I Current work in Baha'i philosophy.
II Sabian astrology, which correlates Indian philosophy and the archetypes of African divination to the I-Ching.
III Wen Wang Gua, on the origin of the trigrams and their use in traditional Taoist divination.
IV The Gregory Richter translation of the I-Ching.
SABIAN LOGIC
The Sabian astrology reading results in eight hexagrams of the I-Ching designated as planets, and a specific line in each one. These are interpreted by reading the text accompanying the lines, such as for example in the James Legge translation. Each one of the texts may be represented as a trigram and read in the order outlined below. In accordance with the principle of mathematical logic called logical equality, if the two sides of an equation are the same the result is yang ( 1 ) and if they are different the result is yin ( 0 ).

order | trigram | name
1 | 000 | Moon
2 | 010 | Venus
3 | 110 | Mercury
4 | 011 | Sun
5 | 101 | Saturn
6 | 111 | Mars
7 | 100 | Jupiter
8 | 001 | Earth

This can be used to study the relationship between the trigrams, thus establishing logical connections between the texts represented by them, and this system works for any type of writing. The logical combination by which the trigrams produce other trigrams is likewise the way paragraphs represented by them can be combined in order to understand them. For example when the Moon trigram is logically combined with the Saturn trigram the Venus trigram is produced, etc. For reading, this and their chiasmatic disposition, as explained at the end of this page, appears to suffice, while for writing it appears that an understanding of these as manifestations of prakriti is required, as was seen in Sabian astrology. The following seeks to give a scientific explanation, based on the Fibonacci sequence, to an important consequence of this, namely, that all writings divide naturally into two distinct types.
In general, readings and writings are divided into two distinct types, depending on whether the reader or author considers them an intellectual endeavour or the expression of self-evident ( to him ) facts. It can be scientifically determined to which of these two a philosophical work belongs. Whether expressly stated or not, all such writtings begin from a distinction between what exists and what does not exist, these being expressed as two separate and distinct things . We will represent these as 1 and 0 respectively. Although from the point of view of Nature it may be represented that what exists appears from nothing, expressed as 0, 1, it is evident that for anything that is said nothing or zero cannot be meant as an absolute, but only in relation to that which is said to exist. Therefore, we will represent the basic principle of the appearance of existence, and all discursive reasoning about it, as 1, 0. From these all discourse proceeds, so that from the zero a one appears, expressed as 1, 0, 1. But just like nothing cannot be expressed as an absolute, neither can that which exists, once the discourse has begun. Therefore from the one that we previously established proceeds another one and zero, not only the zero because it already exists in relation to the previous zero, and not only one one because then it would have to be regarded as an absolute. The expression then has reached the form: 1, 0, 1, 1, 0. All subsequent values can be determined on the basis of this same principle. The first three have produced certain other values, and therefore we continue the discourse on the basis of what the fourth one adds to it. It being a one, and a one producing a one and a zero, the next expression is: 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0. Continuing with the fifth element, and it being a zero, the next value expressed is a one, and then the sixth element, being a one, produces a one and a zero. Then we have the expression: 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0. The first two values have produced single values, and begininng with the third one, it produced two others, then these two produced three, and those three produce five. The five then produces eight, which can be expressed as the sum of three and five, the five itself being the sum of two and three. The two was produced by adding one and one, and before that we had the expression of zero. Therefore, since the first three values produce only a single value, some writings begin with the expression of this single value, and some others express the preceeding one and zero as well. The former are the writings of the intellectuals, the latter those of the mystical poets. Therefore in applying Sabian logic to understand these writings, it will be convenient to remember that some begin with the first trigram, Moon, while others with the third, Mercury. Since the progression of ones and zeros produces no repeatable patterns, there are only these two possible forms of all discursive reasoning. Other writings such as those of scientists or fantasy writers rely on the ability of the mind to remember things that appear close to one another, and thus present ones and zeros in a haphazard attempt to retain the readers attention, but not according to any principle of logic. An example of the form of reading ( or writing ) proposed will now be given. If the third paragraph of a writing be regarded as the Mercury trigram, it will manifest a contrast to what is expressed in the seventh paragraph, represented by the Jupiter trigram, which expresses itself in the fifth paragraph, represented by the Saturn trigram. But if it were an intellectual writing, the third and seventh paragraphs would be represented by the Saturn and Moon trigrams respectively, instead. The eleventh paragraph would likewise be Saturn, and Moon and Saturn produce Venus, which would be the planet of the eighth paragraph. If it were a mystical writing, the eleventh paragraph would be Mercury, and Jupiter and Mercury do not produce Venus. By this and similar means it can be determined if the philosophical writing is that of an intellectual or a mystic. For example, the ninth and thirteenth paragraphs would be Moon and Saturn in mystical writings, but Mercury and Jupiter in intellectual ones, the first of these producing the Venus tenth paragraph, etc.
