The shocking book of Lou Marinoff critically
re-considered
by Dr. Alessandro Volpone, Italy [*]
————————————————————————————
TO BE
PERFECTLY HONEST
I took the occasion of the publication of the
Italian edition of the work of Lou Marinoff to reflect (again) on its contents.
The present note is to be considered midway between a review and a pamphlet, on
the account of its consisting of a double instance which goes along with it.
First of all, it maybe that Tudor B. Munteanu has been too delicate in his
critical analysis, two years ago [1]. Secondly, I suppose
that Mr. Marinoff is nearly as happy when people say negative things about him
as when they say positive things. Certainly, his instincts as a businessman in
the marketplace of ideas tell him that there is no such thing as bad publicity.
So, in advance I apologize for sarcasm and probable cruelty you might find in
my paper – in as far as I will able to do. I know it is better to dismiss
Marinoff’s book in a sentence or two, when someone brings it up, but it is also
opportune to face directly the problem. I will only try to play my part in this
undertaking, hoping that there will be still people with patience and a great
sense of humour…
Lou Marinoff’s Plato, not Prozac! is
essentially a book “against”, so to say: it is against psychology, against
psychiatry, against medicine, against philosophy academicism and against
many other things, paradoxically including the “philosophical counseling”
itself and its relatively young dignity. I mean, before Mr. Marinoff will
publish his new best-seller which, dealing with philosophical practice against
sexology, could be fairly entitled Plato, not Viagra!, it is better to
go ahead in continuing the critical review of his first book made by Tudor B.
Munteanu. This latter was certainly occupied in more serious things, while
reviewing the book, and he could not complete the parade of lapses and
superficialities. They are so many that I will probably not find the whole of
them. I (also) apologize for this.
In the fourth chapter of his book (entitled,
"What you Missed in Philosophy 101 That Can Help you Now"), Marinoff
generously provides «a brief overview of some philosophers whose ideas are
relevant to my counseling practice, to give you some historical perspective»
(page 13). Well, the only problem is that many statements are clearly wrong;
others are very approximative. Munteanu already listed some of them
[2]; here there are other sweets.
[…] Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. They were building on some
significant pre-Socratics too (such as the Cynics and early Stoics). (sic!
on page 53)
The error is so trivial that need no comment.
That’s incredible. (How is it possible that an Associate Professor of
Philosophy at the City College of New York writes that Cynics and Stoics were
pre-Socratics?!)
The early modern philosophers, who emerged in the seventeenth century,
marked the passing of the Dark Ages. (page 61)
What else?! Probably, Marinoff ignores or
underestimates the historical significance of the Italian Renaissance, between
the end of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries.
After the philosophical revolution fomented by Francis Bacon, Thomas
Hobbes, René Descartes, and Galileo among others, the world could never be the
same again. (page 61-62)
A part from the unlucky use of the verb “to
foment”, referred to an “intellectual change of perspective”, not to
rebellions, terrorism or some such things, in as far as I know the only
acknowledged “revolution” of the Early Modern Age is the “scientific” one (not
“philosophical”). (This has nothing to do with relationships between
philosophical and scientific ways of thought.) In the eighteenth century, Kant
declared his intention to be "the Copernicus of philosophy”, and the
statement could introduce the sense of a certain “revolution” in the subject,
but this is another story…
In “The Empiricists”, Marinoff talks about
Hume.
And just because one thing regularly follows another is not enough to
prove that the first caused the second. As difficult as it can be to wrap your
mind around, this argument can be very liberating. Denying necessary cause is
the same as saying that there is no predestination, no fate. This is a key that
opens the door to the belief that you can change. (page 65)
I do not understand so well the meaning of what Marinoff calls
“necessary cause”, but the question is: do it has really to do with
“predestination” and “fate”? Hume’s criticism concerning with “pre-diction”
(not with “pre-destination”!) was focused above all against the inductive
method. (A reason is: one can connect cause and effect by
induction, taking for granted a certain uniformity in space-time, but not all
possible inductions refer to mechanisms of cause and effect; e.g.,
induction by simple enumeration.) Anyway, by criticizing the relation between
cause and effect, Hume denied the necessity of the "relation", but
neither the “necessity” in itself (?) nor the groundless of fate (!). The causes he referred to were “efficient” (or “effective”) causes,
i.e., those generally used in science. Probably, Marinoff fails to see
the distinction between necessarism and determinism. The former
is always true a priori, and deals with pre-destination; the latter is
true only a posteriori, and deals with pre-diction.
