At  first glance, the Philippine Islands and Iraq could not be more different. While one setting is full of lush jungles, the other is barren. Yet both were, and in the case of Iraq, continue to be, scenes of conflict in which the United States is involved. The similarities do not end there, however. The war fought in the Philippines has numerous lessons to teach the current leadership in Iraq, most of which have been ignored. To analyze the present day, however, we must understand the past.

While the US-Filipino war began on February 4, 1899, the roots of the conflict were found in the Spanish-American War. On May 1, 1898, at 5:45 am, Commodore George Dewey ordered shots to be fired on Spanish ships in Manila Bay. After a decisive victory, Dewey was left with a bigger problem: the US Navy could not seize Manila with just ships. Luckily for Dewey, help was acquired in a rebel movement led by a young man named Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy. This movement had been a thorn in Spain’s side since 1896, and while Aguinaldo himself had been exiled to Hong Kong, he still funded their attacks. With such an obvious solution to his ground troop problem, it is no wonder that Dewey chose to bring Aguinaldo back from Hong Kong to occupy Manila. On May 19, Aguinaldo and Dewey met on Dewey’s flagship to discuss Dewey’s plan.

Apparently, there was a miscommunication between the both of them. Aguinaldo came away from their meeting with the assumption that the US would support an independent Philippines; Dewey maintained that he only wanted the Filipino troops to harass Spanish troops until he could get American troops there, telling Aguinaldo, “Go ashore and start your army.”1 Even before Aguinaldo got to the Philippines, the Filipino armies had begun fighting the Spanish, slowly conquering in the archipelago except Manila. On June 12, 1898, Aguinaldo issued a declaration of independence based on the


US model. 2 In what should have been a signal on the US stance to this turn of events, Dewey refused to attend the ceremony.

Around the end of June, the first batch of US troops arrived to “complete the reduction of Spanish power in the archipelago.”3 After negotiating with Aguinaldo, the US troops moved through the Filipino troops and into Manila, where they discovered that the Spanish commanders wanted to surrender, but not to the Filipinos. Finally, the Americans and Spanish decided that they would fake a battle, with Dewey shooting a few shells at Manila, “forcing” the Spanish to surrender. This supposed battle occurred on August 13, 1898, leaving the city of Manila occupied by US troops, who held the Filipino troops out by force. When the surrender ceremony took place, the Filipinos had no part in the ceremony.4

After four more months of fighting in other Spanish possessions, the treaty ending the Spanish-American War was signed on December 10, 1898. In said treaty, the US paid Spain 20 million dollars for the title to the Philippines. The US also stated their goal as “benevolent assimilation.” 5 Even though the Americans began cleaning up Manila by repairing the roads, vaccinating inhabitants, 6 and other generally helpful things, the Filipinos still had no urge to be annexed by the Americans. In fact, the Filipino people had already set up their own government, electing Aguinaldo as their president. As tensions rose between the US troops and the Filipino troops, skirmishes were inevitable. On the night of February 4, 1899, the tension blossomed into war.


Private Willie Grayson was on guard duty in a section of Manila known for numerous skirmishes between the Filipinos and Americans. Around 8 pm, Grayson spotted a few Filipinos headed towards him with weapons at the ready. As Grayson later recalled, “I yelled ‘halt’ and the man moved…I thought the best thing was to shoot him. He dropped.” 7 Grayson then ran back to his camp to tell the other men in his unit that the Filipinos were everywhere, which caused more shooting. The war had begun.

By the end of March, Aguinaldo’s capital had been captured. The Filipino Congress eventually voted to accept the US occupiers in order to stop what was quickly turning into a massacre. Aguinaldo’s head general, Antonio Luna, arrested most of the Congress for treason shortly afterward. They were quickly freed by Aguinaldo. On June 5, 1899, Luna was assassinated.

