2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE

WAR/FINANCE NEXUS

CHRISTIANITY

Crudely put history from the amoeba to Rome was the story of the expansion of a consumptive (parasitic) entity. With no significant process of internal reform of the process of accumulation and within the ruling classes - enabling a continuous process of cyclical reconfiguration of pol/econ forces and development.

Historically the era of the entity (the last of which as a hegemonic force was Rome) expanded to a point beyond which it could no longer (having overstretched itself to breaking point). Ultimately however (as we shall see) the collapse of the entity(from within and without) led to the geo-pol/econ (internal and external) fragmentation of power - which made possible the establishment of such a continuous process (such as had not and could not before).

The pol/econ dialectic of the empire was based upon the predatory exploitation of the provinces requiring a constant forward movement to prevent decline at the centre becoming ever more parasitic. The inability to continue this process of expansion and absorption in the face of increasing resistance led directly to the decline of the Roman empire - a process of disintegration set in.

Why was there no basis for internal reform?

The reason why there was no basis for internal reform was because of Roman omnipotence. There was no external restraining factor (such as existed even at the height of the British empire), on the power of the state (to maintain the independence of the process of accumulation from the control of any one state).

It was neccessary for this imperium to collapse from within and without (eg being over-run by colonies/subject peoples) - so that no similar empire could attain such a complete stranglehold over others - so that there was both an internal (in incipient nation states) and external (all-European) fragmentation of power. Insuring the process of capital accumulation could remain independent of any one state. So that all efforts to establish Caesarist control at the centre of the dynamic of accumulation (where capital actually accumulated - as opposed to conduits - eg sub- Caesarist Spain) would consequently face shipwreck.

Critical to the new (post- Roman) feudal order was the role of the church - as a supranational reserve of education, bureaucracy, culture. Meaning that the central kingly/state power had an alternative point of support to lean on to counterbalance/against baronial power. The church hence served to fragment power both within the incipient nation state and Europe.

Against this decay we need to ask ourselves:

Why was Christianity pacific? Eg no Christian - or other form of significant revolutionary insurgency - capable of seizing power and transforming Roman society to something resembling an evolving capitalist/mercantile system?

Why was it (still nevertheless) persecuted?

How (in spite of this) did it propagate itself, triumph, lead to, lay the basis for a new (feudal) pol/econ order in Europe?

What therefore historical function did it perform and how?

Christianity was pacific because of the omnipotence of the Roman entity/Caesarism the lack of any viable (internal) basis (latent centre of gravity/points of support) for a new pol/econ.

Transformation could only come through internal decay/collapse and external rebellion leading to the geo-pol/econ (and internal) fragmentation of power (insuring process of capital accumulation, independent of any state.

Bread - Based riots/rebellions (as opposed to Power - Based rebellions - those waged or exploited by an incipient ruling class to seize power - most particularly over control of finance/ the process of capital accummalation) such as those of Spartacus were therefore doomed and could not actually seize power to transform the role, direction, function of the state - because they lacked a viable centre of pol/econ gravity to consolidate power.

Even then, Christianity was persecuted because whereas other (esp caste - based/originated) religions could be integrated into the empire (as conservative bulwarks keeping their peoples in check) - Christianity was a hybrid of an amalgam of rebel influences (originating in Judea).

Revolutionary in aspiration (as Marxism is today) - albeit confined to the hope of an afterlife (which however was to assume violent forms - the hope of creating heaven on earth - in the reformation, as we shall see later) it first took root among the slaves. Note the extreme revanchist millinairism of the Book of the Apocalypse - the concept of a final reckoning against (Roman) power. It was only the geo-pol/econ omnipotence of the Roman empire which prevented it assuming an insurgent dimension (just as contemporary Marxism is constrained by its being contained within the operational agenda of capitalist pol/econ - within the logic of laborism). Unlike other religions it thus emerged from direct opposition to the Roman regime.

And because no incipient ruling class could arise to take Roman society forward, political rationalism was completely inert in Rome, as incapable of taking Roman society forward as contemporary Marxism has proved itself against contemporary capitalism.

Christianitys' (defacto) internationalist utopian vision (integral to the neccessary fragmentation of power - in the continental expansion of the church) was propagated (the movement propelled) through the medium of blood sacrifice of martyrs, pure and simple. A utopian immortality of the idea (based on the notion of an afterlife and last judgement) was indispensable to its program.

So that as with the new state of the art revolutionary theory & movement - the more it was attacked and Roman society decayed, the more Christianity grew based on/propelled by this means of propagation/propulsion. We have as much to learn from Christianity in this regard as we do from Marxism viz economic analysis of capitalist decomposition.

Until (unable to be repressed) through a continuous osmosis, it actually won over the ruling class (as the regime decayed).

This adoption of an egalitarian vision (of an afterlife) altered not one jot the character of the regime (hence the continuing of the games, worse/bloodier than before), but this vision insured that a supranational organ (indispensable to the fragmentation of power - as a reserve of bureaucracy, education, culture) was able to survive the collapse of Rome (laying the basis of feudal Europe, laying the basis for mercantile Europe)

Though matter had hegemony over utopian (consciousness) immortality of the idea (and rationalism/materialism, the derivative of - & catalyst for the development of - matter) When the former was as yet inadequate to support a continuous process of evolution in symbiotic conjunction with rationalism.

It is claimed (10 December 2001) that Christians may after all have burnt down much of Rome in AD 64 (previously blamed on Nero).

While it would have been impossible for Christianity to have built/ maintained any significant power base among Romans on the basis of burning down their houses (any populus willing to support such would also be ready for the most brutal insurgency - which there are no records of) & the most blood curdling political/ religous incantations often go hand in hand with a pacifist approach (& what principally concerns us is the method by which an element may in a given time & place actually gain power/ effect policy & the practical repercussions of such - instead of sporadic & ineffectual violent attacks that have no significant impact negative or positive); it is concievable that Judean nationalist Christians (the principle aim of a faction within this faction of Christianity for whom would be the liberation of Judea from Roman tyranny) were invloved.

Again, the lack of any insurgency accompanying the conflagaration demonstrates that any attempt to gain power/ infleuence (for a Rome based movement as opposed to an Al Queda type Judea orientated faction within Christianity seeking to aid insurgency in Judea by striking the heart of the empire) hrough such an act was completely unviable, that it underscores the main point about Christianity could only win power through martyr sacrifice & utopian vision of an afterlife (which enabled the church to play the role it did vis the geo fragmentation of power in fuedal era in Europe).
EARLY MERCANTILISM

Andre Gunder Frank notes (that Wallerstein notes) `From about 1150 - 1300 expansion in Europe took place within the (framework of) feudal mode of production (a thousand years of surplus appropriation). An expansion at once geographic, commercial and demographic.

From 1300 - 1450 what had expanded contracted at these 3 levels.

Over this period a switch from a landed system to one based on finance evolved (with the commutation of labor services to payments in kind to money payment - in response to unprofitable market demand and a need to make concessions to the peasantry at a time of labor scarcity).

(Frank notes that Cipolla observes) `...that the price of precious metals and money increased - concomitantly with the decline of the price level in general.'

What was it about the previous mode of production that made feudalism unprofitable?

Impoverishment of the peasantry? The trashing of the regimes' own demand/consumption base?

Okay, we can see how this might lead to a switch to a money economy; but how does the money economy (more ruthless in many respects - viz the plebeians) lead to an expansion?

Because (unlike with feudalism - a myriad of inefficient petit sub - empires) - this sets up an all-European nexus/skein of exchange relations capable/responsive to the flexible empire of finance. Which in turn forms an alternative supranational and national power centre/source to that of the church.

Frank notes that from 1450 there was already a patchy recovery. Christopher Hill and others argue `...that European prices had already begun to recover before the arrival of the first American gold let alone the first American silver' (`Nonetheless there is substantial agreement that the 16th century inflation and its partial generation by American gold/silver helped to concentrate incomes - the process of accumulation - and to lower real wages'). Anything afterwards was merely a catalytic current. The recovery was led by the German silver boom (thanks to the development of new techniques impelled by the high price of metals - making this profitable).

So there was development of existing reserves, but a compulsion to push for new sources of precious metals. Hence the push to America (already known of by popes, financiers and learned men), albeit the stated reason was a search for new trade routes (to appease the notion of papal infallibility - in the context of the Inquisition).