In the section “The Romantics”, Marinoff presents reader with Rousseau,
writing that he is «the prototypical romantic» (sic! on page 68). I
think it is possible to affirm that Rousseau was a very “strange” illuminist,
but the rough definition of “romantic” seems to me too much hard to maintain.
Rousseau contributed to the Encyclopédie (making contributions about
music, and editing the article “Political Economy”), and made friends with many
«philosophes» – though he next abandoned them. The most part of his philosophy
work remained within the Illuminism: while «philosophes» generally reported
instinct to reason, Rousseau brought reason to instinct. When all is said and
done, the final result is nearly the same. One cannot think Rousseau was tout
court a “romantic”...
Further, Marinoff writes that «idealism [was] pioneered by Hegel» (page
69). Probably, he would say that Hegel can be considered the main
representative exponent of German Idealism – and this could be true in some
way. But I do not understand the use of the verb “to pioneer”. I would like to
remember that the opening work of Hegel about Idealism was entitled Differenz
des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie (1801). So, it
is quite clear that there was some previous idealist before Hegel in Germany...
Marinoff also puts a made-to-measure version
of the Hegelian dialectic, making an adulterated product.
Hegel's idea of the dialectic [...] He believed that one should present
a thesis and an antithesis, then reconcile them through synthesis. [...] Hegel
thought we should then propose the synthesis we arrive at as a new thesis,
counter it with a new antithesis, and hash out a new synthesis, ad infinitum...
Even if you don't want to continue into infinity, this kind of constant
refinement is a useful approach to your personal philosophy of life. (page
69-70)
The
idea of the "constant refinement" of everybody's
personal philosophy-of-life has a very good sense. Yet, it is very hard to
maintain that the Hegelian dialectic was a process to be "continue(d) into
infinity", especially if one refers to Hegel's opinion about his own
philosophy. In fact, it seems that Hegel was so persuaded of the exhaustiveness
of his philosophy system, that in his last years he simply used to repeat his
universitary courses, word for word, spending his time in playing at cards with
friends. A part from this anecdote or others however, I do not find so
excessive to affirm he was the thinker who pretended that philosophy inquiry
would go to an end with him. In the first pages of the Introduction of his
Magnum Opus, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), he wrote significantly:
Dem Ziele, ihren Namen der Liebe zum Wissen ablegen zu
können und wirkliches Wissen zu sein, – ist es, was ich mir
vorgesetzt. [3]
Certainly,
the Hegel I know is a little different from that of Marinoff [4].
Another peculiarity to concern with is the
role that Marinoff attributes to Nietzsche in “The Existentialists”. At the
beginning, the section flows rather smoothly, talking about general problems
and arguments of Existentialism, until Nietzsche is unexpectedly and
inopportunely introduced. «From that perspective, Nietzsche declared, “God is
dead!” (page 74). Then Marinoff presents the reader with Kierkegaard and
Sartre, dwelling on some of their ideas. But suddenly he returns again on
Nietzsche: «Frederick Nietzsche is most remembered for his idea of man and
superman. He thought each person had…» (page 75). Certainly, Nietzsche’s
nihilism influenced in some degree Existentialism, and the German Existenzphilosophie (by the way, in
the section Marinoff does not mention at all Martin Heidegger [5]),
but it is not possible to include Nietzsche directly among existentialists:
this is more than a simply overstatement…
Marinoff did read Pope John Paul II’s
encyclical letter Fides et ratio (1998). Something however sounds
(obviously) wrong in his interpretation. Marinoff writes that the «encyclical
[…] exhorts all Catholics to focus on philosophy» (page 61). That is just
partially true. According to the Pontiff, philosophy, and especially
metaphysics, are particularly suitable in stimulating to reflect about
fundamental questions of life, and this could approach people with God and His
salvation message. (I do not know whether Marinoff really understood Pope’s
reasoning and hidden thought.) The point is John Paul II exhorts not only
“Catholics” – like Marinoff affirms – but “all human beings” to focus on
philosophy (in the hope somebody would meet then religion). What would be the
sense to open a crashed door?!