By early December 1899, Aguinaldo was on the run once more with the Americans on his heels. One of his generals, Gregorio del Pilar, volunteered to stay behind at Tila Pass with sixty men, declaring that “the Americans could never take this place, and if they ever did take it, it would be over my dead body.”8 On December 2, del Pilar and fifty of his sixty men were killed. After this last battle, the Filipinos resorted to guerrilla warfare.

During the months leading to the election of 1900, Aguinaldo intensified his guerilla campaign, hoping to win a victory for the Democratic candidate, who had declared himself opposed to imperialism. 9 This tactic didn’t work, however, and President William McKinley was reelected. Earlier in the year, the general in charge of American troops was replaced by General Arthur MacArthur. MacArthur recruited native


soldiers to help him fight the rebels. He also received a telegram from the War Department giving him permission to ruthlessly exterminate the guerrillas. 10 On the civilian front, an Ohio judge named William Howard Taft was sent to help the Filipinos to adjust to civilian rule. US soldiers were once again used to build schools, vaccinate people, set up courts run by native people, and hold sanitation campaigns. 11 On December 23, 1900, several former members of the independence movement created a political party that went around the Philippines, telling the guerillas to surrender and take a loyalty oath to the US. 12

While all of this helped to end the war, the final blow was issued by Brigadier General Frederick Funston. On March 6, 1901, Funston began his plot: he and a few of his soldiers would be “captured” by troops pretending to be reinforcements for Aguinaldo, who then would capture Aguinaldo. Using this deception, they were able to get through Aguinaldo’s defenses and capture him. On April 19, 1901, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation declaring American sovereignty and asking his former comrades to give up the struggle. 13

Most of the insurgents did, but a few continued to rebel. One village actually slaughtered close to an entire company. One Brigadier General, “Hell-Raising Jake” Smith, took his revenge by killing any Filipino over 10 years old on the island where it happened. 14 To journalists, it appeared that “American soldiers are determined to kill


every Filipino in sight.” 15 By July 4, 1902, President Roosevelt (President McKinley had been assassinated in the meantime) declared the war over.What did America learn from the US-Filipino War? For starters, Commodore George Dewey should have been clear on what he desired from Aguinaldo, and should have made sure that Aguinaldo understood too. Dewey was too vague on what exactly he wanted Aguinaldo and his men to accomplish. In fact, Dewey later claimed by the time he knew Aguinaldo had misunderstood him, that “[h]e would not have listened to me; I could not have stopped him.” 16 Because of Aguinaldo’s declaration of independence, the Filipino people felt that they were free, making them resentful of the American occupying forces. Second, the US should have let the Filipinos have a spot in the surrender ceremony. The Filipinos had fought the battles that defeated the Spanish; not letting them have a part in the ceremony created more tension between the Americans and the civilians. Another lesson learned was that to gain civilian trust, US soldiers had to help to improve living conditions. During the US-Filipino War, Taft’s insistence on US troops helping to rebuild villages served the dual purpose of appeasing Filipino civilians who might have been guerrilla supporters and it gave the Americans local allies. Fourth, just because the leader of the rebellion is removed from power, it doesn’t mean the resistance will stop. In theory, Aguinaldo’s proclamation should have stopped the rest of the guerrillas. As history showed, while it got rid of most of them, a few die-hard believers of Philippine independence continued to fight. Fifth, if all else fails, isolate the guerrillas and starve


them out. While moving all of the law-abiding citizens of a province into a concentration is unethical, it effectively dried up the guerrillas’ water supply. 17 Finally, use citizens to fight against other citizens. Using the Macabebes against the ruling Tagalogs was a great way to get guides and other men to fight for the Americans.

   Can any of these lessons be applied today? Of course; the first lesson is obviously one. When commanders use local leaders, they need to make sure that their intentions are clear, so that nothing can be misinterpreted. In fact, if the commanders would sign a contract or some sort of statement in which their intentions are addressed, miscommunication would be kept to a minimum. Still, the US soldiers’ presence is still resented by Iraqi citizens who want them to leave. But unlike the US-Filipino campaign, the US president declared Iraq independent, not a local leader; this situation is partly of America’s own making.

