The history of East Timor has certain highlights that can be examined further. Among them are the extent of human rights violations, the pro-Indonesian militia, the United States involvement and policy towards East Timor, and the East Timor economic outlook.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EAST TIMOR

In the whole occupation period of East Timor by Indonesia, there have been numerous accounts of human rights violations. The United Nations has investigated the human rights violations in East Timor and has placed their findings in a document entitled: "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General".

The report stated in item number 8 that: "For the last several years, the Commission on Human Rights and other bodies had been concerned with the serious human rights violations in East Timor, relating to continuing allegations of extrajudicial killings, torture, ‘disappearances’ and acts of sexual violence attributed to members of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and pro-government militias and paramilitary groups."

The commission visited East Timor and collected testimonies from people whose rights have been violated. Some of the examples of testimonies of human rights violations were stated in the report: "The Commission interviewed a widow, whose husband had been killed. A young man came before the Commission who had been slashed in the abdomen and was still suffering from the injury. Several women who had gone through the trauma of rape and sexual abuse came to narrate their bitter experiences. Some of the raped women are now faced with unwanted pregnancies. The Commission met children who had witnessed the violence, including a six-year-old girl who lost her left eye during the shooting that took place at Bishop Belo's compound. These are just a few examples of the stories of human suffering that the Commission heard. It should be noted that suffering and a yearning for justice underlie the testimonies received by the Commission." (Item 35)

The police were unable to do anything about the violations in East Timor and seemed to be part of the whole plot. In one of the testimonies of violations in Dili: "According to a witness, on 17 April, four militia groups paraded in front of the Governor's office in Dili. Militia leaders and government officials were present. Speeches were made denouncing the CNRT leadership. The witness had observed 50 trucks brought by the militia. On the same day, she heard gunshots, and saw houses being burned. She also described police standing on the road as the militia marched along."

These militia had no regard even for religious sanctuary. In one of Bishop Belos testimonies: on 6 September, there were about 5,000 people on the premises (to seek refuge). TNI soldiers and militia surrounded the compound. Bishop Belo had a meeting with a senior TNI officer. According to a witness, the TNI soldiers said that they were there to protect the people from militia attack. The attack on the compound began after Bishop Belo was taken away. Eye–witness accounts indicate that TNI officers gave the order for and directed the attack. Two witnesses testified that they had seen three killings by stabbing. Another witness indicated that five persons were killed."

The Commission concluded that there were widespread violations and highlighted the following: intimidation and terror, killings and violence, gender violence, threats to journalists, destruction of property, displacement of people, destruction of evidence and Indonesian army and militia involvement.

The Commission recommended: the rapid return of displaced persons, the disarming of the militias, investigation, prosecution and reparations, a special United Nations responsibility, a human rights approach to future investigations, the creating of an independent investigation and prosecution body and the creation of an International human rights tribunal.

THE MILITIA AND INDONESIA

The widespread destruction, pillage and rape by armed men were the work of pro-Indonesia militias. The militia simply claimed that they were patriots fighting for Indonesia but they mostly were members of civilian guards often linked to pro-colonial and later pro-Indonesian forces.

The UN Commission investigating human rights, through its findings concluded that the militia were responsible for the intimidation and terror experienced by the people of East Timor before and after the elections.

The Commission was also able to find evidence that the Special Forces Command of the Indonesian Army had supported these militia through: "active recruitment, funding, arming and guidance and of the provision of logistics to support the militias in intimidation and terror attacks." Aside from this indirect support, there was evidence that Indonesian army personnel was directly involved in violations. "There is evidence to show that, in certain cases, Indonesian army personnel, in addition to directing the militias, were directly involved in intimidation and terror attacks. The intimidation, terror, destruction of property, displacement and evacuation of people would not have been possible without the active involvement of the Indonesian army, and the knowledge and approval of the top military command."

The UN Commission put the ultimate responsibility for the human rights violations on the Indonesian Army. "The Commission is of the view that ultimately the Indonesian army was responsible for the intimidation, terror, killings and other acts of violence experienced by the people of East Timor before and after the popular consultation. Further, the evidence collected to date indicates that particular individuals were directly involved in violations of human rights."

UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT

The Indonesian Army and militias supporting Indonesia could not have sown terror without weaponry and training. The tools of terror that were used in East Timor came from the United States.

