But now, word goes, the birth of day from darkness Is finished, wandering feet stand at their goal; Our leaders' ways are altering, festive looks Are all the fashion, discontent reproved; -- And yet . . . Night's heaviness is unlessened still, the hour Of mind and spirit's ransom has not struck; Let us go on, our goal is not reached yet. - Faiz Ahmad Faiz, 'Subh-e-Azadi (August 1947)', trans. Victor Kiernan.

I have listed some of the reasons why nuclear weapons are considered desirable, especially by their proponents in India. Let us now take a closer look at these arguments.

The first question is whether the idea of deterrence has been proven to be successful. In its favour is the fact that after the two colliding superpowers acquired the capacity to annihilate each other they did not indulge in direct warfare with each other. The nuclear attacks on Japan provide a possible reinforcement of another kind - would they have been contemplated if Japan had possessed the capacity to retaliate in kind?

The last argument is impossible to settle. Had Japan possessed nuclear weapons, who is to say it wouldn't have attacked first with them? Most likely whoever acquired them first would have used them first. Thus, the argument requires us to imagine a situation where both sides had possessed bombs before war even began - and that is changing the example too drastically for it to have any instructional value. As for subsequent events, it is worthwhile to note that fifty years is quite a short time as far as history is concerned. Most likely it is too short a time for any conclusive judgements to be based on it. But let us ignore this aspect for now.

If deterrence has worked, just why has it worked? It is important that it is based not just on the possession of nuclear weapons, but on the possession of such an abundant number of them that even a "first strike" would not be able to wipe them all out, and enough would remain to ensure the enemy's complete annihilation as well. For, otherwise, the temptation to pre-empt the opponent might be too strong.

Now India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, or at least the potential to have them. But even this potential does not go beyond having a handful of weapons. It seems, therefore, that the key component of the deterrence strategy is missing. For instance, Pakistan is a rather small country. It wouldn't take too much to carpet it with radiation, and it is certainly feasible that such a thing be attempted if tempers run high enough. Of course, one hopes that our leaders will never be so insane; but we already know they are not completely sane either. Now surely this thought will occur to the Pakistani generals and they will push for more and more nuclear weapons. Just as surely India will try to balance this - and for each side balance will mean not equality but superiority.

The other country we are supposed to compete with is China. If we are indeed committed to this, we have quite a bit of catching up to do. For to do any damage to China we need to develop missiles of greater range and capacity than we now possess. China already has ICBMs, and we don't. Certainly, to pull off the deterrence gamble, we will need to invest very heavily in weapons systems of various sorts, quite apart from building the nuclear bombs themselves. It should be a sobering thought that the downfall of the Soviet Union is credited to the stress caused by just such an effort.

There is a line of thought according to which the above concerns, even if correct, are irrelevant. It is too late for such thoughts, the argument goes, we live in a dangerous world and we must have whatever defense we can afford or obtain. To do otherwise is to succumb to a wishy-washy way of thinking that can only result in one's destruction or exploitation at the hands of more hard-headed peoples. My moral objections to such a way of thinking I have discussed in other places in these pages, but there are flaws here in logical and technical terms also. For deterrence by nuclear weaponization attempts only to protect you from nuclear weapons. It is no guarantee of safety from other forms of warfare, and in a sense can even encourage them. Consider again the Indo-Pak situation. We are already in a state of partial war over Kashmir. What can nuclear weapons contribute to this ongoing devastation of a beautiful land and people? One of the possible safeguards against the escalation of the Kashmir crisis has been the danger of its blowing up into a full-scale formal war, and sadly enough, fear of this has also been the only hope for the resolution of the crisis. But now this fear may be put to rest. Pakistan can continue to arm the terrorists in Kashmir, and to encourage the mayhem there, safe in the knowledge that its nuclear threat protects it from a larger war. Given the opportunity, India may similarly foment violence in Pakistan, with the same security. In a manner, even if we have gained deterrence in one sense, we have lost it in another.

Apart from their uses in war, it is said that nuclear weapons are also a means for increasing the self-confidence of a country, and make it a "player" on the world stage. No longer can India be ignored by the masters of the planet. It is hard to say with what seriousness such arguments are made. Let us think about them anyway. Why, for instance, should the U.S. pay more heed to Indian desires? What additional leverage have we gained against them? Shall we threaten them with our bombs? The very thought is laughable. Our bombs can serve no other purpose than to terrorise our neighbours and to set us up as the local bully - but we already had that position available to us whenever we wanted it. As for internal well-being and vitality, and indeed all other arguments, consider the fact that we actually crossed the nuclear threshold way back in 1974. Is it anyone's claim that the first Pokhran explosion has led to a greater sense of fellow-feeling among us, or to a surge of desire to work for the greater cause of the country? If it did not happen then, why should it happen now? Then, the Peaceful Explosion was followed almost immediately by the Emergency. Now, the only local use has been to accuse those who oppose the nuclear weapons program of being traitors and tools of foreign enemies. This is the common thread - the Bomb is a weapon for the party in power against those who would seek to remove it. This is the only use for it. And it did not work in the past.

• You and the Atomic Bomb - George Orwell.

• Indian Scientists Against Nuclear Weapons