Then Marinoff continues:
He [the Pope] admires not only Western philosophers but also India’s
sacred texts, the teachings of Buddha, and the works of Confucius. So now we
inherit a new rhetorical question: instead of asking, “Is the Pope Catholic?”
we can ask, “Is the Pope philosophical?” (Ibid).
Well, this could seem a radicalization of
John Paul II’s ecumenism, but the Pontiff does not refer to texts of India, Buddha
and Confucius in a “religious” way, nor a strictly “philosophical” way, but a
merely “anthropological” one. John Paul II simply states the trans-cultural and
over-historical dimension of the Christian message [see Fides et Ratio,
§§ 71-72]; in the sense that, for example if Jesus Christ was born in China,
and if the Apostles were Asiatic, then the Christian Apostolic Church as
an institution would not be linked to Western thought and rationality (as the Roman
Catholic Church), and notwithstanding would have the same salvation message
of Christ – that is for the Pope the only true. John Paul II would never
counsel people to read the texts mentioned by Marinoff in perspectives (e.g.,
metaphysical, moral, mystical, etc.), which differ from the anthropological or
historical ones. And could not be otherwise: every religion has core beliefs
that are unchallengeable. For example, Christian ethics is
"philosophically" different from teachings of Buddha or some such
things, and vice versa. The Pope knows that very well…
In as far as concerns to myself, a serious doubt raises whenever
Marinoff, in his book, formulates a reasoning moving – with lack of
consideration – from the Western philosophy directly to some Eastern thought,
and vice versa. The thing is not so easy as Marinoff thinks of it. I
will return on the matter at the end of the present paper.
A slightly different note: A part from general shallowness, something
can be saved in the philosophy overview of Marinoff, such as the section
entitled “Analitical Philosophy”, some pieces of “The Existentialists”, etc.
But that is the main point: if Marinoff is able to correctly describe some
philosophy currents and ideas, then I suppose the ones he thoroughly and
repeatedly misrepresents are not perfectly understood by him. (Surely, it is
not the case to claim for misprints!) Tudor Munteanu wrote that an «explanation
for Lou Marinoff's lapses may be an exclusive reliance on secondary sources». I
suggest another possibility: he probably won a philosophy degree at Bingo...
The book of Mr. Marinoff does not represent a
“popularization” work at all [6] – at the most it is
“propagandistic”! At a certain point Marinoff writes: «this book [is] for
starters» (page 6), but then he clearly contradicts the statement more than
once, both (a) in words and (b) in contents. In conclusion, the
purpose of the book is quite far to be clear.
(a) After observing that «the book is much more
didactic [sic!] than a typical one-on-one philosophical counseling
session would be» (page 13), Marinoff states that generally «a session might
run one of three ways» (page 14), and that his book «primarily illustrates the
second one» (ibid). What is this second way? Here it is:
Another common path in a
counseling session is for the client to ask specifically for some philosophical
instruction. In this variation, you may have reinvented a philosophical wheel
and be reassured to know that someone else has mapped out that territory
already. In the likely event that you haven’t covered all the bases yourself,
you could learn from those who have gone before you. (Ibid)
Somewhere else, we also find that «this book draws on the greatest
philosophers and philosophies throughout history and around the world to show
you how to address the important issues in your life» (page 7).
As you note, rather than to “popularise” philosophy, Marin off uses it (i.e.,
his disagreeable «brief overview» of philosophers and philosophies) in a
plainly “functional” way: he tries to satisfy curiosity of readers/clients
giving them «specifically for some philosophical instruction». Certainly, this
“professional” aim is quite different from the mere “popularisation”, although
I think that philosophy beginners may find more serious information about the
history of philosophy in Mickey Mouse…
(b)
In as far as I know, generally philosophers (and scientists) do not create
philosophical (rasp. scientific) theories by using popularisation. In the same
way, mere divulgers – and many of them are very serious professionals of the
field – are simply “divulgers”, and not also theoreticians. Hence, the book of Marin
off is rather ambiguous. The author does not limit himself only to illustrate
the history of philosophy, or that of philosophical practice. He wrote that the
ideas introduced in his brief philosophy overview «are relevant to my counselling
practice» (page 13), and this is perfectly consistent with the fact that in the
same book Marin off present the world with his «five-step PEACE (Problem,
Emotions, Analysis, Contemplation, Equilibrium) process». To be honest, I find
no meaningful relation between the PEACE method and the mentioned brief
overview of ideas, unless he refers to trifles like the following ones:
«Descartes […] The acknowledgement of the dichotomy between mind and body, and
their complex interrelationship, makes philosophical counselling possible»
(page 62); «His other famous contribution, “I think, therefore I am” […] That
concept also lays groundwork for philosophical counselling» (page 63). «The
idea of “tabular Rasa” […] It also suggests the potential of philosophical counselling
to help find the eraser if what has been written on your blank slate is
misleading or harmful to you» (page 64). «The Pragmatists […] I like to think
the original pragmatists would have given two thumbs up to philosophical counselling:
it helps people, so it is pragmatically valuable» (sic! on page 72).