Unfortunately, some writings have been changed by editors so that the original paragraph divisions are no longer evident. Such is the case, for example, with modern versions of "The Book of Certitude" translated by Shoghi Effendi from Baha'u'llah, or the Bible. In this case it is necessary to use ones' intuition to determine where one paragraph ends or begins. If this is not possible, either one lacks information on what is written, or one determines that the writing is not worth the effort.
The first paragraph used in Sabian logic is always the first one in the text, but a text of at least sixteen paragraphs is interpreted as a chiasmus. In other words, the second paragraph used in Sabian logic would be the sixteenth one or a multiple of sixteen, the third one to be interpreted would be the second paragraph, the fourth one the one next before last of the multiple of sixteen, etc. If the text is intellectual (begins with the third paragraph) then that must be taken into account to find the second paragraph to be interpreted, and in the case of a text of sixteen paragraphs, it would be the twelth one because twelve would correspond to the third one before the last one, considering that the fourteenth one is actually the sixteenth one. No chiasmus will have more than 80 elements, and everything after the 80th paragraph is interpreted as a new chiasmus. Note that intellectual writings would end the first chiasmus with the 76th paragraph, and begin a new one with the 79th. If the new one has fewer than sixteen elements, it can be considered as part of a chiasmus that includes the previous one. For example, for a text with 20 paragraphs, paragraphs 17 - 20 could be considered as the second part of a chiasmus of 32 paragraphs, which would relate them to paragraphs 13 - 16.
Here are some other associations of the trigrams:

Trigram | Chinese alchemy | Plotinus' genus-of-being | Beginning or ending | Abdu'l-Bahas' terms | Abdu'l-Bahas' genus of spirits and other beings | Baha'i books | The lines related to the Baha'i calendar
011 | Air | The knowlegde other than the knower and the known | No end | Clouds | Holy spirits | God Passes By | Grandeur, Light, Mercy (4,5,6)
101 | Earth | The known other than the knower and the knowlegde | Ends | Suns | Holy spirits | Gospel of Thomas ( same as Quran in chronological order ) | Sovereignty, Dominion, Loftiness (17,18,19)
100 | Wood | The knowlegde | Ends | Rays of light | Animals | Prayers and Meditations | Will, Knowledge, Power (11,12,13)
111 | Fire | The knowlegde identical to the knower and the known | No end | Mirrors | Spirits of Faith | Will and Testament of Abdu'l Baha | Light, Mercy, Words (5,6,7)
001 | Yang | The known identical to the knower and the knowlegde | No beginning | Rain | Spirits of Faith | The Hidden Words | Splendour, Glory, Beauty (1,2,3)
010 | Metal | The known | No beginning | Fruits | Humanity | Epistle to the Son of the Wolf | Speech, Questions, Honour (14,15,16)
110 | Water | The knower | Begins | Trees | Plants | Gleanings from the Writings of Baha'u'llah | Perfection, Names, Might (8,9,10)
000 | Yin | The knower identical to the knowlegde and the known | Begins | Seeds | Inanimate objects | The Book of Certitude | Glory, Beauty, Grandeur (2,3,4)

Concerning all of the above, it would be wise to note that, should we be able to consider everything as coming from what has no beginning, there will be no end either, because our knowlegde of it could have no beginning.
FROM BOOK TWO OF ARISTOTLES' GENERATION AND CORRUPTION
§ 1 · We have explained under what conditions combination, contact, and action and passion are attributable to the things which undergo natural change. Further, we have discussed unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away, and explained under what conditions they occur, in what subject, and owing to what cause. Similarly, we have also discussed alteration, and explained what altering is and how it differs from coming-to-be and passing-away. But we have still to investigate the so-called elements of bodies.