But as it is it was only with the conjunction of pol/econ events post 1492 that the mercantile system as a global (or at any rate all-European & globalising) system became properly established. Due to the balance of power (fragmentation of power) in Europe, Spanish sub-Caesarism could NOT dominate Europe. Yet (as with oil wealth in contemporary capitalist economies), the wealth of Spanish colonial plunder undermined Spanish manufactures (driving up prices), by sucking in imports and became a conduit for European (especially English and Dutch) accumulation.

Accompanying this was a change in the centre of pol/econ gravity from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

We shall see later that Neo Christianity (the Reformation) was the product of the emergent global division of labor brought about by externally imposed (circulatory) exchange relations (as opposed to an internal realignment of pol/econ forces) - and an aid to the pol/econ global division of labor. And that this in turn forced a geo pol/econ & internal (at the incipient new English core pol/econ) reconfiguration of forces (and the absorption of rationalism/triumph of its hegemony - with that of finance) - Breaking the power of the church by undermining its' supranational role - with the supranational role of finance.

Rationalism was to ultimately percolate downwards as capital was to ultimately depend on the active integration of the wider masses /labor in the pol/econ, to create a (cyclical) basis for its expansion. Rationalism was always (as we shall see) constrained by the operational agenda/hegemony of capital - and only ever able to progress insofaras it served its' interest.

NEO CHRISTIANITY (THE REFORMATION)

Neo Christianity and insurgent utopianism are related but no synonymous. The latter is of even a catalyst for the former - but the former encompasses more than the latter - leading ultimately to rationalism.

Neo Christianity took root where the process of capital accumulation/global differentiation outstripped (or at any rate was able to measure strength with - unlike with the imperium of Roman power) the control of Roman/feudal power, laying the basis for reason.

How then did it exhaust itself?

By/in the very breaking of feudalism. Previously served as the utopian communist and petit bourgeois (combined) resistance to feudalism - In its rational, a SUB feudalism; disappearing into capitalist/materialist rationalism within the hegemony of the overall process.

When mercantile capital finally consolidated (in England) there was no more basis for Neo Christianity as a significant rev force. Why?

Because the Immortality of the Idea had (exhausted itself) served its dialectical purpose as a bridge between rationalism and matter and now a continuous synthesis of matter and rationalism (under the hegemony of matter) could thence develop. Rationalism was a continuum of the hegemony of matter, eclipsing utopianism, and ultimately compelling the radical movement itself, to adopt it, in order to drive forward pol/econ history (as part of the historic process of automatic material development).

Tudor England

Reformation from above merged with development/reformation from below. The product of the emergent geo-pol/econ division of labor - the product of the silver expansion, with a monarchical eclipse of the (Roman) church power.

After Barons broken/exhausted in the Wars of the Roses (which were in effect the fallout from the hundred years war - part dynastic, part incipient mercantile trade war) the supranational church (in England) had no substantial counterweight to monarchical power (to lean on to preserve its position). It was therefore inevitable that they would be attacked next. The English crown was increasingly dependant on loans from the city (merchants/ traders). Hence the evolving monarchical Bonapartism (of Elizabeth 1) - fostering not attacking mercantile capital.

The fracturing of Christendom was a precondition itself and the product of and catalytic aid of an emergent mercantile system (eg with the geo-pol/econ division of labor).

How does the weakness of the English aristocracy (due to an increasing lack of pol/econ continental engagement - to buttress a feudal military) interact with emergent mercantilism/division of labor?

Warfare needed finance therefore crushing the position of the merchants was not an option.

Warfare also eliminated the aristocracy (in England, with the Wars of the Roses - In France the nation was pieced together gradually by the Hundred Years War - consolidating the position of the aristocracy - as continental engagement was still of decisive importance)

Expansion of world trade - strengthened the historic weight of the mercantile classes.

In England the Tudor Reformation was the product of circulatory stimuli -of the silver boom (In the English Civil War, as we shall see later internal factors - catalysed by the recession/end of the silver age - and consolidated the development of a core mercantile capitalist state, England).

The fact was that due to (the aforementioned) geo-pol/econ developments (weakness of the aristocracy), the only room for manouevre (for Henry VIII & Elizabeth I) was to attack the church (exploiting the Reformation struggle); as to so attack the merchants was a non starter (the position of which was strengthened by the long-wave silver boom, the crowns' dependency on the mercantile classes).

The awkward Question is the relationship between the internal and the external. The internal characteristics of Englands' development that made such a response to external (circulatory) stimuli so possible.

Why was the aristocracy exhausted in England before elsewhere?

The unique expandability of continental engagement (for England); PRIOR to the emergence of a global division of labor/mercantile system - causing England to so react to external stimuli.

The dialectics of development in effect determined that there had to be an incipient core state, where the aristocracy would devour itself.

Eg sustained neither by

Marginalisation - as in Germany. Or:

Sub Caesarist entrenchment/consolidation of feudal forms precisely by modern mercantile accumulation as in Spain (which moreover was to act principally as a conduit for Euro accumulation. Revolt was impossible precisely because the Spanish bourgeois was ruined/too weak, as a consequence, to provide a viable pol/econ centre of gravity) - and to a lesser extent France (caught between England and Spain historically).

The Spanish bourgeois were shaped by the sub Caesarist characteristics of Spain's position in relation to the silver boom - like the contemporary arms dealers/speculators in England had been with the oil boom. This made them even more reluctant to mobilise the masses against feudalism/absolutism when the expansion ended. Because of the specific internal dialectics of accumulation there was no basis for the Spanish bourgeois seizing the pol/econ offensive against a weakened absolutism - as there was in England.

As of consequence (largely a consequence of being an island), England lacked the pol/econ structures impelling continental engagement, with its waste of resources. Therefore England (and to an earlier, much lesser extent, Holland), emerged as the core state.

(The Dialectic of expandability of the aristocracy) The Wars of the Roses (an effective war of extermination between the feudal classes) were not really feudal (for the expansion of this or that manorial sub empire), but for control of the state machine. This in itself was critical that feudal war was no longer possible, but instead a war for the control of the state machine was the only possibility.

Where does this leave us?

Pondering the fact that continental disengagement had been (partially) achieved via the (apparently inconclusive) Hundred Years War.

That dynastic war was a non starter in a state which had no use (no great survival imperative for example) for it and better things to do (and critically the option to pursue them) ISLAND FACTOR. Later revealed during the colonial era. Hence the impact of external (circulatory) stimuli viz the Tudors (the ground partially prepared before already) - paving the way for the English Civil War.

The stalemate (like defeat in the American revolution - which we shall examine later) helped to secure/maintain the independence of the process of accumulation from any state/incipient Caesarism. Eg to plunder the colonies was one thing, to plunder the European continent had Caesarist implications (upsetting the fragmentation of/balance of power - if viable - which not as other states would gang up against any such threat )which would threaten/undermine the process of accumulation if achievable, which however, was not.

Revolution from above & below - Tudor to Stuart times

Tudor state sought room for manouevre for itself

17th Century depression exhausted

the position of English absolutism

(consolidation of the position of absolutism

in the rest of Europe - as continental bourgeois

too weak. - as unlike England NO similar

accumulation of pol/econ strength -

esp relative to the aristocracy in the

preceding period - to resist)

Neo Christianity seeped upwards

(from below).

BUT also so did rationalism (materialist

interest if not initially expressed in philosophic

rationalism) - FROM ABOVE (eg in terms of control

of power - for a NEW ruling class).

Utopianism therefore a potent but

secondary subordinate current

A combined dialectic

(of rationalism and utopianism)

But rationalism had hegemony (in the combined dialectic)

Utopian immortality of the idea seeped upwards. Eg with geo-pol/econ impoverishment, differentiation & marginalisation of the periphery - the product of the silver boom.

Rationalism (due to esoteric characteristics - which only expanded with the requirements of capital - ) percolated downwards from above. Rationalism was EPISODIC among the masses - unable to seize control of the agenda - or AS YET, be SUSTAINED by the REQUIREMENTS of capitalism for the next cycle of expansion - which had as yet NO NEED for an institutionalised mass radical component. UNTIL the epoch of industrial capitalism.

German Reformation

Reformation was the product of the European silver boom - rebellion of plebeians/petit bourgeois against `Roman Antichrist' (weakened power of the church - seeking to retain/extend, in its own right & as the agent of sub Caesarist forces/Euro absolutist control).