Marin off thinks that general empty observations like the mentioned ones could
be really enough… enough in order to writes such a thing as the first solemn
statement of the “Acknowledgements” of his book: «Thanks to my philosophical
predecessors and contemporaries for their perennial inspiration» (page ix). The
thing surely represents an overstatement.
The book of Marin off is not a popularisation
of philosophy, but (it pretends to be) an inquiry at the level of theory of
philosophical practice. (Marin off illustrates his own "original"
speculations also by means of examples). I could admit some trivial error in popularisation,
but not in reporting a research work; above all, it is just this point which
makes me so indignant. The matter was already well focused by Munteanu:
Even in Marinoff's context all these are important theories which have a
strong impact on the result of any philosophical undertaking, and one has to
ask what can be the result of any investigation if the most basic
characterizations are so hopelessly confused.
So, we arrive to the theoretical center of Marinoff’s book: the PEACE
process. I do not want to discuss on its specific contents, but some doubts
arise however on its theoretical value. Briefly: the «first two steps» of the
process [Problem, Emotions] «frame your issue, and most people
pass through these stages naturally. They don’t need anyone to identify the
problem with or for them, though sometimes it is a point to be revisited and
refined» (page 38). […] «The third step [Analysis] takes you beyond most
psychology and psychiatry, and the fourth [Contemplation] puts you
squarely into the philosophical realm» (ibid). The final step [Equilibrium]
«incorporates into your life what you’ve learned at each of the first four
stages» (ibid).
As you can see, the final step is considered nothing more but a result – a kind
of “stage beyond-stage” of the process. In as far as concerns with the other
four steps, instead, the only acknowledged “philosophical” stage is the fourth.
Remaining stages can be «naturally» performed by everyone of us: Marinoff
admits that whoever you are – a psychologist, a psychiatrist, a philosopher or
a common man –, the result would be nearly the same! (Personally, I think that
also the fourth step is not so entirely a “philosophical” stage as Marinoff
claims, but this is another story.) The point is: why people would pay for
things they are able to do by themselves?! What a strange kind of “skilled in
philosophy" is that genius of Jersey City! The way he indicates starts
from “about-ism” and goes to real “philosophy” (in the fourth stage). I mean,
it is certainly possible to pass from the «doxa» to the «episteme», so
to say, but probably philosophy lies just in that passage! I think it is not
possible to achieve a minimum in philosophical standards by using a process –
Marinoff’s PEACE – that sounds to me so much paradoxical and misleading as
Philo of Megara’s “formal conditional” (=from the false follows the true). I
think conclusions must be skilfully supported by examined premises, not vice
versa! In my opinion, to extemporize or naturalize the right rationalization
of problems (reduced to colourless reflection about life obstacles and the
emotions they involve) is not only a bad philosophy, but probably it is not
philosophy at all [7].
Presumably, my problem is that I do not
accept the idea of the «PEACE process» in itself. Marinoff acts like to give
instructions on “How to use” electrical households. (Mary Shelley’s Dr
Frankenstein would say “How to make a monster”!) I think there are better and
quite different new-old ways to professionally approach philosophical practice.
One needs to take a step back and ask: why Marinoff does not justify his
personal instance to build up a method? And further, why does he believe this
method has painfully to imitate psychoterapeutical processes and algorithms?!
