearm the Russian Armed Forces and probably those of Belarus, Ukraine and other CIS states. There has been a recent agreement for the Ukrainian and Russian MIC to cooperate in making and selling in the first instance the large transport plane from Antonov.

Analysis of the Russian arms exports however provides little financial basis for optimism. Stripped of elements of sale for barter to third world and other countries such as China, central and Eastern Europe as well as arms provided to some of them in order to extinguish old soviet debts only around $2m/annum is left as a maximum in cash terms. There is no way that such a sum will support the still vast MIC reported above, even if the whole revenue actually reached the factories and is spent correctly.

The largest buyers of Russian arms are the Chinese, with whom Russia is clearly embarked upon a program of military enlargement. Professor Stephen Blank of the US Strategic Studies Institute provides a list in Appendix 1 of his paper "The dynamics of Russian weapon sales to China". These purchases, covering air, sea and land systems as well as missiles, amount to well over $6Bn over the last few years. The agreements give the Chinese the right to develop and make some weapons; there are also collaborative development programs, for example in aero engines. This trade may well grow in the short term but must sooner or later provide diminishing financial returns to Russia. Not all of the weapons supplied have come from the factories, some, such as warships, come from existing kit transferred from the Armed Forces. India is also buying a similar range of equipment. The Russians have recently improved their after sales service, providing depots for technician training, spare parts and manuals in English. Other major targets for Russian arms sales include Malaysia and Indonesia, but much of the purchase price is paid in goods such as food. This barter trade is according to a Russian Finance Minister only "30% efficient in providing real money". The value of return to the factories from all this much heralded trade has to be heavily discounted, especially after deducting the shares taken by the trading companies such as Rosvooruzheniye and the State in taxes.

This region is the main buyer of arms; other countries represent a static or diminishing pattern of purchases. Russian arms are less attractive to them than those of the West. China itself may soon itself be another competitor to Russia. Some modest income might be generated to the defense industries of the CIS from improved collaboration with NATO and the partner countries. In the meantime the finances of the MIC continue to be unpromising.

 

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Russia and Tajikistan�

 

Being exclusively defensive, the Treaty serves as a basis for creating similar regional structures, within the framework of common collective security, in the East-European (Russia-Belarus), Caucasian (Russia-Armenia) and Central Asian (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) directions with ensuring their compatibility and cooperation.

The collective rapid deployment forces, which have been formed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have already proved their ability to function and become an appreciable factor in ensuring stability in the Central Asian region. The ten-year history of the Treaty shows that it is necessary for ensuring the security of its members. Speaking at the session of the Council of Foreign and Defence Ministers, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov underscored that in questions of regulating its relations with NATO, Russia intended to uphold also the interests of its partners in the Collective Security Treaty.

As RIA Novosti was told by the Treaty's Secretary General Valery Nikolayenko, the Treaty will become an organisation "which would adequately and automatically react to new challenges and threats of our time, which is the goal of Russian President Vladimir Putin."

 

UKRAINE��� Military-Industrial Complex

 

At present, the military-industrial complex of Ukraine is the most advanced and developed branch of the state's sector of economy. It includes about 85 scientific organizations which are specialized in the development of armaments and military equipment for different usage. The air and space complex consists of 18 design bureaus and 64 enterprises.

In order to design and build ships and armaments for the Ukrainian Navy, 15 research and development institutes, 40 design bureaus and 67 plants have been brought together. This complex is tasked to design heavy cruisers, build missile cruisers and big antisubmarine warfare (ASW) cruisers, develop small ASW ships.

Rocketry and missilery equipment, rockets, missiles, projectiles, and other munitions are designed and made at 6 design bureaus and 28 plants.

Ukraine has certain scientific, technical and industrial basis for the indigenous research, development and production of small arms. A number of scientific-industrial corporations have started R&D and production of small arms.� The armor equipment is designed and manufactured at 3 design bureaus and 27 plants.

The scientific and industrial potential of Ukraine makes it possible to create and produce modern technical means of military communications and automated control systems at 2 scientific-research institutes and 13 plants.

2 scientific-research institutes and 53 plants produce power supply batteries; 3 scientific-research institutes and 6 plants manufacture intelligence and radio-electronic warfare equipment; 4 design bureaus and 27 plants make engineer equipment and materiel.

The existing structure of the military-industrial complex of Ukraine does not provide for the enclosed cycle of nomenclature of weapons and military equipment for the Armed Forces. Thus, the aim of military-technical cooperation is to create a cooperative system within Ukraine and at international level to meet the needs of industry in accessory parts and components, power supply batteries, cells, materials etc.

������������������� The turbulent transformations that have been shaking Russia in the last ten years have produced a few winners and many losers.� Probably no other part of the Russian economy and society suffered more casualties than its former pride-the military-industrial complex (MIC). Having entered Gorbachev's perestroika at the height of its might and privilege, it now finds itself disgraced, isolated, underfinanced and shrinking beyond recognition. The optimistic plans for conversion of the Russian MIC have degenerated into a combination of incompetent government policies and largely unsuccessful and desperate self-help efforts of the military producers themselves. Many experts both inside and outside of the Russian MIC see the disintegration of its structures as a major threat to national and international security.
���� In its short but dramatic history, military conversion in the USSR/Russia went through several stages. The years of 1987 to 1991 were a period of "limited" conversion conducted according to the central plan (National Conversion Program). In 1992 the emphasis switched to market reforms with special hopes put on foreign investment in the Russian MIC. But investments never came and the introduction of the market only showed that most parts of the MIC have too little to offer to secure their own survival. This led to the novel concept of "export-oriented conversion" (sell more weapons abroad to finance conversion at home). But the ambitious goal of $10 billion annual revenue from arms exports never came close to being realized. Between 1987 and 1993 the volume of exports plummeted 90%, from a value of about $22 billion in 1987 to just $2 billion in 1993. With the failure of this last hope, most military enterprises came back to continued privatization and marketization as the realistic answer.
New Trends, New problems
���� According to the State Committee on Defense Industries, total production in military industries declined 42% during the first
half of 1994. The aviation industry was the most affected, with a slump of 49%. Military employment decreased by 16% from May 1993 to May 1994, while hidden unemployment grew to between 30% and 50%. The average annual salary in 1994 was almost a third less than the average for manufacturing.
���� The quality and technological potential of the MIC is decreasing rapidly. Some enterprises have already lost their former
high-tech capability and cannot even produce spare parts for existing weapons.
���� There are several cases of successful conversion to civilian production in a number of enterprises, such as the production of
satellite communication TV equipment at several enterprises of the military aerospace complex and the development of advanced
diagnostic equipment at the nuclear research facilities in the Ural area. On the whole, though, output in the civilian sector of the
military complex had the same rate of decline as the military sector.
���� The adjustment of military enterprises to market demand is proceeding in the following limited fashion:
���� (1) The first effective owners of military enterprises have started to appear. Though these people still do not fully own their
enterprises, they feel and behave like real owners who have full responsibility for them. This new attitude has led in some cases to higher management efficiency through organizational restructuring, personnel cuts, layoffs, salary adjustments and conversion. Yet according to our estimates, such effective owners do not exceed 10 to 20% of the total. Our respondents believe that most of the directors even of already privatized factories in the military sector still have the mentality of state managers, expecting the
state to provide them with normal working conditions.
���� (2) The government is no longer in control of the day-to-day operations of the MIC, but it is still inserting plenty of
administrative prohibitions and obstacles in the way of privatization. On the other hand, state arrears for military orders
are causing inventories to back up at the factory and making civilian customers look good by comparison. 
�����(3) A "Soviet style" view of the MIC and conversion still predominates. In this view, since the best labor force is
concentrated in military industries, the government must continue to organize, support and subsidize these enterprises. Conversion from military to civilian production is at best an inevitable evil.
���� A minority of our respondents support the path of minimizing military production and moving the best technological and human resources of the military complex into producing civilian goods. They admit that this path faces numerous difficulties, including competition and the necessity to deal with consumers' demand and the high interest rates which military factories as well as other businesses have to pay to the banks. Yet in general, the enterprises that are transferring assets to the production of
civilian goods are financially better off than those who remain devoted to military production but are not paid for it.
���� Despite this fact, even active "conversionists" are trying to keep their state military orders. Here is one explanation: "I
believe the time will come when military orders will again become profitable. That is why we shouldn't give up the state order today. Nobody will bring it back to us tomorrow, everyone will compete for it. It's better to cover expenses by profits from any civilian contract, but to keep the military order."
Government & the MIC
���� Most respondents agreed that government agencies lack a purposeful policy toward the MIC and instead are working hard to
initiate activity and thus to justify the existence of numerous new bureaucratic structures. They also strongly criticized the Yeltsin
Administration's financial stabilization efforts, especially the anti-inflation measures. They considered this policy to be the main
reason why the MIC of Russia is falling apart: "We probably put our priorities wrong by emphasizing inflation as the number one
problem. Manufacturing is paralyzed."
���� What upsets these respondents most is that the government is failing to analyze the competitiveness of individual enterprises
and to choose which are worth supporting through investment. Instead, the Government gives state orders to all the enterprises

and then fails to finance these orders in a timely manner.

 

Ukraine and the evolving security system

The European security system is undergoing dynamic changes. Its key participants � the UN, OSCE, NATO and the EU � are adapting to the new realities. There is no clarity with respect to the future role of Russia, which will continue to exert substantial influence on the process of forming and maintaining security on the continent.

Ukraine has three main options for building its future security � jointly with the West, whose security is guaranteed by NATO; jointly with the CIS Collective Security Organisation (that is, with Russia); or by remaining a non-aligned (neutral) state. These main options have their adherents and opponents, in line with their perception of Ukraine�s interests in the security domain. This article presents an assessment of the mentioned options.

Which organisation should take the lead in maintaining regional security in Europe?

At present, NATO is the most effective military-political organisation within the European security system. Because it has preserved the military-political capacity accumulated during the Cold War and flexibly adapted to new conditions, NATO, when compared with the UN, OSCE and the EU, appears to be the only regional security institution that, according to the experts of George C.Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, �can effectively operate in all four rings of security� � individual security, collective security, collective defense and promoting stability.

 

In the near future (over the next 5-10 years) NATO will retain its lead role in maintaining regional stability in Europe. This conclusion is based on the U.S. readiness to invest significant funds into the defence sector and maintain close ties with Europe, regardless of anything, and the process of the Alliance enlargement. The approach of NATO to the borders of Ukraine as a result of the Alliance�s enlargement will promote European security.

 

At the same time, the end of the Cold War and the trend towards greater interdependence of the European countries have objectively led to a decrease in the attention to the military. Although one cannot entirely rule out a possibility of a war in Europe, the present situation in the security domain is characterized by significant reduction of the probability of a large-scale military conflict. The continent is witnessing a shift in emphasis after the events of 11 September, 2001, from primarily military to law-enforcement and peacekeeping, i.e., a gradual �crossover� of the lead role and predominant influence in the field of regional security from the �military-political� NATO to the �anti-crisis� EU.

In the middle and long run, the system of European security will undergo more significant reformation. The contours of this future system (sometimes called �Co-operative Security System�) will be determined not by the positions and capabilities of the alliances like NATO and the EU, which is the case now, but by the positions and capabilities of politico-economic centres � the USA and a united Europe, and possibly also Russia, in the event of its substantial progress in the direction of market reform and democracy building. Most probably, NATO will play the key role in formation of the future regional security system in Europe.

The chances of Ukraine joining NATO

Ukraine�s accession to NATO in the near future seems unrealistic. This is not a matter of Ukraine�s intentions but of its ability to ensure compliance with NATO membership criteria, and the real economic capabilities of the state. If one compares the potential of Ukraine with that of the new NATO members (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), with roughly equal indicators of aggregate territory, population and armed forces strength, Ukraine�s lag by GDP level and defense expenditures is disastrous (Table �Ratio of the general strategic indicators between Ukraine and the new members of NATO�). At that, one should remember that the new members of the Alliance are consistently criticized regarding their compliance with NATO standards, in particular, for insufficient defense expenditures.

 

Furthermore, there is the factor of Russia, which, despite its rapprochement with NATO, continues to maintain a negative attitude towards the Alliance�s expansion. Russia�s positions in its dialogue with NATO are rather strong, as it is a nuclear power, a key participant of arms control regimes and a major supplier of energy resources to Europe. Formally, the level of Ukraine�s co-operation with NATO far exceeds the level of military co-operation with Russia � among Ukraine�s last year�s gains observers mention nearly 600 joint events with NATO, against 52 Ukraine-Russia military co-operation events.

Meanwhile, in contrast to its relations with NATO, Ukraine maintains close military-technical co-operation with Russia. Ukraine is also strongly dependent on Russia in the energy and political spheres. Generally speaking, at present Russia is gradually consolidating its political and economic positions in Ukraine and diligently working for the extension of the term of stationing for Russia�s Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea, which does not improve Ukraine�s chances of joining NATO either.

It may be assumed that Ukraine�s accession to NATO is theoretically possible in 10-15 years. However, by that time, the Alliance itself will most probably have acquired a new substance, and entry criteria may also have changed significantly. Hence, it would be more correct to assess the prospects of Ukraine�s approach to Euro-Atlantic structures in general, or to the new European security system in general. The most rational position of Ukraine with respect to NATO entry might be formulated as maximum proximity in the absence of formal accession.

The chances of Ukraine joining the CIS Collective Security Organization (the Tashkent Treaty)

For Ukraine, there is no point in joining the Tashkent Treaty. It will not offer anything beyond the present level of co-operation with CIS countries and Russia, but will significantly strengthen political dependence on the latter.

In fact, the CIS Collective Security Organization is only formally a military alliance, since real co-operation within its borders centers not around common goals, values and commitments but primarily on a bilateral basis: Russia-Belarus, Russia-Armenia, Russia-Central Asia (and is shaped, first and foremost, by individual factors of the Treaty members� dependence on Russia).

Furthermore, the prospects of the Tashkent Treaty itself will most probably be affected by the presence of a U.S. military contingent in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan) used for fighting the centers of terrorism in Afghanistan. This factor weakens the role of the Treaty in the maintenance of security and stability in Central Asia and prompts some member states (Kirgizstan and Tajikistan) to take independent decisions without formal consultations with Russia and other members of the Organisation (as required by the Treaty).

Therefore, Ukraine�s accession to the Tashkent Treaty is inexpedient � it already has extensive bilateral relations with Russia in the defence sector, and accession to the Treaty will not give Ukraine�s security anything really new, with the exception of negative political consequences.

The prospects for non-aligned status

Ukraine will probably remain a non-aligned country for at least the next 10-15 years, until the contours of a new European security system are formed.

Joining NATO would correspond to the interests of our state but we are not ready for accession. Meanwhile, accession to the Tashkent Treaty or the Union of Russia and Belarus is possible but does not meet Ukraine�s interests.

Ukraine�s non-aligned status looks logical if one considers its specific geopolitical location and the relevant weakness of its foreign policy � Ukraine is trying to maintain friendly relations with both the West and the East simultaneously, even in the face of contradictions between them. What�s more, Ukraine�s populace is most supportive of formal neutrality.

 

Given the absence of a direct large-scale military threat, it may be stated that in the long run, Ukraine�s security depends not so much on its membership in military alliances as on the effectiveness of economic and democratic reforms domestically. And the declared course of integration with EU may automatically strengthen guarantees for Ukraine�s security in the event of its official recognition as a candidate for EU membership (as is the case with, say, the Baltic states) and Ukraine�s active participation in the EU Common European Security and Defence Policy.

Conclusions

NATO, relying on U.S. potential, will play the lead role in maintaining regional security in Europe for the near future. The most rational position of Ukraine with respect to NATO entry might be formulated as maximum proximity in the absence of formal accession.

The Tashkent Treaty is only formally a military alliance. Possible accession to the Treaty will not strengthen Ukraine�s security, but can lead to negative political consequences. Ukraine�s accession to the Tashkent Treaty is inexpedient.

The process of NATO enlargement and transformation will proceed in parallel with EU enlargement and a gradual transfer of the separate tasks of conflict prevention and crisis management to EU security institutions. Those processes will gradually lead to the establishment of a new regional security system � �Co-operative Security System� that should be joined by Ukraine.

To ensure its security for the time being, Ukraine should, within the framework of its present non-aligned status, significantly enhance the effectiveness of economic and democratic reforms domestically, attain the formal status of a candidate for EU membership and develop the closest possible co-operation with the EU in the security domain.

 

RUSSIA REASSERTS SUPERIORITY OVER THE CIS IN THE WAKE OF NATO SUMMIT IN PRAGUE

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin's relatively friendly tone in the wake of the NATO summit in Prague may be concealing Russia's hopes for strengthening its position in the CIS region. While Moscow has acquiesced on NATO's enlargement in the Eastern Europe, it now again expects the West to recognize Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia as areas of its exclusive strategic interests. Moscow's primary tool seems to be the revitalization of the defunct Collective Security Treaty, which it now tries to turn into a true alliance.

