Ze'ev Jabotinsky The Israeli Classical Liberal Website Sections: Hebrew English Spanish |
---|
TAKE NOTE: Political terminology takes on different meanings in
different times and different places. "Liberal" is used here in
its nineteenth century meaning, which was Jabotinsky's ideology.
Jabotinsky demanded an equitable solution for both peoples...two
autonomous peoples sharing the same land and each governing
their own personal, cultural and religious lives.
Copyright 1996 -- Authorized free distribution of non-modified
copies for non-commercial purposes.INTRODUCTION
Jabotinsky did not have any illusions about a peaceful
return of the Jews to their historic homeland. It was clear to him
that neither the historic bond of the Jews to their homeland nor
the legal status conferred by the San Remo Conference and later
ratified by the League of Nations would convince the Arabs to
relinquish even a minimal part of their extensive territory.
In order to avoid a conflict between its Marxist anti-nationalist and Zionist-nationalist ideologies, the Left had to ignore the presence and legitimate rights of the Arabs. However, for Jabotinsky, who was identified with the nationalist Liberalism of the nineteenth century, this conflict did not exist. In his view, the reconquest of the historic Jewish homeland was morally justified by virtue of a people's right -- one deeply-rooted in the liberal tradition (1) -- to wage war and conquer, if this is necessary for the survival of the people.
Therefore, Jabotinsky had no ideological need to ignore either the presence of the Arabs or their legitimate rights. In his understanding, the armed conflict between the two peoples was inevitable, simply because no people on earth will relinquish any part of its land without fighting (2). The hope of a peaceful realization of Zionism is, therefore, a dangerous fallacy. Nevertheless, Jabotinsky, guided by his liberal ideology, demanded a final, equitable solution for both peoples (3).
The armed phase of the war foreseen by Jabotinsky was fought and the results have been favorable to us. The power to decide and the concomitant responsibility are presently in our hands. The danger lies in the temptation to exploit the situation in our short-term favor, achieving a seemingly favorable yet unstable peace, as the Allies did at the end of World War I.
In the first section of this article the peace policies of the Allies at the end of the two World Wars are compared with each other, and with the Oslo Agreement. The comparison shows that the fatal errors of the Versailles peace are currently being repeated. Jabotinsky's solution, however, shares the liberal spirit of the peace policy implemented at the end of World War II.
The second section analyzes the fallacy of the demographic question which, it is claimed, would necessitate choosing between a small Jewish-democratic state, and a larger but non-Jewish or non-democratic one. Certainly, for a Continental-European type of parliamentary democracy -- similar to those that have served as the "democratic" path to power for Marxism, Nazism and Fascism -- this dilemma may be true. Fortunately, however, there are other, more liberal and more stable, forms of democracy (4).
The liberal nature and historical performance of different forms of democracy are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the American system of democracy, which did not hesitate to violate the principle of "one man - one vote" in order to satisfy the genuine needs of the constituent sectors of the society.
The author is aware of the tremendous difficulties inherent in a genuine liberal solution. At the same time, he is convinced that it is the only kind of solution which affords prospects for a peaceful future. The primary obstacle lies within ourselves -- unfortunately Zionism has been dominated for decades by antiliberal tendencies, and the great majority of Israelis come from countries lacking any liberal tradition whatsoever.
We will limit ourselves to a succinct reference to four conspicuous differences between the peace policies that followed the two world wars and their relevance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:
If there is anything to be learned from history, it is that peace has to precede its written formalization. Any attempt to theoretically establish the nature of a future relationship is doomed to failure. Only a preexisting situation of peace predisposes the parties to the mutual consideration required to reach a just and stable solution. At the same time, history provides many examples of peoples living in peace and harmony despite unresolved conflicts.
The Jordan-Israel peace treaty is an example of such an ex post facto sanction of a preexisting state of good neighborliness. Similarly, the Egyptian-Israeli peace process began with Sadat's clear declaration of "No more war" and the establishment of confidence-building human relations with his memorable visit to Jerusalem. In contrast, the current peace processes with Syria and the Palestinians are attempting to establish peace on paper while hostilities continue.
Shimon Peres' vision of a new Middle East living in peace like the European nations is myopic. It fails to see that whereas the European peace is based on equal status for all inhabitants of the continent, the Oslo Agreement tends to perpetuate a differential situation.
