Is Stuttering a Condition?

Sheehan¹ states that stuttering is your behaviour, not a condition. Not a defect nor an illness, but a series of mistakes you continue to make. Mistakes that you can correct with a little self-study and courage

This conjecture falls within the parameters of Sheehan's role definition of stuttering. As described elsewhere on this site, this is an aspect of Sheehan's work that I don't necessarily agree with.

While I agree with the exploration into a possible behavioural aspect to stuttering extending far beyond mere disfluency in speech, I don't think any such terms should be used within any rigid definition, especially for an area with an etiology so ill defined as stuttering.

Contrary to Sheehan, I do believe there is scope to define stuttering in terms of a condition. It is widely recognised that most stutterers experience periods of fluency as well as disfluency. Most stutterers also experience periods when their speech is recognisably much more disfluent and the symptoms of stuttering much more pronounced.

A person with a heart condition is generally recognised as being more prone to having a heart attack, etc. The source of the condition may be genetic, lifestyle (hypertension), etc. People with such a condition do not normally experience a constant symptomatic physical reference but are normally cognisant (if they are aware of having such a condition) that they need to avoid particular over-exertion, etc. To map onto the stutterer, a stutterer is aware that it is likely that they are going to have problems with the fluency of their speech in the future. While they don't always stutter, they recognise that they will do so in the future, and they may even try to forestall it, often exacerbating the problem.

Sheehan's conjecture also arguably implies a cure to stuttering, something which seems to contradict most of his other ideas. By defining stuttering in respect of rectifiable mistakes, by implication if these mistakes are removed the stutter will not longer exist. There is a possibility that this may be correct and that it is possible, however difficult it may be, to cure a stutter through behaviour modification. However, again this seems contrary to Sheehan's other ideas and inconsistent with his general philosophy.

As a person with a heart condition can still live a long and fruitful life, especially if they take certain precautionary measures; it should also be possible to map a similar conclusion onto a condition of stuttering. By learning to control their stutter, rather than letting it control them, a person should be able to aspire to lead a communicatively productive life while still subject to a stuttering condition. This construct also fits much more comfortably within Sheehan main theory of avoidance reduction. For this reason, I feel defining a stutter as a condition is a valid construct.

Of course, the while issue is clouded somewhat by a definition of fluency over disfluency. Most speakers without a stutter cannot be defined as perfectly fluent. If a stutterer learns to control his or her stutter to such an extent that the experience of disfluency is comparable to a normal fluent (sic) speaker, can they still be defined as a disfluent speaker? If a stutterer becomes so comfortable with their stutter that their iceberg now floats almost entirely above the surface and their stuttering does not have any more implications to the listener than an unusual accent or speaking too fast would have when listening to a normal fluent (sic) speaker, are they now outside the categorisation of disfluency? Also, if stuttering can be defined as a condition, is it a permanent condition or can appropriate treatment remove it completely?

There are many people who argue that stuttering, per se, can never be completely removed or cured. However, if the symptoms and effects it causes can be alleviated to an extent that for both the speaker and the listener it is indistinguishable from general disfluency as experienced by all speakers, the effect is arguably such that the condition has been effectively been removed or minimised so that it no longer causes any real concern to the stutterer. This may be somewhat comparable to the way that the installation of a pacemaker allows a person with a heart condition to live a much less restricted and controlled life. For these reasons, I believe defining stuttering in terms of a condition may be useful in evaluating thereputical methodologies and praxis.