«The PEACE process […] The acronym is fitting
since these [five] steps are the surest path to lasting peace of mind» (page
38). What is such a clear declaration of Sophism?! If you pay me, then you
"surely" get the “true”, or the “peace of mind”! (Honestly, I do not
know whether Marinoff sometimes feels like God…) He writes: «By no means does
benefiting from the wisdom of the ages hinge on having a Ph.D. or any such
thing» (page 9). I agree, and Marinoff himself certainly represents a living
example of this sentence. I think that if he had proposed a more serious image
of philosophical counseling, then he would have not been induced to think out –
and to push actively for – the introduction of a bill to authorize NY State
certification (licensing) for himself!
The other theoretical proposal of Marinoff is the direct and
non-critical passage from the Western philosophy to the Eastern thought, and vice
versa, that he constantly makes in his book. (I am sure that Marinoff does
not know that this passage represents in some sense a “theoretical proposal”, i.e.,
something to be seriously justified.) By using a precious fisherman’s example,
he peacefully writes:
I’ve find it invaluable to
cast my net wider than just Western philosophy […]. Three important branches of
philosophy originated in roughly the same time period of antiquity, circa
600-400 B.C.E. […] The Athenian school […]. At the same time, in a different
part of the planet, the Forest Sages of India, most famously Siddharta Gautama
(Buddha), were adding to the Hindu worldview. Just around the globe, Confucius
and Lao Tzu were developing Confucianism and Taoism, which together with the
older I Ching, form the heart of Chinese philosophy. This crucial period
in those ancient civilizations was formative in the history of philosophy. I
use this three traditions with my clients in approximately equal measure,
tailoring my choices to the individual, naturally. (pages 53-54)
Here it is just one example. Talking about the I Ching, he
writes:
You seek advice, you throw
some coins, and the I Ching gives you expert guidance purely by chance.
It doesn’t exactly add up, but it surely works. Hume thought that “chance” was
a vulgar word, expressing only our ignorance. The I Ching ‘s reliability
suggests that Hume was right. (page 304)
Considering series of events, Hume supposed
that just “custom” or “habit” make humans sure that when one event follows
another, the first caused the second. And for “custom” or “habit” once again,
when we do not find events that follow one another, we claim for “chance”. (In
this sense, the term simply dresses our “ignorance”.) The only problem is that
so standing things, how is it possible that Marinoff gives trouble to Hume in
order to justify what he calls “reliability” of the I Ching?! In fact,
one only of these two possibilities may be true: either the I Ching is
“reliable” or Hume “was right”! In this case, Marinoff plainly fails to apply
Hume’s scepticism. What strange kind of “supernatural” reason persuaded
Marinoff into the belief that if «you throw some coins», then the I Ching
«surely works»?! And finally, what have to do Hume's opinion with his
respectable but personal “superstition”?!
The Appendix E of the book of Marinoff,
called “Consulting the I Ching”, «briefly outlines the proper way to use coins
to point you to a reading» (page 301). Marinoff is not Chinese, but American;
and he only pretends to be a “philosopher”. I want to respect his ideas, but I
think it is better he become clear with himself before sentencing thing such
as, «a lot of New Age thought takes as a premise that the world is just as it
should be or is meant to be» (page 11). What is the real reason for which
Marinoff thinks the I Ching is just “reliable” as it should be or is
meant to be?! Actually, I find very strange Marinoff’s various attacks (not
required) against the New Age: «This book can guide you. But rather than
offering superficial New Age […], this book offers time-tested wisdom
specifically geared to helping you live with fulfilment and integrity in an
ever more challenging world» (page 7). This sort of justification and analogous
expressions make me feel perplexed…
Instead to waste my time in criticizing
Marinoff’s mess confusion of Western and Eastern thought, quite different each
other from a strictly epistemological point of view, I prefer directly to quote
some high reflection on the matter from Emile M. Cioran, a shrewd thinker who
desperately suffered La tentation d’exister.
«La vie intense est contraire au Tao», enseigne Lao-tse, l'homme le plus
normal qui fut. [...] Maîtres dans l'art de
penser contre soi, Nietzsche, Baudelaire et Dostoïevski nous [au contraire] ont
appris à miser sur nos périls, à élargir la sphère de nos maux, à acquérir de
l'existence par la division d'avec notre être. Et ce qui aux yeux du grand
Chinois était symbole de déchéance, exercice d'imperfection, constitue pour
nous l'unique modalité de nous posséder, d'entrer en contact avec nous-mêmes. [8]
Des siècles d'attention au temps, d'idolâtrie du devenir. Nous en
affranchirons-nous par quelque recours à la Chine ou à l'Inde?