BACKGROUND: The NATO summit in Prague sent mixed signals to the alliance's partners in the CIS. On the one hand, a special session in Prague was dedicated to praising the efforts of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in their fight against terrorism. Uzbek President Islam Karimov was particularly outspoken during the meeting, emphasising that his country needed NATO for protection and that it would be seeking even closer cooperation with the Alliance in the future. On the other hand, NATO seems to be increasingly giving consideration to Russia's view of the CIS. The summit has thus raised difficult questions about the extent to which NATO is committed to developing its security ties with the post-Soviet states in the face of Russia's growing opposition to the Western influence in the region. It appears that the current wave of enlargement has made Russia ever so determined to dilute and undermine NATO's presence in the CIS.

In the wake of the Kremlin's decision earlier this year not to oppose NATO enlargement, many in Moscow called for a 'damage limitation strategy'. Tighter military integration in the 'near abroad' is seen as a key element of this strategy. The most noteworthy development in this respect has been the decision taken in Moscow on May 14, 2002, to transform the defunct Tashkent treaty organisation into a military-political alliance similar in structure and functions to NATO. The Russian General Staff views the new block, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), as a countermeasure to the West's continuing penetration of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Within the CSTO framework, it is pushing for an upgrade of the joint rapid deployment force established in 2001, the unification of the military training procedures on the basis of Russian army colleges, a common arms procurement policy, and integration of the national military-industrial complexes.

IMPLICATIONS: Russia has toned down its objections to NATO, yet this may represent a tactical shift in its position or, as the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov puts it, 'an increase in the possibility of a manoeuvre' by 'seeking allies not for a lifetime but for a specific interest'. The congruity of interests between Russia and NATO surely does not extend into the post-Soviet space, where Russia is steadily becoming more assertive. It is actively seeking to reinforce its positions in the region, by the means of new military basing rights, a growing intelligence presence, and control over the energy, transport and telecommunications sectors of former Soviet republics.

Any prospect for NATO's increased influence in the CIS fuels Moscow's sense of insecurity. The Russian defence establishment is largely unreconstructed and its threat perceptions have not changed in spite of Putin's more pragmatic stance towards the West. Many regard NATO as a direct threat and an instrument of U.S. influence in Europe. These beliefs are perpetuated by the Soviet-style system of military education and operational planning. The defence think-tanks which formulate military doctrine, the General Staff Academy and the Centre for Military-Strategic Research, are notorious for their hard-line stance on the West and the 'near abroad'. It therefore comes as no surprise that Russian strategic planners continue to press for a firm hand in dealing with those in the CIS who militarily want to move closer to NATO.

Seen in this context, the newly established CSTO has a special role to play in Russia's attempts to strategically isolate those post-Soviet states which gravitate towards the West. CSTO will also allow the Kremlin to consolidate its control over the defence policies of states like Kazakhstan which, unlike Georgia or Uzbekistan, seek to balance between Russia and NATO. Under the new economic cooperation scheme, the Russian military-industrial complex gains privileged access to the former Soviet defence industry assets in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan's participation in the new defence block is a signal to the U.S. that its forces can remain in the region only until the anti-terrorism campaign is over. This view was affirmed by Vladimir Rushailo, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, who said recently that Moscow wanted a firm deadline for the withdrawal of Western troops from Central Asia. The Russian military reasons that the CSTO arrangements will make it easier for Moscow to deploy armed forces against Islamic militant groups and exploit intelligence assets in the CIS, while keeping Americans and Europeans at bay. And, of course, the Kremlin expects the new defence block do deliver in terms of strengthening Russia's negotiation position vis-�-vis NATO.

CONCLUSIONS: There may be a connection between Putin's friendlier tone in the wake of NATO summit in Prague and Russia's continuing quest for asserting its strategic superiority in the CIS area. While Moscow has acquiesced on the Alliance's current wave of enlargement, it at the same time expects the West to recognize that Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Central Asian states fall within Russia's exclusive sphere of influence. Many in its security apparatus, including the chief of the General Staff, General Aleksei Kvashnin, complain in private that President Putin's role in the anti-terrorist coalition serves the interests of those in Washington who seek to strategically encircle Russia. A group of influential ex-army officers recently claimed in a letter to the president that his "indecisiveness" in the face of the growing U.S. military presence in Central Asia amounted to "a policy of licking the boots of the West". Moscow-based analyst Lilia Shevtsova argues that such views point to Putin's failure or unwillingness to build a national consensus on key foreign policy issues. It remains clear that the Russian heavy military and intelligence presence in Caucasus and Central Asia gives Moscow a worrying capacity to derail cooperation projects between NATO and the CIS states.

 

RUSSIA MOVES TO REASSERT INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA, CAUCASUS

 

After concentrating in early 2002 on fostering strategic ties with the United States and European Union, Russia is retrenching in Central Eurasia, moving vigorously in recent months to bolster its influence over other CIS countries. Political analysts say the Kremlin is skillfully advancing its agenda by utilizing Bush administration foreign policy rhetoric with its emphasis on the anti-terrorism campaign and the right of preemptive action.

The motivation for Russia�s shift in geopolitical priorities is a desire to develop reliable partners. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin focused on enhancing Moscow�s relationship with Washington. But Putin�s strategic initiatives have been hampered by decades of mutual mistrust between the erstwhile Cold War enemies, as well as by economic competition connected with the development of Caspian Basin energy resources.

Over the past year, Russia has concluded strategic partnership agreements with the United States, EU members and other countries. Nevertheless Russia has no real and reliable strategic partners, prompting some to express concern about geopolitical isolation, some analysts say.

"There is no country or even a group of countries or an international institution that can or would want to give Russia some guarantees that its security, territorial integrity or at least its economic interests will be respected," writes the regional analyst Iskander Khisamov in the journal Ekspert.

"Thus, no mater how weak or disintegrated the Commonwealth of Independent States might be," Khisamov continued, "it remains Russia�s main strategic priority � more important than America, Europe or China and India."

As the recent agreement to establish a Russian air base in Kyrgyzstan underscores, Moscow is now keen to demonstrate that it remains a dominate regional power in Central Asia. Khisamov, the political analyst, said the Russian base is meant to show that Moscow "is the true master of the post-Soviet space." The basing agreement also is indicative that Putin may be less accommodating in his dealings with the United States in 2003. Putin himself said in November that the era of Russian geopolitical concessions � which began with the 1991 Soviet collapse and continued through the post-September 11 appearance of US military bases in Central Asia � was coming to an end.

"Russia has ceded so much over the last decade that further �giving away� is simply out of the question," Putin said November 27 in comments broadcast by Ekho Moscvy radio. "[Instead of �giving away�] we will �take� � but [only] within the framework of agreements and international accords."

Russia�s participation in the US-led anti-terrorism campaign prompted Russian nationalists to severely criticize Putin�s foreign policy. The new policy emphasis has generally mollified Putin�s nationalist critics.

Ironically, it is under the anti-terrorism campaign�s aegis that Moscow is pursuing its current policy goals. Earlier this year, many Russian pundits were critical of what they characterized as US imperial behavior. Now, however, Russia is effectively mimicking the United States in seeking to project influence in Central Asia. "Our elite who only recently was enraged by the American arrogance, is now going out of its way to emulate Washington," writes political scientist Liliya Shevtsova of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in her commentary published in the Moskovskie Novosti weekly.

There is a dramatic difference, however, between Moscow�s moves and Washington�s: while the United States is unquestionably a global force, Russia is struggling to shore up its regional power status. "The actual policy of our country in the post-Soviet space in the outgoing year has become a small replica of America�s behavior in the global arena," political commentator Tatiana Rublyova wrote in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper.

Being a pragmatist, Putin seems to be fully aware of the difference between US and Russian strategic capabilities, and is content to skillfully play a "weak hand." In addition to the America-led global coalition against terror, of which Russia is an important but far from a leading participant, Putin is diligently building his own mini-coalition on the basis of the Collective Security Treaty (CST), of which Moscow is the indisputable leader.

Using the anti-terrorism struggle as a catch phrase, Russia is pushing to create a full-fledged regional military bloc that can help Moscow strengthen its grip over post-Soviet Eurasia.�

Viktor Ilyin, philosophy professor at Moscow Technical University, called on Russia to develop its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. "The exclusive right of control over the former fragments of the [Russian] empire and support of the friendly regional regimes there is the prerogative of Russia, which strives to reintegrate the [former Soviet] Union space under its leadership," Ilyin wrote.

In the same vein, the post-Soviet countries are now being increasingly portrayed in Moscow as underdeveloped and in need of Russian protection. The historian Vladlen Sirotkin, a specialist in French history, recently compared poorer CIS states to the former French colonies in Africa. He went on to suggest in a recent analysis published in the Literaturnaya Gazeta weekly that Putin should emulate the policy approaches that Paris took in the 1960s towards Africa. "France has completely restored control over its �African CIS,�" Sirotkin said. "It has retained its old military bases; it controls the local economy and trade."

There appears to be a growing belief in Moscow that such a neo-imperial policy in the post-Soviet space can succeed. Analysts mention such positive factors as geographic proximity, economic and political dependence of the post-Soviet nations on Russia and Moscow�s potential to exploit the internal political difficulties of some CIS leaders, such as Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev. Also important, Tatiana Rublyova points out, "in contrast to America, Russia possesses the historical experience of keeping these nations within its sphere of influence."

A Russian Rapid Reaction Force?

The Collective Forces of Quick Deployment (CFQD) of the Collective Security Treaty have been carrying out joint military exercises. The main goal of these exercises is the improve the CFQD to combat international extremist groups. It is assumed that the collective troops will become the force that will enable the member-states of the Collective Security Treaty to repulse the attacks of Islamic extremists on Central Asian territory, and possibly, the Afghan Taliban movement.

On Oct 11, the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia met in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek to discuss measures to boost security in the volatile Central Asian region.

They signed an agreement on the Collective Security military forces, to be assembled in case of need by member states. The forces are to be used to combat outside aggression, to carry out "anti-terrorist" operations, or to be involved in military maneuvers. The forces' expected numerical strength was not revealed.

 

Fourth Pillar?

If there are three pillars comprised of N. America, EU and CIS should we look to other regions, and could there be a �Fourth Pillar�?

Looking at the globe there is two likely candidates depending on future developments.

South America, led by Brazil and Mercosur could form a fourth region with its two aircraft carrier groups.

India makes up most of the Subcontinent, has a democracy, nuclear technology and large population.


 

Industrial Consolidation

 

The US aerospace sector in the 1990s saw many companies consolidate, scrambling to make their way in the post-Cold War era. Boeing, the largest aerospace company in the world, got that way by acquiring a slew of operations, including Rockwell International's aerospace and defense operations (1995) and most importantly, McDonnell Douglas in a $16 billion deal (1997). Lockheed, the world's #2, merged with Martin Marietta (1995) and acquired Loral (1997). These US companies had it relatively easy -- they all paid taxes to Uncle Sam, but acquisition deals in Europe were stymied by concerns over national security and privatization because much of Europe's defense industry was government-owned.

Spurred into action by their US rivals, in 1997 DASA and British Aerospace (now BAE SYSTEMS) -- partners in Airbus -- began merger talks. Fearful of being left out in the cold, France's government-owned Aerospatiale -- another Airbus partner -- began talks to merge with Matra, a French defense company controlled by Lagard�re. Weeks after the Aerospatiale-Matra deal was announced in 1998, the chairman of DASA's parent company, J�rgen Schrempp, met with Lagard�re's CEO, Jean-Luc Lagard�re and proposed a three-way deal. It never occurred and in 1999 the BAE SYSTEMS and DASA deal fell through as well.

Later that year Schrempp and Lagard�re met again and laid the groundwork for a merger between DASA and Aerospatiale Matra. Less than three weeks after the Aerospatiale-Matra merger was completed, Lagard�re found himself pitching the DASA/Aerospatiale Matra merger idea to a stunned French government (which still held a 48% stake in Aerospatiale Matra). Marathon negotiations ensued. Late in the year Spain's Construcciones Aeron�uticas SA (CASA) agreed to become part of EADS.

In 2000 Airbus announced that it would abandon its consortium structure in favor of incorporation -- as Airbus Integrated Company (AIC) -- and EADS went public.

Airbus, which accounts for about 75% of EADS's sales, and its new super-jumbo A3XX are key to EADS's success. With the A3XX, Airbus hopes to wrest customers away from Boeing, which has enjoyed a monopoly on jumbo jets and is Airbus' only competition in long-range passenger aircraft. Scheduled to be flying as early as 2005, the A3XX will carry up to 600 people in a double-decker configuration.

In June 2000, the Airbus partners announced the formation of an Airbus Integrated Company (AIC), which will operate under EADS management. At the same time, with the "Authorization to Offer" the starting signal was given for the market launch of the A3XX megaliner. The A3XX family is planned to be larger than the largest existing commercial passenger aircraft, with a wingspan of 79.8 m and a large-diameter fuselage divided into three decks along the entire aircraft (two full passenger decks and a cargo deck). The A3XX is expected to be the first commercial aircraft featuring four aisles (two on each deck) and a double staircase. Several versions are currently proposed. The first version, designated the A3XX-100, will seat approximately 550 passengers in three classes and offer a long-haul range of 14,500 km to 16,200 km (7,650 nm to 8,750 nm), providing links between major hubs in Europe, North America and Asia, or between hubs within Asia. A second aircraft, the A3XX-200, will be a stretched 650-seat version. Other derivatives are being examined, including a smaller version, the A3XX-50, a freighter and a convertible passenger/freighter.

Like much of the economy, the aerospace and defense industry was struggling to maintain profitability even before September 11. Needless to say, the terrorist attacks have had a profound affect on the aerospace and defense industry, accelerating some trends, while reversing others. The ramifications will differ for each of the three basic industry segments: defense, commercial aircraft, and space.

The defense market accounted for about 50% of the aerospace and defense industry's sales in 2000, but that figure is expected to grow as a result of the war on terrorism. For example, President Bush's newest proposal for the US Department of Defense's budget calls for a spending increase of about 15%. The world's overall defense spending will also increase. Obviously, this trend will bode well for the large companies that dominate the market.

The large got larger throughout the 1990s in the defense market and that trend continued into the new century. In all, defense companies spent $30 billion on mergers and acquisitions in 2001, with Northrop Grumman�s purchase of both Litton Industries and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding being the most prominent of the deals.

In 2001 Lockheed beat out Boeing for the $200 billion contract to build the Joint Strike Fighter, the largest defense contract ever. The contract, which is spread out over almost 30 years, may well mark the last one for a manned fighter as the success of the unmanned drones (as evidenced in Afghanistan with the use of General Atomics' Predator) is expected to continue, supplanting the need for the more expensive manned jets and making it unnecessary to risk pilots' lives in combat.

September 11 dealt a devastating blow to a commercial aircraft market that was already reeling from a market slowdown. That market, which accounted for just over 40% of aerospace and defense industry spending, is divided into four segments: large commercial aircraft (planes of 100 seats and more); maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO); jet engines; and business and regional aircraft (less than 100 seats). In 2001 Boeing and Airbus, the world's only two large commercial aircraft makers, saw orders plummet by 45% and 28%, respectively. While Airbus has drawn even and then surpassed Boeing in orders, deliveries for 2002 are expected to drop 25% from 2001. As a result of the drastic fall-off in business, Boeing has announced plans to cut about 30,000 jobs or roughly 30% of its commercial aircraft workforce.

The MRO and jet engines markets have also suffered; GE Aircraft Engines, UTC Aerospace, and Rolls-Royce are the three largest. The outlook for the business and regional aircraft market is a mixed bag -- while the regional aircraft market has taken a hit as a result of travel concerns, the business jet market might not deteriorate as much because of the perceived safety and convenience of non-commercial travel. The biggest players in this market are Bombardier, Gulfstream, and Textron�s Cessna unit.

American Consolidaton

With a more cautious approach to troop commitment, the military-industrial complex has returned to the situation that worried Eisenhower: it doesn't matter whether weapons are used (or usable), as long as they are bought. The military budget is, of course, growing rapidly. Two years ago, the United States spent as much on the military as the next eight countries combined. Last year, as much as the next 15 combined. This year, as much as the next 20. Yet it is hard to match the pattern of spending to the nature of new threats. Consider the F-22 Raptor fighter plane, which was designed in George H.W. Bush's administration. Each plane will cost well over $100 million, perhaps twice that much. The expense is mainly for measures that would allow the aircraft to penetrate a Soviet air defense system that disappeared more than a decade ago.

