For Professor J. Baker

By Michael De Jong

ID#973614

The aim of this paper is to identify an acceptable method for making moral judgements. To decide which moral standards are acceptable, consideration will be made for the realist and anti-realist standpoints; it will become clear that the realist standpoint is unacceptable and anti-realism must be adopted. Before investigating anti-realist theories, it must be made clear that anti-realism and categorical bindingness are not mutually contradictory.

We will select between the two options available to the anti-realist:

1. The agent can adopt the standpoint that moral standards should be based upon subjective criteria, or,
2. The agent can adopt the standpoint that moral judgements should be based upon a categorically binding moral standard

It will be shown that possibility A is unacceptable, and that categorically binding moral judgements must the basis for a moral standard if moral judgements are to be made with rational justification.

To come to this conclusion consideration will be made for a number of moral anti-realist theories that may serve as a basis for an acceptable moral standard. We will find that the Humean theory should be adopted with special consideration given to requirements for rationality. We will recognize that the Humean theory entails a conclusion similar to Kant’s categorical imperative. Thorough proof of this will not be provided although reasonable justification will be presented.

An acceptable moral point of view has one basic criterion: it must be founded rationally – in essence, each of the assertions or stipulations that are included in the theory must be justified rationally. We will use this requirement for rationality as a guideline for the rest of this inquiry.

The two most basic standpoints available to an agent must be investigated as a first step. An agent can hold a realist point of view or an anti-realist point of view. Before we can determine how an anti-realist should set out to decide and to justify his/her choice of what to do in a morally difficult situation we should understand why the realist point of view is not considered.

A realist point of view does not fit the criterion for rationality: to suggest that a moral standard exists independently of any human thought, that is, to ascribe an ontological status to a moral standard is undoubtedly unreasonable. A realist standpoint is irrational for the following reasons:

1. We can see that ontology is dispositional. There exist in external reality no objects that have no disposition. Furthermore, any "object" that has no dispositions cannot have (positive) ontological status ascribed to it. Even solipsists, for the most part, would agree that there exist certain objects of perception that have capacities to interact with other objects (we will assume a non-solipsistic standpoint for this remainder of this paper), while other aspects of perception have no dispositions. Normally we take those objects of perception with any dispositional nature as external rather than mental creations.
2. Ontology does not include hypotheticals: ontology is factual and is the basis for all factual statements. Hypothetical statements are non-dispositional.
3. Moral standards are hypothetical – that is, they are statements about the way the world should be.
4. Therefore, moral standards cannot have (positive) ontological status.

An anti-realist point of view must be adopted not only because it is the only option left but also because it is rational: adopting an anti-realist view solves the problems that are inherent in a realist point of view. Anti-realism enables the agent to justify his moral standards without relying on ontology. This justification is available, however, only if the most rational anti-realist standpoint is taken.

To reach this point, uncertainty concerning the relationship between ontology and categorical bindingness of moral judgements needs to be clarified. It will become clear that anti-realism and categorically binding moral judgements are not mutually exclusive. Generally speaking, moral anti-realists feels justified, and are indeed justified in subscribing to categorically binding rules outside of morality, rules that do not need any ontological basis. This occurs in the case of mathematical rules. We should investigate the nature of mathematical rules and their categorical bindingness and we will find that requirements for categorical bindingness are similar.

The premise of this discussion is that ontology is equivalent with disposition – that is, capacity to interact. We need to consider this premise when analyzing the ideas of categorical bindingness.

1. Mathematical Rules

1. Mathematical rules are guidelines for mathematical operation on two or more arguments (the word ‘argument’ is being used to refer to objects of mathematical rules). Often these arguments are dispositional – apples in addition of one apple plus one apple, for example
2. The mathematical operators are relations between or among mathematical arguments and these operators have no dispositions. That is, they have no ontological status.
3. Furthermore mathematical operations can be performed with general arguments (a+b=c). The mathematical rules hold in this case where the arguments are non-dispositional.
4. Mathematical rules are categorically binding.
5. Therefore categorical bindingness requires no positive ontological status

1. Moral Standards

1. Moral standards are guidelines for making moral judgements concerning behaviour. Most often agents of these behaviours are dispositional – usually human beings.
2. Moral standards are guidelines for behaviour and are non-dispositional. They are hypothetical; behaviors may or may not correspond to these hypotheses. If behaviors act in accordance with these hypotheses they are considered morally good actions. However, these guidelines, like mathematical rules, have no ontological status.
3. Moral judgements can be made concerning a general agent (agent A ought not to perform action D). A general agent may or may not have dispositions.
4. Therefore we can conclude that categorically binding moral judgements themselves require no ontological basis.