(Specifically) England (and Holland) had/evolved a viable mercantile centre of gravity(profiting from Spanish sub Caesarism - acting as a conduit for Euro esp English accumulation)

But Germany was marginalised by the silver boom (the shifting the geo pol/econ & commercial centre of gravity to western Europe), buttressing (in context of global division of labor) German semi feudalism - as a supplier of raw materials to the west - aiding/entrenching the German princes (as the centre of German pol/econ gravity); as the German bourgeois were (due to marginalisation) too weak to provide a viable centre of national pol/econ gravity.

Consequently although Luther (responding to Papal attacks) could begin the break from Rome, the German bourgeois were too provincial, fragmented, weak to sustain a rebellion and consolidate power. Only the party of Munze could (partially) sustain it through the (violent) utopian mode of struggle.

And the only way the princes could establish their centre of gravity (in new geo pol/econ) against Rome, was thanks to the neo Christian currents giving them bargaining power/room fro manouevre. Eg not an internal centre of gravity (of Germany alone) but a manifestation of an emergent geo pol/econ centre of gravity (Neo Christian currents could emerge because of the fractured character of Christendom in the early mercantilist era) in the establishment of which, neo christianity was essential.

The question is not how munze & co failed - this is obvious as they could establish no viable centre of pol/econ gravity. But how the German princes consolidated power against such opposition?

The skein of global/national mercantile/feudal forces consolidated the centre of gravity, including the bourgeois - increasingly shaped by a specific role in the context of the global division of labor, around the princes and against utopianism.

English Civil War

To enable it to finance its wars in order to preserve (and by logical consequence extend) its prestige power the crown sought to extend its control over taxation (seeking a financial basis to consolidate incipient absolutist development) which parliament & the mercantile classes resisted.

Conflict between parliament and crown was over the right to levy taxation and over defacto control of both property and the state.

The crown attempted to impose a form of absolutism (prevalent across Europe - in the wake of the 17th century recession) but without a corresponding pol/econ and financial basis for it. The regime possessed a weak army and a weak state (due to the previous period of monarchical bonapartism - where the monarchy acted as a guardian of the bourgeois before it was able/needed to take power in order to preserve and (by logical consequence) extend its power.

Due to the power accumulated by the bourgeois in the silver boom, parliament had the power to resist - which for example the French bourgeois lacked; the commercial interest being effectively predominant (the Commons 3 times richer than the Lords). So that the attempt to clamp down (by the king) was ultimately met with force, the mobilisation of a parliamentary army to protect commercial prerogative.

The bourgeois could only win by calling the masses into play.

Similarly the masses only came into (significant) political play with the rebellion of bourgeois material interests; hegemony therefore, of rationalism in the combined dialectic.

Unlike in the case of Germany/Munze, utopian rebellion did not become partially self sustaining. Because the English bourgeois had over the preceding period of the silver boom, accumulated strength enough to (maintain control of the agenda and) fix a viable centre of pol/econ gravity.

Though mass involvement was as inevitable as bourgeois control over the effective pol/econ agenda. (But to remphasise, so equally was bourgeois detonation of the movement and control).

To recap utopianism/immortality of the idea, while a significant secondary factor, was kept under the hegemony of rationalism and matter.

The levellers represented a hybridisation of left wing rationalist - utopianism (ultimately subordinate to bourgeois rationalism) and millinairian utopianism.

In spite of the fact that the New Model Army was never defeated, it was crushed by Cromwell & co. How? Why was this possible?

Because the levellers were never able to seize the political offensive (How? Why?) simply because they lacked a viable centre of pol/econ gravity and therefore could muster no unity of insurgent purpose. Facing them was the logic of `Overturn, overturn, overturn.' Consequantly they were always responding to somebody else's' agenda.

Control of the offensive (with, following that of wealth and taxes) had moved (over the evolution of the global market) from the crown to parliament/bourgeois.

Control of the offensive is everything. If you cannot command the offensive, you cannot command anything.

The masses were therefore doomed to be the playthings of a ruling elite to which control over the political offensive had shifted (the essence of bourgeois rationalism - in its political if not yet its' philosophical sense). Note Lilburne's prostration before Cromwell in order to eliminate the king.

The left split into the pacific Diggerism of Winstaley and the Neo Christian insurgency of the Fifth Monarchists.

The (semi materialist) agrarian/utopian communism of Winstaley and the Diggers represented the episodic and esoteric rationalism of a delimited fragment of the masses (The pure fleeting product of mass involvement in the civil war) which history had no use for - until the institutionalisation of radical struggle between 1789-1848 (which we shall examine later), was required to drive forward industrial capitalist hegemony.

The pacifism of the Digger movement represented an acknowledgement of the reality of their powerlessness - and was to disappear like snow in the summer sun.

If both led in the direction of utopian communism, in what did the differences between the Diggers and 5th Monarchists exist?

In the economic sphere, not a great deal. The logic of both led towards a break of from the world market and reactionary egalitarianism.

But whereas the 5th Monarchists still sought to drive their movement via the old means of propulsion (utopian immortality of the idea) - when no longer viable; because a viable (increasingly) stable centre of pol/econ gravity (could be &) had been established (matter/rationalism trumps utopianism - when it is finally strong enough to fix such a centre of gravity).- The Diggers rejected the old means of propulsion (utopian immortality of the idea). Leaving them with (nothing but) a (clarified) material objective (evolving over time).

They were radical insofaras they were able to define an ultimate objective but not the means to carry it out - as subordinate to the hegemony of matter. And to re-iterate there was no pol/econ historical imperative to sustain them, they disappeared with the repression.

The 5th monarchists still based on the old means of propulsion - became more and more extreme after defeats - until like a white dwarf fizzled out altogether.

`After the failure of the levellers the radical sects in their desperation first became wilder and more millinairian (5th Monarchist & early Quakers) and then gradually concluded that Christ's kingdom was not of this world' - Christopher Hill

What caused utopian rationalism and utopian immortality of the idea to remain together in unstable equilibrium (viz Munze's movement) and English rationalism/utopian immortality of the idea to split?

The abscence of a supremely victorious bourgeois rationalism in Germany (eg of bourgeois mercantilism over the remnants of the old - fuedalist - immortality of the idea which previously hath held Christendom together - before the rise and consolidated supremacy of finance in England) - confronting Utopianism with its' consolidated omnipotence/victory.

Therefore both rationalist and utopian immortality of the idea able (viz Munze & co) to remain together in an unstable equilibrium.

We have seen that the English bourgeois (unlike France in 1789 - which we shall examine later) was strong enough to seize power and had no need of an extreme (proto Bolshevist) Jacobin current to seize power (for it) in order to break the stranglehold of absolutism.

Yet they did (Barebones Parliament - half of whom were 5th Monarchists, not a homogenous current/movement) exhibit radical tendancies which went beyond the latent centre of pol/econ gravity.

The radicals (carried along by `ideological'/institutional momentum/inertia) exhausted their position by:

Higher taxes - To maintain the (remains of the) revolutionary army - beyond the point the merchants were willing to support it - leading to a tax strike (which originally brought down Charles 1) by the merchants.

Exhaustion of the extreme option. The smashing of the Levellers etc (& the refusal later, to renew such a partnership - eg the rejection of Lilburne) meant Cromwell & co had no mass base to sustain their position.

The logic of the Levellers et al was (increasingly) to split from the global economy - But the radicalism of Cromwell and the army (the major generals - later deposed) was founded precisely on a strong mercantile expansionist policy (combined with the abandonment of the policy of continental engagement pursued by Charles 1). Therefore to talk of bourgeois radicalism is not wholly misplaced.

The (English) core pol/econ had finally moved from finance serving the sword, to the sword serving finance (- all that remained was to cut the radicals down to size).

And to recap after rapproachment with the bourgeois, Presbytry (and smashing of the left), the Protectorate was left sitting on bayonets, leading to a gradual slide towards a (partial) restoration of the monarchy - yet with the primacy of capital assured.

1660-88

The experiance of the civil war (and settlement) led to a framework of civil dialogue between the hostile ruling factions -a terror of/avoiding dragging the masses into it - the partial cauterization of both extremes.

So when King James sought to ride the reaction/recreate an absolutist dynamic (effectively playing chicken - daring the mercantile classes to resort to extreme methods again) - the united policy of the ruling class was to invite a foreign army (Dutch) to carry out its policy to avoid arming the masses. This was only possible because of the impressive unity of the ruling classes against both sets of ultras (masses/absolutist party) and for a viable settlement.

1688 completed the process of the emergence and consolidation of a single (sea borne) core mercantile capitalist power.