Since the United States has ended up with so much more imposing a force than any adversary, perhaps the complex should be thanked rather than criticized? Well, no, for exactly the reasons that Eisenhower foresaw: "economic, political, even spiritual." The economic problem is that the federal government no longer has enough money to throw around without a plan. The political problem is the distortion of the process of public choice. Pentagon budget analyst Franklin Chuck Spinney uses the term "political engineering" to describe the parceling out of defense subcontracts to the districts of influential members of Congress. The more senators and representatives are dealt into the arrangements, the harder it is for them to exercise independent judgment.


 

Contractors and Subcontractors of Selected Major Weapons Systems

(Prime Contractors Appear in Bold)

F/A-18E/F Fighter - Boeing, Northrop, General Electric

F-22 Fighter - Lockheed Martin Corp., Boeing Company, UTC Aerospace

Joint Strike Fighter - Lockheed Martin Corp. (Partnered with Northrop Grumman), Boeing Company, UTC Aerospace

F-15 Fighter � Boeing, UTC Aerospace

F-16 Fighter Aircraft - Lockheed Martin Corp., UTC Aerospace, General Electric

C-17 Transport Aircraft - Boeing Company, UTC Aerospace

E-8C Joint STARS Reconnaissance Aircraft - Northrop Grumman Corp.

V-22 Osprey Aircraft - Boeing, Textron, Allison

RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter - Boeing Rotocraft, UTC Aerospace, Inc., LHTEC

AH-64D Apache Longbow Helicopter Upgrade � Boeing

DDG-51 Destroyer - Bath Iron Works, Ingalls Shipbuilding

SSN-21 Seawolf Submarine - General Dynamics Electric Boat Division

NSSN New Attack Submarine ("Virginia" Class) - General Dynamics Electric Boat Division, Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding

LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Dock - Avondale Industries, Inc., Bath Iron Works, General Dynamics, Hughes Aircraft Company, and Intergraph Corp.

LHD-1 Amphibious Assault Ship - Ingalls Shipbuilding

Trident II D-5 Missile - Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space

Tomahawk Cruise Missile - Raytheon Systems Company, Williams International

MILSTAR Communications Satellite � Lockheed

M1A2 Tank Upgrade - General Dynamics Land Systems

Bradley Fighting Vehicle Upgrade - United Defense

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) - Stewart & Stevenson

Crusader Artillery System - United Defense

 

Contrary to initial expectations, the military-industrial complex did not fade away with the end of the cold war. It has simply reorganized itself.

As a result of a rash of military-industry mergers encouraged and subsidized by the Clinton administration, the "Big Three" weapons makers�Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon�now receive among themselves over $30 billion per year in Pentagon contracts. This represents more than one out of every four dollars that the Defense Department doles out for everything from rifles to rockets.

If they get their way, the new military-industrial behemoths will receive billions more in the years to come. The Clinton administration�s five-year budget plan for the Pentagon calls for a 50% increase in weapons procurement, from $44 billion per year now to over $63 billion per year by 2003. On issue after issue�from expanding NATO, to deploying the Star Wars missile defense system, to rolling back restrictions on arms sales to repressive regimes � the arms industry has launched a concerted lobbying campaign aimed at increasing military spending and arms exports. These initiatives are driven by profit and pork barrel politics, not by an objective assessment of how best to defend the United States in the post-cold war period.

In order to achieve an effective, affordable defense, it will be necessary to rein in the power and profits of the Pentagon and the military contractors. But before looking at the recent activities of the arms lobby, it is important to reflect on just how misguided the Pentagon�s current spending priorities really are.

President Eisenhower�s warning about the "acquisition of unwarranted influence" by the military-industrial complex is as relevant today as it was in 1961. Despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military budget is higher today than it was when Eisenhower gave his military-industrial complex speech in 1961. At more than $270 billion per year, the U.S. military budget (in constant dollars) remains near the peacetime cold war average that prevailed during the prime period of U.S.-Soviet rivalry, from roughly 1950 to 1989. This is astonishing considering that Russia has slashed its weapons procurement budget by 77% since 1991, and that Russian forces could barely prevail over a rebel army in Chechnya (inside its own borders), much less project force against neighboring countries.

Absent a robust Russian military, where is the threat that justifies spending over a quarter of a trillion dollars per year on war and preparations for war? The Pentagon�s answer is simple: there is no longer one powerful superpower adversary to contend with, but U.S. forces still need to be equipped to fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously against "rogue states" like Iraq and North Korea. �And getting hundreds of thousands of troops to these far-away places requires spending almost as much as the United States spent during the cold war�or so the Pentagon claims.

Michael Klare is not alone in suggesting that the new threats to U.S. security have been greatly exaggerated. Pentagon budget analyst Franklin Spinney has bluntly asserted that "the Pentagon�s two war strategy is just a marketing device to justify a high budget." Merrill McPeak, who served as Air Force Chief of Staff during and after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, has also weighed in on this issue:

We should walk away from the two war strategy. Neither our historical experience nor our common sense leads us to think we need to do this. We�ve had to fight three major regional contingencies in the past 45 years�Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. One comes along every 15 years or so�two have never come along simultaneously.

For those who question whether conflicts like Vietnam or the Gulf War were essential to U.S. security, McPeak�s estimate of one major conflict every 15 years can be extended to one every twenty to thirty years. And, as we will discuss later, the U.S. military budget could be sharply reduced if our government would take concerted action to prevent conflict. A preventive strategy would be far cheaper and more effective than the current approach of marshaling huge, expensive forces to prepare for contingencies that are unlikely to occur. This point is borne out by the war in Kosovo, where it has become painfully evident that the costly application of high tech military force is the wrong tool for dealing with ethnic conflicts and civil wars. By forcing the withdrawal of human rights monitors and humanitarian organizations that had been operating in the province, the NATO bombing campaign actually made it easier for Serb forces to drive ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo at gunpoint.

Lawrence Korb, a top official in the Reagan Pentagon who now serves as the director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, has argued that even if one accepts the proposition that U.S. forces need to be ready to fight two major regional conflicts at once, there is still room to make major cuts in the current Pentagon budget. Korb notes that the United States currently spends 19 times more on its military forces than all of the Pentagon�s so-called "rogue states"�Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea�combined. Korb also asserts that the Pentagon completely discounts the military capabilities of such key U.S. regional allies as Israel and South Korea, which would reinforce U.S. military power in a major regional conflict in the Middle East or Asia. Once we take into account the relative weakness of the rogue states and the strength of our allies, Korb suggests that there is room to trim at least $40 billion from our current Pentagon budget, even if we accept the highly unlikely scenario of needing to fight two major conflicts at one time. �The point about the relative strength of the United States and its allies is underscored by the fact that the United States and its key allies (NATO, Japan, and South Korea) now account for 62% of total global military spending, up from roughly one-half in the mid-1980s. �In short, despite repeated calls for higher military spending to remedy the alleged "readiness crisis" facing U.S. forces, the United States and its allies currently account for a much higher share of global military spending than they did at the height of the Reagan military buildup in the mid-1980s.

By exaggerating the current threat to U.S. security, the Pentagon is carrying on a long and dishonorable tradition. In fact, in the early 1990s it was revealed that U.S. projections of Soviet military power had been wildly overstated for years as a result of misleading intelligence supplied by people like Aldrich Ames, the CIA agent who was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union. Similarly, in the 1970s, the conservative Committee on the Present Danger pressed the CIA to do a slanted "Team B" assessment of Soviet military power that helped pave the way for Ronald Reagan�s unprecedented peacetime military buildup of the 1980s.

The terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998) and missile tests by Iran (July 1998) and North Korea (August 1998), and NATO�s air war in Kosovo (inaugurated on March 24, 1999) have prompted politicians and media pundits to demand that the Pentagon be given more money in order to beef up its national security policies. It is essential to offer a compelling alternative to the exaggerated threats and misguided spending priorities that military hawks are promoting in the hopes of dramatically increasing the Pentagon budget, bringing it back to the record-high, Reaganesque levels that prevailed in the mid-1980s.

If the current threats to U.S. interests don�t justify spending $270 billion a year on the Pentagon, much less increasing the military budget, as conservatives are suggesting, what is driving these enormous expenditures? First and most obviously, the main beneficiaries of cold war military spending�including the Pentagon, the major military contractors, and key members of Congress who routinely steer military dollars to their districts � have been working overtime to keep the military gravy train running. Beyond this institutional pressure for permanently high military spending, there is also a strategic rationale�the notion that the United States should retain the capability to serve as a sort of "globocop," charging to the rescue to restore order, stability, and "free markets" when they are threatened by the forces of evil and chaos. Although it is true that in a number of key instances�such as Somalia and Rwanda�the United States has abandoned the task of policing violent conflicts due to public concern about U.S. casualties, the Pentagon�s strategy and budget remain focused on retaining a capability for global force projection. And in those areas where there are critical resources or potential U.S. investments at risk�such as the Persian Gulf and the oil-and-gas-rich former Soviet Republics of Central Asia�the Pentagon is busily at work providing arms and training, arranging access to bases, and (in the case of the Persian Gulf) prepositioning troops and equipment in readiness for a possible military intervention at some future date. If we were to abandon the outdated notion that the United States needs to maintain the capability to project force to every corner of the globe and focus instead on developing better diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with other nations, we could afford to cut tens of billions of dollars from our bloated military budget.

� ����������������� In recent years, Lockheed Martin and its allies in the weapons industry have aggressively pushed for favorable treatment from the federal government in the form of special subsidies, lucrative contracts for big-ticket weapons systems, and wholesale changes in U.S. policies on arms sales and military technology transfers. Given the tremendous growth of these military conglomerates, one way to look at the development of U.S. security policy as we approach the 21st century is to echo the question that critics raised about General Motors in the 1950s: Is what�s good for Lockheed Martin good for America?

The Pentagon claims that using taxpayer money to subsidize military mergers will cut overhead and save money by, as Norman Augustine puts it, allowing companies to run "three full factories instead of six half-full factories." In reality, as research by Harvey Sapolsky of MIT has demonstrated, the Pentagon has not shut down a single major weapons production line since the end of the cold war. And even if Lockheed Martin cuts some overhead costs by closing factories and laying off workers, there is no guarantee that the same company that brought us the $600 toilet seat in the 1980s and pioneered in the arts of bribery and influence peddling in the 1970s is going to pass on its savings on overhead to U.S. taxpayers. So, while it may never provide lower weapons prices for the Pentagon, the 1990s bout of government-backed "merger mania" in the military industry has accomplished one thing: it has resulted in a slightly leaner, considerably meaner, and much more politically powerful corporate military sector. As John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists has noted, a company like Boeing, which since its absorption of McDonnell Douglas has over 250,000 employees, leaves a huge "political footprint" that gives the company immense clout on Capitol Hill. Similarly, after the Lockheed/Martin Marietta merger was consummated, Lockheed Martin put out a slick brochure that bragged openly about its "facilities in all 50 states."

Buying Weapons That the Pentagon Never Requested

One way that firms like Lockheed Martin and Boeing fatten their bottom lines at the expense of our long-term security is by using their connections on Capitol Hill to force the Pentagon to buy weapons that weren�t included in the department�s original budget request. This "add-on game" is a bipartisan pursuit. House Speaker Newt Gingrich kept an eye out for Lockheed Martin, which has a plant near his Marietta, Georgia, district, but House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt has been just as aggressive in seeking funds for the McDonnell Douglas division of Boeing, the largest employer in his St. Louis area district. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott was a master at steering military projects to his home state of Mississippi, but Democratic Sen. Daniel Inouye of Hawaii almost matched Lott�s lobbying prowess: Inouye inserted 31 projects for his home state�worth over $258 million�into the FY 1999 Pentagon budget.

Spreading Pentagon contracts around to the districts of powerful legislators has been a routine practice for decades, but defense budget politics have taken a unique twist in the 1990s. Since 1994, when the Republicans took control of both Houses of Congress, Congress has added billions to the Pentagon budget every year beyond what the Department of Defense requested. This is a role reversal from the Reagan years, when liberals in Congress were always trying to shave a few billion off from the President�s Pentagon budget request. According to the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Congress added a total of roughly $20 billion to the Pentagon budget during Fiscal Years 1996-1998. And despite cries from the military and Pentagon budget hawks regarding the "readiness crisis" that is afflicting U.S. forces, three-quarters of this $20 billion windfall was earmarked for weapons projects that benefit major arms makers, not for maintenance, training, pay, or other items that would improve the safety and quality of life of our men and women in uniform.

The add-on game is designed to increase the revenues of major contractors by extending the production runs of weapons systems that the Pentagon had hoped to terminate. The payback for legislators is twofold: not only do they get hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from the contractors, but they also get to claim credit for high-profile, job-producing weapons projects in their districts. This self-serving process has serious costs. First, it wastes billions of dollars in taxpayer funds that could be put to more productive uses rebuilding our schools or restoring our environment. Second, it undermines our security by distorting the spending patterns within the Pentagon budget.

Take the C-130 transport plane, which is built by Lockheed Martin just outside of Newt Gingrich�s Marietta, Georgia, district. Since 1978, the U.S. Air Force has requested a total of just five C-130s, but Congress has purchased 256 C-130s. This ratio of 50 planes purchased for every one requested by the Pentagon may well be a record in the annals of pork barrel politics. Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) has remarked that Congress has purchased so many surplus C-130s that "we could use them to house the homeless." The C-130 has been promoted over the years by everyone from former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-GA) to former National Guard and National Reserve subcommittee Chairman Sonny Montgomery (R-MS) to House Speaker Newt Gingrich to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott. The added planes are generally placed with national guard units based in the states of key members. For example, of the more than two dozen C-130s that Congress has added to the budget in recent years, more than half of them will be based at Kessler Air Force Base in Trent Lott�s home state of Mississippi.

The C-130 add-on is an example of "the waste that keeps on wasting." For one thing, Congress has been buying them at such a rapid clip that since 1991 the Air Force has been forced to retire 13 perfectly usable C-130Es with more than a dozen years of useful life left. Secondly, because Congress doesn�t budget funds to operate the added C-130s, the Pentagon will have to come up with over $1 billion to maintain the unrequested C-130s over the next six years, funds that may have to deplete allocations for pay, or training, or other so-called "readiness accounts" of the sort that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been claiming are underfunded.

The C-130 is one of dozens of unnecessary items that members of Congress from key committees have been cramming into the Pentagon budget during the Clinton/Gingrich era. Even in 1998, when Congress was allegedly operating under a balanced budget agreement that was supposed to cap the military budget at roughly $270 billion, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott managed to slip in a down payment on a $1.5 billion helicopter carrier for the Marines (to be built in his hometown of Pascagoula, Mississippi) and $94 million for a spaced-based laser program that Lott hopes to have located in Mississippi. The Texas delegation slipped in a few more F-16 fighters (built at Lockheed Martin�s Fort Worth, Texas, facility), and Connecticut will benefit from the addition to the Army�s budget of no fewer than eight extra Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters. In June 1998, Senator McCain released a list of $2.5 billion in unrequested projects that members of the Senate had added to the Pentagon�s FY 1999 budget; McCain described the add-ons as the "worst pork" that he had witnessed in the Pentagon budget process in years. Finally, to add insult to injury, in the last-minute maneuvering between the White House and Capitol Hill on the FY 1999 federal budget, the congressional leadership added an astounding $9 billion to the Pentagon�s funding, including an extra $1 billion for Star Wars research. Then, to add insult to injury, in May of 1999 Congress more than doubled President Clinton�s already generous $6 billion supplemental budget request to pay for the war in Kosovo, adding billions in unrequested military funds that had nothing to do with sustaining NATO�s bombing campaign and everything to do with opening up room in the budget for more military pork targeted to the states and districts of key members of Congress.

The industry�s successful campaign to lift a 20-year-old ban on exports of advanced U.S. combat aircraft to Latin America is a prime example of how its lobbying machine operates. First the industry prevailed on Defense Secretary William Perry to advocate for lifting the ban within the counsels of the Clinton administration and to send U.S. Air Force F-16s to do demonstration flights at the March 1996 air show in Santiago, Chile. Prior to the show, the Pentagon had also arranged for some Brazilian generals to do test flights in F-16 planes deployed with the Puerto Rican National Guard. Then aerospace lobbyists generated letters to then Secretary of State Warren Christopher from 38 Senators and 78 members of the House of Representatives urging him to support the lifting of the ban as well. Time magazine reporter Douglas Waller described the lobbying letters as the "more million dollar letters," because the members of the House and Senate who signed onto the appeal to Christopher received a total of more than $1 million in Political Action Committee contributions from major weapons exporting companies. The industry representatives followed up by holding White House meetings with presidential counselor and confidante Mack McLarty and an aide to Vice President Gore.

