Mein Freund, die Zeiten der Vergangenheit
Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Sieglen.
Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten hei�t.
Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist,
In dem die Zeiten sich bespieglen.
Goethe, Faust, 575-59.
King of the Gods
In the "Mother of Nabonidus" Inscription found at Harran the god S�n is referred to a number of times by the title:
d30 LUGAL.DINGIR.MES
"S�n, King of the Gods." In orthodox Babylonian theology of the time of Nabonidus this title was reserved for Marduk, patron god of Babylon the capital of the empire. It seems evident that in promoting S�n Nabonidus was pursuing some definite policy. Whether this was religious, economic, or political, or, as is more likely, some combination of these, is not entirely clear, but there is enough evidence to suggest some possible answers, and to arrive at some conclusion concerning how successful that policy may have been.
There is always the possibility that Nabonidus was a muddled thinker who was not sure exactly what he wanted, or was simply promoting his personal god, S�n, for reasons that were essentially capricious. This is unlikely. He was represented by his enemies as an incompetent madman. This was sheer propaganda. It is more likely that Nabonidus was an extremely astute politician. It is unlikely that he was interested in promoting S�n (or the equivalent names) as simply a substitute for Marduk--that is to substitute the one name for another. Rather, there must have been some substantive issue or idea behind the desire for such a change. Dougherty says of the Tema campaign: "A primary aim springing from personal preference and exhibiting no care for the empire's fate seems out of the question. The international situation was too tense and too much was at stake for a Babylonian king to be governed by mere caprice in a procedure involving the destiny of the nation." The fact that he remained the ruler of Babylon for seventeen years attests to the capability of Nabonidus as a ruler. What evidence we have suggests that he was well able to carry out definite long-range policies. His long stay in the city of Teima, for example, may have been a very realistic means of dealing with opposition in the capital: By broadening his base of support he may have extended his own rule, and also that of the empire, for at least a decade longer than might otherwise have been the case.
Religious motives:
Speculation concerning religious motives is highly subjective involving many unknowns. This does not mean it has no influence in historical events. A monograph entitled Religion in the Struggle for Power (1946) deals with the struggle for power in the context of European religious history. The author, J. M. Yinger, offers some insights which can be applied to our own study. He points out that it is not possible to hold to a "narrow economic interpretation of history"--even Marx did not; but he poses the problem of the point at which ideas and beliefs enter the picture. "With reference to religion, our question is: Is there a source of religious ideas and energy which cannot be traced back eventually to material conditions, or, slightly more generally, to the struggle for power? Put in this way, it is clearly part of the question of the origin of religion; and no precise answer is possible." At the end of his study, however, he concludes that the religious factor, no matter how elusive, is quite real:
In terms of the present study it would seem to be an error to discount completely the influence of the purely religious idea working in history, and equally an error to fail to see the limitations of its power and the frequency with which it is dominated by other interests. The limitations are partly intrinsic: the religious interest is dominant in only a small minority of persons. No matter how skillfully religious leaders use the power at their command, they cannot erase the influence of other powers and interests, particularly in the relations of groups--of classes and nations.
Nabonidus may have been a rather advanced theological thinker--for a politician. Writing of Achenaton, who, finding himself in much the same position as Nabonidus, adopted a similar solution, Rudolf Otto remarks: "cultural and ritual diversity is an obstacle to political harmony, while 'unity of cult' is very conducive to it." This is not to say there was no purely religious motive in Nabonidus' policy--we may be sure that there was, but such a motive is not to be easily disentangled from the others; in nearly every historical action we find such "mixed motives." That his policy, like that of Achenaton, was ultimately unsuccessful, may be deduced from the fact that the "Marduk party" opened the doors of the city of Babylon in a coup d'�tat; that Nabonidus ruled for seventeen years is a measure of his success.
Religious Background:
Benno Landsberger says: "Only one attempt was made to have a whole empire worship a new god, the old and at the same time new Aramaic god Sin, combined by Nabonidus with Nannar and Ilteri in a great syncretistic effort that fused the Sumerian, Akkadian, Assyrian, and Aramaic roots of his people." He contrasts this with the policy of the Assyrians who though they took away the statues of conquered peoples, never forced them to revere Assur, they only sought to show that Assur was more powerful than their own gods. On the political level Nabonidus may have been trying to create or encourage something like a "two-party" system--the clergy and the royalists, though of course, without the franchise. The plethora of Mesopotamian gods, at any rate, was a serious threat to imperial hegemony. It was impossible for any ruler to succeed without a huge coalition of religious "parties." Nabonidus as a political realist, may have realized that only a strong central cult would allow him to rule successfully. There was no chance of him gaining control of the Marduk cult, nor was it greatly compatible with his other sympathies. The promotion of S�n as a universal god was an attractive alternative for many reasons. As a political and religious visionary Nabonidus was aware of the difficulties: such a move, as Landsberger points out, was unprecedented, but the rewards to be gained were great.
