In order to understand the reasons for the rapid growth of the German navy between 1898 and 1914, one needs to examine the socio-political forces at work during this period. One of the important forces was the tremendous increase in Germany's population between 1890 and 1913, a population increase significantly higher than in France or England. Twenty million Germans were born during this 23-year period, swelling the population from 49 million to 69 million -- an expansion of 40% This unexpected population boom fuelled the enthusiasm for nationalism, Lebensraum, and German territorial expansion. It was an enthusiasm the German politicians and leaders manipulated, it led to the growth of Weltpolitik thinking and political ideas based on social Darwinism. These ideas became increasingly common among the population, including the German leadership, and especially among the Junker and mercantile classes. The second significant factor at work during this period was the rise of the middle class as a powerful socio-political force. As industrialization enabled Germany to move into the modern age it became the premier producer of steel in Europe, large shifts in the population from the countryside to the cities created not only a new mercantile class and a large working class, but also fears among the Prussian aristocracy of being unable to maintain their political and economic status. However, through some skilful political manoeuvring by the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, and the head of the German imperial naval office, Alfred von Tirpitz, the Junker class found the support they needed to maintain their position of power and status. Supported by the Kaiser, leading members of the mercantile class manipulated the rest of the middle class into providing broad populist support for the navy expansion. Important mercantile figures such as Albert Ballin, founder of the worldwide shipping line, Hamburg American Lines (HAL); Alfred Krupp, the great steel magnate and friend of the Kaiser; and Lois Ravene, the iron merchant, were perfect examples of the new bourgeoisie's attempts to increase its share of power in Germany. It was men like these who stood to benefit the most from any large scale expansion of the navy. (It was not beyond Krupp, for example, to offer the US government a lower rate for nickel cadmium armour plated steel than the German navy; above all, he was interested in making a profit.) Given their industrial ties, these men would be the first to see the advantages of the navy's expansion. As Geoff Eley has pointed out, however, the rise of economic power within the mercantile class in Germany also resulted in political conflicts, conflicts that created problems for the behind-the-scenes supporters of naval development in the Reichstag. Germany's mercantile class, composed mainly of economically progressive liberals, was represented for the most part by the left wing of the Reichstag. In opposition to this party stood the old Prussian aristocracy of the right. In the centre stood the Catholic centre party, whose members tended to be either neutral or conservative. In order for Tirpitz and the Kaiser to advance the development of the navy, each of the two parties in the Reichstag opposed to the naval expansion would have to be neutralized. (It had been because of this opposition in the Reichstag that initial attempts to expand naval construction had been vetoed.) But the opposing parties saw no reason why they should spend millions of marks on the navy when the army was already exhibiting a voracious appetite for money. In the case of the Junker class, the opposition to navy bills was strong. Being essentially a land-based aristocracy, they perceived naval expenditures to be a threat to their military traditions. Agrarian factions were also apprehensive over the heavy emphasis on industrialization, which the naval lobby advocated, as this could entail a decrease in the importance of their own agricultural interests. Historian Garry Weir argues that the Kaiser's efforts, along with those of Admiral Von Terpitz, to build a powerful German fleet, created the industrial military complex that enabled Germany to participate in WW1. This viewpoint has merit but a different approach to this period, as developed by historians such as Gemzell, provides an alternate perspective. Gemzell's theory is that in a situation where there is a combination of conflicting forces acting upon other forces, alliances and innovative changes will occur. This theory applies itself well to this period in German history. Conflicts between the new mercantile classes and the Junkers created new groups, alliances and conflicting quests for power.