The Oslo agreement, like the Versailles Treaty, is a collection of conditions imposed by the winner on the loser. Its supporters assume that the Palestinians will forever be satisfied with a Lilliputian state, or less than a state, which comprises less than a quarter of their original territory, and that they will forever resign themselves to seeing the remaining three-fourths of their motherland in the hands of the Jews. A resident of Nablus expressed this graphically: "How can I bear the fact that my son views the sea through the window, but has to travel to Gaza to swim in it".
Such a Palestinian state will necessarily be a chronic source of resentment and irredentism. These feelings will be sharpened by the economic gap, which will be attributed, with some amount of reason, to the long Israeli domination. This state will be a focus of terror, and will wait for the first favorable political or military contingencies to liberate the entire motherland. And in our unstable world there is every likelihood that these contingencies will come about -- sooner or later.
* will form a geographic continuum with the Arab and Muslim world; and control from the highlands 80% of the Israeli population densely concentrated in a narrow strip between the Muslim world and the sea.
It certainly constitutes a mortal danger that only irresponsible politicians would dare espouse.
Jabotinsky's solution, while totally at total variance with the Oslo agreement, is in complete harmony with the spirit of liberal European peace. It recognizes the existence of two peoples, each with a legitimate claim to the very same land: the Jews, who demand the right to return to their ancient homeland from which were dispossessed by force, and the Arab inhabitants of this land. "Each of the ethnic communities will be recognized as autonomous and equal in the eyes of the law," says Jabotinsky (3), who envisioned two autonomous peoples sharing the same land and each governing their own personal, cultural and religious lives.
This is possible since people of different cultures and religions can coexist in liberal societies without inconveniencing each other. This is specially true in the Jewish-Arab case since the ethnic, cultural and religious differences between Arabs and Jews are less pronounced than those which set apart the various ethnic communities in the U.S..
.
At end of the Second World War, however, a different attitude prevailed, namely the conviction that preparedness for any war, even a nuclear war, is essential to make peace and freedom possible. Neither naive pacifism, nor American isolationism appeared. The quoted Biblical lesson(5) seems to have been learned. Had this dangerous mood not been so ensconced in the spirit of the Western Allies at the end of the First World War, the history of the bloody 20th century might have been quite different.
The Oslo Agreement, fruit of a mood similar to that of the Western Allies at the end of World War I, is based on the delusion that peace can be attained by separating the two peoples. In this respect it resembles American isolationism, with the oceans replaced by a green line drawn on a map. We find in Oslo Agreement the same tragic dilemma faced by the European Allies at the end of World War I between the avidity for enjoying the advantages of the victory and the impatience for peace.
The security measures delineated in peace treaties, international guaranties and other signed papers have a very limited degree of reliability, and remain in force only as long as favorable circumstances exist. However, since circumstances change unpredictably, only facts on the ground can ensure stability during the process of peace-building.
As in the Versailles treaty, the Oslo agreement has delineated security measures on paper, while responsibility for security on the ground has been transferred to the Palestinians from the very outset. Moreover, it is assumed that the future Palestinian state will be demilitarized as Germany was at the end of World War I. In the case of Germany, the Marxist menace quickly nullified the signed agreement, and the result was the bloodiest war in history.
2. The Jews must be convinced that there are no other solutions with similar prospects for peace and security.
2. The Arabs' rights have been violated by the Jewish majority in our totalitarian-constitutionless democracy. The Arabs have the right to demand effective constitutional measures to ensure their rights.
See also:
(1)
" The life of governments is like that of man. The latter has a right
to kill in case of natural defense; the former have a right to wage
war to their own preservation" (Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de
Montesquieu (1689-1755) "The Spirit of the Laws" (1748), i, X, 2)
"From the right of war derives that of conquest" (There, i, X, 3)
"It is a conqueror's business to repair a part of the mischief he has
occasioned. The right, therefore, of conquest I defined thus: a
necessary, lawful, but unhappy power, which leaves the conqueror
under a heavy obligation of repairing the injuries done to humanity."
(There, i, X, 4)
(2)
See
Wladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky "We and the Arabs -- The Iron
Wall" (1923).
(3)
W. Jabotinsky "The Arab Question -- Without Dramatics"
(1942)
(4)
"Happily the republic so rich in forms, ...., is adaptable to all
the demands.." (Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-84) "The Bases" (1852))
(5)
See Judges 18, 7-10. The tribe of Dan conquers the land of
a quiet and secure people.
" ...They saw the people .... how they dwelt safely, ... quiet
and secure ...When you go you will come to a secure people....For
God has given it into your hands".
return
return
return
return
return