Since 1975, the invasion of East Timor, the US has played a decisive role in Indonesia’s actions toward East Timor.

At that time, the president of the US was Gerald Ford and his secretary of State was Henry Kissinger. Prior to the invasion of East Timor, Ford and Kissinger knew of the intentions of Indonesia. Recently declassified documents from State Department records, National Security Archive and the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library show that America had given the green light to Suharto to continue the invasion of East Timor. Besides confirming that Henry Kissinger and expected an Indonesian invasion of East Timor, archives showed that the Secretary of State fully understood that the invasion of East Timor involved the "illegal" use of U.S.-supplied military equipment because it was not used in self-defense as required by law. Suharto misleadingly characterized the opposition movement in East Timor as communist in nature to sway the US to their side. Suharto claimed that Indonesia did not want to interfere with East Timor's self-determination but implied that it might be compelled to because "those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced."

Just before the invasion, Ford and Kissinger made it a point that they would not oppose the invasion. Ford stated: "We will understand and will no press you on the issue. We understand the problem and intentions you have." Kissinger noted that the use of US made arms would be a problem but he also added that the legality would be dependent on how the US would construe it whether it is self-defense or foreign operation. Kissinger’s concern was not whether the use of arms would be offensive and illegal but whether the act could be interpreted as such- a clear intention of manipulation.

And so the Indonesian invasion of East Timor pushed through and East Timor fell into Indonesian hands. Even after the invasion, the US continued to supply arms to Indonesia to perpetuate its control of East Timor.

The Carter administration continued the trend set by Ford. In 1978, US arms sales reached $112 million, and averaged $60 miilion per year for the four years of the Carter administration.

The Reagan Administration maintained a steady outflow of weaponry to Indonesia, averaging $40 million per year in his first four years of administration. In 1986, sales reached a record of $300 million+ in weapons sales to Indonesia. This was the time that US sold to Indonesia its first batch of 12 F-16 fighter planes, state-of-the art combat aircraft.

The Bush administration saw a drop in weapons sales to about $28 million per year but in the term of Clinton, sales went up again, on an average of $67 million dollars per year. The flow of arms was suspended only on September 11, 1999 due to international, congressional and grassroots pressure on Clinton. Clinton stated on the 11^th: "Today we suspended all military sales, and continue to work to try to persuade the Indonesians to support the United Nations' operation to go in and help to end the violence and secure the safety of the people there."

After this withdrawal of support, the Indonesians withdrew from East Timor- a testament of how much Indonesian military depended on United States support for the control of East Timor.

AUSTRALIAN MOVES ON EAST TIMOR

Australia is the next-door neighbor of East Timor and was a major player in the peacekeeping forces sent by the United Nations. Australia may seen "benevolent" in its helping it neighbor but often "benevolence" and "benefits" come with a price tag.

There are indicators that Australia may want East Timor to be its neocolony. Neocolonies are those territories that are not directly under the control of a nation but are dependent on a bigger core nation economically. Australia, by its moves, may seem to be veering towards this goal.

East Timor is Australia’s largest overseas effort. AusAID, the Australian Government’s Overseas Aid agency contributes to disadvantaged nations and gives the most to East Timor. Australia’s 1999-2000 contribution of US$ 37 million is the biggest ever contributed by Australia as a response to an international issue. In 2000, Australia pledged an additional US$ 150 million staggered over 4 years up to 2004.

Until now, East Timor’s security is also dependent in Australian forces in East Timor.

Australia’s actions of giving support and military security are only indicative of a bigger agenda of neocolonialism. An evidence of Australia’s interests in East Timor is its insistence on East Timor signing the Timor Sea Agreement that would entitle Australia to jointly exploit with East Timor an oil/gas field in the Timor Gap.

TIMOR GAP ISSUE

In the southern coast of East Timor lies the Timor Gap, an area rich in oil and gas fields. The richest of these gas fields is the Greater Sunrise Gas field.

During the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, there was an agreement forged between the governments of Indonesia and Australia called the Timor Sea Agreement. The agreement, forged in 1989, created three zones in the Timor Gap and the zone in the middle was to be called "Zone A". Under the agreement, Zone A would be jointly exploited by Australia and Indonesia. Zone A lies between the boundaries of the then Indonesian dominated East Timor and Australia. In this agreement, the revenue sharing from the area will be divided 50-50.