The Main Protagonists
The expansion and development of the German navy was influenced by a number of socio-political factors: forces that produced individuals and groups searching for control of the political status quo, and groups and individuals attempting to maintain it. The two main figures in this drama were Terpitz and the Kaiser, Wilhelm II; each embodied two separate groups in the struggle. Terpitz represented the bourgeoisie, who were attempting to gain status and power (Tirpitz was the son of a judge but not a noble). The Kaiser represented the summit of the Prussian Junker class, which was attempting to maintain its aristocratic status. The Kaiser played a crucial role in controlling the state of dynamic tension between the mercantile and worker classes in the Reichstag debates, and the older, Prussian aristocracy. The interesting question is how much of the Kaiser's naval policy was truly his own, and how much was due to the influence of other interests. Still, it must be admitted that he was an ardent advocate of the navy. In fact, it was his prime interest. As a result, he sought a solution to the problem of obtaining approval for navy expansion by any means. Alfred von Tirpitz, the man who was destined to become the driving force behind the modernization of the German navy, entered the navy at 16. He worked his way through officer school and then upward through the naval ranks. Intelligent and ruthless in his pursuit of power, Tirpitz built a network of powerful alliances throughout his early career in the hope of finding an opportunity to increase his political status. This opportunity came in June 1897, when he was recalled from his position as Far East Cruiser Squadron commander at the direct request of the Kaiser. The move was not only the beginning of a brilliant career, but was to affect the growth of Germany's navy in every aspect. The appointment of Tirpitz was not just Wilhelm's idea, however. As historian Hans Burmeister points out, Prince Philipp Eulenburg also played an extremely significant role in Tirpitz' appointment as the Kaiser's advisor and closest friend for more than ten years (until his disgrace and exile due to the revelations of Maximillian Harden.) In fact, it was Eulenburg who helped Tirpitz gain his position through influence with the Kaiser. This is an important point, as it is surprising how often and how pervasive the influence of Eulenburg and his friends were throughout the Kaiser's reign. Although the question of who actually chose Tirpitz remains uncertain, the choice represents a shrewd assessment of character by whoever did make the decision. It also reflects Wilhelm's determination to build a naval force that equalled that of his uncle's, Edward VII, of Britain.
Naval Expansion
By June 15, 1897, two weeks after his appointment as head of the Imperial Naval Office, Tirpitz presented the Kaiser with a revision of Wilhelm's naval construction bill. By October 29, 1897, Tirpitz, now admiral of the fleet, had obliged the Reichstag to pass the bill with minor modifications. By carefully omitting certain requests that could be admitted at a later date, Tirpitz had passed a crucial point in the passage of the bill by making it palatable for the Reichstag to swallow.
Debates over final approval of the bill, however, extended from June 1897 to April 1898. To sway the government, nationalist parties were influenced in support of the bill. Copies of Captain A. T. Machan's book, for example, Influence Of Sea Power, were printed in the thousands by the German colonial society to drum up support for the bill. The joint efforts of the Kaiser and the mercantile class paid off. Despite a large opposition in the Reichstag against passage of the bill, it was passed on April 10, 1898.
The Kaiser was elated. But Tirpitz could see that despite this success, future naval bills would be subject to violent debate -- if not failure -- if he did not harness the political opposition in the Reichstag. Both he and the Kaiser knew that a broad base of support was the key to solving the problem. As stated previously, the political and social changes within Germany had created conflicts and new alliances between the Reichstag parties, an unsteady situation Wilhelm and Tirpitz manipulated into support for the naval expansion. By appealing to the national, and by insinuation, non-partisan interests of Reichstag parties, Tirpitz and Wilhelm were able to unify the Junkers and the mercantile classes. As Wilhelm states in his own words:
It was necessary that the representative of the navy should have a solid phalanx behind him, both among the Ministers of State and in the Reichstag, and that it should, from absolute conviction, energetically support him in its cause....To this end an energetic propaganda was needed, through a well organized and well directed press, as well as through eminent men of science at the universities and technical high schools.
To this end, on April 30, 1898, an organization (The Navy League) was founded that was to have a decisive influence over the passage of future naval bills. The Navy League, by enabling its supporters to avoid any direct political association with the Reichstag (temporarily), neatly sidestepped the political backwater that had stalemated the first navy expansion plans put forward by Wilhelm. It also allowed the industrialists, encouraged by Terpitz and the Kaiser, to appeal directly to the Volk for ideological support for their plans. By catering to this new, popular vote, the search for political influence by Terpitz and the industrialists was amply rewarded. An emphasis on the German nation became the tool with which Wilhelm and Terpitz cultivated the Reichstag, persuading its members to ideologically support naval development.
The industrialists who played a major role in supporting naval expansion were also in a position to benefit economically from nationalistic politics. It is not by mere chance that men such as Alfred Ballin, Carl Theodor Deichman (an important banker) and Krupp were among the front-line supporters of the Navy League. Krupp also supported the Pan Deutsch Gesellschaft, while Ballin, who had powerful, worldwide business connections, influenced the Kaiser as a close friend.
Tirpitz was quick to capitalize on the Navy League and other associated movements, which helped to create a climate favourable to the passing of additional naval bills. As Tirpitz points out in his memoirs, by 1900 the Reichstag had obligated itself by law to the support of all naval bills submitted by Tirpitz. These were powerful concessions the Navy League had been instrumental in obtaining. When, on June 14, 1900, Tirpitz' second navy law was passed by the Reichstag, it was a major turning point in the development of the navy. The bill had one very important clause: the Reichstag was now committed to doubling the present fleet to 38 battleships, 20 armoured cruisers and 38 small cruisers, but with no limit on the costs.