La délivrance, si l'on y tient en effet, doit procéder de nous: point ne
faut la chercher ailleurs, dans un système tout fait ou quelque doctrine
orientale. [9]
Plus d'un a l'Inde facile, s'imagine en avoir démêlé les secrets, alors
que rien ne l'y dispose, ni son caractère, ni sa formation, ni ses inquiétudes.
Quel pullulement de faux «délivrés» qui nous regardent du haut de leur salut! [10]
As a matter of fact, both in nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, many philosophers made some reflection on the relationship
between the Western philosophy and the Eastern thought (Hegel, Kierkegaard,
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, to name but few). Yet, Marinoff does not mention
opinions on the subject at all, and that confirms once again his shocking
superficiality as a “theoretician”. The most persuading effect of differences
that exist between the Western philosophy and the Eastern thought concerns the birth
of “Modern Science”: it is not a mere accident that happened in our world. For
example, Edmund Husserl clearly argued the subject as follows:
Für das tiefere Verständnis der griechisch-europäischen Wissenschaft
(universal gesprochen: der Philosophie) in ihrem prinzipiellen Unterschied von
den gleichbewerteten orientalischen „Philosophien" ist es nun notwending,
die praktisch-universale Einstellung, wie sie vor der europäischen Wissenschaft
sich jene Philosophien schuf, näher zu betrachten und sie als
religiös-mythische aufzuklären. [11]
Es ist verkehrt, es ist eine Sinnesverfälschung, wenn man, in den von
Griechenland geschaffenen und neuzeitlich fortgebildeten wissenschaftlichen
Denkweisen erzogen, schon von indischer und chinesischer Philosophie und
Wissenschaft (Astronomie, Mathematik) spricht, also Indien, Babylonien, China
europäisch interpretiert. [12]
The book of Marinoff has become a best seller
in sixteen different countries (including Italy), painfully spreading all over
the world its errors, misunderstandings, superficialities, etc., contained. How
can we justify that fact? It is possible that
philosophical counseling represents so very successful ideas
that even bad works like Marinoff’s book sells well. (So standing things, it is
better you write a book on the subject as soon as possible!) Otherwise, it is
possible to suppose that people do not read so carefully the books they sell.
Probably, our world is too much filled with shouted slogans and wear-and-tear
aphorisms to allow some space to consistency, honesty, composure or sacrifice
of a really Socratic examined life today. I am not a pessimist; the point is
that the great fortune of the book of Marinoff certainly represents a defeat of
culture in general all around the world. One could even ask, how is it possible
to continue to do philosophy in society after this clamorous rout?!
[1]
T.B.MUNTEANU, Critical Review of Lou Marinoff’s Plato, not
Prozac!, in The Proceedings of the Friesian School,
Fourth Series, electronic journal and archive of philosophy – http://www.friesian.com/munteanu.htm.
[I made available an Italian translation of the review at the URL: http://www.geocities.com/philosophy_practices/friesian_school/Recens_Munteanu.htm.]
-
The only source for Socrates and his philosophy is Plato [see page 57];
- Kant was a rationalist [page 65];
>
- Kant’s noumenon is a way of &qquot;really look"-ing (appearing),
not a mode of being [see page 65-66];
- Plato is a character in the Republlic [page 183];
- Plato is "the foremost naturalisst" [page 186];
- teleology is equal to philosophical uutilitarianism [see page 192];
- Socrates' negative elenchus reeveals only what something isn't, while
Leonard Nelson’s Socratic Dialogue aims directly at what a thing is
[page 262];
- etc.
[3] G.W.F.Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes,
Bamberg und Würzburg, bei Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807. (Full German original
text re-printed in: G.W.F.Hegel, Fenomenologia
dello Spirito, V.Cicero (ed.), Bompiani, Milano 2000; page 52).
My literal English translation: «To co-operate
in order that philosophy may attain the goal to leave its name of Love for
Knowledge for becoming Real Knowledge – that is the task I mean
for myself».
