FORCED
MILITARY SERVICE:
Why
Did Canada Use Conscription In The First World War?
History
2610
Dr.
J. Petryshyn
3
March 1998
When Canada entered the First World War, the government promised
citizens any effort would be voluntary. This voluntary duty was successful for
nearly three years. However, after allied forces took Vimy Ridge it became
apparent that another method of recruitment needed to be implemented. Wounded
Canadian soldiers were being sent back to battle, the casualty rate was high,
and there just weren’t enough new recruits to replace the dwindling Canadian
forces. Although many Canadians were opposed to the idea of forced military
service, Prime Minister Robert Borden had no other choice but to implement it.
In 1914, Great Britain declared war on Germany. At this time,
there was no doubt among Canadians that they should be part of the British war
effort. Even French nationalist Henri Bourassa thought it was necessary. The
general consensus among Canadians was that any military effort would be
voluntary. At first this policy was successful. Four Canadian Regiments were
sent overseas, and Canadian soldiers earned a well-deserved reputation. This
reputation did have a downside; Canadian troops were sent into many dangerous
front line battles because of it. By mid 1917, high casualties and declining
recruitment had begun to take their toll. New recruitment methods were
obviously necessary. [1]
Other methods such as propaganda campaigns were tried but proved unsuccessful.
Borden set in motion a voluntary national registration program designed to
identify possible recruits. Only one fifth of these were returned. Not one of
the noted possible recruits volunteered.[2]
When this ploy did not work it became obvious to Borden that he must go back on
his word not to implement conscription.
Canada was not the only country looking at conscription as a
method of filling out troops. When the United States entered the war, they had
an automatic draft imposed. In Australia popular vote twice defeated any
possibility of conscription. Borden new that he had a hard sell for the idea in
Canada. The issue of conscription quickly turned into a French/English issue.
Borden offered to stay the conscription vote until after the upcoming election
if Sir Wilfred Laurier[3]
would join forces. Laurier, misreading English Canada, and fearing the loss of
Quebec to Henri Bourassa declined the offer. Laurier fought the conscription
issue, but nowhere near as adamantly as Bourassa.[4]
The House of Commons voted 102 to 44 in favour of conscription, and the bill
was approved by senate.[5]
After passing the Military Service Act, which created conscription, Borden
dissolved the government and called a federal election. Many Liberals in favour
of conscription, including the West’s most influential Liberal – Sir Clifford
Siften, joined Borden to form a Coalition Union Government. This union
government promoted the use of conscription, wartime prohibition, and an end to
political patronage.[6]
Borden’s coalition won the federal election with a large majority.[7]
As explained by Historian Norman Ward, the effect of conscription was
devastating not only for the Liberals, but also for Borden:
The
Wartime election of 1917 not merely split the Liberals over the conscription
issue, but gave Sir Robert Borden a Unionist majority, composed of
Conservatives and former Liberals, which became increasingly difficult to
control as the thirteenth Parliament wore on.[8]
The Military Service Act became law in July of 1917, but it was
not imposed until January 1918, after the federal election. The policy was
designed to keep Canadian forces at their current level, but did not include
plans for expansion. Conscripts were selected based on marital status and age.
The Act had three states of appeal. Of the 404,395 men called in for the first
class, 380,510 appealed. When the first group was called for training, only
20,000 appeared.[9] Due to heavy
casualties, in March 1918 the government was forced to cancel any exceptions to
the Act; because of this many farmer’s sons were conscripted right at seeding
time.[10]
This did little to win favour for conscription among the rural population.
It did not take long for conscription to become a French/English
issue. French Canada was almost unanimous in it’s opposition. From the start
there were many issues French Canadians cited. Henri Bourassa insisted that
Borden was an imperialist. He advocated the idea that Canada should use the war
as an economic tool, by supplying food, equipment, and shells. At the same time
he maintained that Canada’s front line was Canada, not the European
battlefields.[11]
Bourassa’s ideas, although believed by many French Canadians
were not the only issues Quebecers faced. Tensions between French and English
Canada were already amplified by the revival of the school question, not only
in Manitoba but also in Ontario.[12]
The language issue served only to help destroy the feelings of good will which
had been felt between English and French Canada during the early years of the
war.[13]
As a whole, French Canadians were never as connected to the war
as were English Canadians. The French did not feel strong ties with either
England or France, and tended to look more internally to North American, and
more particularly Canadian, issues. The heightened language issues caused them
to once again to look at the internal Canadian situation rather than the war in
Europe. Added to this were language barriers in the Canadian Military which
caused difficulties for French Canadians to enlist and train. Military forces
were also not very concerned with the creation of French Regiments, or the
promotion of French officers.