There had to be a single mercantile power to accumulate capital as the core state (or else inter-state rivalry would have dissipated the process); & as we shall see, pave the way for the industrial revolution (after the mercantile system had reached saturation point with a falling rate of profit, the heavy concentrations of capital built up combined with further attacks on the masses - were neccessary to facilitate primary industrial capital accumulation).

The American Revolution

The rationalism of Hobbes was a reaction against the utopian (attempts to split of from the world market) millinairism of the English Civil War.

Philosophical materialism first clearly emerged/began as an aristocratic reaction - in a sense neccessary - (as a starting point from which to proceed) to consolidate materialism/rationalism (& mercantile capital) against utopianism.

Filtrating downwards materialism became the preserve of (represented the interests of ) capitalism in its various stages of evolution - Which having had its geo pol/econ position consolidated had no further use for neo Christianity, as a revolutionising current.

In both reaction & revolution (we shall see) materialism always served the interests of the automatic development of capital accumulation.

English mercantilism reached its zenith and negation with the 7 years war, in which France was knocked out as a serious competitor.

Combined with the fall in the rate of profit (on the basis of mercantilism) was a tendancy towards mercantile absolutism. The attempt of the British pol/econ regime to foist onto America the costs of its falling rate of profit - and treat this (defacto) peripheral part of the Anglophone core pol/econ as another colony like India etc.

Mercantile absolutism had more to do with core merchant interests - which the crown was merely cogniscent of - than any straightforward restorationist plot - even if that would have been the ultimate logical upshot. The beginnings of the industrial revolution required a switch of capital into heavy concentrations due to the cheapness of capital - as a consequence of a fall in the rate of profit of mercantile capital. For this to continue, it was imperative that the incipient Caesarism of mercantile absolutism be broken.

The knocking out of the French (which had encouraged English capital to be more arrogant in its dealing with America), also encouraged the American people to resist - no longer fearing the French - they were left confronting a single predatory enemy (mercantile absolutism).

Mercantile absolutism represented the (attempted) repression of the independence (not just of American capital but) the very process of world accumulation itself from any state/pol/econ interest, by a Caesarist dialectic.

The resistance was (not led by the American bourgeois) led by petit bourgeois/smallholders - which American capital was too weak to prevent (unable to provide - ironically - a strong enough point of support for repression - and if it had been, would also have been strong enough to resist/deter English aggression).

The crucial role of materialism (and Tom Paine) in this:

Providing a manifesto of resistance - pertinant to the autonomy of the process of accumulation.

Tolerable therefore/integral to this process (of world accumulation) that the American people (at the periphery of the English core) should resist the construction of mercantile absolutism. - And that critically capital was not willing to finance total war; as it had the option of industrial expansion with heavy concentrations of capital - when otherwise would merely have consumed itself in the effort to hold onto control.

The core contribution of the American revolution was to keep the development, evolution of capital accumulation beyond/above that of the/any state - preventing a Caesarist dialectic. (Eg because mercantile capital lacked the financial stomach for total war and would not finance it.). Albeit a wholly inevitable victory. The global process of accumulation was unhindered still, thanks to the(continuing) fragmentation of power (unlike Rome and the radical entities - which we will examine later).

Simply by containing mercantile absolutism, the American Revolution helped to force/catalyse capital to find another way forward - eg through industrialisation.

Battle for the American Revolution

The American Revolution was a movement of a confederal type - conventions of lots of local rebellions merging into a single rebellion - held together by hostility/lack of legitimacy of English imperialism.

Ultimately this led to a partial confederation of pro debtor states (to the bane of the bourgeois) - subject to an inflationary dynamic, with nothing to hold them in place after the English removed. As there was no viable centre of gravity for the Jacobinettes (eg in certain respects the dialectical forerunners of the Jacobins in French Revolution - most particularly in the radical inflationary dynamic) there was a latent tendancy to slide into utopianism (leading to the exhaustion in power of the states' rights concept).

The key factor in the American restoration (of the bourgeois in power) was:

The debt chain and (as we shall see):

The legitimacy question/new centre of pol/econ gravity tied to it.

Ultimately the debt chain therefore (responsible for the collapse of the old confederation) led to penetration by (global) market/economy finance economy in rural areas/artisans etc.

Effectively transferring/holding the masses responsible for American bourgeois' own debts - acquired in trading with English merchants - who would only accept gold/silver - because (due to war/pro debtor policy - undermining their own currencies) paper money was worthless.

This amounted to a class war waged through inflation by BOTH sides. - Jacobinettes (local) and merchants (global phenomenon).

Frank: `It was global circumstances/conditions which weakened the old confederation'

And enabled the bourgeois to gain/consolidate control. External economic circumstances led to the political consolidation. Without these the American bourgeois was too weak to consolidate power (by itself). These externalities revealed the weakness of the Jacobinettes position. Something NOT possible on the basis of purely localised pol/econ forces.

The response to the debt chain was an uprising of the yeoman farmers/artisans with Shays' Rebellion which however neither:

Possessed a viable centre of pol/econ gravity or (as before):

Had a national threat to hold it into place (such as existed with English imperialism).

The critical point is that the localised Jacobinettes were incapable of offering serious resistance to the pol/econ attacks of the (global) bourgeois (via the debt chain).

This debt chain served as a lever to break the Jacobinettes (inevitably so - Provincial radical currents Vs Global consolidating currents)

Frank: `It was global circumstances/conditions which wrecked the old confederation'

And enabled the bourgeois to consolidate/gain control. External economic circumstances led to the political consolidation (the gerrymandered constitution of 1789 drawn up behind the peoples' backs - in the wake of Shays' rebellion - to stabilise the rule of capital). Without these the bourgeois too weak to consolidate power by itself. These externalities revealed the weakness of the Jacobinettes position. Something not possible on the basis of purely localised pol/econ forces.

The Jacobinettes represent an intermediate form between levellerism and the French Jacobins.

Able to actually exercise power (and the bourgeois unable to consolidate - except with the aid of external dynamics) yet unable to create a viable central power. And prove therefore to be a crypto form of utopianism in spite of the rationalist veneer.

Then why no (comparable) 5th Monarchist current after the defeat of Shay? When did millinairism cease to be a significant radical factor? - No basis for insurgent utopianism - Why?

Precisely because rationalism such a key part of the masses arsenal (and had to be to even fight the British) - yet if Shaysitism was possible, it would have led back to utopianism (as it effectively meant being broken from the world market). The fact therefore that the British were globally preponderant meant no such dreams could be entertained as they could in England of 1648, when England was the (or one of the) great power(s).

Conclusion:

The American Revolution was not a total war (nor even a frustrated total war - as in the case of early Christianity and neo Christianity), but a continuum of the process of geo-pol/econ accumulation - which can/should be seen as a process of violent dialogue (within the construct of the regime), which as we shall see continued right up until the fall of laborism.

Finally (leading onto our examination later in this Vol of later USA history):

What compelled Washington to hand in his sabre of command?

Because the confederation could not be bound by a strong central power (dictator/ king), as post revolt the USA was both an incipient empire (manifest in its capacity to absorb the population overspill from Europe) & possessed residual characteristics of a colony, manifest in its continuing provision of primary resources (deep south slaveholders) to the rising (industrial) British empire.

Tension between these conflicting interests ultimately led to the civil war against the expansionist slaveholders (slaveholder compradors - effectively a residual British imperialism) & consolidation of the incipient empire over the deep south (a process we shall examine in greater depth later in this Vol).

Yet (as we shall see) still no need for a strong central power until the manifest rise of the USA world empire vis need for FDR led rev reforms of USA & global capitalism - in response to the rev shocks of H.P. Long & Euro radicalism post WWII.

UNTIL then, the role of the weak central power role was primarily to arbitrate/ hold the balance between residual (declining) southern landlordist interests, northern capitalism and to a lesser extent the working class.

So Washington had to hand in his sword, as the power of incipient geo pol/econ tendancies/ developments, were too strong to be commanded by a kingly power - the neccessary historic division of power between the conflicting declining & emerging interests (both landlords & capitalists balancing on the masses for support - note the curious phenonemon of laborism & landlords in the same Democrat party), meant no strongman could exist (though NOW, caesarism in the USA, as we shall see later, IS a terrible threat - as there be no more room for bargaining between plutocrats & labor, such a threat is now on the cards vis global econ implosion/ USA Caesarist takeover as outlined in Vol I Chapter 1).