The second lesson can and has been used in a broader sense. The American soldiers of today are attempting to help the Iraqis set up their own government, with Iraqi citizens in every administrative position. Instead of the Americans picking the new leaders, the Iraqis have had democratic elections. The US troops in the Philippines, on the other hand, first put Americans in power, not giving the Filipinos any voice at all. Only as the guerilla campaign picked up force did the Americans begin putting the native citizens in figurehead positions in villages. In some instances, the Americans chose the same people to run the villages that the guerrillas had also chosen.18

The third lesson, building and rebuilding the occupied country in order to gain the trust of the citizenry, is also being used. US soldiers’ forces today are split between


defeating the guerrillas and helping to rebuild Iraq. In fact, rebuilding Iraq appears to be US soldiers’ first priority. In the US-Filipino War, however, rebuilding the country took a back seat to the overall goal of suppressing the Filipino guerrillas. Although rebuilding the Philippines was a part of the American occupation policy, it appears to have been relatively abandoned until William Howard Taft emphasized it in 1900. 19

  The fourth lesson has now been re-taught to the American soldiers in Iraq. During the US-Filipino War, the US soldiers were viewed as oppressive invaders and Aguinaldo, who had been elected as the independent president of the Philippines, was looked upon as a hero. Aguinaldo was also a symbol of Philippine independence itself. The fact that most of the guerrilla attacks ended after Aguinaldo proclaimed that the war was over is evidence that he still wielded considerable power. However, even Aguinaldo could not predict the meaning of Philippine independence to some of the rebels. In Iraq, however, while most of the Iraqi citizens appeared to be happy that Saddam was gone, they were not happy that American soldiers had to invade their country to get rid of him. Also, the ruling Sunni Muslims were not pleased that their reason for power had been captured. It should come as no surprise that they also want the Americans to leave Iraq. The American soldiers should have been ready for this turn of events. This lack of preparation for a guerrilla war has contributed to the deaths of US troops.

The fifth lesson, a call for total war, has not been used yet. During the US-Filipino War, this step was necessary for the war to end. Since both the guerrillas and law-abiding citizens looked alike, the US troops locked the law-abiding citizens (and those who pretended to be) away in concentration camps. While numerous citizens died, the result of this action was successful. As long as the guerrillas could depend on civilian help, pacification was impossible. 20 In today’s world, of course, the rounding up and imprisonment of citizens is not looked upon favorably anywhere. If the United States attempted to imprison Iraqi citizens, there would be an almost global uproar. While never ethically okay, the soldiers of the US-Filipino War were able to get away with it because of the feelings of the time, the feeling that “Filipinos were foreigners as well as enemies." 21

        The final lesson, using natives in American battles, is also useful and has been implemented successfully. During the US-Filipino War, the greatest evidence of this was in Funston’s plan to capture Aguinaldo. The Macabebes were able to get close enough to Aguinaldo to capture him because they were natives. The Macabebes were not the only tribes the Americans used. In most cases, the tribes were much harsher to the guerrillas than the US troops. 22 In Iraq, The US troops are training Iraqi units to help them fight the insurgents. These troops will help to protect the Iraqi government once the US troops are withdrawn.

          In conclusion, the US-Filipino War and the situation in Iraq have numerous similarities. Although the terrain is different, the situation is eerily similar. In both cases, it was assumed that victory would be quickly won for the Americans. In both the Philippines and Iraq, the real battles were not even battles at all, but guerrilla attacks. Because of this, the US-Filipino war has numerous lessons that can be used in Iraq.


While most of them have not been forgotten and have been used, some have been neglected. Time will tell whether Iraq will end up like the Philippines.

       

 

     

 

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