Marduk Syncretism:
There had been many attempts at syncretism in Mesopotamian religion, most notably that of the Assyrians to assimilate Assur and Marduk, though with poor results. (cf C>I> p. 187). But long before this occurred the assimilation of the minor god Marduk with other gods, and his long, slow climb to the top of the god-heap. In fact there are several striking parallels between the rise of Marduk as "King of the gods," and the efforts of Nabonidus to give this position to S�n.
Marduk was chief god of Babylon, a city that, until the time of Hammurapi, was of minor importance. Marduk was as obscure as his city, and his rise in fortune was completely tied to the rising pre�minence of Babylon among the Mesopotamian city-states. Lambert points out that in his rise to supremacy Marduk did not simply replace Enlil, the earlier head of the pantheon. Nippur, the city of Enlil, though it possessed religious, was never politically powerful. Perhaps it was for this reason, as Lambert thinks, that Enlil was never completely autocratic in the councils of the gods, but, surprisingly, the order was rather surprisingly democratic. The supremacy of Marduk, as it is recounted in Enuma Eli� was, on the contrary, absolute: the archetypical "Oriental Despotism." In another characteristic also, according to Lambert, Marduk exceeded Enlil: he absorbed the functions of numerous other gods, or, to express it more correctly, they were considered aspects of Marduk. Lambert cites a triple-column god-list that manifests "a syncretism of sundry gods with Marduk." There are other examples given by Lambert:
A Prayer to Marduk begins by explaining various major mambers of the pantheon as aspects of him: Sin is his divinity, etc. The most elaborate example--two fragments of a tablet containing a hymn to Marduk--has hitherto escaped notice. On one side of the tablet is a series of sections each of which identifies a particular aspect of Marduk (unfortunately in each case the word is broken off) with another deity, who is qualified with his usual epithets.
According to Lambert's summary of the evidence: "Thus Marduk did not simply replace another god. His supremacy was verging on monotheism, though some prefer to call it pantheism. This distinction was not afforded to Enlil." Here I disagree with Lambert's interpretation, that such a syncretism could be attempted was precisely because it was not monotheistic. Yekezkiel Kaufmann says, "While the great empires (Egypt, Assyria, Rome) did tend to symbolize themselves by a supreme god, they never were led thereby to monotheism." One might use a term such as "pseudomonotheism," or the like but that is not monotheism at all. That such efforts were made at all merely points up the fact that polytheists have problems. As someone once remarked: He who is not satisfied with one God, will find two too many, and hundreds not enough. These efforts never led to more than, nor could they ever have led to more than, what Lambert calls elsewhere, "sophisticated polytheism."
The supreme position in the Babylonian pantheon at the time of Hammurapi, contrary to the opinions of many, was not held by Marduk. Even at the end of the Cassite rule Marduk was still subordinate, while Enlil, or both Anu and Enlil, occupied a position at the head of the pantheon. The exhaltation of Marduk, as Lambert presents evidence to show, took place only in the reign of Nebuchadnezzar I, about 1100 B.C. The first evidence we have for the title Marduk sar ilani, is from a boundary stone from this reign. After this the title is found often. Even during the reign of the Cassites Marduk was often considered the head of the pantheon in private circles, as is evident from the personal name Marduk-sar-il�ni, occurring in a document from the reign of Kudur-Enlil. Lambert points out:
Names of this type had flourished since early in the Old Babylonian period when, curiously, Sin is the god most commonly so described. Only in the late Cassite period is Marduk used in this type of name, which soon afterwards dropped out of use altogether. Thus the first assertion of Marduk's supremacy comes from an unofficial source.
Though privately Marduk may have been regarded as the King of the gods, by the time the Cassites had been driven out the statute of Marduk was no longer in Babylon, having been carried off to Elam as part of the spoils of war. This was regarded as an indication that the god was angry with his city, and had chosen to live elsewhere. Thus the time was not ripe for the public exaltation of Marduk. Several texts cited by Lambert preserve accounts of Marduk's return to the city in the reign of Nebuchadrezzar I.
A bilingual text from the second dynasty of Isin, which has survived in four badly damaged copies, opens with a poetic description of victory in battle, which is probably not the beginning of the tablet:
The story continues with a description of the piety of a certain god's slave, who gives himself no rest until he has seen his master's lofty form. His prayers were heeded, for the divine master (who is later named as Marduk) consented to return from "wicked Elam" to Babylon, where he was received amid universal acclaim and the bestowing of bountiful gifts.
Lambert says the account must refer to Nebuchadrezzar I, though his name does not occur in the preserved portions of the text.
Economic Motives:
Goetze /quote/
The lack of primary resources in Babylonia suggests its importance and power, like that of Great Britain at its zenith, or of Japan today, were due to some principle of organization or of human resources, rather than to its ability to produce wealth from the earth in the pre-petroleum era. Oppenheim suggests that the Assyrian empire existed on its capacity to communicate (C.I., p. 175) In Babylonia the ability to write and create archives may have given the people an economic edge, making possible long range commercial transactions and, of course, bureaucracy.
