Marshall Editions of London has produced a series of unique battle books using 3D graphics and the incomparable watercolor battlefield scene art of the late Harry Clow.

Many new insights can be gained about the Vietnam war's battles from their Sandhurst military expert Pimlott-authored battle book. These books were also reprinted by U.S. companies and put on sale at very affordable prices at Barnes & Noble and Books-A-Million--but are now sold out!

One of the battles covered in Pimlott's book is the USMC debacle called "Operation Starlite" named after the early nickname for image intensifier onservation scopes.

One of the many problems of the USMC is that it claims perfection while claiming to never change its WW2 frontal beach assault ways nothwithstanding the "maneuver warfare" window dressing falsade it also claims, all mentalities backed by no tangible equipment means like Percy Hobart-style combat engineer tanks.

The good thing about 1965's OPeration Starlite (OPS) was that it attempted 3D and 2D maneuver. The 3D maneuver by helicopters from amphibious ship flight decks would land in 3 landing zones and be the "hammer" as the 2D maneuver "anvil" would come over water by landing craft off-loading M48 Patton medium tanks, M50 Ontos 106mm recoilless rifle armored tracks and LVTP-5 armored amphibious tractors (AMTRACKS) with 34 infantrymen packed inside. As a young marine, I was told in boot camp that OPS was a bragging point that the USMC was somehow the first Americans to fight in Vietnam (despite advisors and helicopter pilots fighting and dying there since 1958) and vindication that the gyrene style of warfare was hugely successful. This never washed with what I knew of later Vietnam war history. However, now its clear that OPS was a tiny but disastrous clusterfuck that took place in an area no larger than 2/3rds of a square mile. It was no huge success.

Here is the official "glorious" USMC history of OPS:

www.ehistory.com/vietnam/books/buildup/0069.cfm

What went wrong?

Two of the three foot slogger infantry companies landed by helicopters without any enemy opposition and could walk ahead. It should always be kept in mind that if you are not opposed by the enemy you can almost do anything as long as the earth itself thru terrain/weather doesn't stop you. In the case of OPS this would prove critical as we see later. The third rifle company, landed and could not move because it was pinned down by enemy fire from nearby high ground. Where have we seen this happen before? All through out warfare?

The prior preparation mistake here is that the USMC did not buy the infantry carrying variant of the Ontos, the T56---that could have been flown in by helicopters to give their 3D maneuver forces an ability to shrug off enemy fires and keep moving. Since the USMC is permeated by foot infantry narcissism, it continues to get bloody noses in wars trying to fight them WW1-style on foot. These preventable losses can be spun as heroic deaths etc. under a smokescreen of "patriotic correctness" but the EFFECTS NEEDED ON THE BATTLEFIELD IE; VICTORY will suffer. Today, the USMC still lacks a helicopter-deliverable, tracked infantry carrier while dozens of NATO countries and even the U.S. Army has such mobility means.

Because 1/3 of the "hammer" force was itself in a vise of enemy fire from Hill 43, a relief column of AMTRACKS led by M48 medium tanks was sent to rescue it. It became lost having to follow trails due to their vehicle's weights/ground pressures and were ambushed by the VC. To rescue the rescuers, more AMTRACKS and some Ontos ultra-light tanks led by M48 medium tanks were sent. But the rescue-the-rescue force itself got ambushed by Hill 30. The marines dismounted to clear the area and then took even more casualties as the enemy melted away. The marines stop what they are doing and hold defensive perimeters as naval guns and air strikes are called in to get them through the night. 45 men die and 614 Vietnamese bodies claimed as enemies.

Some will say tracks versus wheels is not important---they are obviously mistaken as the truck-handicapped French Group Mobile 100 being wiped out years earlier screams out at anyone aware of military history would know. However there is a further understanding that is needed; there are good tracks and there are bad tracks. The USMC has often had bad tracks due to some bad institutional biases and requirements. First, the LVTP-5 AMTRACK and M50 Ontos were GASOLINE powered, criminally suicidal fuels to power combat vehicles. The Army had switched to safer diesel fuels in its tracks long before Vietnam. Making matters worse, the LVTP-5's gasoline fuel tanks were in the BOTTOM of the vehicle and when they ran over a landmine would end up incinerating everyone in the vehicle. Marine sniper Carlo Hathcock was wounded for life because of riding even on top of an AMTRACK that ran over a land mine. As a huge, bloated but thinly armored box, the LVTP-5 was very heavy, 44+ tons and had terribly high 10 psi ground pressure so that it could not go cross country at will like the Army's lighter 10-ton M113 Gavin tracks, and was restricted to roads and trails where enemy landmines awaited to explode their bottom gas tanks. So by being poorly designed to overcome either the earth or human resistance, the LVTP-5s as a means to do ship-to-shore 2D maneuver inland as infantry carriers rapidly fell out of favor out of sheer personal survival concerns. Marines had to walk for the majority of the time they were in Vietnam after disembarking from a truck or helicopter (problems there, too) which exposed them to all kinds of mines and booby trap deaths and maimings even if the Viet Cong (VC) or North Vietnamese Army (NVA) enemy was not even there!.

The M48, while almost a heavy tank could do excellent fire support service with its 90mm gun, but as the Army's armored cavalry realized it needed to be supported by scouts in lighter M113 Gavin Armored Cavalry (ACAV) gunshield equipped vehicles fanning out ahead and to its flanks to ascertain the best paths to follow and keep it from being ambushed; the USMC never had effective light tracked APCs, certainly not for OPS. Army troops behind ACAV gunshields stood from inside or on top and were ready to pour fire in all direction at the first sign of possible enemies. Though only 8 tons, the 1953 technology M50 Ontos was not mechanically as reliable or as fast as the later-technology M113 Gavin or significantly more mobile than M48 medium tanks. Even if it could scout ahead, the Ontos had no scouts, only a 3 man crew to point the entire hull and fire 6 collimated 106mm recoilless rifles. Thus, the USMC tracked forces lacked the best possible cross-country mobility and didn't even have tracked scouts to clear the way ahead if they had to stick to roads/trails. This was and is a self-inflicted wound. The USMC does not have a mounted warfighting doctrine or ethos with its relive WW2 foot beach assaults with tracks providing only a means to get from ship-to-shore and for fire support mindset. The walking infantry remains the "star" of the USMC "show" even though it was late for Baghdad by 6 days recently resulting in the enemy regrouping to wage the current Iraqi guerrilla war against us that has cost us so far 1, 600+ dead and 19, 000+ wounded--almost Vietnam numbers.

The current LVTP-7 (carries 25 troops in back) replacement, the AAAV now called EFV will still carry 20 troops in back! Like the OPS LVTP-5 which carried 34 troops in back, this new AMTRACK will still be a huge and easy target for enemies to optically acquire and hit, and kill in one swoop 1/5th of a rifle company. The USMC still has not properly adapted to inland 2D maneuver warfare which requires smaller, more densely armored vehicles carrying no more than a 9-man infantry squad. Some futurists think even that is too many and only a 4-man fireteam should be inside an infantry carrier. Thus, the real "lessons learned" from OPS is that the lessons WERE NOT LEARNED by the USMC, and more bloody failures are in store until these things are realized.