According to an account by Merrill Goozner of the Chicago Tribune, a Lockheed Martin brochure touting the Latin arms market as "a $3 to $15 billion opportunity over the next 10 years" was even slipped under the hotel door of former Costa Rican President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias during one of his business trips. Dr. Arias has been working with the Carter Center, the Council for a Livable World, and a coalition of DC-based public interest groups to promote a moratorium on new sales of advanced weaponry to Latin America as a first step toward promoting regional discussions on conflict prevention and force reductions. But so far, the power and money of the arms lobby has sidetracked this common sense proposal, which would do far more for the future security and stability of Latin America than would hawking expensive military hardware.

On the issue of NATO expansion, the role of U.S. contractors was not to change administration policy but rather to reinforce a questionable policy decision. The Clinton administration decided to expand NATO for a variety of reasons, such as consolidating free market democratic reforms in Eastern and Central Europe and recruiting new allies to help keep the peace in Bosnia and other hot spots. But given the obvious downsides of expanding the alliance�such as alienating Russia, stalling further efforts at U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions, and initiating an open-ended, costly commitment to rearm the new member states�the Clinton administration needed allies to help it sell the NATO expansion concept to Congress and the public. By far the most important players in the pro-NATO expansion lobby were organizations of Polish, Hungarian, and Czech-Americans along with major arms manufacturers like Lockheed Martin and Textron, who took an aggressive stance in support of this costly new commitment.

Corporate lobbying for NATO expansion took several forms. Most importantly, Lockheed Martin lent out one of its vice presidents, Bruce Jackson, to serve as president of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO, a lobbying and public education group housed at the offices of the conservative American Enterprise Institute. The committee sponsored ad campaigns, congressional briefings, speeches, articles, and white papers promoting the "widest possible" expansion of NATO. Jackson claims that his role at the Committee to Expand NATO is a "hobby," but the nature of his work suggests otherwise. For example, in the summer of 1997, when the U.S. Committee sponsored a dinner at which twelve U.S. senators were briefed on NATO expansion by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Jackson invited Lockheed Martin board member Bernard Schwartz, who, coincidentally, was the largest individual donor of soft money to the Democratic Party during the 1995/96 election cycle. Schwartz�s presence was a clear signal to the senators present at the dinner that supporting NATO expansion would be a good way to garner support for their campaign coffers. To reinforce that message, a few weeks after the NATO dinner Schwartz sent a $50,000 check to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.

Other pro-NATO expansion activities pursued by U.S. weapons firms included financial contributions by Lockheed Martin, Textron, and McDonnell Douglas to proexpansion ethnic organizations like the American Friends of the Czech Republic and several Romanian foundations promoting that nation�s candidacy for NATO membership; political funding to help pass the public referendum on NATO expansion that was held in Hungary in 1997; and all manner of wheeling and dealing in East and Central Europe in order to convince the top leadership in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, and other NATO "wannabe" nations that buying U.S. weapons would be the best way to curry favor with the U.S. government and win its support for their NATO candidacies. It is important to note that many people in Eastern and Central Europe, including democratic leaders such as Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic and Lech Walesa of Poland, were supportive of NATO expansion based on longstanding fears of Russia, which made them a receptive audience for the NATO expansion proposal.

When the Senate finally voted on NATO expansion in early 1998, it passed by a vote of 81 to 19. But due to public concerns about the costs of future NATO expansion�by one estimate the total cost of multiple rounds of expansion could reach as much as $500 billion over 12 to 15 years, or at least $2,500 for every American household�the next round of NATO entrants may not be invited to join until 2001, not 1999 as originally planned. This delay offers critics of NATO expansion an important political opening to marshal the forces that will be needed to hold back the arms lobby and the executive branch from going further down the dangerous and costly path of expanding a cold war alliance that has no clear purpose in the post-cold war world.

The Star Warriors:� Who's Benefiting from National Missile Defense?

The "Big Three" weapons contractors�Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon�are all profiting handsomely from Star Wars research and development, and stand to make billions more if a national missile defense system is actually deployed.

Boeing�Won $1.6 billion initial contract for "systems integration" of the overall missile defense effort, 4/98; according to the Wall Street Journal (5/1/98), the contract could be worth $5.2 billion to Boeing over the next ten years. Boeing is also the prime contractor for the Airborne Laser (ABL), a chemical laser mounted on a 747 aircraft that is supposed to be able to intercept Scud missiles in their "boost phase" (as they are being launched); the Air Force expects to spend as much as $1.2 billion on this program between now and 2002, most of which will go to Boeing. Boeing has also received a contract to assemble the booster rocket motors for the Ground-Based Interceptor, another key Star Wars component; the boosters will cost an estimated $3 million each.

Lockheed Martin�Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for the Army�s Theater High Altitude Area Defense system, THAAD. The project has failed its last six tests in a row, and Lockheed Martin has agreed to pay up to $75 million for the costs of any failed tests in the future. The Army has spent $3.2 billion on THAAD so far.

Raytheon�Raytheon is the prime contractor for the Navy�s Theater Wide missile defense project, which is supposed to intercept enemy missiles early in their flight path by detecting them and firing at them from ships at sea. Theater Wide is the pet project of pro-Star Wars groups like the Heritage Foundation and Frank Gaffney�s Center for Security Policy, and it is slated for a $100 million to $200 million per year increase over the next five years. Raytheon is also a major subcontractor to Boeing for systems integration on the overall National Missile Defense effort. The Theater Wide program is slated to receive roughly $1.4 billion in funding from F.Y. 1997 through F.Y. 2003.
Industrial Aerospace/Defense Companies and projects they share:

All OSCE

N. American

Projects that are spanning Euro-Atlantic

Europe

Projects that are spanning Euro-Asiatic

Asiatic

Projects that are spanning NA-Asiatic

 

NMD

 

Araine

Mako

 

5th Generation Fighter

 

Sea Launch

Boeing

58 Billion

 

EADS

27 Billion

Mig 29 MAPS

T-72S Westernize

RAC MIG

 

 

F-22 Raptor

Space Shuttle

J-35

Airbus

Astrium

Eurofighter

RAC MIG and Sukhoi merger planned

International Space Station

Lockheed Martin

24 Billion

J-35 Fighter�

BAE

13 Billion

 

Sukhoi

1 Billion

 

F-22 Raptor

J-35

Eurofighter

 

 

 

Su-30

 

UTC

26 Billion

 

Alenia

3. 5 Billion

 

Rosoboronexport

 

 

J-35

 

 

 

 

 

 

Northrop Grumman

20 Billion

 

Alcatel

22 Billion

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mirage 2000

 

 

 

Raytheon

17 Billion

Thales-Raytheon Systems

Thales

9 Billion

 

Avialeasing

 

 

 

 

Rafale

Mirage 2000

 

 

 

General Dynamics

12 Billion

 

Dassault

3 Billion

 

Rybinsk Motors

 

Division of GD, makes Civil Aircraft

 

 

 

 

Gulfstream

10 Billion

 

Air Foyle

AN-70 Future Intl European Transport Requirement

Antonov

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bombardier

13.5 Billion

 

Rolls Royce

10 Billion

 

Illyushin

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Textron

13 Billion

 

 

MI-8

MI-17

Kazan Helicopter Plant

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Goodrich

5 Billion

 

 

TU-334

Tupelov

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Precision Castparts

1. 5 Billion

 

Volvo Aero

 

Aviacor

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Honeywell Intl

25 Billion

 

 

 

KnAAPO

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sequa

1. 5 Billion

 

 

 

Design Bureau of Transport Machinery

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Orbital Sciences

 

 

 

 

Polyot

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Khrunichev

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SAIC

 

 

 

 

S.P.Korolev

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GE Aircraft Engines

11 Billion

 

 

 

Aviapribor

 


 

 

50 jets were purchased by India and China is carrying out licensed production for about 200 Su-27 fighter aircraft and may still yet purchase Su-30 ground-attack aircraft.

 

Joint Strike Figher

The UK, which needs around 150 JSFs to replace Royal Navy Sea Harriers and Royal Air Force Harrier GR7s from around 2012, is set to become a junior partner in JSF. Ironically, BAE Systems' 10 per cent share of JSF production could be worth more in the long run than the value stream generated by its flagship defense product, the Eurofighter Typhoon, in which it has a 37.5 per cent stake.� Both the JSF and the F-22 are needed, not just to fill US orders - there is a $100bn requirement for 3,000 JSFs in the US alone - but to compete with an emerging breed of European fighters that are challenging US market dominance for the first time in decades.

 

 

DESCRIPTION:

Joint Strike Fighter is a program designed to develop a family of stealthy, next- generation replacement strike fighter aircraft for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, and the U.K. Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. The supersonic JSF evolved from the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program, which entered the concept design definition research phase in December 1994. The JSF program entered its current phase, the Concept Demonstration Phase, in November 1996, when two contractors, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, were selected to build and fly concept-demonstration aircraft. A down-select to one contractor or contractor team for engineering and manufacturing development is scheduled for fall 2001, following flight testing which will conclude the same year. All three Lockheed Martin JSF demonstrators have completed government-mandated flight-test requirements. The X-35A (U.S. Air Force), X-35B (U.S. Marine Corps/U.K. Royal Navy and Royal Air Force) and X-35C (U.S. Navy) all demonstrated aerial refueling, handling qualities, acceleration and deceleration, formation flying at different altitudes, and logged many other achievements, including supersonic flight. Additionally, the X-35C carrier variant made the first-ever transcontinental flight of an X plane, completed 250 practice carrier landings at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md. and was flown by eight pilots from the U.S. and U.K. . The short-takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) X-35B, with its unique shaft-driven lift-fan propulsion system, achieved the JSF program�s first vertical takeoff and vertical landing on June 23, 2001. It went on to complete 17 vertical takeoff/hover/vertical landing missions before fulfilling all government requirements in subsequent flight testing.

 

 



F-22 Raptor

 

The F/A-22 Raptor is a new breed of super-fighter for the 21st century. With its stealth, supersonic cruise, agility and advanced integrated avionics, it will dominate the skies over any future battlefield and bring unequaled capability into the hands of America�s Air Force fighter pilots.

Lockheed Martin, Boeing and UTC Aerospace have joined with the U.S. Air Force to develop and produce the revolutionary F/A-22 . The world�s first stealth air-to-air fighter, the F/A-22 will be unseen and deadly at long range and unmatched at close-in dogfighting. As a true multimission fighter, it will also have superb, precision-strike ground attack capability. A multimode electronically scanned radar, internal weapons carriage, vectored thrust and a sophisticated fully integrated sensor array are only some of the revolutionary advantages that Raptor brings to the air combat arena. Slated to become operational in late 2005, the F/A-22 will replace the U.S. Air Force's aging fleet of F-15 Eagle fighters.

The F/A-22 is the first production aircraft with the ability to supercruise � flying at supersonic speeds without the use of afterburners. The Raptor achieves this by combining efficient aerodynamic design with two UTC Aerospace F119-PW-100 engines, rated in the 35,000-lb thrust category.

Designed and built with reliability and maintainability in mind, the F/A-22 offers new capability to deploy and fight on day one. Twice as reliable and capable as its predecessors, it will allow the Air Force to get to the fight faster, stay longer and fly more missions than any conventional fighter aircraft.

The F/A-22 is proving itself today through a rigorous flight test program in the skies above Edwards Air Force Base, California, and the results have been outstanding. Air Force and F/A-22 Contractor Team test pilots are putting the Raptor through its paces, and the aircraft, engines and avionics will be thoroughly tested before the F/A-22 enters active duty.

The Raptor will carry existing and planned air-to-air weapons, including a full complement of AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) and AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range missiles, along with an internal M61A2 Vulcan 20mm cannon. Multimission air-to-surface weaponry includes the new GBU-32, 1,000-lb joint direct attack munition (JDAM) for precision, all-weather attack

 

NMD National Missile Defense

The US created quite a stir internationally by working on a national missile defense project that some fear would cause China or others to have an arms race to be able to swamp the defense. With the election of Bush as President and his support of NMD, probably some $60 billion will be spent on the system. President Clinton tried to blunt criticism by saying the US may consider sharing the missile defense technology, or by providing capability to 'civilized nations' supportive of nonproliferation. Something like this project was suggested in the 80s but failed due to political disagreements and then was called SDI the strategic defense initiative. The amount of dollars involved and the new research will be a boon to the company(ies) doing so and probably Boeing or Lockheed Martin will be the prime contractor. Should Europe have its own NMD project? Would EADS be the prime contactor?

Theatre missile defense

 

 

 

European Pillar consolidation

 

Eurofighter

Eurofighter GmbH, based in Hallbergmoos, Germany, is the consortium set up to manage the development and production of the complete Eurofighter Typhoon weapon system. It has agreed development work shares of:

  • Alenia Aerospazio - 33%
  • BAE Systems - 21%
  • EADS - 46%

Production work shares correspond to the number of aircraft ordered by each European Partner Country (EPC):

  • 232 for the UK 37%
  • 180 for Germany 30%
  • 121 for Italy 19%
  • 87 for Spain 14%

The Eurofighter project will help the top aeronautic companies compete not only with the Americans but also with other European companies such that the Typhoon may become a project that fuels and funds consolidation since other companies such as Dassault may not be able to keep up.

Dassault Aviation makes military birds of prey such as the Mirage and Rafale jet fighters. A drop in military sales has recently sent sales and profits into a downward spiral, however. Many industry analysts predict that within 15 years a single European fighter will emerge and replace Dassault's combat aircraft.

Eurofighter is the most up-to-date high-performance multi-role aircraft and at the same time the largest procurement project of the present time. Its mission spectrum comprises both air combat over very large distances and beyond visual range (BVR) and close-range combat requiring extreme agility. In addition, it can be deployed in all weather conditions and possesses short take-off and landing capabilities, supercruise, and high survivability and mission effectiveness. It is also independent of any external ground equipment. Eurofighter was extensively evaluated by the Air Forces of Germany, Italy, Spain and Great Britain along with all feasible alternatives, including the F-22 and Rafale as well as upgraded versions of the F-15, F-16, F-18, MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft. These evaluations also included comparison flights with Russian prototypes. Eurofighter regularly proved to be the most suitable aircraft in terms of performance and cost.

The basic version of the Eurofighter is a single-seater fighter aircraft with a twin-seater variant for operational instruction and training. The weapon system concept is based on a balanced interaction of high agility as a result of the aerodynamic design and the capabilities of the engine, armament and sensors. The signatures are extremely low. The mission spectrum of Eurofighter comprises: airspace surveillance, air defence and superiority, engagement of enemy air ground forces, interdict missions, air support for ground missions, antiship operations and reconnaissance. The growth potential for combat efficiency improvements will also enable the aircraft to meet the demands of the future.

 

 

Eurocopter and the NH-90

To strengthen the competitiveness of the European helicopter industry, in 1992 Dasa founded the joint venture Eurocopter S.A. together with Aerospatiale of France. Today, Eurocopter, which is headquartered in Marignane, France, is a 100% subsidiary of EADS.

Eurocopter's range of products reaches from single-engine light helicopters to medium-weight transport helicopters. All in all, the product spectrum covers 80 per cent of the market demand. Within a short time, this bi-national joint venture has become the largest manufacturer and exporter of civil helicopters in the world and gathered almost 50 percent market share in the US in 1999.

In 1999, the Tiger series production contract was signed. Germany and France have each placed orders for 80 units of this two-seater combat helicopter.

The transport and naval helicopter NH 90 is being developed by Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. It is due to enter service with the armed forces of those countries in the year 2003.

Eurocopter can offer a wider range of products than any other helicopter manufacturer, with models ranging from a single-engine light helicopter EC120 up to a medium weight transport helicopter in the ten-tonne class like the Cougar MK2, thus covering about 80 percent of the global market demands. In the military field, the focus is currently on the production investment phase of the Tiger and NH90 helicopters.

Aerospatiale and Dasa both had already had a long history in the field of development and production of helicopters and were already cooperating in the framework of the European programmes for the Tiger and NH90 military helicopters.

The transport and naval helicopter NH90 is being developed by Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The participants in this project, which is managed by NH Industries, are Eurocopter with a 66.4 percent share, Agusta (Italy) with 26.9 percent and Fokker B.V. (Netherlands) with 6.7 percent. Total requirements for the NH90 are for 595 helicopters. In June 2000, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands signed a contract for the acquisition and a Memorandum of Understanding for the series production launch of a total of 366 helicopters.

In the area of civil helicopters, the first joint product was the twin-engine light helicopter EC 135, for which a record number of more than 230 orders have been received since the first delivery in 1996. Since that year, Eurocopter has established its position on the market by offering several helicopters with extremely low noise emissions, such as the single-engine EC 120 or the EC 130 and a light transport helicopter in the five-tonne class, the EC 155. As the global Leader in the helicopter market the company is excellently positioned for further growth.