Another possible explanation for the resistance of French Canada
was the legacy of Sam Hughes. Hughes, the former Minister of Militia, had
angered the Quebec population. He made no attempt to place French Canadian
volunteers in French units, and indeed believed they should be receiving orders
from English officers. He also angered the Roman Catholics by using Protestant
Ministers as recruiting officers in Quebec.[14]
The alienation Quebecers felt must have been great, as talk in
the province circled around topics such as separatism, revolution, even
annexation to the United States.[15]
Although Bourassa did not outright advocate rebellion, the editorial pages in
his newspaper, Le Devoir, saw it as an inevitable result.[16]
Eventually rebellion did occur. Over the 1918 Easter weekend, anti-conscription
riots broke out in Quebec City. These riots were quelled only when soldiers
from Toronto arrived. The soldiers fired out into the crowds. When all was said
and done four civilians were dead. Ottawa took these riots very seriously and
announced any further protests would result in immediate, on the spot,
conscription.[17] This only
served to further the opposition to conscription among French Canadians.
What may have seemed solely a French/English issue was, in fact,
not. French Canada stood a united front against the use of conscription. Thins
were not as clear-cut in the rest of the country. Many groups did oppose the
bill but did not have the forum to present their views. From the beginning,
farmers were opposed to the use of conscription on farmers. They felt they were
contributing to the war effort by growing food. After exceptions to the
Military Services Act were revoked, this opposition from farmers grew stronger.
Many workers and unions saw the use of conscription as the first step towards
forced service elsewhere. They felt they would be forced to have the same job
for the duration of the war if such a plan were implemented. Pacifists and
religious groups felt the idea of war was immoral. Pacifists, who had at one
time been seen as honourable, were now considered “slackers”[18].
In fact, in the April 3, 1918 issue of The Guardian, the article The
Vice of Pacifism condemned pacifism as being “a vice revealing the terrible
fact that the conscience has lost its sensitiveness and the soul has lost its
courage.”[19]
The August 1918 battle of Amiens in France was the last battle
fought by a Canadian Military made up strictly of volunteers. After this battle
there was an influx of approximately 12,000 reinforcements; this was the first
injection of conscripts. Specialist in military history, Daniel Dancocks,
claims two facts were immediately noticeable:
The
first is that the Corps could not have contributed so impressively during the
remaining months of the war without the conscripted solders who filled the
depleted ranks. The second is that the Corps would never again reach the peak
of efficiency displayed at Amiens.[20]
In total, nearly 120,000
men were conscripted; before the end of the war almost 47,000 were sent
overseas. Perhaps had the end of the war seemed imminent such large numbers
would not have been used. As explained by former editor of The Canadian
Historical Review, Ramsay Cook, nobody suspected the war was near an end.
The
disruption of national unity was a high price to pay for those reinforcements,
but in the spring of 1918 the war was in its most critical phase and neither
Borden nor anybody else realized that Germany would collapse in November.[21]
The use of conscription in the First World War had three major
outcomes. It heightened French/English tensions. Precedence was set for the use
of conscription. Finally, the conscripted soldiers, although few in number,
were an essential part of Canada’s war effort in the final months of World War
One. This war effort considerably gained recognition for Canada as a nation,
both internally and externally.
Had Canada not joined the war with Britain at the start, there
is a chance conscription would never have been needed. The general belief that
Britain’s war was Canada’s war started the course of events which ended with
conscription. This belief was held in both English and French Canada. Tense
relations between English and French Canadians has always been an essential
part of the country. It is true “La crise de la conscription” heightened
tensions during the first world war, but it would be hard to prove the act had
any permanent negative effects on relations; rather, it was just one of many
issues that divide the country.
Throughout her short history, Canada has always been a nation
with an identity crisis. During the First World War, Canada was learning to
stand on her own, looking to her mother for support and guidance. The guidance
Britain gave was not particularly maternal, but did allow the country to grow
up independent. The push for more form Britain was one of the major influences
to use conscription. The actual use of conscription allowed Canada to realize
the potential of her abilities. Canadian solders stood proud in the war, an
overall contributed a great deal to the allied effort. This helped to
considerably elevate Canada’s status as an independent nation. At first, when
Prime Minister Borden asked Britain if he could be part of the peace
negotiations with Germany, they refused; but, in honour of Canada’s dead, a
place was later granted at the newly formed League of Nations. When the
American Secretary of State complained about Canada’s place at the
negotiations, he was reminded that Canada had suffered more casualties in the
war than the United States.[22]
Borden set a precedent when he initiated conscription. At the
onset of the Second World War Sir William Lyon Mackenzie King also vowed he
would not use conscription; but perhaps it was not as bitter a pill to swallow
when he too had to employ it. Although the conscription issue once again raised
French/English tensions during the Second World War, the shock was nowhere near
as great when, once again, heavy casualties forced its use. Even though Canada now has an identity
separate from Britain, and will not automatically follow them to war, does not
mean we will not be involved in overseas action such as in Iraq. The precedence
set by the use of conscription in both World Wars is something for Canadians to
be aware of, given the current state of world affairs, and in the event of
future conflicts.