When the UN took over East Timor’s transition to independence, it brokered a deal called the Timor Sea Arrangement. The arrangement retained the zones previously created by the 1989 agreement and renamed Zone A into the "Joint Petroleum Development Area" or JPDA. The agreement also modified the revenue sharing. The revenue sharing would be 90% for East Timor and 10% for Australia.

At first, this arrangement may seem greatly beneficial to East Timor but in actuality, East Timor has a lot more economic benefits to reap if they assert their territorial boundaries.

In this situation, there are two scenarios to be chosen from. The first scenario is that East Timor will ratify the UN brokered Timor Sea Arrangement and get 90% of the revenue from the JPDA but the territorial boundaries of East Timor in the Timor Gap remain unresolved. The second option is that East Timor will assert its territorial boundaries in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that would further extend the boundaries of East Timor and eventually include a major part- if not all- of the Greater Sunrise field. Under scenario 1, only 40% of the potential benefits of Greater Sunrise would be acquired by East Timor as compared to the benefits that will be acquired under scenario 2.

The problem that East Timor now encounters is whether to ratify the treaty or to assert its boundaries according to UNCLOS. Australia is pushing for the ratification of the TSA. The issue still remains unresolved today.

EAST TIMOR ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Presently, East Timor is the poorest Asian nation. Like many Southeast Asian countries, East Timor is heavily dependent on foreign aid. In May of 2002, donor countries pledged $440 million in aid to the new country, which could keep her afloat for the next three years. After that, it is unclear where East Timor will get financing.

According to East Timorese leaders, they know where the money will come from after 2005. The money will supposedly come from the revenues from the Timor Gap where East Timor could expect to receive $6 billion over the next 25 years.

Because of this the UN believes that East Timor will not be dependent on foreign aid. But still, oil is a unsecured commodity to peg an economy to as there are often fluctuations in price. According to Sarah Cliffe, chief of the World Bank mission in Dili: "We know from the experience of other countries that oil revenue that oil revenues are as much as a cure as they are a blessing."

Even if revenue problems are solved, it is a fact that oil and gas production wont create jobs. Aside from these two, East Timor has no industries to speak of. Up to 90 percent of East Timorese live on less than US$1 (Php50) a day and more than half the population are illiterate. Around three-fourths of the population live in rural areas and make a living out of subsistence farming. Even if the oil and gas revenues will be used for infrastructure and alleviation of poverty, diversifying the economy will be another matter.

Despite the bleak outlook, the East Timorese are looking forward to their future. Asked if he was scared about East Timor’s future, Gusmao answered: "No. Concerned but optimistic."

As seen in East Timor’s history, East Timorese independence was continually hampered by foreign nations. First in their history was the entrance of the Portuguese who annexed East Timor and created it into a penal colony. The neglect of Portugal towards East Timor slowed development in East Timor.

The next player who entered was Indonesia, who unlawfully annexed East Timor and declared it as their province. This annexation was not recognized by the UN and was only upheld by a few countries.

The annexation of East Timor was supported by the actions of the United States of America who continually and increasingly fed arms and military supplies to Indonesia who in turn used these arms for the suppression on revolutionary forces in East Timor. The US only stopped the provision of arms to Indonesia in 1999, due to international pressure. Because of the withdrawal of support of the US, Indonesian troops in East Timor made a speedy withdrawal – a testament to the importance of American war machine support in the suppression of East Timor.

Even today, East Timor, though formally independent, seems constrained in achieving total independent action. Australia now wants a payback of its money invested during the UN peacekeeping in East Timor. Australia wants a part of the Timor Gap oilfields. East Timor is having a problem in what to do about the Timor Gap issue. It may opt to bow down to Australia who gives East Timor a substantial amount of economic and military aid and receive only a fraction of its rightful revenues from the Timor Gap. Or, East Timor may choose to assert its claims over the Timor Gap and risk angering its next-door neighbor whom East Timor is greatly dependent upon militarily and economically. The painful choice is upon the leaders of East Timor- to risk losing revenues it greatly needs for the fueling of the government or risk losing economic funding and military security that it also needs for the continuance of stabilization.

In conclusion, it can be seen that East Timor is and was a victim of foreign policy of other nations. If it wishes to really be independent, East Timor must find a good way to play the delicate issue of foreign policy.