GO TO HOME PAGE

THE WORLD BANK  ON THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE

              MARKET FRIENDLY VIEW.   The World Bank 1993 Report on East Asia defends the view articulated in the World Development Report of 1991 (WB 1991). WB calls the 1991 viewpoint as the market-friendly view. The market-friendly view expands on the neo-classical view that rapid growth in developing countries has been associated with effective but carefully  limited government activism. As discussed, the market-friendly government activism should:

    ensure adequate investment in people

    provide a competitive climate for private enterprise

    keep the economy open to international trade

    maintain a stable macroeconomy

              Beyond the above role, the report argues, governments are more likely to do harm than good, unless the interventions are market-friendly.          

              BASICS.  The high performing asian economices (HPAEs) achieved growth by getting the basics right   (p. 5):

    private domestic investments and rapidly growing human capital were the principal engines of growth

    high level of domestic financial savings sustained the HPAEs high investment level

    agriculture, while declining in relative importance, experienced rapid growth and productivity improvement

              GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION.   The WB recognize that the HPAE governments intervened---systematically and through multiple channels---to foster development, and in some cases even the development of specific industries.  Policy intervention took many forms (p. 5-6):

    targeting and subsidizing credit to selected industries

    keeping deposit rates low and maintaining ceiling on borrowing rates to increase profits and retained earnings

    protecting domestic import substitutes

    subsidizing domestic industries

    establishing and financially supporting government banks

    making public investments in applied research

    establishing firm and industry-specific export targets

    developing export marketing institutions

    sharing information widely between public and private sectors

    some industries were promoted, while others were not

              PRE-REQUISITES FOR SUCCESS IN SELECTIVE INTERVENTION.   The WB argues that in some economices selective interventions contributed to growth while in others it did not. The pre-requisites for success in selective interventions are as follows (p. 6-7):

    the selective interventions address problems in the functioning of markets

    good fundamental policies

    ability of government to establish and monitor appropriate economic performance related criteria to interventions

              Among the most important fundamental policies (p. 10-11) are those that encourage macroeconomic stability, high investments in human capital, stable and secure financial systems, limited price distortions, and openness to foreign technology.   The WB also pointed out that for interventions the guiding principle to maintain is that  they must address failures in the working of markets. Otherwise,  markets would perform better (p. 11).

OTHER FACTORS FOR SUCCESS OF EAST ASIA

1.       HPAEs reportedly created contests in addition to market-based discipline. One by-product of these contests (p. 14) was the reduction of rent-seeking activities.

2.       Relatively honest and competent technocrats (p. 14).

3.       Enhanced communication between business and government (WBR/EA p. 14)

4.       Using deliberation councils (WBR/EA p. 14).

WB RECOGNITION OF EAST ASIA vNON-CONVENTIONAL STRATEGIES FOR GROWTH

1.  All countries, except Hong Kong, began with a period of import substitution, and a strong bias against exports. But each move to establish a pro-export regime more quickly than other developing economies. First it was Japan, in the 1950s and early 1960s, and then the Four Tigers in the late 1960s, shifted trade policies to encourage manufactured exports.  (WBR on EA p. 12)     

2.  In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan,China, governments established a pro-export incentive structure that coexisted with moderate but highly variable protection of domestic markets. (WBR on EA p. 13)

3.  The role of land reform in Korea and Taiwan (WBR on EA p. 13) is recognized.

4.  The WB report recognized that the HPAEs promoted specific, including heavy, industries. In p. 21, the WB report recognized Japan's manufactured exports promotion of policies of the 1950s  and the subsequent imitation of these policies in Korea. Also in p. 21, the WB report recognized that Japan and Korean policies included import protection as well as subsidies for capital and other imported inputs. However, the WB discounts the strategies taken by Korea and Japan and says in the 2nd to last para of p. 21 that there is very little evidence that the actions are main factors for their success. Yet,  WB had prescribed against these in all its "advices"  in RP and Korea.

5.  While Lichauco argues in Nationalist Economics that the HPAEs pursued protectionist policies (except Hong Kong and Singapore?), the WB report argues that Hong Kong and Singapore adopted trade regimes that were close to free trade. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan supposedly adopted mixed regimes that were largely free for export industries. 

 

Hosted by www.Geocities.ws

1