 

ATR� and Alenia from Italy

EADS is an equal partner in ATR with Alenia Aerospazio ("Alenia"), a division of Finmeccanica of Italy. ATR is a world leader in the market for regional turboprop aircraft of 40 to 70 seats. Alenia's manufacturing facilities near Naples, Italy, produce the aircraft fuselage and tail sections. Aircraft wings are assembled at EADS' facilities at Saint-Nazaire in western France, and nacelles (engine housings) are assembled at EADS' Saint-Martin Eloi site near the airport of Toulouse. EADS carries out final assembly, flight-testing, certification and deliveries at the Toulouse site. EADS outsources certain areas of responsibility to the Airbus Division, including wing design and manufacture, flight testing and information technology.

With its -500 Series of the ATR 42 and ATR 72 aircraft ATR (Avions de Transport R�gional) with headquarters in Toulouse, France, is a world leader in the market for turboprop regional aircraft for 40 up to 70 passengers. Turnover of the year 2000 amounted to 650 million euros.

More than 650 ATR aircraft have been sold all over the world. More than 100 operators fly them. Statistically spoken, every 20 seconds, an airplane of the company take off around the world.

In June 2001, the two shareholders decided a restructuring of the former joint venture. Today, ATR comprises besides development procurement as well as sales, a former tasks of the ATR consortium, also the industrial capabilities, which were attributed to the two partners EADS as well Alenia Aerospazio until then.

ATR's manufacturing facilities near Naples, Italy, produce the aircraft fuselage and tail sections. Aircraft wings are assembled at Airbus' facilities at Saint-Nazaire in western France, and nacelles (engine housings) are assembled at Saint-Martin Eloi site near the airport of Toulouse. ATR carries out final assembly, flight-testing, certification and deliveries at the Toulouse site. ATR outsources certain areas of responsibility to the Airbus Division, including wing design and manufacture, flight testing and information technology.

ATR's production system, which uses a two-stage final assembly line, is designed to maximize the company's ability to react swiftly and effectively to market changes.

ATR Programme

ATR is a world leader in the market for regional turboprop aircraft of 40 to 70 seats. The latest "- 500" generation aircraft, ATR 42-500 and ATR 72-500, benefit from major improvements in the fields of performance and passenger comfort and maintain its competitive hedge in terms of operating costs.

Fifteen years after Air Littoral put the first ATR 42-300 into service on the B�ziers-Paris-B�ziers route on December 9th 1985, the ATR fleet logged its 10 000 000th flight in October 2000.

 

What about Greece and the privatization of Hellenic Aerospace (HAI)?

The controversial strategic sale of a 49 per cent stake in Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI) is linked with a$7bn military aircraft purchase planned by the socialist government. The consortium of the companies building the Eurofighter, EADS, BAE Systems and Alenia Aerospazio is competing with a French-Greek bid led by Dassault Aviation.� The offers include a detailed five-year business plan to develop HAI's capacity for building commercial and military aircraft.

The company that wins the stake will take over management at HAI, a loss-making, state-controlled facility handling repair and maintenance work for the Greek air force and which makes parts for Airbus and Eurofighter. At a later date the investor is to be offered a majority stake in HAI.

Analysts said the Eurofighter consortium was seen as the frontrunner, partly because Greece is committed to buying at least 60 Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft, with an option for 30 more, in a deal worth a minimum of $5 billion, as part of an air force modernization program. Dassault is set to take a smaller stake in the procurement program, providing 15 new Mirage 2000s and upgrading 10 older Mirages for the Greek air force.

Alcatel

Paris-based Alcatel primarily makes telecommunications equipment for public networks, homes, and businesses. Its products include optical and wireless networking gear and underwater networking systems. The company also makes power and telecom cables. Alcatel counts itself at or near the top of many of the markets it serves. About 55% of sales are in Europe.

Following the recommendation of the French government, in 1998 Alcatel, Dassault Industries, and Aerospatiale joined forces to buy part of the state's stake in defense electronics group Thomson-CSF (now Thales). In early 2000 Alcatel swapped all but 10% of its stake in nuclear power company Framatome for an additional 10% of Thomson-CSF. This raised its stake in Thomson-CSF to 25%.

Formerly run by the French government, Paris-based Thales (pronounced TAH-less) makes advanced electronic equipment and systems for both defense and commercial customers. After reorganizing, the company operates in three business segments -- aerospace, defense, and information technologies and services. Thales produces airborne systems, avionics, air security systems, naval systems, communications, optronics, information systems, electron tubes, and space equipment.

Thales has grown through acquisitions. Chairman Denis Ranque uses a "multi-domestic" strategy of buying small defense companies in countries to establish a local presence. Alcatel SA, a French telecommunications equipment maker, owns 27% of the company, and Dassault owns about 6%.

Alcatel and Thales have developed a strong industrial and technological cooperation over the past years.  The cooperation between the two groups is covered by the June 1998 cooperation agreement, amended and extended to other areas in November 1999 when Alcatel took a large stake in Thales' capital.  The agreement covers:

technological cooperation in software, telecom technology, optronics and micro-wave
       communication;

cooperation in patents due to reciprocal agreement giving free access to patents held
       by both groups;

diversified cooperation in purchasing, insurance, facility management, property and
       venture capital.

Through the implementation of common projects, taking advantage of the civil-military complementarity of their respective businesses, the two groups aim at maximizing the synergies in the fields of electronics and software to face international competition, significantly reduce costs and strengthen their profitable growth.

The cooperation allows for both groups to reinforce their positions and market shares in key growth technologies or sectors and to achieve together top-ranking positions, providing each other mutual commercial support in export markets while continuing to pursue a policy of European and international alliances in the professional and defence electronics sectors.

Military affairs are at a turning point with electronics and systems playing a more crucial role than ever. With its multi-domestic operations, and its capacity to develop complex systems and manage them as prime contractor, Thales has an outstanding position in the defence market. Thales, present on all types of air, sea and ground military platforms, is one of the few companies to have recorded several successive years of revenue growth in the challenging new defence context.

The company's military businesses range from the design and production of detection systems, identification systems and air command and control systems to very short-, short- and medium-range air defence systems to defend high-value assets and protect forces on the battlefield. The company is also involved in armaments and propulsion.

The air defence market includes air command and control systems and battlefield air defence systems. These systems rely on surveillance radars, operations and command centres, and weapons systems to provide protection from airborne threats. They trigger defensive action and prepare for offensive missions, communicating with airborne sensors, surface-to-air missiles, air bases and land forces.

This market is growing partly because of the need to update NATO.s infrastructure to ensure allied interoperability at continental level and for force projection operations, and partly because of the emergence of new threats including tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Transatlantic dimension:

Thales Raytheon Systems (TRS), the first-ever transatlantic structural partnership in the defense sector, was set up on 1 June 2001. The company advances transatlantic cooperation and system interoperability in the fields of air command and control and air surveillance. Through TRS, which has facilities in France and the United States, the partners have access to markets on both sides of the Atlantic and can serve export markets more effectively.

The alliance is a logical extension of recent partnerships between Thales and Raytheon on major programs: the Florako contract for Swiss airspace surveillance won jointly in 1998, and the 1999 contract to supply NATO with the first phase (LOC1) of the ACCS (Air Command & Control System).

The company also covers battlefield defence. Thales is contributing to France's SCCOA (Air Command & Control System) programme and new programmes including Rapsodie, the French Army's future land-based surveillance radar, as well as the Cobra programme being conducted by the Euroart consortium.

The MAKO project and EADS as Prime Contractor

In the coming 25 years, there will probably be demand for approximately 2,500 light combat aircraft/high-performance trainers, because at the present time the extension of the service life of existing types has reached its limit. The Mako, a new Generation Light Combat Aircraft, is a lightweight military and training aircraft of the fourth generation with a modular design concept. The maiden flight of the Mako could then take place with effect from the beginning of the year 2005 and series production could start by 2007.

Ariane consortium:

EADS is active in the field of launchers and launch services through its shareholdings in Arianespace for heavy-lift launchers, Starsem for medium-lift launchers and Eurockot for small-lift launchers. The EADS has a 25.9 percent stake in Arianespace S.A., with over 50 other European companies and institutions also participating.

Today, Ariane has an almost 60 percent market share of satellite launches. The commercial exploitation of Ariane 5, the successor model to the successful Ariane 4 was done by EADS, the industrial prime contractor for this program, with responsibility for the cryogenic main stage, the solid fuel booster and the structures and strutting for the helium tank of Ariane 5. Furthermore EADS is the systems leader for the upper stage of this European heavy launcher. EADS also supplies launcher equipment to non-European customers, particularly in the U.S.

 

A Second EADS?

The Dassault/Thales/Alcatel axis could conceivably form the nucleus of a "second EADS".� There seems to be room for another prime contractor, a second European multinational company. Additionally the BAE/SAAB connection and others could form another nucleus - or combine with the first. There is no guarantee that EADS will have a monopoly position in a Euro market.

BAE signed a joint venture agreement with France's Dassault Aviation to co-operate on a next generation of combat aircraft to replace the Tornado bomber and strike versions of the Mirage 2000. The Future Offensive Air System (FOAS), as it is known in the UK, is needed in service around 2020.

 

Following the money: Banks in the Ariane consortium -

Eleven banks are part of the Ariane group and access to these funds may allow additional financing for industry consolidation. If most of the participants in this group decided to go the route of Airbus and decide to combine operations, then the Industrial portion of the Complex would be as big or bigger than Boeing. However if there were two EADS style companies the competition between them might be played out inside Ariane.

 

Collective Security Organization / Commonwealth of Independent States

With agreements signed to form a team based around Sukhoi, Russian resolve is not in doubt, but with scant domestic purchases on the horizon, those aspirations will depend heavily on exports to fund the work.

Currently, Russia is exporting aircraft to a number of countries such as the Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 (NATO reporting names: 'Flanker') to China and India.

Russia's armed forces before 2015, according to governmental predictions, will buy only 7-10% of Russia's aircraft industry's output, Russian airlines are expected to buy another 13-15%, leaving 75-80% for export. Any slump in exports could mean the collapse of the Russian aircraft industry, officials said. Adding to that, they said, Russia will be squeezed from the market forever unless it offers a new fighter to foreign customers by the 2010-15 timeframe.

Several new aircraft will be available around this time, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF is seen as the most important rival, especially if the US Department of Defense speeds JSF development as now seems likely rather than cancelling it as many speculated would happen. The planned Russian fifth-generation fighter is to be called the PAK FA after the Russian Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsyi, or Future Air Complex for Tactical Air Forces.
������������������� It is intended to be the same size as the US JSF but have a mission profile closer to the F-22 Raptor, with air superiority being the primary mission and ground attack and reconnaissance being

secondary. Also similar to the JSF, the cost is expected to be about $30 million each. Even the deadlines assumed by the Russians are directly related to the date of entering JSF into the market.

In May, Yuriy Koptiev, general director of Rosaviakosmos state agency said that the prototype of the PAK FA would take-off in 2006 and that in 2010 the aircraft would be ready for series production.

The first deliveries, both for Russian armed forces and for export, would be possible in 2011-12. The trick, however, will be finding the money to develop the fighter. The first source of funds, small and uncertain, is the Russia's Ministry of Defense budget. The second source, several times larger, is the export revenues of the companies participating in the program. The third possible source is financing from other countries interested in buying the aircraft.

The �ROSOBORONEXPORT� Federal State Unitary Enterprise

is the major specialised agency responsible for Russian arms export. With nearly half-a-century expertise inherited from its predecessors � �Rosvoorouzhenie� and �Promexport� companies -- it is also the most experienced Russian state-run company engaged in international military sales.

"IZHMASH" Open Joint-Stock Company

Accumulated for about two centuries experience, traditions and above all gifted creators of the weapon, enormous engineering potential make it possible to produce high-quality weapons and afford to take the adequate place in the world market.

"Motovilikha Plants" Corporation

Up to the recent times the "Motovilikha" produced mainly the newest kinds of armament. During the last few years the company began to produce various kinds of the up-to-date gunnery such as the 152-mm system "Giatsint", the 240-mm self-propelled mortar "Tyulpan", a family of the 120-mm towed and self-propelled guns "Nona", and also the salvo fire missile systems "Uragan" and "Smerch".

State Enterprise "Izhevsky Mehanichesky Zavod"

is an enterprise with high level of technologies having sufficient experimental base, computer center, automatized system of production management, up-to-date equipment including automatic lines, mechanicalprocessing complex, complex and mechanized bays and shops with highly productive and highly precise equipment. Electronic and machine-building are the main sphere of Works activity.

Votkinsky Zavod

is a large, equipped with up-to-date machinery enterprise with immense production potential. It produces machining centers, high-precision milling machines, packing machines, pasteurizing and cooling plants, centrifugal pumps, motor-car radiators and heaters, thyristor and transformer units for oil-rigs, washing machines, perambulators, gas stoves, micro-wave ovens and other items.

Ulyanovsk Machinery Plant

started to manufacture small arms ammunition in 1917 and since then it has remained one of the leading Russian enterprises which manufacture sporting and hunting cartridges for the rifles of different caliber. Today SUE "PA "Ulyanovsk Machinery Plant" is a multiprofile enreprise that manufactures spark plug, load-lifting equipment, contactless starters and consumer goods.

JSC "Tulsky Oruzheiny Zavod"

For the space of a long time of its history the activity of the Tulsky Oruzheiny Zavod was, is and will be of much benefit to Russia.

"VYMPEL" State Production Association

is an acknowledged leading manufacturer in Russia of 5.45 mm, 7.62 mm and 9 mm cartridges for small arms. The Vympel-produced cartridges fully comply with most exacting requirements imposed upon ammunition by modern small arms development standards, production is based on unique and highly efficient technologies.

Vyatskie Polyany Machine Building Plant "MOLOT", JSC

is one of the biggest Russian exporters of civil firearms. The Plant has all the modern technologies and complete cycle of production. Every single gun of MOLOT Plant is manufactured with special care from beginning to the end.

The OJ-SC "Tula Cartridge Works"

is one of the largest suppliers of ammunition both to the Russian and international markets. The volume of supplies and the number purchasers in CIS-countries, Europe, U.S.A., Asia and Africa is growing from year to year.

JSC "Barnaul Machine-Tool Plant"

is one of the leading producers of industrial goods and ammunition in Russia. The company has a source of long long-term and stable contacts with large suppliers of raw materials. They also process an increasing direct relationship with Russian and foreign firms. Unique technology and great scientific potential permits the development of new types of products and extends their range.

 

RUBIN

The design of the first combat submarine of the Russian Navy was developed in 1901. She was commissioned under the name of "Delfin". The majority of Russian submarines which participated in World War I and World War II were built to the designs of CDB ME "Rubin". Now CDB ME "Rubin" is a diversified company which is not only holding the leading position in marine engineering but is successfully mastering a number of conversion activities.

Central Research Institute of Structural Materials "PROMETEY"

As а result of а complex of basic and applied research we сrеated а series of unique high-strength and cold-resistant steels, durable light corrosion-resistant titanium and aluminum alloys, polymer composite and many other materials. Currently, hundreds of grades of shipbuilding materials, which have different composition, physical nature and technical properties, are being used.

Zvyozdochka

Enterprise "Zvyozdochka" is a large shipbuilding and shiprepairing plant in the North-West Region of Russia. "Zvyozdochka" modern slips, flooding docks, ship transporting cars, quays, shops with up-date machines, and skilled personnel on hand. The enterprise is engaged with shipbuilding, shiprepair, machine building and with construction of oil and gas Drilling Rigs.

"ALMAZ" Shipbuilding Company

specializes in patrol and attack craft construction since 1914. With the present day requirements to control a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone in addition to coastal surveillance the yard builds patrol boats of new generation Svetlyak class. Successful operation of these boats and other ones of previous generations by Marine Forces of the Federal Boundary Service as well as by a number of foreign coast guards - is the best approval of the yard as high-qualified specialist in special craft building.

Joint Stock Company "Kalugaturbine Works"

is one of the domestic largest manufacturer�s of power generation equipment � steam turbines to drive electric generators, driving turbines, package-type turbo generators, geothermal turbines.

The Central Research Institute of Ship Electrotechnics and Technology

or "SET Research Institute" for its external trade activities, is a specialized scientific and production centre which is involved in design experimental developments requiring deep scientific research in a full scheme, i.e., ending up with brand new products.

Central Research Institute of Shipbuilding Technology ("CRIST")

is the only scientific centre in Russia in the field of integrated development of advanced shipbuilding technologies, methods and ways of construction and testing of warships and merchant ships of various types and classes.

"TAYPHOON" Joint Stock Company Of Open Time

is a modern, well-equipped industrial enterprise, situated in the central part of Russia. It is specialized in production of a complex navigation and radio engineering equipment.

 

 

Russian industry hunts out a future for itself

It is more than 10 years since the end of the Cold War during which the Russian Defense industry's reason for existence was as much as a political instrument against NATO and other Western forces as military and economic.

The former Soviet Union and the USA both used arms transfers and military assistance as a tool of foreign policy during the Cold War. For Moscow, according to a former director of the state-owned trading company, this meant that its 1990 Defense exports of $16 billion generated just $900 million in cash.