But the global revolution, establishing the hegemony of human consciousness over matter, must consolidate itself through the moral dictatorship of the martyrs - to keep all leaders in check. This will require (should I have survived this far, as the moral dictatorship will not actually exist until the death of the individual that uncovered the idea, so removing the last default/ inertial Caesarist threat) that I must be removed from the process, by being held responsible for anything that goes wrong in the revolution & executed - merely a neccessarily more extreme version of Washington handing in his sword.

Radical Entities

Other societies however did not have such a fragmentation of power (such as occured in Europe) - but neither were they principally based on plunder like Ancient Rome.

Instead they had a highly centralised system whereby a high agricultural output/productivity led to a high population density and central/kingly power - against which the power of the merchant class was very weak/could more easily be contained by a central power leaning on the people for support (or unreliability of harvests, insuring that the feudal mode of production was too unreliable - requiring a pooling of risk - BOTH led to aristocratic- bureaucratic structures).

There was consequently a tendancy to consume, rather than concentrate in dynamic bourgeois/merchants' hands - the surplus product.

Rebellions followed, consequently a markedly different pattern to Europe. Instead of providing the means by which a new rising class might supplant another, to secure (expansionist) hegemony, they were aimed at the restoration of (a previous) status quo - tending to the renewal of existing pol/econ structures (leading to the curtailment of bourgeois rights - and concentrations of wealth).

While there were many variants (Islamic Empire, China, Benin, Aztecs etc) they were distinguished by a tendancy to ultimately political control of the economy - rather than (emergent) economic control of polity (fear of food riots etc).

Consequently they were unable to set up a globalising skein/nexus of finance/exchange relations and accumulation (such as happened in Europe - where finance emerged to serve the sword, and then the sword increasingly served the interests of finance).

In Europe, utopianism (due to the specific context of the fragmentation of power in Europe), as we have seen served as a bridge to the hegemony of mercantile finance. But radical entities were subject to internal revolt/reform (more properly renewal) and rebureaucratisation - within the framework of an entity (even though, or more specifically because not of a parasitic type like the Roman entity). So no transnational/continental process of globalisation (through fragmentation of power - church as a reserve of education, culture and bureaucracy - giving way to finance) could develop, only a renewal of existing structures.

Why reversion after renewal?

Because no higher means of accumulation could be developed - only primitive equalitarianism.

But (as we have seen) the European system of war/finance demanded constant expansion (internally and externally) in a way the more insular radical entity didn't - thanks to fragmentation of power and (consequent) constant cyclical impetus to reform/reconfigurate itself - including by shifting its geo pol/econ centre of gravity (assisting in the eclipse of outmoded forms/facilitating the advancement of new modes/patterns of accumulation) eg from Italy to Spain to Holland to England.

(This meant that) While radical entities began with/often exhibited much more civilised cultures/advanced techniques than feudal/capitalist Europe - they lacked the ALL important flexibility of the Euro feudal/capitalist process (the product of the fragmentation of power) in the military sphere and also in the sphere of financial innovation/plunder (as a process the two inextricably linked).

So the rise of emergent mercantilism was to cause the catastrophic eclipse/destruction of the centralised radical entities - that capitalisms' fall was to have on the USSR core radical bloc.

The European system of war & finance demanded constant expansion (externally and internally) in a way the more insular radical entity doesn't (thanks to fragmentation of power - constant cyclical ability to reform/reconfigurate itself).

The effective (later) role of the radical entity (eg Africa & L. America integrated into the European framework) was to act as an aid to the extraction of surplus value - as an indispensable factor in the development of European accumulation (initially through pure plunder).

This was done largely by playing one centralised state of against another. And where no despotic figurehead existed - by creating internecine (compradorist) states, as points of support for the extraction of surplus value (eg via the slave trade).

What would it have taken to resist such a dynamic?

Extending the pol/econ war to the core itself - so that the very independence of the process of capital accumulation would be called into question - insuring therefore that there be limits as to how far the imperialist power would be prepared to go.

What would it have taken to take the war to the core pol/econ itself?

A national bourgeois that was:

Capable of consolidating a rebellion - by daining to accept or filch power after defeat of the invader.

Yet incapable of repressing the masses until imperialists repelled

A (consequent) connexion between insurgents and the core pol/econ.

In other words to be already part of `the club' - in Europe where Caesarism was contained by the balance of power, or to be at the periphery of the very core itself (as with America/England) - so that the very independence of the process of accumulation was bound up with the independence struggle - insuring there were limits to how far the imperialists would go in their subjugation.

But the very strength of the (local) kingly political power - undermined any such process of violent dialogue - between rebels and the core pol/econ. Insuring it could be used (ultimately) as a lever to break the masses and establish an internecine state. - Even though in the case of the more robust pol/econ structures of India & China - only internal decomposition of the former and conquest by a fully fledged industrial power - enabled this absorption.

Fratricidal compradorism (the internecine state) was an inevitable extra national extension of the process of imperialist capital accumulation - irresistible on the basis of the old modes of struggle. And (as we have seen) modern methods (of political warfare) required modern points of support and a viable modern centre of national pol/econ gravity - to establish a viable resistance.

The Industrial Revolution

The independence of capital was safegaurded by the American revolution. The 1763-89 Recession, with the fall in the rate of profit, (as there was no more room for expansion on the basis of mercantilism), catalysed the beginnings of the industrial revolution.

The recession was a transitional period - a change from a mercantile (due to falling rate of profit) to an industrial capitalist system - made possible (and therefore inevitable) due to the corressponding cheapness of capital and the consequent possibilities/neccessities for capital intensive development - eg the need to be so (productively/profitably) invested.

1789-1819 was the first expansionary wave of the industrial revolution. The costs of primary accumulation were borne entirely by the masses (and colonies). There was therefore a political need for repression to facilitate the passing on of the costs onto the masses. In England the pol/econ regime could only survive due to the increased social differentiation with the rise of the new middle classes and technical personnel.

Globally the masses had to be repressed to enable primary accumulation to take place.

At the French periphery the dialectic of repression (with the contraction of mercantile trade) forced them to rebel; and overthrow a weak and decayed absolutism (unlike the robust English core - which through increased social differentiation new middle classes/technical personnel, actually stabilised). This in turn assisted the dialectic of repression at the English core (The French threat unifying the English elites' response to the internal threat).

In both France and England the dialectic was the same (repression of masses). But due to the radically different internal configurations of forces/latent potentialities, there were radically different pol/econ consequences in each.

Whereas in England repression facilitated primary accummalation, in France it was merely an attempt of a decayed bankrupt absolutism to hold onto power - which could not work precisely because it was possible and therefore inevitable that a core radical state would emerge (and catalyse/aid repression in England). The absolutist centre of gravity broke down and there was no geo pol/econ structure to hold it in place.

WHY?

Simply that the entire old absolutist/mercantile structure imploded and there was nothing to replace it until re-integration into a new all European industrial capitalist system.

After 1815 and the defeat of France - the All-reaction axis of landlords and bourgeois (held together by the French threat) fell apart in England.

We shall examine the process later. But to outline the period (1789-1848) we are dealing with (in this subsection)

1789-1819: Repression led development at the English core

1819-48: Transition in England - to the expanded (Euro core pol/econ)

Post 1848: Establishment of the Euro core pol/econ. With the post1848 revolutionary reforms.

The period can be categorised as one of transition (the dissolution of old Europe); the breakdown of Absolutism under:

Impact of the French revolution - compelling pol/econ innovation

The dialectic of pol/econ re-integration at the (expanded) core in accordance with the geo pol/econ post 1848 requirements of industrial capital (expanded beyond the initial English core).

The French Revolution

(Revolutionary Inflation)

With a powerful standing army (which existed due to continental engagements, threats, conflicts etc), French absolutism was able to retain hegemonic control of its' bourgeois- post 1648. No one class was allowed to get too strong. But no one class was obliterated either.

Mercantilism was encouraged - but as a point of support for absolutism against the feudal nobility (just as the nobility counterbalanced the mercantile bourgeoisie).

France was effectively compelled to play 2nd fiddle to mercantile England.

The consolidation of France's secondary position after defeat by England in the seven years war, set of a chain of events which led to the American Revolution. In which for geo-pol/econ reasons (national legitimacy pride, prestige of the regime compelling engagement -to justify politically the regimes' existence), it was inconcievable that France would remain neutral. The costs of French involvement in the American Revolution was to catalyse the bankruptcy of the French state.