In 1917, casualties were high, enlistment was low, Canada was
deep in the war effort, Britain was demanding more, and Borden had to make a
decision. It was quite possibly the hardest decision of his career as forced
military could spell the death of his political life. It is ironic that, in the
end, conscription of Canadian soldiers had little impact on the outcome of the
war. However, the decision by Borden to introduce it was the right one. The
most important consideration when analyzing his decision is realizing that
during the time conscription was introduced and implemented, there were no
signs of the war ending soon. As Prime Minister, Borden did what had to be
done.
Callwood, June. Portrait of Canada. (Garden
City: Double Day and Company, 1981)
Cook, Ramsey; John Saywell; John Rickel. Canada:
A modern Study. Revised Edition. (Toronto/Vancouver: Clark Irwin & Company,
1977)
Craig John. The Years of Agony 1910-1920.
(Toronto: Natural Science of Canada, 1977)
Dancocks, Daniel G. Spearhead to Victory: Canada and the Great War. (Edmonton:
Hurtig Publishers, 1987)
Fillion, John, ed., The Canadian World Almanac &
Book of Facts 1988 (Toronto: Global Press, 1987)
Francis, R. Douglas; Richard Jones; Donald Smith.
Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation. 3rd Edition.
(Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1996)
McGinnis Shulze, Lorine. The Canadian Great War
Homepage. (Online. Internet. Feb 25, 1998. Available: http://www.rootsweb.com/~wwIcan/time.htm)
Moniere, Denis. La crise de la conscription.
Online. Internet. Feb 23, 1998. Available: http://w3.alphacom.net/~frapb/vigile/hist/conscription/moniereconspiption1.html
Smith, Donald B., R. Douglas Francis. Editors. Readings
in Canadian History Post Confederation. 4th edition. (Toronto:
Harcourt Brace and Company, 1994)
Ward, Norman. The Public Purse. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1951)
[1]
Close examination of enlistment records will show the majority of volunteers to
the ware effort were recent British immigrants. Native-born English Canadians
were less likely to volunteer. French Canadians were the least likely. (Cook,
192)
[2]
Morton, Desmond. A Short History of Canada. (Edmonton: Hurting
Publishers) 151
[3]
Laurier was a former Prime Minister, and the leader of the opposition.
[4]
Morton, 153
[5]
Callwood, June. Portrait of Canada. (Garden City: Double Day and
Company, 1981) 251
[6]
Morton, 154-155
[7]
Borden won 153 seats, of which only 3 came from Quebec. Of the 82 seats Laurier
won, 20 came from outside Quebec. The issue was very polarized French vs.
English.
[8]
Ward, Norman. The Public Purse. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1951). 155.
[9]
Morton, 155
[10]
Morton, 155-156
[11]
Morton, 153
[12] In
Ontario regulation 17 allowed French teaching in early grades only, and restricted
the establishment of French-language schools. Manitoba had abolished French
language schools entirely.
[13]
Cook, Ramsey; John Saywell; John Rickel. Canada: A Modern Study. Revised
edition. (Toronto/Vancouver: Clark Irwin & Company, 1977). 199-192.
[14] Craig,
John. The Years of Agony 1910-1920. (Toronto: Natural Science of Canada,
1977). 87.
[15]
Callwood, 251
[16]
Craig, 87
[17]
Morton, 155-156
[18]
The term “slackers” was a propaganda tool used to promote the war effort as
being good, and those who did not contribute to it as being less than
honourable.
[19]
Quoted in: Socknat, Thomas P. “Canada’s Liberal Pacifists and the Great War.”
in Readings in Canadian History Post Confederation. 4th ed.
Editors R. Douglas Francis & Donald B. Smith. (Toronto: Harcourt Brace and
Company: 1994). 337
[20]
Dancocks, Daniel G. Spearhead to Victory: Canada and the Great War. (Edmonton:
Hurting Publishers, 1987). 86
[21]
Cook, 196.
[22] Callwood, 256