For army inventories, the company offers battle tanks that in a number of parameters have no rivals worldwide. Rosvoorouzhenie also offers combat-proven infantry fighting vehicles, armoured personnel carriers with unsurpassed fire-power, multiple-launch rocket systems equal in their efficiency to smart weapons, and many other types of weapon system that are equal to or superior to armaments of foreign rivals.

On the aircraft front, the company offers Russian-made multi-functional combat aircraft considered by many experts as the world�s best in their class. In the near future they promise to become the most sought-after aircraft in the world with export sales already totalling billions of dollars. In the air Defense systems� sector, the corporation is marketing air Defense assets that cover the full spectrum from low-altitude, short-range systems, medium-range air-Defense systems with an anti-precision weapon capability, through to long-range systems capable of detecting, engaging and destroying targets at large distances from protected sites. The company is offering complex solutions in the air-Defense sector, allowing integration of Russian-made systems into the existing air-Defense environment using foreign-made assets to set up multi-layered and highly efficient Defenses against all means of air attack.

The development of new systems requires funding that current economic conditions dictate must largely come from export-derived income. However, rather than buying military hardware in recent years, Moscow has focused on developing a new generation of advanced equipment that some say is a decade from deployment.

China and India have most consistently dominated the list of Russia's Defense-related markets in recent years. Together with Iran and Syria, they also promise the greatest potential for further growth. A lower rung of nations that have contributed to this post-Cold War export drive includes Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, North Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.

Following a Russian government resolution, Nikolai Nikitin was appointed designer and director general of the VPK MAPO Company and the MAPO MIG series production plant. On 3 February, the new chief was presented to the staff by Russia's first deputy prime minister Yury Maslyukov.

Before the appointment, Nikitin was deputy director general of the AVPK Sukhoi Aircraft- Building Military-Industrial Complex. He started work at Sukhoi after graduating from the Moscow Aviation Institute. Nikitin was technical supervisor of the flight tests of the Su-27 fighter and has been a Sukhoi board member since 1997. Sukhoi officials said Nikitin is one of the most gifted men in the industry and an " A-grade professional" and a skilful manager.

MAPO was formed in January 1996, comprising 20 leading military and civil aircraft-building plants. Today, it is a leading concern in Russia with unique experience and technologies. MAPO designs, produces and promotes advanced aviation systems and armaments and also offers maintenance, repair and modernization services. MAPO headquarters is located in Moscow, and the overall workforce of the company's plants exceeds 60,000 employees.

The MiG MAPO company is the leading aircraft-building plant in Moscow and an affiliate of MAPO. By merging the two rival manufacturers of the country's leading fighters, the Russian government expects to improve the country's position on the international fighter market by allowing joint modernization of the third-generation fighters of the two companies and removing competition between them on the foreign market.

The Sukhoi fighters are generally considered to be more competitive than the MiGs. However, VPK MAPO is believed to have had better connections in the previous Russian government, which tried to lobby the company's interests in the international fighter market.

In the words of Maslyukov, a process has been initiated to restructure Russia's aerospace complex. This is aimed at setting up three to four major corporations specialising in the final assembly of aircraft; two to three major corporations focusing on the production of various types of aircraft engines; and about 20 to 30 corporations specialising in technological development.

According to Maslyukov, the Kamov company is likely to form an independent helicopter-building corporation, specifically capable of competing with the US Sikorsky company. Other enterprises engaged in the development of weapons, control and avionics systems, presently part of VPK MAPO, are also due to merge with major corporations.

The task of these structures is to carry out the full cycle of development and production of competitive types of aircraft weapons and military hardware. VPK MAPO's new structural concept is expected to take two months to work out. During this time, the complex's work will be analyzed to identify top priority projects.

In the next 10 to 15 years, Russia's aircraft-building industry will enjoy hardly any support from the state.� Therefore, the industry will depend on its export potential (including that of VPK MAPO). Under current conditions, Russia's aircraft-building industry can survive only on the basis of its export potential.

It remains to be seen whether any German or other European company will be encouraged to take a stake in the new company. The concern will be the cornerstone of a new Russian defense industry and an opportunity for the privatization of Russian assets.

Three Reorganizations equals One Coup

There is an almost perennial ritual of aerospace industry reorganization by the Russian government. The administration of President Vladimir Putin has either carried out or proposed three or more major organizational initiatives: one to reshape the manner in which Russian aerospace products are sold for export; another to restructure the industrial base; and a third to change how the industry is to be administered by the state�all of this in hopes of preserving the industry financially and retaining a core cadre of specialists and technical competence.

There is almost no disagreement in Russia regarding the need to improve the industry�s market position and financial well-being, but there is plenty of skepticism and criticism to go around as to whether the government�s efforts in this area, including these latest organizational rescramblings, do more harm than good. There are those in Moscow and elsewhere who would argue that in the last 10 years all of the government�s recovery plans, reorganization schemes, decrees, special commissions and other measures designed to promote Russia�s aerospace sector have had almost no affect on stemming the industry�s decline.

On the contrary, the measures are seen by some as having accomplished little more than exacerbating the two severe deficiencies that are responsible for that very decline: a lack of a steady flow of orders and/or funding from the state, and an unstable, uncertain administrative climate that leaves many wondering who they will be working for or responsible to in the future, or even which ministry will control their industry.

For almost 10 years now the strategy for the long-term survival of Russia�s aerospace and defense industrial base has had some basic characteristics. The first priority has been to try to stay alive with the income from export sales, while orienting development of new model iterations toward the export market.

Second, Russian design bureaus have continued development of new technologies and, where possible, applied them to the design of existing aircraft systems to validate their use and effectiveness with an eye toward eventually incorporating them into a next-generation aircraft system.

Third, plans for a new fleet of fighters, bombers, airliners, and so forth have been postponed until the economic situation in Russia stabilizes and permits some nominal level of regular procurement. In the meantime, the Russian armed forces and its fleets of aging passenger aircraft are forced to limp by with what they have, using modernization and life-extension programs.

A new round of efforts to support this strategy and reshape Russia�s place in the aerospace market began almost as soon as President Putin took office last year. One of his first objectives was to correct what had been perceived as a period of neglect and mismanagement of the aerospace sector under his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Above all other shortcomings, exports of defense and aerospace products�which are the only hope for Russia�s survival as a major industrial power�had been the subject of endless complaints of corruption, nepotism and charges that the money generated by these sales was not being put back into the industry to fund its revival.

Putin struck not soon after his inauguration in the spring of 2000 with the first of three organizational initiatives by addressing the problems associated with defense exports.

One of Russia�s three state arms export agencies, Rossiskie Technologii, was liquidated and folded into the second largest of the three, Promexport. A few months later, in November 2000, Putin removed the directors of the two remaining arms export agencies�Aleksei Ogarkov of Rosvooruzheniye and Sergei Chemezov of Promexport�and in the same executive act ordered the two agencies be merged into a new one, called Rosoboronexport.

Andrei Belyaninov, former deputy director of Promexport, was named director of the new company and almost immediately announced plans to clean house by furloughing approximately 1,000 of the 2,500 employees he had inherited. A number of departments and deputy directorships that existed at Rosvooruzheniye were also eliminated.

However, positive results of this first rather dramatic change have yet to be proven. When the formation of the new company originally took place, analysts both inside and outside of Russia predicted this move could have only negative aftereffects on the country�s prospects to earn badly needed hard currency from weapons sales. Contracts with several export customers that were still in negotiation at the time were put on hold and have not yet been finalized. ����������

While this reshuffling was taking place, Russia�s ministers were also awash in plans for the second initiative�a plan to consolidate the aerospace industrial base and create economies of scale. Their objective was to create equivalents to the mammoth consortiums of Lockheed Martin, Boeing and BAE Systems in the West, although the original proposal that was floated in the last months of the Yeltsin government was to combine like firms into single organizations.

The most famous of these was the proposed government-ordered merger between the Mikoyan and Sukhoi design bureaus, which are the primary fighter aircraft producers. Similar plans were made regarding the amalgamation of Tupolev and Ilyushin, the two largest commercial aircraft firms; a combination of Almaz and Antei, which produce almost all Russia�s surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems; and so on throughout the industrial complex.

Not surprisingly, these proposals were greeted with little enthusiasm within the industry and resisted at all levels. A number of the firms whose mergers were proposed were long-time bitter enemies, but more importantly, what drove their innovative designs and what was their most valuable asset was the competition between them�an asset which would be eradicated by the mergers.

A retreat has now been made from this proposal and a scenario for a new set of combinations has been put forward in the last month by deputy prime minister Ilya Klebanov, who holds the portfolio of control over the defense industry. Under his plan, the majority of Russian aerospace firms would be joined into two large holding companies�each one called a samoletno-vertoletostroitelniy kompleks (aircraft-helicopter manufacturing complex, or SVSK).

SVSK-1 would be composed of RSK-MiG (the union of the former Mikoyan Design Bureau and the MiG-29 MAPO plant in Moscow), the Sokol Aircraft Production Plant in Nizhni-Novgorod, Kamov helicopter design bureau, Tupolev and all of the series production plants associated with their product lines. SVSK-2 would be composed of Sukhoi, Ilyushin, Mil, the Kazan helicopter enterprise and Yakovlev�again, along with all of their associated series production plants.

This plan avoids the confrontation between a fighter design bureau that does not want to cohabit with another fighter design bureau or helicopter firms that do not want to join with their major competitors. However, it does not get away from the fact that the production centers involved in these new unions have little or no interest in becoming part of a giant conglomerate controlled from Moscow. The attitude of the series manufacturing plants is that they turn out the products that actually make money, and they are not anxious to have authorities in Moscow take a huge bite out of their proceeds.

Sources in Moscow predict fairly stiff resistance to this plan from organizations such as the Irkutsk Aviation Production Association (IAPO), which manufactures the Su-30MKI fighter for the Indian air force. IAPO, explained one Moscow-based analyst, �was very aggressive some years ago in carrying out an extensive privatization, with the government now holding only about 15 percent of the shares. Having found some independence from Moscow they will have little interest in surrendering it now.�

What may weaken the Russian government�s hand in forcing this plan onto all of these enterprises is the now-anticipated third act in this reorganization drama. The present government structure that has control of the aerospace and defense industries in Russia spread across five state agencies is projected to be dissolved soon.

Russian financial newspaper Vedomosti and other Moscow press sources reported earlier this year that the agencies� functions will be consolidated into the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology with Klebanov or one of his subordinates taking over this ministry and displacing the current minister, former Yakovlev general designer Aleksandr Dondukov. The latter has been in a bureaucratic struggle with Klebanov to take control over the defense and aerospace sector since he was named the head of this new ministry last year, but if the proposed scheme is initiated, he will have lost the battle and will probably no longer have a government position.

At no time in the last 10 years has been�as there is now�such a far-reaching and ambitious attempt to restructure so many entities to such a degree in almost concurrent time frames. This makes a number of Russia�s aerospace officials look to the future with no small degree of fear and apprehension.

At the present time the 'Sukhoi' military-industrial complex controls 14-15% of the global combat aviation market, according to the Sukhoi's General Director Mikhail Pogosyan. This share, Pogosyan noted, is expected to increase to 20% in the very near future with the annual operating budget of the company already at $1 billion. The budget is expected to grow twofold.

Export of the 'Sukhoi' combat planes currently comprises about 50% of all Russian military equipment exports. However, Pogosyan said, sooner or later these mergers will become a reality. He also expressed his believe that Russian industry will follow the road to integration.

Currently, the 'Sukhoi' is working with 'MiG' and 'Yakovlev' design bureaux on the fifth-generation fighter project in which Sukhoi is the primary contractor. In addition to that 'Sukhoi' is working on a regional airliner development with the 'Ilyushin' and 'Boeing' firms. The airliner is being developed in line with the international standards and its target market will include Russian and foreign regional airlines. Pogosyan firmly believes that the success will accompany only those projects that will manage to attract additional funding from outside of Russia's federal budget. The approach of 'Sukhoi' to doing business is concentrated on the task of diversifying the sources of funding and looking primarily toward the commercial, non-governmental sources of money. Pogosyan also believes that other Russian military hardware manufacturers have to invest more in the development of perspective aircraft using the funding available from the country's defense budget.

The combat aircraft modernization program currently underway is in no way interfering with the progress of the fifth-generation fighter program. "We are looking for balanced solutions and the work on the new fighter program does not undermine the modernization efforts." Pogosyan said that the next-generation fighter is being developed in accordance with the timetable set by the government. The major task in the development of this fighter, Pogosyan believes, is the marriage of avionics and weapon systems with the airframe. In the October of 2001 Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed an executive order establishing the aviation holding company 'Sukhoi'. According to this document, the 'Sukhoi' will have the priority in development of future combat aviation systems for the Russian Ministry of Defense. As a part of this process the Russian government will work to transform the KNAAPO and NAPO aircraft manufacturing plants into open-stock organization with the various federal structures holding 100% of its stocks. During this transformation period 74.5% of the stocks will form the minimum budget of the 'Sukhoi' and 25.5% of the stocks will remain a permanent property of the federal government. Once the organizational structure of the company is reformed, all 100% of the stocks will become the government's permanent property.� Pogosyan also noted that all Russian strike aircraft and 50% of the country's fighters carry 'Sukhoi's' trademark.

Russia's fifth-generation fighter will have dramatically improved aerodynamic qualities. It design would allow for the 35-degree angle of attack without possibility of a stall. According to Pogosyan, that flying over Mach 2 or Mach 3 is not the priority for the new fighter design - the high speed is the domain of the missiles the aircraft will be carrying.

Many existing problems in the development of the new fighter will be solved using new construction materials and new manufacturing technologies. At the same time Pogosyan did not elaborate on whether or not the new fighter will have a forward-swept wing as the Su-47. According to Pogosyan, the fighter will be delivered to the Armed Forces "according to the timetable agreed upon with the Russian Ministry of Defense." Pogosyan emphasized that today 'Sukhoi' has the resources and capabilities the company did not have just a few years ago.

The country's hundreds of aviation companies will be consolidated into a half dozen holding companies by 2004 in a bid to transform the stagnant industry into a mean and lean competitor to U.S. and European rivals, the government announced.
The plan puts a new spin on a years-long industry restructuring by proposing to clump civil and military aircraft makers together.

By setting a three-year deadline, the government showed the urgency with which it feels a revamp is needed. Its 2004 deadline is well ahead of the 2010 deadline that the Russian Aviation and Space Agency and the Industry, Science and Technology Ministry suggested when proposing the revamp to the government.

Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov told reporters after the government meeting that Russia has to consolidate its hundreds of aviation companies into a handful of aviation powerhouses that can compete with the likes of Boeing and Lockheed Martin of the United States, and the maker of the Airbus, the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co.
"There's only three of them in the world, and there are 316 in Russia," Klebanov said.

This number will be whittled down to six to seven holding companies, of which one or two will make aircraft. Only three civil aviation plants will remain, factories in Voronezh, Ulyanovsk and Kazan that produce Ilyushin and Tupolev planes. The civil aviation plants, in turn, are to be saddled with the country's two military giants, the producers of Sukhoi and MiG fighter jets and helicopters.

Under the plan, one holding company will combine 10 enterprises including the Tupolev aviation complex, MiG Russian Aircraft Corp., helicopter designer Kamov, Aviastar in Ulyanovsk, Aviakor in Samara and Progress in Primorye. A second holding will unite 15 companies including MiG rival Sukhoi, the Yakovlev design bureau, the Ilyushin aviation complex, and the Mil, Rosvertol, Kazan and Ulan-Ude helicopter plants. A third will bring together the country's 33 engine producers.
Klebanov said the government also wants to set up 10 to 13 more holdings to lump together other aviation companies such as those dealing in weapons and avionics.

The deputy prime minister did not rule out an eventual merger between the makers of the Su and MiG jets, a proposal that has been floated by the government in the past and fiercely opposed by both military giants.

A federal audit last year found that the government maintained a controlling stake in only seven companies, while it had completely lost control of 94.� The government said Friday that at least a third of the aviation companies is state-owned, while another third is partly state-owned. The state has no stakes in the rest.� The government is working to increase its ownership in the companies by writing off their debts.� The Russian Aviation and Space Agency estimates that endeavor will cost the government 222 billion rubles ($7.7 billion), of which 14 percent will come from the federal budget.

Some industry players welcomed the government's bid to prop up their sagging profits. The industry, which accounted for up to a quarter of global production in Soviet times, only managed to roll out nine civil aircraft and 21 military planes in 1999, according to the Audit Chamber. All 21 military planes were sold abroad. By comparison, the Soviet Union built about 450 civil and 1,000 military aircraft during its glory days, the chamber said.