The consequence of the debts accumulated in the American Revolutionary wars, was the attempt by French absolutism to do to the French bourgeois what English mercantile absolutism tried (vainly) to do the world - subordinate the process of accumulation to its own transient form; by passing the debts onto the various classes. This in turn led to a `revolt of the nobility'.

The `revolt of the nobles' led to a complete breakdown in the existing centre of pol/econ gravity. And opened the door to general revolt of wider sections of society anxious not to be saddled with the debts accrued by absolutism (as a consequence of its attempt to cling onto power).

Increasingly (inevitable, in the global/national context of a French pol/econ where no class was able to consolidate a viable centre of pol/econ gravity) the masses themselves, who were called into play, began pressing their own bread based as opposed to power based (eg an attempt to establish a permanent rev democratic centre of gravity - on the basis of common control of finance & land and collective accumulation of capital thereof) claims. And having been called into play they increasingly determined the pol/econ agenda.

This caused a general shift towards radical proto Bolshevist policies, that responded to their bread based claims - in an inflationary way. Which however (because of the revolutionary inflationary dialectic) could not result in the establishment of a new and stable centre of revolutionary pol/econ gravity.

Inevitably therefore the revolution would exhaust itself in power (temporary blocks on the leftward swing notwithstanding) - before the new (latent) centre of (geo) pol/econ gravity could reveal itself. - (while it was possible, under the momentum of events, for Jean Varlet and the Sectionnaires to take power; it was not inevitable. Because it was possible, and happened, that the Jacobins under Robespierre could exhaust the revolution in power - via revolutionary inflation).

Establishing the European Centre of Gravity

The bellicose position of both the French Girondins (trying to re-capture control of the pol/econ agenda in France) and continental feudalism (afraid of contagion) inexorably set up a war dynamic. As both elements were incapable of tolerating each others' presence - the other being a threat to the others' security. This led to a tendancy for the fuedalists to expend themselves in a sort of all- European War of the Roses.

Why were the continental fuedalists unable to resist and the French able to conquer?

Simply that the fuedalists were unable to lean on the people- as the French able to.

Thus the French Revolution was in effect a European revolution - integral to the establishment (through the modern pol/econ requirements of war) of a new European centre of gravity (ultimately) leading to the re-integration of Europe into a/the core pol/econ.

Robespierre & co prosecuted the war implacably (unlike before - when the `moderates' conspired with the Euro- reaction for the suppression of the French Revolution). Repression of the extremists was not possible until the threat of invasion had been partially removed (hence a further reason for the failure of the traitor/invader alliance).

When the threat was removed, the chain/dynamic of events went into reverse, the raison d'etre for the war economy/terror/reactionary egalitarian dynamic, having been removed (and the peoples' willingness to support/tolerate it, was consequantly exhausted) - control of the executive dictatorship fell under militaristic/bourgeois interests (a sub Caesarist current) - represented by Napoleon.

The French bourgeois were too weak to rule in its own name, therefore military expansion/empire was the only way to hold onto power.

The basis of Napoleon's centre of gravity (in so far as it possessed any relative stability) was the peasant - pissed of with the grain expropriations.

It was not possible to prevent the (urban) masses exhausting themselves in power, but once they had, the (middle) peasant consolidated their political death (unlike in Russia 1917 - where the peasant was faced with a permanent choice of either losing their land to a globally enforced white reaction or grain seizures/expropriation by the reactionary egalitarianism of the Bolsheviks).

France expanded the (bourgeois property forms of the) revolution into Europe to stabilise the pol/econ structures/conquests at home. Compelling foreign absolutism (via Napoleons' continental system - fostering development of a French dependant bourgeois within the system) to enter for the first time into the modern pol/econ process. Although the only TRULY lasting contribution of the French Revolution to European capitalist development was that for the purpose of national survival (war) Europe/Prussia (it) had to cultivate its own bourgeois - under absolutist hegemony.

The French Revolution (scope of) was determined by its position in relation to (industrial) England. Before the process of capital accumulation (in the mercantile era) brought marginalisation - now with industrial capitalism (a system that was to become dependant on the permanent involvement/engagement of the masses to force reform/purchase its goods - and therefore cyclical expansion of the core) - set up a process of pol/econ re-integration (via war).

What role did the French Revolution perform?

As well as precipitating (via the automatic breakdown of the old centre of pol/econ gravity) the all- European war of the roses - The French (revolutionary) threat was a geo-pol/econ expression of the SAME process/domestic threat in England (consequent of the passing of onto the masses of the costs of primary industrial accumulation); helping to catalyse repression in England - as in the first developmental upswing of industrial capitalism (neccessity of passing on the costs of primary accumulation); there was NO room for bargaining between capital and labor.

The French Revolution/system was to represent a transitional system between the old and the new - in the process of re-integrating politically and economically (through the pol/econ catalyst/requirements of war), the previously marginalised states of old Europe.

It established a sort of Russian doll. The French dialectic was within the hegemony of the English dialectic. And the Euro (absolutist) dialectic was within the sub hegemony of the French dialectic. Until Waterloo.

While in many respects wholly reactionary - in this one key respect it was progressive - in that it maintained the fragmentation of power so critical to the process of capital accumulation - by preventing any one state having such tutelage over others (in the incipient Euro- core) that it would come to threaten the autonomy of the process of accumulation within its own borders. AND violate the ability to foster development (for the purposes of survival) in other parts of the incipient Euro core.

Waterloo thus, while apparently a victory for reaction cut dead the tendancy to French Caesarism.

Indeed, as we shall see later, at the core, it caused the English 1789-1819 reaction to be exhausted, no more EXTERNAL excuse for repression; and led to a renewed struggle for reform.

English Jacobinism

When and where did the English Jacobins (or `sectionairres') have their roots (post 1648 - pre1789)?

As an adjunct (`Wilkes and Liberty' etc) to bourgeois struggle. Otherwise merely (bread- based riots/struggle) sub revolutionary - as opposed to the `revolutionary crowd' that Rude suggests (though in the specific geo-pol/econ context of France, it was to have revolutionary implications). Otherwise the `mob' was a utilised as a political tool of the various ruling factions, aristocratic and bourgeois, whatever the sophistication of various isolated elements, unable to pose their operational own macro pol/econ agenda.

When we think of Jacobinism, we think of a conscious force in and of itself for itself.

The origins of Jacobinism (English and French) are the product of the 1763-89 recession.

In France with absolutisms' attempts to pass of the costs of its debts onto the masses.

In England industrial capital passed on the costs of its development onto the masses (creating a basis for a new technical personnel/middle class - stabilising the regime through increased/revitalised social differentiation).

Why should then repression catalyse Jacobinism - makes sense viz France, but England?

Because Jacobinism (chief propagandist - Tom Paine), was the resistance of the increasingly destroyed artisans resisting global repression. BOTH from absolutism and industrialisation.

But why a rationalist (not utopian) current?

Jacobin radicalism was contained within the context of (decaying) mercantilist pol/econ forms.

Yet the core pol/econ had progressed/was progressing to industrial capitalism. Even as yet through the very means which provoked Jacobinism (marginalisation of the artisanal classes); thus in the process leaving it (Jacobinism) dead in its tracks.

Rationalism and parliamentary reformism percolated down to a DELIMITED fraction of the masses (the MASS current remained propelled by a bread- based dynamic). The black fear of the ruling classes was that these TWO SEPERATE currents would MERGE as they did in France (and here and there they did in conspiracy in England); and become a viable threat to the regime.

Post Waterloo campaign for parliamentary reform with the bourgeois. Pre Waterloo the bourgeois in the all reaction axis with landlordism.

But from all angles - the essence of Jacobinism is that (a fraction of) the masses (one way and another) attempted (however falteringly) to impose themselves on history, as an independent agency.

The key question is how we justify lumping all these disparate radical elements together under the catch all of Jacobinism/proto Bolshevism? Eg prove that this is more than just an arbitrary/convenient designation?

Classification of currents must be determined by the principle function they perform in the overall pol/econ process. Especially noting the division of labor between bread- based struggle and esoteric radicals (most notably in France 1789-94 & Russia 1917). The highest function such esoteric radicals really could perform was to be able to act as a substitute ruling class - and accept the power given to them by Varlet (who himself could only ride the revolutionary inflationary wave) & co, when the bourgeoisie was unable to consolidate (preventing immediate inertial fall back of power into the hands of the old absolutist order) NOTHING MORE.