The economic policy of Nabonidus might be a topic of major research. Here I wish only to make some observations on the subject as it relates to his attempt to promote S�n as king of the gods. The best evidence presently at our disposal for economic prosperity in any given reign is the number of economic tablets that can be dated to that reign. This would indicate there was great economic growth in the reign of Nabonidus. (H. Lewey, Ar. Or p. 58, n133) Nabonidus seems to have been especially interested in spreading the wealth, and avoiding concentrations of wealth in the capital, perhaps to dissipate the power of the Marduk clergy. The best clue that Nabonidus was inclined to distribute wealth more generally throughout the empire comes from the Harran stele H2 (iii,15-16). It may even have been a motive in his Teima campaign.
The essence of Nabonidus' economic policy seems to have been directed towards gaining the upper hand in the struggle with the temple personnel over where the center of balance in directing the economy was to rest.
Dandamaev, CAH 2, p. 261:
"In Neo-Babylonian times the royal economy weighed less in the general economy of the country; the leading role belonged to the temples and private house-holds."
Nabonidus apparently intended to get a grasp on the temple revenues--a portion for himself, and greater say in how the rest was to be spent. Such a policy, if successful, would greatly strengthen the central government. If Dandamaev is correct he was largely successful:
"Under Nabonidus the influence of the state over the temples gained in strength."(Dandamaev, CAH 2, p. 263)
Royal commissioner handed part of the revenues over to the king p 263-4; his staff began to intervene in temple affairs.
Such a policy would not only strengthen and enrich the government, but its long term effects would probably be an increase in trade. This would increase the wealth of the empire, including the populations of the outlying areas, including the Aramean tribes in which Nabonidus was interested.
While one cannot show a direct link between the religious program of Nabonidus and his economic policy, both tended to strengthen his position, to give him more say in religious and economic affairs, and to lessen the influence of the clergy, particularly of the Marduk cult. The intention was to broaden his power base in the empire.
This was sound policy: Nabonidus may have realized that eventually the whole bureaucratic structure would collapse under its own weight if the base were not enlarged. Babylon, with its narrow local economic base, could only maintain a pre�minent international position only if it offered advantages not available elsewhere. These were what we would call today the "economies of scale." Only the whole empire could carry enough weight (or "purchasing power") for this kind of merchandising, which was not possible if economic and political control were concentrated in Babylon. A single city could not do business on this scale. As R. J. van der Spek says, " The wealthiest nations in antiquity were those which had an empire."
Later internationalized, but not under native rule.
The Babylonian clergy seem to have taken a more shortsighted "isolationist" view. One can understand how present economic and political power seemed to them preferable to future imperial splendour for the (Neo) Babylonian ! Empire, especially when someone else would be reaping most of the benefits! (apres moi...) Nabonidus' view was more cosmopolitan, but not for that reason necessarily more realistic. His interests were not at all identical with those of the city of Babylon, and for this reason his policy was broader, and thus recommends itself to us as being more farsighted.
Economic motives:
H2 3.15-16 "in wealth and abundance my people in the distant tracts I spread abroad" -- trade?
Gadd, p. 85, points to 2.9-10, "they accomplished my command in the seclusion of tracts far distant..."
copied
Political motives:
****
Something is known of the general organization of the Aramean tribes in the early period, but the history of these tribes has yet to be written. J. A. Brinkman says the Arameans in and around Babylonia in the early 7th Century B. C. were divided into more than 35 tribes, which were usually smaller than those of the Chaldeans, of which there were only five tribes. The basic tribal organization and structure of the two peoples were different. The Aramean tribes were more loosely knit and often had more than one leader. They were generally less wealthy than the Chaldeans, who were more likely to settle in fortified cities. They did not follow the practice of the Chaldeans, many of whom took Babylonian personal names. (Or 46 (1977) 306-7; review of M. Dietrich, 1970)
copied nomads--quote SPW
political move to extend the Babylonian empire westward.
Conclusions:
Dougherty, 1929, p. 160:
"Consolidation and extension of the western part of his kingdom may be suggested as tangible results of the course which Nabonidus pursued. The attainment of such a goal can be regarded as commensurate with his conquest and domination of the most important city of Northwest Arabia. Subsidiary influences and secondary interests need not be dismissed entirely. It seems wholly possible that Nabonidus gave consideration to commercial matters and exhalted his favourite deity after he had established his court in T�m�; that he appreciated the benefits of the salubrious climate is undoubtedly true. It appears improbable, however, that these things constituted the main claim of T�m� upon his attention. Unless we are to believe that Nabonidus was bereft of kingly sagacity, some overpowering political purpose, such as the establishment of real sovereignty over the Westland or the cementing of essential alliances, must have induced him to make Arabia the center from which his influence radiated."
Gracian, � 66:
He who wins, does not have to explain. Most men see nothing of the means to an end, but only the good or the bad issue thereof: and so none endangers his reputation who accomplishes his end. A happy finish gilds everything, however unfitting the means may have been. Which explains why at times it should be the rule to offend the rules, when it is not possible by other methods to obtain a happy ending. (p. 68)