Shi'ite Muslims, the "early fundamentalists" (Hiro, 24), have always leaned towards conservatism and orthodoxy. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the Sunni Abbasid caliphs began slipping away from an ultra-orthodox interpretation of the Quran, the Shias became "the sole repositories of the vision of ideal Islam" (Hiro, 25). Even in modern times, Shi'ite Muslims have remained the orthodox sect of Islam. When the Shah "launched the White Revolution with the purpose of bringing Iran into the modern world" (Groliers), ousted religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini successfully led the Shias to revolt. Khomeini was victorious in dethroning the Shah because the Shi'ite Muslim majority in Iran wanted a purist form of Islam that would struggle against "Western liberalism" (Military Review, 33).
Shi'ism, with its insistence upon strict formality and purist views, is clearly the more orthodox of the two sects of Islam. Of Iran's 65,615,474 citizens, 95% are Shi'ite Muslims, 4% are Sunni Muslims, and 1% are Jews, Bahais, Zoroastrians, and Christians. The obvious majority religion, Shi'ism, preaches that through "asceticism and suffering one can remove the ill- effects of sin" (Hiro, 145). This is in direct contrast to Sunnism, which has "no such outlets for its followers" (Hiro, 146). Sunnis view Islamic history "essentially as a drift away from the ideal" (Hiro, 145). Shias, on the other hand, believe that "Islamic history is moving towards a fixed goal, and the forces of injustice will ultimately be defeated" (Hiro, 145). This view bends Shias towards radical activism because they feel that they will ultimately prevail over the unjust. They believe that "wars must be conducted for ideological and cultural, not national, ends" (Military Review, 33) and that "Holy Wars are waged against unbelievers and infidels" (Military Review, 33). And unlike the Sunnis, the Shias believe that "everything must be under Islamic Law's rule, as it was in Mohammed's time in Medina" (Military Review, 33).
The shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, had ideas that were in direct contrast to those of his constituents. In 1963, he instituted the so-called "White Revolution". He "initiated land reform by taking land away from the large landowners and the mullahs, the religious leaders" (Groliers). Wealthy landowners and Islamic clergy joined in 1963 to "oppose the shah's land reform program" (Diller, 216), beginning the White Revolution riots. The shah also "emancipated women and vastly expanded education" (Groliers). As oil revenues grew, modernization quickened. However, "with modernization came greater inflation, corruption, and social unrest, which the shah sought to control with the help of his brutal secret police, the SAVAK" (Groliers). The shah "further alienated his people by bringing in foreigners, especially Americans, to support his programs and provide technical skills" (Diller, 216).
During the 1960s and 1970s, "sentiment against the government was growing in nearly every segment of Iranian society" (Diller, 216). Middle-class Iranians "who opposed the government found allies in the religious hierarchy." (Diller, 216). The "clerics were incensed not only by the secularization of the education system, which they viewed as a direct assault on their position within Iranian society, but also by the Family Protection Law that allowed women to disobey Islamic teaching and divorce their husbands." (Diller, 216). The monarchy increasingly became an anti-Islamic symbol. By relying on foreigners and by reducing the role of the body of religious scholars in government, the shah "disrupted the balance that had existed between religious and secular authority in Iran" (Diller, 216). The religious scholars called upon conservatives in the Iranian population to rebel. Even the poor people opposed the shah, but mostly on moral issues. They saw his attempts to Westernize Iranian society as attack on beloved Muslim institutions. On the night of the revolution, the shah implemented price controls to stop inflation from rising. He closed nearly 250,000 small shops. This "alienated the merchant class, many of whom were jailed or excessively fined for profiteering" (Diller, 216).
The religious leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, used the negative sentiment against the shah as incentive for a revolt. After Khomeini was deported to Iran by the shah, he "was able to attack the shah's repressive regime more openly than its opponents in Iran could. As a result, he became first the symbolic and then the actual leader of the revolution as opponents of the shah rallied around his name" (Groliers). Khomeini "condemned the violation of Islamic and constitutional principles; political, economic, and military domination of Iran by foreign powers; suppression of freedom of expression, especially for the clergy; and the government's diplomatic, commercial, and intelligence relations with Israel" (Groliers). In 1978, after a government article in the Tehran newspaper Etelaat accused Khomeini of conspiring with Communists against the shah's rule, Khomeini supporters protested the article in "Qom", a religious center led by Shi'ite clergy. During the protest, armed troops from the SAVAK fired into the crowd. The victims of the shooting were "the first of an estimated ten thousand people killed during riots in 1978" (Diller, 217).
In November, Iranian workers "staged strikes in sympathy with the anti-shah demonstrators. The most important strikes were those by oil workers, whose walkout soon produced a fuel shortage, causing serious damage to the economy of the beleaguered nation" (Diller, 217). The shah, in a last minute attempt to appease his opponents, granted amnesty to Khomeini. However, the people would not be placated, and riots continued. Soon, even civil servants refused to report to work. On January 16, 1979, the shah announced "I am going on vacation because I am feeling tired." On February 1 Khomeini returned triumphantly to Iran. After "a referendum, in which the only form of government to appear on the ballot was an Islamic republic, the public overwhelmingly voted for the establishment of an Islamic republic" (Diller, 217).
A number of factors led to the ousting of the shah in 1979. However, the most important single factor was the fact that the Shi'ite majority in Iran was disgruntled with the shah's liberal ideas. Because the Ayatollah preached conservatism and orthodoxy, he was triumphant in dethroning the shah.