ALL struggle divided essentially between the rationalist esoteric layers and the wider/deeper bread based component. (Eg NO nuclear free will was possible whilst there still existed room for automatic development).

If anything the more clear lack of unity of purpose in English Jacobinism (compared with French, Russian or even American counterparts) more clearly illustrates this reality.

Previously there was violent dialogue (as H. T. Dickinson notes) within the regime.

But the falling rate of profit of the old mercantile system (requiring a shift of capital into industrialisation - the super exploitative period of primary accumulation)

And radical rationalism among a section of the masses - attempting to push their own agenda -

Leading to revolution at the periphery of the core in France (where rationalism merged with bread based revolt).

Meant mass radicalism appeared as a geo pol/econ threat to the regime.

How is b) related to a)?

The old system was in permanent decline (and being eclipsed by an initially super exploitative system) this meant that the logic (IF allowed/able to proceed as a continuous process) of the new (weapon) rationalism (regardless of the tentative moderation of many of its proponents - that H.T. Dickinson notes) WAS to (eqaulitarian) revolution (eg combined with the same old bread based struggle - harking back to time immemorial).

AND the new super exploitative system had (initially) NO room to bargain with the impoverished masses (though able to survive as able to achieve/entrench class differentiation - through new technical personnel). Therefore required (initially 1789-1819) the all reaction axis to survive(which due to increased class differentiation - was actually, inevitably able to benefit from the French Revolution).

The specific conditions of the English CORE pol/econ (eg NO uniform squeeze on broadest layers of the populace) also account for the division/confusion over tactics/methods (of struggle) of different English Jacobin currents (from reformism to outright insurgency).

English Jacobinism (unlike its French counterpart) appears as a historical dead end, run over by the march of industrial capitalism. But just as the French revolution opened up Europe to the dialectics of the incipient global pol/econ (through the war imperative), the English Jacobinism were the motor of a dynamic which led to the development of modern radicalism and reformism.

The very fact that they had manifested themselves (before) and would manifest themselves again - If the new pol/econ dialectics were not deployed, which moreover because they could, be viz new historic potentialities post Waterloo, inevitably were; acted thence as a (national/global) compulsion to push pol/econ history forward (as was to be the case in Europe).

1819-1848

After the defeat of France (and restoration) the English industrial bourgeois no longer felt quite as afraid of the masses (or of geo pol/econ threats aligned with rebellion at home). And felt sufficiently secure to disengage from the old unconditional alliance between capitalism and landlordism. And felt free to seek room for manouevre for itself - to seek parliamentary reform (in its favor) and the repeal of the corn laws etc.

To do this it needed to manouevre between mass agitation on the one hand and (the landlordists') repression on the other.

In the turmoil/controversy that followed the Pentridge Rising the role of `Oliver the Spy' (agent provocateur in the Pentridge Rising) did much to convince the middle classes that the status quo represented a greater immediate threat to its interests than the masses did.

The Pentridge Rising (according to E. P. Thompson) was `One of the first attempts to mount a wholly proletarian insurrection without any middle class support' and represents a transitional movement between Luddism and the `populist' radicalism of the 1820's and 30's (differing from Luddism principally in that it was the new proletariat in rebellion - though just as doomed).

`A rising without Oliver would have panicked the middle classes to the side of the administration. A rising with Oliver threw whigs and middle class reformers on the alert'. With the consequence that the main political contests were centred on defence of civil liberties etc (where the middle classes were most sensitive).

The Oliver affair centred working class efforts around constitutionalism `peaceably if we may took precedence over forcibly if we must'. Only the shock of the Peterloo massacre (August 1819) threw a part of the movement back into an insurrectionary course; and the debacle of the Cato St. Conspiracy (Feb 1820) `...served to re-inforce the lessons of Oliver and Pentridge...'

From 1817 until Chartist times the central working class dialectic was that which exploited every means of agitation/protest short of active insurrectionary preparation.

This as we have seen/shall see demonstrates clearly the geo pol/econ consolidation of the new industrial pol/econs' global/Euro consolidation.

`In 1795 Pitt could present himself as defending the constitution against French innovation. In 1819 Liverpool, Sidmouth, Eldon and Castlereagh were seen as men intent on displacing constitutional rights by despotic `continental' rule' - E. P. Thompson

The Peterloo massacre was the final catalyst for this new period of bourgeois, petit bourgeois & plebian cooperation/agitation.

Peterloo and the new alliance represented the beginnings of transformation at/of the core. Which culminated in 1832 reform act (after the French revolt of 1830 compelled the core elite to grant reforms in order to prevent/cut the ground from radical elements). - To have granted concessions before 1830/French revolt still more so after Peterloo, it was feared (by ruling elite), meant running a risk of `opening the door' to extreme radicalism.

1830 catalysed an understanding (on the part of reactionaries) of the need for reform for stabilisation. Before only mass action could have overturned/so forced them - which because it meant unlocking the door (& could indeed be so avoided - by the bourgeois holding the reins of the agenda) was, a nonstarter.

The French revolt served as a neccessary catalyst to scaring both the ruling elite and the new bourgeois into (piecemeal) reform, but executed with the greatest care to insure no threat of unlocking the door to Jacobinism etc.

Why was the working class unable to seize the initiative?

Riots/disturbances harked back to old forms of struggle (including old Jacobinism); but unable to seize the offensive because (just as in 1648) harks back to reactionary egalitarianism (no viable centre of pol/econ gravity) - hence the manifestation of a generally constitutionalist approach (AND of a demagogic radical leadership sensing itself a `class apart' from the masses - symptomatic of a leadership not yet absorbed/institutionalised, therefore outside of the establishment).

Therefore there was a question of incipient legitimcay tied in with the LATENT centre of gravity (Note the duel role of the Political Unions - as a threat for reform AND to put down disturbances out of its control/remit - Eg Bristol Riots); effectively dating from Peterloo, - 1832 - and only fully completed with the repeal of the corn laws.

While the `length of the fuse' may not have been infinite, it was safely long to insure that other much shorter fuses (as in France 1830) would short circuit any revolutionary developments in England.

Chartism (Post 1832)

Chartism emerged as a rev-pol attack on the legitimacy of (national) landlordism; when the bourgeois had not yet secured/consolidated its hegemony despite having partially done so in 1832.

Chartism (threatening revolt) effectively did so for it (eg compelling repeal of corn laws). In so doing, it fulfilled the first precondition of global pol/econ reform that England be able to be the central prop of it. Post 1848 rev reforms effectively consolidated it in the periphery of the core.

Post 1848, laborism was absorbed by the regime (domestically and on the continent) incrementally. Hence (even more than before) the superficiality and verbage of revolution lacked the actual substance.

Revolution From Above

Defeat by Napoleon 1806-7 inspired internal reforms and a blunting of interests/divisions between bourgeois and nobles (commercial imperative of the sword); by transforming Junkers into agri capitalists. As the German absolutist govt favored a large market as a source of wealth and political strength. Absolutism effectively functioned as a caretaker of the bourgeois - promoting joint ventures with the bourgeois later (eg railroads).

From 1830 the proletarian polar force takes the field. The only significant resistance to the regime, inspiring reforms; the bourgeois were insignificant as an independant political force.

As absolutism led the transformation the German nation was pieced together piece by piece; under the impact of the French revolution and the consequent pol/econ war imperative.

England was the home of the 3 class duel. In Germany polar forces gathered to a critical mass within the crucible of absolutism. (France stood somewhere in between).

Eg for absolutism/bourgeois, English free trade of decisive importance in making possible/inevitable reform for industrial expansion (as opposed to the localised, peripheral, context upon which the French revolution was based - at a time in which England was the only core state and needed an external threat as opposed to an expanded European core) to develop.

The weakness of Marx's contemporary analysis etc comes from approaching (at an operational level) the question at a localised instead of operationally globalised level. Hence the absurd hope in the autonomous role of the German bourgeois against absolutism. Also there was nought else for them to do as lacking a viable pol/econ centre of gravity - (following agenda of the regime).

Why follow/work within the agenda of the regime?

Because there would have been no unity of insurgent purpose (neccessary to seize the offensive) for the mass movement.

Waterloo helped fix the European centre of gravity - under English industrial hegemony and absolutist led develpoment; laying the basis for a European industrial upturn (aided by the 1847 repeal of corn laws, vital geo pol/econ point of support for post 1848 breaking of landed hegemony in Europe)

French created (`from below') a middle class; and the restoration (and reform from above in Prussia/Germany) further continued the transformation of Junkerdom into an agri capitalist class.