This crucial factor was a deliberate ploy by Wilhelm and Tirpitz to sidestep the previous conflicts with the Reichstag over passage of naval bills. As the historian Herwig points out, it was this removal of control from the hands of the Reichstag to those of the Kaiser that Tirpitz had promised Wilhelm in 1898. The Reichstag could still, by a majority vote, reduce the naval costs. But the Bundesrat controlled by the Prussian Junkers and by its King, the Kaiser, had veto power over such changes. Tirpitz and the Kaiser had surreptitiously succeeded in drawing the power to develop the navy into their own hands by bypassing the opposition in the Reichstag.
Opposition against Terpitz increased in the Reichstag as the expenses for ship construction soared. Some of this criticism came from within the navy, as rivals for Terpitz' position jockeyed for power. But Tirpitz successfully suppressed their criticisms. This was to later prove a significant weakness in the development of the German navy as Tirpitz was able to oppose criticism -- some of it constructive -- as long as he stayed close to the Kaiser. He continued to maintain the construction of a battleship fleet, for example, when, in fact, he would have been wiser to have constructed more submarines. As the historian Weir notes, Tirpitz was so interested in maintaining his power that he did so at the expense of the navy.
In evaluating the submarine, Tirptiz's strategic dogmatism was at its worst. He never considered the vessel anything more than an auxiliary to the battleship because it threatened his plans for the fleet as well as his own political and professional position.
The power that Terpitz held also shows that the Kaiser was not merely a figurehead; Wilhelm played a powerful role in promoting or negating support for particular individuals. No one could be appointed to a senior military or political position without his approval, and Tirpitz answered not to the Reichstag, but to the Kaiser. The Kaiser is the key factor, therefore, in the expansion of the German navy during this period, even though he acted more distantly than did Terpitz.
Still, the Kaiser did not limit his control over elected officials to Tirpitz. The entire government operated under the same principle of control. As the historian Rohl argues, the Kaiser managed to surround himself with a court of officials, friends, advisors and ministers wherein the real power of an individual lay in his proximity and frequency of contact with the monarch.
What is so disturbing about the personal rule of the Kaiser was the extent to which it allowed such a vain and insecure individual to act out his Wagnerian fantasies upon not only the German people, but the rest of Europe as well. Even though he was not inclined to war, Wilhelm's apparent warmongering -- bravado, more likely -- through his efforts to develop Germany's navy did not go unnoticed by the other European powers. Tensions developed, especially between Germany and Britain, as Britain saw the Kaiser's naval expansion as a direct threat to her need for the guaranteed security of her shipping -- and indeed, for her very survival. To the English, the only apparent need for Germany to develop such a large fleet was to threaten England or to challenge her colonial interests.
As the tension increased over Germany's naval build up, the press in Germany and England began to harangue each other. In 1905, Lord Fischer introduced the Dreadnought battleship class. This prompted Germany to also increase the size of her battleships. Construction costs increased proportionally. Tirpitz was now in a difficult position. His plans began to conflict more frequently with those of Germany's foreign office, and especially with Von Bulow, the Chancellor (1900-1909). Bulow was increasingly agitated over the English reaction to the naval expansion. (He may also have been scheming to remove Tirpitz as a possible threat to his own position). Yet Tirpitz managed to prevail against even Von Bulow's opposition, and continued the naval expansion with the support of Wilhelm.
The naval development program had now reached the point of no return. Wilhelm and Tirpitz had managed to consolidate nationalist support for the program with great success: in 1899, the budget had been 133 million marks; in 1905-06 it was 233 million marks; and in 1913-14 it was to be 467 million marks. These were substantial and irreversible financial forces, which, like a powerful river, continued to carry the process along. The momentum provided by the Navy League founded by Krupp and Prince Wied in 1898, combined with the large industrial concerns, was also for all intents and purposes irreversible. Krupp was quick to point out to the Kaiser that his works employed thousands of social democrats, and that if they had work they would be much happier than if they did not.