[4]
In the twentieth century, various thinkers (e.g., some sociologists and
philosophers of complexity) re-visited Hegelian dialectic in the sense
indicated by Marinoff. (By revaluating some aspects of it, they made recurring
the thesis/antithesis/synthesis process, or they suggested that the world is
not black-and-white, nor false-and-true.) I suppose Marinoff read something about
these re-visitations, but I doubt he directly knows Hegel's main original works.
[5] In my opinion, the absence of
Heidegger is two time paradoxical in this case. In the first place,
Heidegger can be peacefully considered as a reliable “existentialist”. (The
alternative is “ontologist”, but Marinoff does not mention Ontology at all.) In
the second place, I like to remember that Heidegger was one of the very few
twentieth-century philosophers who affirmed that it is possible to consider in
some way Nietzsche as an “existentialist”. (But I do not think that Marinoff
knows such a peculiar position.)
[6] In this sense, for example I do not find necessary the chapter so
trivially entitled: “Hit Parade of Philosophers”. By the way, the “Hit
Parade” is a “classification” – from the first item to the last. But Marinoff
mentions philosophers following an “alphabetical order”! What a strange kind of
“Hit Parade” is that?! Moreover, what have in common Western philosophers like
Kant, Nietzsche, Gödel, Quine, etc., with thinkers like Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu or
Confucius?! Probably, Marinoff would justify better and deeper his many
extravagances ...
[7] With
respect to “emotions”, for example, I think that the simple expression of
emotions is not philosophical at all, because philosophy is at the most to
rationalize emotions.
[8] E.M.Cioran, La tentation d'exister,
Gallimard, Paris 1956; page 11.
My
literal English translation: «"A deeply living goes not along with Tao", as teached by Lao
Tzu, the most common man who has never existed. [On the contrary,] learned
people of the thinking-against-the-self, such as Nietzsche, Baudelaire and
Dostoïevski taught to let our trust in endangering life, to inwider the range
of our ills, to come into existence by separating us from our being. And all
that which for the great Chinese represented a falling into decay, or an
exercise of imperfection, it is for us the only way we have to come into
contact with – and to be in possession of – ourselves».
[9] Page 12.
My literal English translation: «From time
immemorial we take heed of time, idolatrizing the change. Could we redeem
ourselves by appealing to China or India?».
My
literal English translation: «Redemption, if you really are concerned with it, has to proceed from
yourself: it is of no use to look for it elsewhere, in a recorded system or in
some Oriental doctrine».
[10] Page 13.
My literal English translation: «Many people
easily have got India, pretending its secrets to be disclosed; but they are
quite not predisposed to that, either for character, or formation or
disquitude. What a pullulating of false "redempted" looking us from
the highness of their salvation!».
[11] E.Husserl, "Die Krisis des
Europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie" (1935), in Die Krisis
der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie,
W.Biemel (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1976, page 314-348:
329-330.
My literal English translation: «In order to
understand the Greek-European science (in universal terms, Philosophy) and its
fundamental difference from Oriental "philosophies", respecting all
of them, it is necessary to go more deeply into the universal-practical
attitude proper of all philosophies that were born before the European science;
so, that attitude will reveal its own mythical-religious sense».
[12] Page 331.
My literal English translation: «We are well
educated in conceiving the scientific thought arisen in the ancient Greece,
which was then worked out by modern science; hence, it is wrong – in the sense
of a falsification of meaning – both to talk about Indian or Chinese
philosophy and science (astronomy, mathematics), and to interpret India,
Babylonia or China into an European sense».
[*] EDITORIAL NOTE
Dr. Alessandro Volpone is a teacher of primary school, qualified
for high school teaching too. He graduated in philosophy at the University of Bari,
Italy (06/29/1993). At present, he is taking a degree in biology, at the Campus
of the same University, studying zoology and theoretical biology. Philosophical
post-graduate courses of his are: Epistemology and Computing (1995/96),
Bioethics (1996/97), Theory and Practice of Philosophy Teaching (1997/98) – all
of them of the University of Bari. From some years, Dr. Alessandro Volpone
co-operates as a teacher educator of Philosophy for Children with the C.R.I.F. (Centro Ricerca Insegnamento Filosofico), Italian Research Center for
Philosophy Teaching, of Rome; and he is a founder-member of the A.I.C.F. (Associazione Italiana Counseling Filosofico), Italian Association for
Philosophical Counseling, of Turin. Currently, other co-operations deal with
philosophy and biology.