For coming-to-be and passing-away occur in naturally constituted substances only given the existence of sensible bodies. But as to the matter which underlies these perceptible bodies, some maintain it is single, supposing it to be, e.g., Air or Fire, or an intermediate between these two (but still a body with a separate existence). Others, on the contrary, postulate more than one—ascribing to their association and dissociation, or to their alteration, the coming-to-be and passing-away of things. (Some, for instance, postulate Fire and Earth; some add Air, making three; and some, like Empedocles, reckon Water as well, thus postulating four.)
Now we may agree that the primary materials, whose change (whether it be association and dissociation or a process of another kind) results in coming-to-be and passing-away, are rightly described as principles or elements. But those thinkers are in error who postulate, beside the bodies we have mentioned, a single matter—and that a corporeal and separable matter. For this body cannot possibly exist without a perceptible contrariety—this ‘Boundless’, which some thinkers identify with the principle, must be either light or heavy, either cold or hot. And what Plato has written in the Timaeus is not based on any precisely-articulated conception. For he has not stated clearly whether his ‘Omnirecipient’ exists in separation from the elements; nor does he make any use of it. He says, indeed, that it is a substratum prior to the so-called elements—underlying them, as gold underlies the things that are fashioned of gold. (And yet this comparison, if thus expressed, is itself open to criticism. Things which come-to-be and pass-away cannot be called by the name of the material out of which they have come-to-be: it is only the results of alteration which retain the name. However, he actually says that far the truest account is to affirm that each of them is gold.) Nevertheless he carries his analysis of the elements—solids though they are—back to planes, and it is impossible for ‘the Nurse’ (i.e. the primary matter) to be identical with the planes.
Our own doctrine is that although there is a matter of the perceptible bodies (a matter out of which the so-called elements come-to-be), it has no separate existence, but is always bound up with a contrariety. A more precise account of this has been given in another work; we must, however, give a detailed explanation of the primary bodies as well, since they too are similarly derived from the matter. We must reckon as a principle and as primary the matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from, the contrary qualities; for the hot is not matter for the cold nor the cold for the hot, but the substratum is matter for them both. Thus as principles we have firstly that which is potentially perceptible body, secondly the contrarieties (I mean, e.g., heat and cold), and thirdly Fire, Water, and the like. For these bodies change into one another (they are not immutable as Empedocles and other thinkers assert, since alteration would then have been impossible), whereas the contrarieties do not change.
Nevertheless, even so the question remains: What sorts of contrarieties, and how many of them, are to be accounted principles of body? For all the other thinkers assume and use them without explaining why they are these or why they are just so many.
§ 2 · Since, then, we are looking for principles of perceptible body; and since perceptible is equivalent to tangible, and tangible is that of which the perception is touch, it is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute forms and principles of body, but only those which correspond to touch. For it is in accordance with a contrariety—a contrariety, moreover, of tangible qualities—that the primary bodies are differentiated. That is why neither whiteness and blackness, nor sweetness and bitterness, nor similarly any of the other perceptible contrarieties either, constitutes an element. And yet vision is prior to touch, so that its object also is prior. The object of vision, however, is a quality of tangible body not qua tangible, but qua something else—even if it is naturally prior.
Accordingly, we must segregate the tangible differences and contrarieties, and distinguish which amongst them are primary. Contrarieties correlative to touch are the following: hot-cold, dry-moist, heavy-light, hard-soft, viscous-brittle, rough-smooth, coarse-fine. Of these heavy and light are neither active nor susceptible. Things are not called heavy and light because they act upon, or suffer action from, other things. But the elements must be reciprocally active and susceptible, since they combine and are transformed into one another. On the other hand, hot and cold, and dry and moist, are terms, of which the first pair implies power to act and the second pair susceptibility. Hot is that which associates things of the same kind (for dissociating, which people attribute to Fire as its function, is associating things of the same class, since its effect is to eliminate what is foreign), while cold is that which brings together, i.e. associates, homogeneous and heterogeneous things alike. And moist is that which, being readily adaptable in shape, is not determinable by any limit of its own; while dry is that which is readily determinable by its own limit, but not readily adaptable in shape.