In the German press there were occasional voices of dissent against the large expansion of the fleet, but they were not effective in slowing the momentum of Tirpitz and the solid alliance of the Kaiser's Sammlungspolitik -- the bourgeoisie and the Prussian aristocratic alliance. The Times' Berlin correspondent, for example, was reporting that articles in the Deutsche Tageszeitung and the Kreuz Zeitung were advocating a slowdown of the pressure to build more ships. However, these articles probably represented more the partisan politics of the time than a concerted opinion that could oppose the Kaiser's plans. After all, in the final analysis, the only policy allowed was the Kaiser's. Still, there were statements from important men of the period, such as Ballin, dating from after the war. But the question of motive is a problem. Ballin, for example, wrote after the war (regarding Tirpitz):
You speak of Tirpitz... Tirpitz had the great fortune that England did not take advantage of an opportune moment to halt the development of the German fleet by force. In my opinion (this was) an enormous error on England's part. But Tirpitz did not use this good luck as a statesman would have. By 1908-1909 he had fortunately got by the danger zone. At any time thereafter he could have negotiated with England as one power to another. But he did not wish to negotiate. He wanted no settlement he wanted only to build ships. He put obstacles in the way of every understanding with England, even though at the time every intelligent man had to admit that limitless construction on the part of both sides was a race which England was always destined to win because of its much greater resources.
In this quote Ballin seems to be avoiding any responsibility for the naval expansion. Instead, he places full responsibility on the shoulders of Tirpitz. This is obviously unfair. What is not so obvious is why men such as Ballin were so late in seeing the results of Germany's Weltpolitik. If Ballin is telling the truth there is no real answer to this question, except to propose that after 1900 the rise of nationalistic feeling had created irrational behaviour among German nationalists.
It is to Kaiser Wilhelm II that the term irrational could, however, be more accurately applied. As Sir Edward Grey noted in 1907:
The German Emperor is ageing me; he is like a battleship with steam up and screws going, but with no rudder, and he will run into something some day and cause a catastrophe.
Although this catastrophe did not occur during the Kaiser's important 1907 state visit to England, it was obvious to others besides Grey that the Kaiser's comments and attitude reflected nationalistic interests in Germany. Lord Northcliffe, the owner of The Times, later stated:
The precarious position of German industry and the determination of the Prussian Junker classes to force on, if possible, some foreign complication in order to prevent the destruction of their privileges by internal reform are, to my mind, the main elements in the situation. In Different ways, both of them make for war.
During the same visit, while the now increasingly bitter battle for naval supremacy between England and Germany raged on, Wilhelm visited his friend Colonel Stuart Wortley for three weeks at Highcliffe Castle. Remarks made by the Kaiser to Wortley were later published in December 1908, in the Daily Telegraph. They caused a sensation (the Daily Telegraph Affair). In the Telegraph's article, Wilhelm was quoted protesting his friendship for Britain, while at the same time stating that many Germans were anti-British and were, in fact, held back by his more moderate council. The British press did not place too much emphasis upon Wilhelm's comments, as he was known to extemporize without too much thought. But the remarks caused the German chancellor von Bulow some difficulty in the Reichstag. Particularly alarmed were the government's more liberal factions, since they were going along with the naval bills. This was not the only occasion, however, upon which the Kaiser expressed inflammatory opinions to a foreign power.
The instability of Wilhelm's character became even clearer to many of the leaders in Europe when he gave a second interview to the editor of the New York Times on the Hohenzollern, on July 19, 1908, in Norway. This interview was almost published in the United States but was successfully repressed by both the German and American governments. However, copies of the interview were widely circulated and read by French, English, American and even Japanese diplomats. In this interview the Kaiser told Dr. William Bayard Hale (editor of the New York Times) that there would be a war with England if she attempted to limit German naval growth through formal requests. Hale reported to the American president that the Kaiser expects war with England and is not concerned how quickly. The American magazine, Century, was ready to publish this interview but agreed to halt the press; 150,000 copies of the magazine were obtained by the German Consul in New York, Bunz, and no repeat of the Daily Telegraph incident occurred. It can be seen from this event that the ability of one individual (Wilhelm) to drive Germany either toward or away from conflict at this time was considerable, and severely weakens those arguments that suggest the Kaiser was merely a tool of others.
In 1909, embarrassment in Germany over this incident and the Daily Telegraph affair led to the downfall of the German Chancellor Von Bulow. At the same time, revelations by German newspaper publisher Maximillian Hardin of government corruption, through the connections between Prince Eulenburg and many of the close advisors to the Kaiser (the Liebenberg circle), were to have some impact on all German policies. Prince Eulenburg's attempts to support the Kaiser's personal rule were exposed, and the existence of a group of homosexual aristocrats, the "Camarilla," was also hinted at by Harden. Several members of the aristocracy were ruined in a highly publicized trial; others chose to leave the country. The result was a strong shift in Germany toward the right and a demand for a strong, uncorrupted government. What transpired was the further militarization of an already inadequate political system in relation to the monarchial fiat of the Kaiser.