We can see that moral standards are directly analogous to mathematical rules. An anti-realist may adopt a mathematical rule without violating any of his/her anti-realist views. Here it becomes apparent that there exist two general possibilities: we may adopt an anti-realist theory that prescribes categorically binding moral judgements, or, alternatively, we may adopt a theory that advocates subjectivity.

Moral Relativism and Humeanism seem to be the most plausible anti-realist theories.

1. Moral Relativism

1. All Moral Relativist theories necessarily include self-contradiction: Moral Relativity is the doctrine that holds as a universal law that there are no universal laws in morality.
2. Moral Relativism may be self-defeating: the locally accepted standard may be an irrational standard. Adoption of moral relativism for the purpose of being rational may require that the agent ultimately act in accordance with irrational standards.
3. If the agent chooses not to subscribe to the local standard, the agent has no moral code.
4. Moral Relativist theories, specifically Actual Rule Contractarianism, are normative theories. They do not adequately dictate how behaviour should be – they explain accepted behaviours

1. Humeanism

1. The Humean theory provides solution to problem of non-dispositionality of moral standards – it employs the dispositionality of desire to provide motivation for action. The morally good desire is the rational desire; moral judgements of actions are based upon the degree to which the agent acts in accordance with those desires
2. Identification of rational desires may become difficult in some situations difficult in the Humean formulation: this will be addressed later in the paper

When we appeal to mathematics, we can see that no mathematical rule is subjective. Furthermore, if any part of mathematics were subjective mathematical rules would not work. In fact, it should be clear that subjectivity and rule adoption are contradictory. A rule does not work as a rule if it can be modified in various situations. This is the case with moral rules also.

Certainly morality arises in many cases when an agreement is reached within a community; this does not mean that the agreed upon morality is the correct morality. This is obvious in the case of the acceptance of irrational moral standards. Moral relativity entails self-contradiction at the outset of the theory and continues this tendency throughout its formulation.

We find difficulty maintaining this animosity toward subjective theories upon investigation of the Humean theory. Although it is dependent upon desires it is remarkably convincing, moral judgements are adequately justified by rational desires, plus, situational considerations can be made.

These two apparently subjective theories now seem to suggest opposing propositions concerning the acceptability of subjective theories. Upon further investigation, we realize that there is no opposition. In fact Hume’s moral standard is not subjective at all. So we can rejuvenate our animosity. Nevertheless the reader may now be confused (if my paper explaining this has not been read) at the proposition that Hume’s theory is not subjective. The Humean theory suggests

1. An agent’s desires serve as a standard for making moral judgements concerning the agent’s actions (Hume)
2. The only desires that may serve as the moral standard are rational desires (Hume). This necessarily entails that the morally good action is the action that is based upon a rational desire and whose execution does not contradict another of the agent’s desires

As was outlined in the paper On The Existence of Categorically Binding Moral Judgements further investigation of the requirement for rationality reveals that

3. The only desires that are ultimately non-contradictory and non-self-defeating are the desires that can be held universally, and,
4. Therefore, the only rational desires are those desires that may be held universally

To prove this is a substantial ordeal, and that is not the purpose of this paper. However when this idea is investigated inductively it becomes clear that this stipulation on rationality holds. It may seem that there are certain circumstances where categorically binding moral judgements do not make essential situational considerations. However, standards can be formulated in such a way so that situational considerations are made. For example, it may be decided that killing cannot be held as a universal desire, so the conclusion made is that killing is wrong. An objection may then be proposed where a situation may arise when one must kill another individual in order to save one’s life. Certainly then, the categorically binding moral judgement "killing is wrong" seems unreasonable. And it certainly is. This judgement can be reformulated to consider situations where killing is essential for one’s safety. For example, we may conclude that killing is wrong except in the effort of defending one’s own safety (or the safety of another).

This formulation explicates the fact that the Humean theory is not open to objections to subjectivity in moral standards.

Therefore, when making a moral judgement one must ask him/herself if the justifying desire for this action could be adopted universally. When a decision has been reached the agent should ask him/herself if this decision could be adopted universally. The decision is justified if the answer is yes; then the agent can be sure that the decision is founded rationally.

We can see evidence of this in the Lattimer case: Traci Lattimer’s father would have had to have let her daughter die naturally, enduring the excruciating pain of her condition if he had acted in accordance with an actual rule contractarian theory. The local community had adopted the contract that life is sacred and should not be ended intentionally under any circumstance, an irrational view.