The aviation industry produced 73.8 billion rubles worth of goods last year, while profits reached 17.1 billion rubles, according to government figures. Output grew 41.4 percent.� Orders from the state account for 10 percent to 15 percent of production capacity these days.

And that is exactly what has been happening in some aviation companies. As they scramble to survive, some have been revamping operations, diversifying products and seeking partnerships with other players.� Fighter producer MiG, for example, has completed a restructuring that brought design, production, rollout and servicing under one roof. Sukhoi is carrying out a similar revamp. Both companies have for several years been pushing civil aviation programs with modest success.

Perm Motors, producer of the PS-90 engines that power Ilyushin and Tupolev passenger jets, is building up a holding, and Lulka-Saturn, designer of engines for Su-27 fighter jets, and producer Rybinsk Motors are aiming for a merger.

 


 

Co-operation

Why Is the U.S. Aiding Russia's High-Tech Military Industry?

Russia's high-tech military industry is the backbone of a planned large-scale modernization program that Defense Minister Pavel Grachev says will compensate for troop reductions and compete with American firms on the international arms market.

The CIA and DIA report that Russia is readying to test-launch a new generation silo-based ICBM, a mobile ICBM, and SLBM, and is developing a new ballistic-missile submarine to go on-line within the next decade.

The U.S. government, in trying to help Russian "reform," has been promoting and subsidizing the transfer of American technology and capital to many of Russia's most advanced military design bureaus and plants. Rather than abandoning military production for consumer products, these plants form the core of Russia's conventional and nuclear military modernization. To remain predominant in the military-industrial complex, they need Western technology and investment.

�         The Administration, with bipartisan congressional support, has been providing just that. The Bureau of Export Administration of the Department of Commerce, the Defense Enterprise Fund, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and other government programs and entities are promoting Russian firms that are not abandoning military production, but have merely opened civilian production lines to attract American support.

Points to consider
Is Congress serving the nation by helping an increasingly hostile and unstable Russia to modernize its decaying war machine? Current policy is inadvertently exacerbating the following problems:

�         Strengthening the un-reformed military-industrial complex with the means to expand its political base in Russia;

�         Proliferation of high-tech weapons to rogue regimes;

�         Threats of a revitalized, high-tech military against Russia's neighbors;

�         New threats to the United States, particularly through proliferation and strategic nuclear modernization.

 

Will Russia Have Fifth Generation Fighter?

The technical condition of the Russian armed forces is far from ideal. It must be said that the domestic defense industry is not producing new examples of military equipment. But they either go immediately for export, or they reach the Russian army in single examples. So, with each passing year, Russia`s armed forces grow more and more inferior in equipment to the modern examples of materiel of the armies of the NATO countries. One side of the problem is the circumstance that the question of the financial resources for the development of new examples of military equipment is extremely keen. For example, of fifth generation fighters. It previously had been planned that the new fighter would appear in the Russian military by 2008 - 2009. Up to 1.5 billion dollars is needed for development. At the same time, for example, in the United States there is active work under way on a similar project under the designation of the F-35. Only it is planned to spend up to 23 billion dollars on the development of the new fighter. And another nearly 200 billion on starting the production and the purchase of 3,000 F-35. So it is possible to maintain with confidence that in a very few years the U.S. Air Force will receive the new fighter. In Russia a fundamental battle for the development of the fifth generation airplane has developed between the MiG and Sukhoy OKB firms. In which connection, the Russian media has reported more than once about the fact that Sukhoy OKB interests are lobbying former Vice Premier and now leader of the Ministry of Industry and Science, Ilya Klebanov. Accordingly, experts have been evaluating Sukhoy`s chances as preferred. However, after the dismissal of Klebanov from the post of vice premier, the Sukhoy OKB`s chances for victory have declined considerably. And according to the report of a number of information agencies, for the years immediately ahead, Russia generally may abandon plans for the creation of a fifth generation fighter. She will gamble on, most likely, deep upgrade of the airplanes serving in the inventory of the Russian military until the fifth generation. Which, of course, is much cheaper and faster, than the creation of a fundamentally new airplane. In principle, there is nothing bad in the fact that the interests of the various lobbying groups are in conflict around the development of new types of armament. As is done everywhere, even Russia in this situation is no exception. But it is another thing that the struggle around the orders for the development and manufacture of military equipment not be carried out to the detriment of the interests of the state. The best should win, independent of how high a post the patrons of one firm or another occupy in the state structures. Although, of course, much depends on the officials both in Russia and in the U.S., and in other countries. And their choice isn`t always justified. Nevertheless, in speaking about the advantages of MiG or Sukhoy airplanes, the specialists should speak. But it is interesting that even around the contracts for the construction of already existing examples of equipment sometimes, serious passions flare up. As, for example, around the the building of two torpedo boats for China. At the present time, the situation for the domestic defense industry is also rather complex. American firms have fixed on India, a traditional partner of the Russian enterprises of the defense industrial complex. Who has significantly greater possibilities for standing up for their interests than the Russians. So the struggle around the distribution of export order may bear a serious loss to the business reputation of the Russian companies. The problems of the Russian military industrial complex and the questions of the upgrade of the military are very serious and do not give in to quick resolution. But it even would be good that the don`t forget about them in the government. The existing programs for the reformation of the military and military industrial complex fully respond to Russia`s capabilities. The main thing is to gain their execution. Otherwise, in several years there will be nothing to upgrade and reform

In 1998, the first real steps were taken in the development of military co-operation between Russia and NATO. Representatives of the state-owned company Rosvoorouzhenie, the Russian ministry of Defense and the Russian foreign office participated in working parties for national armaments directors at the NATO conference. A series of possible joint projects was specified: modernisation of T-72 tanks to NATO standards in central and eastern European countries; building stability and fire safety into the design of military vessels; creating systems for rescuing submarine crews; organising a unified air defense system for the European continent and an aerospace monitoring and air traffic control system.

Suggested co-operative projects include the modernisation of projectiles for the Grad salvo rockets, the development of an active armour protection system for Arena type tanks for application to French AMX-30B tanks; the mounting of French thermal imagers on the Russian BMP-3, and equipping the RS30 Smerch with French navigational equipment.

Setting up the Arena system on a French AMX-30B tank significantly increases the stability of the vehicle and, therefore, its competitiveness, by comparison, for example, with the Russian T-80U tank.

Since 1992 the Ministry of Defense has not bought a single plane from RAC MiG.

This could well be the revamped MiG-29SMT, raising a familiar classic to a performance level to rival the next generation of fighter aircraft and at the same time extending the effective life of the plane by 10-15 years. At this point, military hot heads start to enthuse about the unlimited market for MiG-29 upgrades, forgetting that an upgrade programme, though a costly exercise, is around ten times cheaper than buying a brand new aircraft.

 

GE Aircraft Engines

 

GE Aircraft Engines and the Sukhoi Design Bureau, of Russia, have signed a contract for GE CT7-9B turboprop engines to power the Sukhoi S-80 multipurpose STOL (short takeoff and landing) aircraft.

Two instrumented CT7-9B engines for flight testing will be delivered to Sukhoi by early 1996. Production of the GE-powered Russian S-80 transport aircraft is planned for 1997. Sukhoi estimates that as many as 650 S-80s could be sold by the year 2006.

Originally designed for the Russian domestic market, the new Sukhoi S-80 is characterized by rugged two-beam construction. The S-80 can be configured either as a 26-passenger airline or as a 6,800-pound cargo aircraft, capable of transporting Jeep-type vehicles or standard aviation containers,

CT7 engines have powered Saab 340 aircraft in commercial service since 1984 and Airtech (CASA/IPTN) CN235 aircraft since 1987. The engine has also been selected to power the Let L610G aircraft, which is undergoing flight testing in the Czech Republic.

The MIG-29, Russia and Eastern Europeans

With the end of the Soviet Union and the abandonment of weapons in former East European nations, the East Europe area provides a chunk of the market and source of technological secrets. Logistic support for 23 ex-East German aircraft now in the inventory of the German Air Force in the framework of a joint venture with Russia, "westernization" contracts plus proposals for other MiG-29 operators (e.g., Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania) means that EADS actually inherits lots of client nations and makes deals with industrial corporations in the eastern part of Europe. These include Aerostar, Romania; Danubian Aircraft Company, Hungary; MAPO, Russia; Roswoorushenije, Russia; and Terem, Bulgaria.

German-Russian joint venture company MiG Aircraft Product Support (MAPS) has concluded agreements with both Bulgaria and Romania to service and partly upgrade their MiG-29 fighter aircraft fleets, providing the company with a regional dominance in the market.

The joint venture is 50% held by Germany's DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (Dasa) [now EADS] with the remainder held by Russia's MIG-MAPO and arms export agency Rosvoorouzhenie. The work excludes modifications to the MiG-29's RD-33 engines.

The involvement of EADS in the maintenance and eventual upgrade of MiG-29 aircraft came as a result of German unification when the Luftwaffe inherited 24 MiG-29s.

The need to "westernize" these aircraft to NATO standard provided the impetus to consider the market potential in Central and Eastern Europe.

It seems that the original reluctance by many MiG-user countries, after the fall of the Berlin Wall a decade ago, to continue operating Soviet-era equipment and purchase Western equipment instead has been replaced by a more realistic assessment that existing equipment will have to be used for some time to come and that the introduction of Western equipment will be gradual.

Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) were concluded with Bulgaria last October and with Romania the following month, with MAPS also seeing potential for further agreements with Hungary and Slovakia, which operate around 50 MiG-29s. The organization has already entered into partnership with Hungary's Danubius Aircraft company.

Initial modifications for Romania and Bulgaria will focus on bringing the aircraft up to minimal NATO standards, including an identification friend or foe transponder; VHF/UHF and emergency communications equipment; the introduction of English language equipment; and collision- warning lights. A further three levels of upgrade can be carried out including new central data processing unit, radar, weapon systems and electronic countermeasures.

MAPS's Bulgarian agreement, which includes involvement from local partners, covers a level-two fleet maintenance program to extend by 1,100h or nine years the air force's 21-strong MiG-29 fleet.

The Romanian MoU covers two projects. MAPS will carry out a life-extension program on an initial two MiG-29A fighters and two MiG-29UB trainers, bringing the aircraft to level-two standard. The modifications could also be extended to cover Romania's remaining fleet of around 14 aircraft.

A further upgrade project will be conducted by EADS with Romania's Aerostar and Elbit of Israel. One MiG-29A will be converted into a post level-three demonstrator, with work to be completed before year-end. The aircraft will then be displayed to other European MiG-29 operators.�� The 'Sniper' project will employ avionics from Romania's modified MiG-21 Lancer and new systems including a modular multi-role computer linked to a 1553B databus. The aircraft will also feature hands-on throttle and stick controls, a wide-angle head-up display and two digital displays.

EADS officials have also confirmed that the company is holding talks with two European air forces regarding a possible upgrade and life-extension program for their Sukhoi Su-22M4 'Fitter-K' attack and Su-22UM3 'Fitter-G' trainer aircraft. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia currently have around 194 Su-22s in their inventories.

 

EADS teams with GE for the definition phase of the Mako advanced trainer/light combat aircraft family

A teaming agreement has been signed between EADS Military Aircraft, Munich, and GE Aircraft Engines, Evendale/Ohio, for the definition phase of the Mako family of advanced trainer and light combat aircraft. The cooperation between the two companies is targeted to work on the definition of the integration of a derivative of the GE fighter engine F414-GE-400.

EADS Military Aircraft and GE together will define the technical details of the Mako powerplant installation and the single-engine features for the F414. In addition to the hardware-orientated tasks, the team will elaborate all specifications and documentations necessary to prepare the launch of the development phase, which is planned for mid 2004. The 98 kN-class propulsion system for the Mako aircraft family is designated F414M (M for Mako) and will incorporate the single-engine features of the basic F414, which is in service with the U.S. Navy�s F/A-18E/F �Super Hornet� since the year 2000.

�Due to the fact that the engine, based upon its successful predecessor F404, shows impressive performance data and comes closest to the Mako design criteria, we feel that we have made the right selection�, said Max Heyder, Mako Program Manager at EADS Military Aircraft. �In particular for the advanced trainer version of the Mako family, we foresee a significant reduction in life-cycle cost , as this aircraft will be flown with a derated engine.� �Another aspect within our down-select process was GE�s offer for participation of European engine manufacturers in the F414M program�, Heyder added.

Mako is one of the contenders for the future Advanced European Jet Pilot Training (AEJPT). The related feasibility study has been signed recently. The Mako Advanced Trainer is designed to ensure an optimum transition to newest-generation high-end combat aircraft. Thanks to its high-performance level together with its leading-edge cockpit design, the aircraft will open a new dimension of economic lead-in fighter training and companion training. The air forces will be offered an advanced trainer which is highly representative to their high-end fighters and thus will allow to down-load training tasks to an unprecedented extent.

EADS is a global aerospace and defense leader, and the world's second largest in terms of revenues. EADS maintains a workforce of more than 100,000 and is a market leader in defence technologies, commercial aircraft, helicopters, space, military transport and combat aircraft, as well as related services. Its family of leading brands includes the commercial aircraft maker Airbus; Eurocopter, the world's largest helicopter manufacturer; Astrium, the space company and MBDA, the world's second largest missile company. EADS is also the biggest partner in the Eurofighter consortium and heads the A400M military transport aircraft programme. EADS has more than 70 facilities in France, Germany, Spain and the UK. It is active in markets around the world, including the U.S. and Asia.

Boeing, Sukhoi, Ilyushin Initiate Regional Jet

The Boeing Company, Sukhoi Civil Aviation, and the Ilyushin Design Bureau today announced a cooperative effort of jointly designing, manufacturing, certifying, marketing, selling and servicing a new regional jet for global operations.

We have agreed to work jointly with Sukhoi and Ilyushin to produce a new regional jet below 100 seats that meets the market's needs effectively. The regional market is an exciting and challenging one, one that is consistent with our fundamental belief that people want to fly directly, point-to-point, with fast, efficient jet service.

A joint program with Ilyushin and Boeing is a wonderful opportunity to address the needs of the regional jet market in Russia, the CIS and globally, Pogosyan said.

Sukhoi Civil is the newly incorporated subsidiary of Sukhoi, one of the world's largest producers of military aircraft. Ilyushin is one of Russia's most successful civil airplane enterprises, with over 1,000 Ilyushin aircraft flying internationally. Boeing has other significant cooperative programs in Russia, including joint Design and Technology Centers, titanium programs, new trans-Siberian routes, International Space Station and Sea Launch.

Lockheed Martin

Cooperative programs among various Russian industry teams working with Lockheed Martin companies represent nearly $7 billion in total value, including current revenue and backlog orders. The ventures currently employ some 700 people in the United States and have the potential to increase that number tenfold while creating thousands of jobs in Russia.
     A brief description of the cooperative ventures follows.

International Launch Services: San Diego-based International Launch Services (ILS) is a joint venture stock company established in 1995 to market two of the world�s premier launch vehicles, the American-built Atlas and the Russian-built Proton. ILS is owned equally by Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services and Lockheed Khrunichev Energia International. Together they now offer two fully-mature space launch systems and have an experience base of over 450 flights.

Launch Vehicles: Lockheed Martin Astronautics, Denver, and International Launch Services will use the RD-180 rocket engines developed by RD AMROSS LLC to power the Atlas IIAR and the commercial variant of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). The EELV is being developed as a candidate for the U.S. Air Force�s competition to select the future family of launch vehicles.
     RD AMROSS LLC is a joint venture of NPO Energomash and UTC Aerospace that will build the RD-180 solely for Lockheed Martin. The engines will be fabricated at NPO Energomash facilities in Khimky, Russia. Compared to the current-generation Atlas IIAS which requires nine engines to power the rocket, the RD-180-powered Atlas IIAR will require only two. The RD-180 is simpler to operate and build, and uses nearly 10,000 fewer parts than the previous generation. The first Atlas IIAR launch powered by the Russian-built RD-180 engines is planned for later this year; the first EELV is planned for 2001.
     The cooperative venture underscores Lockheed Martin�s commitment to the global commercial launch vehicle market and strengthens the corporation�s ties to Russian space interests.

Lockheed Martin Intersputnik: Lockheed Martin Intersputnik, or LMI, is a joint venture company formed by the Lockheed Martin Corporation and the Intersputnik International Organization of Space Communications. LMI, based in London, draws upon the expertise and capabilities of the two companies to provide a full range of worldwide communications services.
     Initially, LMI will provide broadcast, fixed telecommunications and Very Small Aperture Terminal services to customers in Eastern Europe, South Asia, Africa and the Commonwealth of Independent States. LMI plans to place a constellation of satellites into orbit and lease capacity on them for voice, video, data and fax services, direct-to-home broadcast as well as mobile services to customers worldwide.
     LMI combines unmatched expertise in satellite communications. The substantial experience of Intersputnik as a global satellite service provider is combined with Lockheed Martin�s extensive satellite, launch and ground systems capabilities.
     Intersputnik is an international intergovernmental organization which operates a satellite communications system and provides international, regional and domestic communications worldwide. The organization was established more than 25 years ago and has 22 member countries. Intersputnik has been providing its customers in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific regions a wide range of telecommunications services, including voice, data, television and audio broadcasting in international, domestic and regional public networks as well as establishment of videoteleconferencing and business communications networks.