From these are derived the fine and coarse, viscous and brittle, hard and soft, and the remaining differences. For since the moist has no determinate shape, but is readily adaptable and follows the outline of that which is in contact with it, it is characteristic of it to be such as to fill up. Now the fine is such as to fill up. For the fine consists of subtle particles; but that which consists of small particles is such as to fill up, inasmuch as it is in contact whole with whole—and the fine exhibits this character in a superlative degree. Hence it is evident that the fine derives from the moist, while the coarse derives from the dry. Again the viscous derives from the moist; for the viscous (e.g. oil) is a moist thing modified in a certain way. The brittle, on the other hand, derives from the dry; for brittle is that which is completely dry—so completely, that it has actually solidified due to failure of moisture. Further the soft derives from the moist. For soft is that which yields by retiring into itself, though it does change position, as the moist does—which explains why the moist is not soft, although the soft derives from the moist. The hard, on the other hand, derives from the dry; for hard is that which is solidified, and the solidified is dry.
The terms ‘dry’ and ‘moist’ have more senses than one. For the damp, as well as the moist, is opposed to the dry: and again the solidified, as well as the dry, is opposed to the moist. But all these derive from the dry and moist we mentioned first. For the dry is opposed to the damp; and the damp is that which has foreign moisture on its surface (sodden being that which is penetrated to its core), while dry is that which has lost foreign moisture. Hence it is evident that the damp will derive from the moist, and the dry which is opposed to it will derive from the primary dry. Again the moist and the solidified derive in the same way from the primary pair. For moist is that which contains moisture of its own deep within it (sodden being that which contains foreign moisture), whereas solidified is that which has lost this inner moisture. Hence these too derive one from the dry and the other from the moist.
It is clear, then, that all the other differences reduce to the first four, but that these admit of no further reduction. For the hot is not essentially moist or dry, nor the moist essentially hot or cold; nor are the cold and the dry derivative forms, either of one another or of the hot and the moist. Hence these must be four.
§ 3 · The elements are four, and any four terms can be combined in six couples. Contraries, however, refuse to be coupled; for it is impossible for the same thing to be hot and cold, or moist and dry. Hence it is evident that the couplings of the elements will be four: hot with dry and moist with hot, and again cold with dry and cold with moist. And these four couples have attached themselves to the apparently simple bodies (Fire, Air, Water, and Earth) in a manner consonant with theory. For Fire is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist (Air being a sort of vapour); and Water is cold and moist, while Earth is cold and dry. Thus the differences are reasonably distributed among the primary bodies, and the number of the latter is consonant with theory. For all who make the simple bodies elements postulate either one, or two, or three, or four. Now those who assert there is one only, and then generate everything else by condensation and rarefaction, are in effect making their principles two, viz. the rare and the dense, or rather the hot and the cold; for it is these which are the moulding forces, while the one underlies them as matter. But those who postulate two from the start—as Parmenides postulated Fire and Earth—make the intermediates (e.g. Air and Water) blends of these. The same course is followed by those who advocate three. (We may compare what Plato does in the divisions; for he makes ‘the middle’ a blend.) Indeed, there is practically no difference between those who postulate two and those who postulate three, except that the former split the middle element into two, while the latter treat it as only one. But some advocate four from the start, e.g. Empedocles; yet he too draws them together so as to reduce them to the two, for he opposes all the others to Fire.
In fact, however, fire and air, and each of the bodies we have mentioned, are not simple, but combined. The simple bodies are indeed similar in nature to them, but not identical with them. Thus the simple body corresponding to fire is fire-like, not fire; that which corresponds to air is air-like; and so on with the rest of them. But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of cold. For freezing and boiling are excesses of cold and heat respectively. Assuming, therefore, that ice is a freezing of moist and cold, fire analogously will be a boiling of dry and hot—a fact which explains why nothing comes-to-be either out of ice or out of fire.
