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Preventing Chemical Terrorism and Accidents Questions and Answers on the Chemical Security Act The “Chemical Security Act” (S.1602) will protect communities from terrorism and accidents involving hazardous industrial chemicals. This bill establishes the first national effort to reduce industrial chemical hazards that endanger nearby neighborhoods, schools, hospitals, senior centers, or other public and business areas. Senators Corzine, Jeffords, Boxer, and Clinton introduced the Chemical Security Act and held hearings on November 14, 2001 (testimony: www.senate.gov/~epw/stm1_107.htm ). Q: What is the purpose of
the Chemical Security Act? A: The Chemical Security Act establishes the first federal program to reduce or secure industrial chemicals that can endanger surrounding communities in the event of terrorism or accidents. Q: Why is the Chemical
Security Act needed? A: Recent terror attacks show how hazardous chemical facilities could suffer a worst-case explosion or toxic gas release into surrounding communities. At some 3,000 U.S. facilities, more than 10,000 people live within the “vulnerability zone” where they could be hurt of killed in an industrial chemical release; some 700 facilities each put more than 100,000 people at risk. Yet no federal law regulates these vulnerability zones in terms of size, chemical intensity, or populations at risk, or even requires companies to assess and consider inherently safer alternatives. What is more, current voluntary industry efforts show almost no measurable progress toward reducing the size of these vulnerability zones. Q: What will the Chemical Security Act do? A: The Chemical Security Act gives government the tools it needs to combat chemical terrorism, while taking a flexible approach to encourage innovation. In general, the bill will: n Require the EPA Administrator, in consultation with the Attorney General and state and local agencies, to identify high priority industries that use dangerous chemicals based on the threat posed by potential terrorism or accidental release; n Make it the legal duty of high-priority industries to reduce chemical hazards to the extent practicable or take steps to secure these hazards and to minimize the consequences of any releases that do occur; n Establish a consistent national approach to inherent safety that will encourage companies to reduce hazards first before resorting to expensive add-on security or safety equipment; n Provide the EPA Administrator and the Attorney General with the necessary legal authorities to protect the public, including abatement, facility record keeping, site entry, and penalties for non-compliance; n Require the EPA Administrator to take long-overdue action to protect the public – and not just rely on voluntary industry efforts. Q: How does the Chemical
Security Act differ from current chemical safety laws? A: Current laws cover various aspects of chemical safety, but none require companies to use (or even assess) safer alternatives that eliminate or reduce wherever practicable dangerous practices that could send a chemical fire or toxic cloud beyond the plant fence line. In general:
In short, no federal law directly regulates the vulnerability zones that hazardous chemical facilities impose on surrounding communities. The Chemical Security Act will reduce and eliminate these industrial chemical hazards in communities wherever practicable, and ensure that high-priority industries secure and safeguard chemical hazards that cannot be reduced or eliminated. Q: How will reducing
industrial chemical hazards help in the fight against terrorism? A: Design for prevention can be the best site security option. What you don’t have, can’t explode – and doesn’t require expensive add-on site security. For this reason, EPA advises companies that “eliminating or attenuating to the extent practicable any hazardous characteristic during facility or process design is generally preferable to simply adding on safety equipment or security measures.”1 (See www.epa.gov/swercepp/pubs/secale.pdf) Q: How will the Chemical
Security Act reduce our vulnerability to chemical terrorism? A: The Chemical Security Act directs high-priority facilities to reduce their vulnerabilities to chemical terrorism “to the extent practicable” by: · First, using inherently safer technologies that eliminate or reduce the possibility of a serious chemical fire or release; · Second, for vulnerabilities that cannot be reduced or eliminated, adding well-maintained secondary containment, control, or mitigation equipment; · Third, for vulnerabilities that remain, improving site security and employee training; and, · Fourth, as a last resort, establishing buffer zones that keep extremely hazardous chemicals away from vulnerable populations (and vice versa). This prevention hierarchy covers all bases and in all cases will identify feasible measures to protect communities and the environment – without forcing companies to use any particular technology. Q: The Environmental
Protection Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency already