After 1908, Helmut Moltke became the most powerful individual in Germany's military hierarchy, thanks not only to his position as chief of staff, but more importantly to his proximity to and friendship with the Kaiser. According to Harden, Moltke was also one of Prince Eulenburg's circle. Moltke advocated preventative war and he brought the Kaiser even closer to individuals with a social Darwinist philosophy, which fitted so well with the military's Weltpolitik ideas. This meant that Helmut Moltke and the Kaiser's circle were also determined to develop the Prussian army, as well as the navy. The result was a new direction in the balance of forces surrounding the Kaiser. Still, Wilhelm remained committed to building his navy. He continued to support Tirpitz, and he could veto any vote that did not support his plans to increase its size. As Freidrich Holstein stated in his memoirs, "the Kaiser would say," ," I get rid of people in an official position if they contradict me and the plan to create a navy equal to the British." Although the Eulenburg affair severely weakened access to the Kaiser by the more moderate (the Liebenberg circle), as opposed to the Prussian military groups of Moltke, the main affect of this crisis was the development of an increasingly militaristic mood surrounding the Kaiser. As the historian Hull points out, with the removal of Prince Eulenburg's influence the Junker class asserted its interests with little opposition, and the Prussian military asserted its influence through Moltke's friendship with Wilhelm.
Tirpitz continued to maintain his influence with the Kaiser through all this political manoeuvring, and the naval construction continued. He was extremely lucky at times, particularly during the German chancellor's attempt to obtain political advantage with the Moroccan Crisis over Agadir in 1911. The chancellor, Bethmann-Holweg, hoped to use a victory in Morocco as a catalyst to support the strengthening of the conservative forces in the Reichstag -- in other words, nationalistic support. This was seen to be critical at the time as the Social Democratic Party was winning all the by-elections to the Reichstag (1911). This attempt to obtain influence in Africa provoked a reaction from Britain and France, and an outbreak of nationalism in Germany. It also marked the growing influence of the more aggressive forces now acting upon the Kaiser.
Following the Moroccan Crisis, the Kaiser's plans for the navy received a definite boost. Navy bills were easily passed in the Reichstag thanks to nationalistic fervour. The Germans felt humiliated by the deceitful French and the perfidious English. The press also played a key role by playing up the nationalistic theme -- after all, this was why Krupp and Prince Wied had founded the Navy League and Die Flotte in 1898.
Conclusion
The historian, Steinberg, places some emphasis on the role of Tirpitz in the belligerent and overextended development of the German navy, and consequently, in creating the milieu that helped lead into the war of 1914. However, there were also other significant, contributing factors. The struggle within the Prussian elite to maintain power against the rapid growth of the SDP party and the new mercantile class created the need to maintain their aristocratic position. They did this through an alliance with the mercantile class. Wilhelm himself can be seen as the central character of this drama: the king who rallied the Prussian knights against the advancing pawns of the SDP. His active naval policy appealed not only to Tirpitz but to Germany's new bourgeoisie class, enabling them to raise their status through a feudalization of the bourgeoisie. This allowed not only a Krupp to aspire to the Prussian aristocracy, but also many members of the new middle class. This process was not a dilution of Prussian power and political influence. If anything, it increased Prussia's influence by extending the franchise of the Prussian state both militarily and politically. If there is a continuum operating within German history of a will to war, it can be seen that it did not operate solely through the actions of individuals. But it would be difficult to argue that Wilhelm's attempts to prove himself a warrior in the tradition of his father and his ancestors did not bring Germany significantly closer to war. As the Prussian ruler, he held complete authority over all key positions within the German state. This alone was a major factor, for example, in the Kaiser's appointment of Tirpitz as admiral. Yet if Tirpitz had for a moment lost the support of the Kaiser he would have been finished. The process of building up the German navy must be seen, therefore, as one of a complicated relationship between the Kaiser and other socio-political forces within Germany. Wilhelm did not have total power, but he was certainly able to exercise a great deal of control over the political process. Conversely, he was restricted by the influence of elites and vested interests within the upper classes of Germany. In turn, these interests were often reacting to the demands of a rapidly growing population, one that was fuelling a new class structure. Nonetheless, it is a fact that Wilhelm supported Tirpitz and his grand design against what many inside and outside Germany considered a foolish policy. In the final analysis, it was the volatile and insecure personality of the Kaiser that was crucial in focusing Germany's economic and social power on the expansion of her battleship fleet. Tirpitz was merely the means to an end.