The simple bodies, since they are four, fall into two pairs which belong to the two regions, each to each; for Fire and Air are forms of the body moving towards the limit, while Earth and Water are forms of the body which moves towards the centre. Fire and Earth, moreover, are extremes and purest; Water and Air, on the contrary, are intermediates and more combined. And, further, the members of either pair are contrary to those of the other, Water being contrary to Fire and Earth to Air; for they are constituted from contrary qualities. Nevertheless, since they are four, each of them is characterized simply by a single quality: Earth by dry rather than by cold, Water by cold rather than by moist, Air by moist rather than by hot, and Fire by hot rather than by dry.
§ 4 · It has been established before that the coming-to-be of the simple bodies is reciprocal. At the same time, it is manifest, on the evidence of perception, that they do come-to-be; for otherwise there would not have been alteration, since alteration is change in respect to the qualities of the objects of touch. Consequently, we must explain what is the manner of their reciprocal transformation, and whether every one of them can come-to-be out of every one—or whether some can do so, but not others.
Now it is evident that all of them are by nature such as to change into one another; for coming-to-be is a change into contraries and out of contraries, and the elements all involve a contrariety in their mutual relations because their distinctive qualities are contrary. For in some of them both qualities are contrary—e.g. in Fire and Water, the first of these being dry and hot, and the second moist and cold; while in others one of the qualities is contrary—e.g. in Air and Water, the first being moist and hot, and the second moist and cold. It is evident, therefore, if we consider them in general, that every one is by nature such as to come-to-be out of every one; and when we come to consider them severally, it is not difficult to see the manner in which their transformation is effected. For, though all will result from all, both the speed and the facility of their conversion will differ in degree.
Thus the process of conversion will be quick between those which tally with one another, but slow between those which do not. The reason is that it is easier for a single thing to change than for many. Air, e.g., will result from Fire if a single quality changes; for Fire, as we saw, is hot and dry while Air is hot and moist, so that there will be Air if the dry be overcome by the moist. Again, Water will result from Air if the hot be overcome by the cold; for Air, as we saw, is hot and moist while Water is cold and moist, so that, if the hot changes, there will be Water. So too, in the same manner, Earth will result from Water and Fire from Earth, since both tally with both. For Water is moist and cold while Earth is cold and dry—so that, if the moist be overcome, there will be Earth; and again, since Fire is dry and hot while Earth is cold and dry, Fire will result from Earth if the cold pass-away.
It is evident, therefore, that the coming-to-be of the simple bodies will be cyclical; and that this method of transformation is the easiest, because the consecutive elements tally. On the other hand the transformation of Fire into Water and of Air into Earth, and again of Water and Earth into Fire and Air, though possible, is more difficult because it involves the change of more qualities. For if Fire is to result from Water, both the cold and the moist must pass-away; and again, both the cold and the dry must pass-away if Air is to result from Earth. So, too, if Water and Earth are to result from Fire and Air—both must change.
This second method of coming-to-be, then, takes a longer time. But if one quality in each of two elements pass-away, the transformation, though easier, is not reciprocal. Still, from Fire and Water there will result Earth and Air, and from Air and Earth Fire and Water. For there will be Air, when the cold of the Water and the dry of the Fire have passed-away (since the hot of the latter and the moist of the former are left); whereas, when the hot of the Fire and the moist of the Water have passed-away, there will be Earth, owing to the survival of the dry of the Fire and the cold of the Water. So, too, in the same way, Fire and Water will result from Air and Earth. For there will be Water, when the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth have passed-away (since the moist of the former and the cold of the latter are left); whereas, when the moist of the Air and the cold of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, owing to the survival of the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth—qualities constitutive of Fire. Moreover, this mode of Fire’s coming-to-be is confirmed by perception. For flame is par excellence Fire; but flame is burning smoke, and smoke consists of Air and Earth.
No transformation, however, into any of the bodies can result from the passing-away of one quality in each of two elements when they are taken in their consecutive order, because either identical or contrary qualities are left—and from them no body can be formed. E.g. if the dry of Fire and the moist of Air were to pass-away, the hot is left in both; and if the hot pass-away out of both, the contraries—dry and moist—are left. A similar result will occur in all the others too; for all the consecutive bodies contain one identical and one contrary quality. Hence, too, it clearly follows that, when one is transformed into one, the coming-to-be is effected by the passing-away of a single quality; whereas, when two are transformed into a third, more than one quality must have passed-away.