Lockheed Martin Intersputnik-1 (LMI-1): Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space is building the LMI-1 satellite for Lockheed Martin Intersputnik. The satellite, based on the A2100 geostationary bus, will provide direct broadcast satellite television and audio service, as well as communications services to Asia and portions of Europe, Africa and Australia. The satellite is scheduled for launch later this year aboard an International Launch Services Proton booster. LMI-2 and LMI-3 are planned for launch in 1999 and 2000, respectively.

Iridium: A space-based telecommunications system that will provide global voice, fax and paging services, Iridium relies on a constellation of 72 low-earth orbit satellites. The Iridium satellite bus, based on the modular LM 700, is built by Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space. The Iridium bus is fabricated for prime contractor Motorola Satellite Communications Group for Iridium LLC, which owns and operates the Iridium constellation.
     The Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center provides launch services with the Proton booster on behalf of Motorola. Khrunichev, one of the world�s premier aerospace and manufacturing facilities, develops launch vehicles, orbital stations and other space equipment.

International Space Station: The International Space Station will be an earth-orbiting laboratory that will house scientific missions from the various space-faring nations cooperating in its development.
     Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space builds the solar arrays that will provide power to the International Space Station, as well as the joints that will ensure the position of the solar arrays is maintained to maximize power generation. The solar arrays, the largest ever built for space flight, measure 108 feet by 38 feet. They are developed for the Boeing Company, the International Space Station prime contractor for NASA.
     Khrunichev is building the Functional Cargo Block, the main node for the science laboratories on the International Space Station, for the Russian Space Agency in coordination with NASA.

Mir Solar Array: A solar array containing panels built by Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space became the first U.S.-developed component of the Russian space station Mir. The Mir Cooperative Solar Array (MCSA) provides six kilowatts of power, boosting Mir's energy-production facilities and enabling microgravity and life-science research, as well as refurbishment and resupply of the Mir complex. The array was delivered to Mir in November 1995.
     The MCSA Program was managed as an integrated product team consisting of NASA, Boeing-Rocketdyne Division, Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space, and Russia's Rocket & Space Corporation-Energia.

National Security: Lockheed Martin Advanced Environmental Systems, Inc., Albuquerque, N.M., is working with the Russian Federation government and the U.S. Defense Special Weapons Agency to remove the solid fuels in SS-22 and SS-24 strategic missiles via a contained burn process to meet the requirements of our strategic arms reduction treaties. This effort, Solid Rocket Motor Disposition, requires the design, construction, and operation of facilities in Russia.

 

An-70: Antonov with UK company Air Foyle for the UK Royal Air Force's short-term strategic airlift requirement and Antonov's An-70 is also being considered for the European multi-national future transport aircraft requirement.

UKRAINE

The Defense Department has announced three industrial partnership awards designed to assist Ukraine in converting its former Soviet military production facilities into commercial joint ventures. These awards bring the number of joint ventures in Ukraine to seven.

The projects total $64.60 million in cash investments. Through the Department of Defense (DoD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the U.S. government will contribute $47.46 million to these projects. The seven U.S. firms involved will contribute a total of $17.14 million in cash and technology and licensing valued at over $50 million.

The following Defense Nuclear Agency contract awards have been announced:

- Approximately $4.80 million has been awarded to ABB Combustion Engineering, Windsor, Conn., to form a closed joint stock company with Ukraine's Monolit, located in Karkiv, to convert a manufacturer of aircraft, spacecraft and missile electrical, control and guidance systems into a manufacturer of digital instrumentation and control systems for nuclear power plants. ABB Combustion Engineering will contribute technology and licensing valued at $20 million to the joint venture.

- Approximately $3.03 million has been provided to Die Casters Incorporated, Wayne, N.J., to create a joint venture with Ukraine partner Meridian (formerly Korolev), Kiev, to convert a million electronic and radar equipment facility into a factory that manufactures die cast consumer products, for example, automotive parts and hand tools. The project will upgrade Meridian's die casting capability by installing process monitoring and control systems and remanufactured die casting machines. Die Casters incorporated will contribute $1.07 million to the project.

- Approximately $2.66 million has been awarded to American Industrial Development (AID) Corporation, Boston, Mass., for a joint venture with Ukraine's Orizon, located in Smela, to convert an electronic apparatus and space navigation equipment plant to a polyvinyl chloride window and door assembly facility. AID Corporation will contribute $469,979 to the joint venture.

Previous DoD funded industrial partnerships in the Ukraine created production ventures in construction and civil engineering, pre-fabricated housing, nuclear electronic control instrumentation and cellular telephones. The projects were initiated under a $50 CTR implementing agreement between the DoD and the Ministry of Machine Building, Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion of Ukraine.

CTR program assistance to Ukraine for defense conversion helps reduce the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; assists Ukraine in building a peaceful, commercially viable market economy while reducing its excess military industrial capacity; and promotes opportunities for U.S. industry's entry into a potentially large market for consumer goods and services.

 

The possibility of a Transatlantic, Asiatic-Atlantic and/or Euro-Asiatic Merger:

With the consolidation of the defense and aerospace industry, it is very possible that a large American and large European company could merge in a transatlantic consolidation.� With privatization in Russia a large Russian company may merge with an outside firm.�� In fact the world's largest maker of missiles, Lexington, Massachusetts-based Raytheon the US's #3 aerospace and defense firm, behind Boeing and Lockheed Martin, agreed to a joint venture with France-based Thales to form a joint air-defense venture, Thales-Raytheon Systems. Raytheon is selling its aeronautics business soon to focus on electronics, but with the current environment would it have to be an American purchase of the aeronautic business or would a European company buy it?�

EADS and MIG created MAPS for the upgrade of east European Mig-29s, is this the beginning of greater euro-asiatic cooperation?

Northrop Grumman the number 4 US company is cosying up to EADS, exploring alliance possibilities to share surveillance and reconnaissance defense-electronics technology.� The Joint Strike Fighter project between US and the UK could put a lot of dollars towards a merger between BAE and Lockheed Martin.

 


 

If the tripartite organization successfully walks the tightrope and gets additional regional pillars created, how would these regional organizations relate to a globalized security environment?

 

 

Nation

Region

Budget 2020 $b

Budget 2040 $b

Alliance

UN Security Council

 

 

 

 

 

 

CIS

CIS

30

 

Tripartite

Permanent/Veto

N. America

N. America

350

 

Tripartite

Permanent/Veto

EU

Europe

250

 

Tripartite

Permanent/2 Veto

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sub Saharan Africa

OAU

 

 

 

General Assembly

South Asia

Middle East

 

 

 

General Assembly

India

 

 

 

Partner

General Assembly

S. America

S. America

 

 

Partner

General Assembly

China

East Asia

 

 

 

Permanent/Veto

MAGREB

Mediterranean

 

 

Med Partner

General Assembly

Mexico

N. American

 

 

Member

General Assembly

Japan

Pacific

 

 

Partner

General Assembly

Republic of Korea

Asian

 

 

Partner

General Assembly

S.E. Asia

S.E. Asia

 

 

Partner

General Assembly

 

Role for the UN and the Security Council

The Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 by 50 nations. On 24 October 1945, the United Nations formally came into being.

Article 51 of the UN Charter establishes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense of all UN member countries. It sanctions measures they might take in the exercise of this right until such time as the UN Security Council has taken the steps necessary to maintain international peace and security. It stipulates, in addition, that measures taken by member countries under the terms of this Article must be immediately reported to the UN Security Council and do not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take what actions it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The relevance of the UN Charter to the North Atlantic Alliance is twofold. First, it provides the juridical basis for the creation of the Alliance; and second, it establishes the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security. These two fundamental principles are enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. The preamble to the Treaty makes it clear from the outset that the UN Charter is the framework within which the Alliance operates. In its opening phrases, the members of the Alliance reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter. In Article 1 they also commit themselves both to settling international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the goals of the Charter and to refraining from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. Article 5 of the Treaty makes explicit reference to Article 51 of the Charter in asserting the right of the signatories to take, individually or collectively, such action as they deem necessary for their self-defense, including the use of armed force; and, it commits the member countries to terminating the use of armed force in restoring and maintaining the security of the North Atlantic area when the UN Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Further reference to the UN Charter is to be found in Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which reminds signatories of their rights and obligations under the Charter and reaffirms the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security. And finally, in Article 12, a clause was included in the Treaty providing for it to be reviewed after ten years, if any of the Parties to it so requested. It stipulated that the review would take place in the light of new developments affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal and regional arrangements under the UN Charter.

The North Atlantic Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949. None of the Parties to it have requested a review of the Treaty under Article 12, although at each stage of its development the Alliance has kept the implementation of the Treaty under continuous review for the purpose of securing its objectives. The direct relationship between the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations is and will remain a fundamental principle of the Alliance.

From 1949 to the present day, the formal link between the United Nations and the North Atlantic Alliance has remained constant and has manifested itself first and foremost in the relationship between their respective founding documents. However, for most of this period, working relations between the institutions of the United Nations and those of the Alliance remained limited. In 1992, the situation changed.

In July 1992, against the background of growing conflict, NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft, began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of a United Nations arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia. In November 1992, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) began enforcement operations in support of UN Security Council resolutions aimed at preventing the escalation of the conflict.

The readiness of the Alliance to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council was formally stated by NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1992. The measures already being taken by NATO countries, individually and as an Alliance, were reviewed and the Alliance indicated that it was ready to respond positively to further initiatives that the UN Secretary General might take in seeking Alliance assistance in this field.

A number of measures were subsequently taken, including joint maritime operations under the authority of the NATO and WEU Councils; NATO air operations; close air support for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); air strikes to protect UN "Safe Areas"; and contingency planning for other options which the UN might take.

In December 1995, following the signature of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris on 14 December, NATO was given a mandate by the UN, on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1031, to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. A NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) began operations to fulfill this mandate on 16 December. Details of the work of IFOR and its subsequent replacement by a NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 1996, are also described in Chapter 5. Throughout their mandates both multinational forces have worked closely on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina with other international organizations and humanitarian agencies, including those of the United Nations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF).

In February 1998, after discussions with non-NATO contributors to SFOR, the North Atlantic Council announced that, subject to the necessary mandate from the UN Security Council, NATO was prepared to organise and lead a multinational force to continue the work in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate in June 1998. The new force retains the name "SFOR", reflecting the continuing need for stabilization of the Bosnian situation and for laying the foundations for permanent peace in the region.

From the onset of the conflict in Kosovo in 1998 and throughout the crisis, close contacts were maintained between the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of NATO. Actions taken by the Alliance in support of UN Security Council resolutions both during and after the conflict and the role of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) established on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 1244 of 12 June 1999 to provide an international security presence as the prerequisite for peace and reconstruction of Kosovo.

NATO's role in crisis management in the Balkans has led to an intensification of cooperation with the UN. The Secretary General of NATO reports regularly to the UN Secretary General on progress in NATO-led operations and on other key decisions of the North Atlantic Council in the area of crisis management. Increased sharing of information between NATO and the UN also takes place in the context of the international campaign against terrorism, following the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. In general, working contacts between the two organizations have become more frequent and a number of high level visits take place between the UN and NATO every year. The UN remains at the core of the wider institutional framework within which the Alliance operates.

Globalization of Security

 

The globalization of the war on terrorism almost begs the question of whether there is a growing globalization of security.� Perhaps the way to look at it is to see in terms of layers:� There is a global layer, an OSCE/NATO/CoE layer, individual pillars, and then nation-states.� With the debate over Iraq you see tensions between the layers and between pillars. Notice however that there is no Islam/Arab League/OPEC pillar and the UN Security Council does not have a veto for it.� Would a Clash of Civilizations war in the Middle East be a step towards globalization of security?


�

 

 


BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

MILITARY‑INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

 

A Working Bibliography of MHI Sources

 

 

 

UNITED STATES ‑ BEFORE WWII

 

Blum, Albert A.� "Roosevelt, the M‑Day Plans, and the Military‑Industrial Complex."� Mil Aff 36 ����������� (Apr 1972):� pp. 44‑46.� Per.

 

Cooling, Benjamin F.� Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy:� The Formative Years of America's ����������� Military‑Industrial Complex, 1881‑1917.� Hamden, CT:� Archon, 1979.� 286 p.� VF373C66.

 

Gough, Terrence J.� "Origins of the Army Industrial College:� Military‑Business Tensions After ����������� World War I."� Arm Forces & Soc 17 (Wtr 1991):� pp. 259‑75.� Per.

����������������������� Argues that rivalry with businessmen over wartime procurement roles led logistical officers to professionalize & estab the college.

 

Molander, Earl A.� "Historical Antecedents of Military‑Industrial Criticism."� Mil Aff 40 (Apr 1976):� ����������� pp. 59‑63.� Per.

 

 

 

 

U.S. ‑ AFTER WWII

 

Baumgartner, John S.� The Lonely Warriors:� Case for the Military‑Industrial Complex.�� LA:� Nash, � 1970.� 237 p.� HC110D4B38.

 

Carey, Omer L., ed.� The Military ‑ Industrial Complex and United States Foreign Policy.� Pullman:� ������� WA State U, 1969.� 66 p.� HC110D4 M5.

 

Cooling, B.F., ed.� War, Business, and American Society.� Port Washington, NY:� Kennikat, 1977.� 205 p.� HC110D4W34.

 

Dickson, Thomas I., Jr.� "Military Industrial Complex."� Mil Rev (Dec 1971):� pp. 29‑35.� Per.

 

Gorgol, John F.� The Military ‑ Industrial Firm:� A Practical Theory and Model.� NY:� Praeger, ����������� 1972.� 143 p.� HD9743U6G6.

 

Horowitz, David, ed.� Corporations and the Cold War.� NY:� Monthly Rev, 1969.� 249 p.� ����������� HC110D4C6.

 

Kaufman, Richard F.� The War Profiteers.� Indianapolis:� Bobbs‑Merrill, 1970.� 282 p.� UC267K34.

 

Koistinen, Paul A.� The Military‑Industrial Complex:� An Historical Perspective.� NY:� Praeger, ����������� 1979.� 168 p.� HC110D4K64.

 

Lisk, Percy F., Jr.� "The Army and Air Force Exchange Service:� Its Relations with the Retail ����������� Economy."� MA thesis, U of PA, 1950.� 44 p.� UC753L57.

����������������������� Succinct hist, 1866‑1950, Chap 2.

 

Melman, Seymour, ed.� The War Economy of the United States:� Readinger on Military Industry and �� Economy.� NY:� St Martin's, 1971.� 247 p.� HC110D4M42.

 

Proxmire, William.� Report from Wasteland:� America's Military‑ Industrial Complex.� NY:� ����������� Praeger, 1970.� 248 p.� HC110D4P76.

 

Pursell, Carroll W., Jr.� The Military‑Industrial Complex.� NY:� Harper & Row, 1972.� 342 p.� ����������� HC110D4P87.

 

Rice, Berkeley.� The C‑5A Scandal:� An Inside Story of the Military Industrial Complex.� Boston:� ����������� Houghton Mifflin, 1971.� 238 p.� UH351C5R5.

 

Rosen, Steven, ed.� Testing the Theory of the Military‑Industrial Complex.� Lexington, MA:� ����������� Lexington, 1973.� 311 p.� HC110D4R64.

 

Yale, Wesley W.� "The Military Industrial Complex."� Mil Rev (Sep 1970):� pp. 45‑50.� Per.

 

 

OTHER NATIONS

 

Borkin, Joseph.� The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben.� NY:� Free Press, 1978.� 250 p.� ����������� D804G43I33.

 

Carroll, Berenice A.� Design for Total War:� Arms and Economics in the Third Reich.� The Hague:� ���������� Mouton, 1968.� 311 p.� HC286.4C3.

 

Dubois, Josiah E., Jr.� The Devil's Chemists.� Boston:� Beacon, 1952.� 374 p.� D804G43I333.

 

Reimann, Guenter.� Patents for Hitler.� NY:� Vanguard, 1942.� 316 p.� D800R44.

 

Sasuly, Richard.� I.G. Farben.� NY:� Boni & Gaer, 1947.� 312 p.� HD9654.9II5S3.

 

Schweitzer, Arthur.� Big Business in the Third Reich.� NY:� Harper, 1941.� 203 p.� HC286.3S463.

 

Simpson, Kemper.� Big Business, Efficiency and Fascism.� NY:� Harper, 1941.� 203 p.� HD2785S55.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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