coordinate emergency response – why doesn’t that fix the problem? A: These agencies coordinate emergency response. In contrast, the Chemical Security Act will reduce the possibility of toxic spills “to the extent practicable” before a chemical release ever occurs. In common terms: n An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure – safer technologies can avoid the need to respond and clean up after spills; n Better safe than sorry – reducing unnecessary chemical hazards can prevent deaths, injuries, and evacuations; n Don’t put all your eggs in one basket – start with prevention and use all approaches, not just response after spills and emergencies. Q: Aren’t OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) and EPA’s Risk Management Planning (RMP) programs intended to prevent catastrophic chemical releases? A: These laws don’t deal with many chemical spills, let alone terrorism. For example, one review examined 167 U.S. deadly chemical accidents that together killed over 100 people – and found that over half of the chemicals involved are not currently covered by PSM or RMP.2 Further, while both programs help firms identify hazards, neither program includes any requirement that companies consider safer alternative chemicals or processes. In addition, neither program considered terrorism prevention when selecting covered chemicals, thresholds, or processes. In 1995, EPA considered adding inherent safety requirements to the RMP program, but then failed to act. Q: What objections are
raised to the Chemical Security Act? A: Chemical industry lobbyists and their most rigid allies in Congress have long sought to restrict public right-to-know about potential catastrophic spills. They argued that unrestricted disclosure would lead terrorist to target their facilities. The reality, however, is that terrorists can get information from any number of sources. The real danger is the chemicals themselves, which is why hazard reduction is needed. Faced with the actual chemical security requirements of the Chemical Security Act, however, the chemicals lobby is once again working against making plants inherently safer. Here are some of their arguments against reducing chemical hazards: [o] The
bill makes terror attack victims into “criminals.” No, the bill requires companies to secure their chemicals against intrusion, theft, or criminal release. A showing of negligence is necessary before a company is held responsible for security lapses. Since terrorism at a chemical plant involves such extraordinary hazards, it is necessary to prosecute companies that fail to meet security regulations. In the words of Edward Munoz, a former managing director of Union Carbide, India (before the Bhopal chemical leak killed thousands of people), “if you do something that is inherently dangerous and somebody does something foolish with it, still you are responsible for doing what was inherently dangerous.” [o] A
voluntary effort is sufficient to protect against terror attacks. No, we need a national response to potential terrorism, not just voluntary self-assessments by local facilities. For example, if site security at airports were voluntary, it would not work well or make Americans feel safe. Further, a survey of nearly 200 major chemical companies found only three that had developed measurable goals and timelines to reduce worst-case vulnerability zones.3 In addition, the chemical industry claims that its own voluntary standards are not intended to supplant regulations: “We don’t want anyone to say, ‘We don’t need this regulation, because we have Responsible Care’,” said the chemical manufacturer’s Don Evans; “We don’t view the [Responsible Care] program as a shield [against regulation].”4 Finally, recent voluntary industry site security guidelines lack standards, timelines, or measurable hazard reduction goals. They contain no third party verification and are not enforceable. They dismiss the need to address potential worst-case releases – even after Sept. 11 – and assume that terrorists or accidents will not cause add-on protection equipment to fail (e.g., if an airplane crashes into a plant). They don’t address the added security risks of contract workers. They don’t apply margins of safety. They don’t weigh security costs against safer design. They neglect inherent safety options that can reduce hazards and reduce security needs. They don’t include materials accounting methods to help identify theft. They don’t account for security costs imposed on police, fire fighters, and local governments. They don’t address anonymous chemical sales on the Internet. In short, they are not designed to protect public health and safety. [o] It’s
the government’s job to prevent terrorism – the bill puts the government’s
job on industry. No, it is impossible for government to predict and prevent all possible terror attacks, chemical theft, site intrusion, etc. The chemical industry needs to acknowledge this and act accordingly. General knowledge of a possible terror attack is enough to require prudent safety actions even without specific knowledge of an impending specific attack. [o] Congress should let the new Office of Homeland Security take care of national security. No, the Office of Homeland Security is very small and has limited resources and authority. Further, Congress has a duty and obligation to make the laws that tell the executive branch what to do. [o] Now is not the time for new regulations on industry. Contrast the words of EPA Assistant Administrator Marianne Horinko about the need to protect water supplies: “Clearly, the Administrator is adamant that EPA's efforts to help secure the safety and integrity of American’s water supply and infrastructure must be undertaken with great speed, energy, and attention. Deadlines that were established before September 11th for action are no longer appropriate. We have no time to waste….”5 Public interest organizations have long advocated for hazard reduction at chemical plants; the risk of terrorist attacks makes this need all the more evident. Notes:
Version
12-23-01, prepared by: Working
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