If there was a partial stagnation throughout this period, what was the impetus to reform?

Proletariat - led. 1848 like 1525 in its apparent inconclusiveness. But this time leading to re-integration not marginalisation - in the context of an expanded industrial Euro-core pol/econ. The bourgeois were exceptionally weak - hence leaning on the crutch of absolutism (the proletariat doing nearly ALL its fighting for it - in Consequantly forcing rev reforms).

The Birth of Modern Socialism

(And the Rise of Euro Capitalism)

Throughout the 1763-1789 reccession French materialism grew in violent opposition to absolutism; as absolutism ceased to be able to play any nurturing/developmental role and become an absolutely regressive factor.

But the German materialism (of Hegel) grew from within the state. Why?

Because the regime fostered development - up to a point. As stated earlier, materialism serves the interests/hegemony of matter/capitalism and cannot of itself transcend it.

Hegels' materialist dialectics of history/philosophy ultimately merged with (concomitant with the historic requirements of a globalising capitalist development), political economy (labor theory of value) in the Marxian idea of an international revolution (the threat as a neccessary precursor to an international capitalist pol/econ). But only the esoteric circles/leadership not at an effective mass operational level.

Why did the mass and philosophical and philosophical currents remain separate?

Marxist (esoteric) philosophy was internationalist, as was capitalism.

However the operational mass struggle (like Jacobinism before), was contained within national boundaries. Yet the (national) capitalisms the mass (only nominally - as opposed to operationally) Marxian/materialist movements fought, had geo pol/econ points of support that enabled rev reform (increased social differentiation). Whereas this Jacobin mass current STILL tended towards a revolutionary inflationary dynamic, which could not establish a viable centre of gravity and was frustrated by the latent globally supported (national) centre of pol/econ gravity of the (national) capitalisms they were fighting.

Masses were the only resistance to absolutism. Therefore the only significant radical factor.

Yet with German dialectic/Marxism NO genuine operational internationalist movement, only an esoteric theory.

Which was grafted onto (esoteric radical circles/leadership) of the revolutionary movement/mass struggle - where previously plebian esoteric utopian rationalist schools held sway (in struggle against absolutism/capitalism eg Weitling/Cabet etc) - where the bourgeois were incapable of initiating significant independent political action (unlike the core pol/econ of England - where it was powerful enough to retain control of the agenda).

It merely happened to be the case that capitalism needed this geo pol/econ threat (even though only a theoretical threat), to force geo pol/econ reform - hence its birth (which nothing could otherwise prevent).

Hence a merger from different directions - from above and below (in accordance with the historic requirements of the regime/automatic development), of high philosophical theory and radical circles/leaders (though NOT operational command of the pol/econ agenda).

Only with the ending of the era of automatic development and the consequent collapse of ALL reformism (and with it the revolutionary - inflationary dialectic), does FREE WILL become a PRIMARY historical factor. And only thence has the mass philosophical revolution become viable.

What Happened to Owenism?

Owen was a socialist philosopher of the core pol/econ. Growing out of the very socio econ potential of the industrial revolution - but as a freestanding thinker - not out of/merging with any radical class movement (an exception that proved the rule of his class).

Marx was a philosopher of the global (modern laborist centred) pol/econ (eg requiring political institutionalisation of labor within the system). Defined a modern revolutionary objective - but centred on (the manifold variants of) laborism, no control of the pol/econ agenda/potential to seize the offensive.

National/global currents?

Why thence would Owen be against laborism?

The whole global point is that with Marx, laborism (bread based struggle) merged (in accordance with the requirements of industrial capitalist pol/econ - for a catalyst to force reform)

Owenism was the (partial) defining of an (ultimate) objective - but because (especially English) capitalism did not need it, Owenism rejected even the inadequate means (that Marxists used) to try and accomplish their ends.

Owen therefore was the last great rationalist of the English core pol/econ

Marx was to become the lynchpin of (capitalist) world pol/econ (the institutionalisation of laborism - even the most extreme merely a defacto bargaining position, like in an Arab bazaar; never threatening seriously to mobilise sufficient force to accomplish their ultimate objectives - None of this is to deny the heroic courage of those that gave their lives in the struggle, merely to emphasise that such movements could not be propelled by martyrdom, as they were contained within the general construct of orthodoxy). The merging of 2 distinct and separate currents - rationalism and laborism.

The key difference (aside from Marxian/German dialectics) is simply that by the time of the Communist Manifesto, capitalism needed the geo pol/econ institutionalisation of (the various forms of) laborism. This was not the case with Owen.

In the case of Owen, still evolving (laborism) NOT institutionalised (yet still a historical imperative - Jacobinism leading to pre laborism, forcing reform of/for the bourgeois, leading to laborism.

Okay, that accounts for the origins of Owenism; but why no absorption later? A la Marx?

Well, up to a point, there was. But there was no DUEL evolution of the dialectic and laborism leading to CONVERGENCE. Therefore, petrification.

Curiously the inherently partisan nature of rationalism in England and France, tended to obscure the dialectical PROCESS. Causing it to wander of into vulgar primitive equalitarianism (as in France - philosophical fallout from the French Revolution) or equally vulgar apologetica for the regime (Owen remained politically loyal to the regime - hostile to activism).

Whereas the subordination of the German bourgeois (to absolutism) allowed it to pursue (inherent) logic to its ultimate conclusion. Marxism was a continuum, pushing things to their most clearly defined conclusion. Indeed Marxist theory became the very foundation of world capitalism - In:

Its' conception (from where it emerged) and correspondingly:

Its' operational logic.

Marxism both product and lynchpin of emergent world capitalism.

The Debacle of 1848

Germany 1848 was in many respects a re-run of 1525. Eg in its apparent inconclusiveness and the role of the `treacherous' bourgeois - subordinate to absolutism. Which this time (in the context of the emergent industrial as opposed to mercantile geo pol/econ) was compelled/able to implement rev reforms leading to Germany's re-integration into the core global pol/econ (as opposed to marginalisation 1525) in response to popular revolt and the increasing institutionalisation of laborism, which of neccessity led to the wider incorporation of other states into the core pol/econ - albeit with bitter rivalry between them.

Due (inevitably so) to the operational subordination of the rev movement to the pol/econ agenda of the enemy (unable to establish its pol/econ centre of gravity - tending instead to revolutionary inflation), Marx engaged in a hilariously tragi-comic deprecation of the German bourgeois (whom he expected to overthrow absolutism - so that they in turn could be overthrown next), for failing to (open the door to the proletarian revolt - as their French counterparts had done in 1789 - and) commit suicide for the good of humanity.

Only the organic growth of (marxism within the variegated forms of) laborism (itself entirely dependant on) from capitalist development prevented this entire approach being treated with the ridicule it so richly deserved.

This, it is worth bearing in mind, was the mother of all those endless complaints (being uttered STILL at the time of writing) about the labor leadership failing to overthrow itself. - As a pisspoor substitute for saying how the mass movemnt - acting on its own initiative is supposed to overthrow them

Then be it said, while automatic development was still possible, nowt else was dialectically possible. WE however do NOT have the same excuse today.

In spite of Marxism esoteric rationalist could not gain hegemony over reactionary egalitarianism and establish a viable centre of pol/econ gravity.

Why was there no chaos? or Bolshevism? or Proto Bolshevism?

To remind ourselves, Bolshevism (pre Bolshevik Russia) was bound up with both national/global legitimacy/pol/econ centre of gravity. Eg as a landlordist warmongering component of a decayed (nation state based) global pol/econ.

France 1789 was subject to a decomposing absolutism on the periphery of the core - able to expand (post 1789-94) into the fossilised absolutisms of Europe (forcing them to innovate pol/economically). Well, as a GENERAL solution Jacobinism/Napoleonic sub Caesarism was not an option for any state - due to the Consequantly re-inforced fragmentation of power after 1789 - Waterloo. Also England was (could be relied upon to be) a stabilising prop for this balance of power.

Therefore by due process of historical elimination, the only path left (in a geo pol/econ in which this WAS possible) was rev reform.

Mass Struggle

Marxism was always of peripheral importance in the (national) labor movements. Operational logic took them in a completely different direction - because they were still working through the operational logic of the regime itself (as was Marx).

Marx and 1848:

Separate currents, mass radicalism on the one hand and esoteric Marxism on the other (impotent within the operational logic of the regime). Therefore one part of the Communist League went one way - The mass did something quite different.

The revolutionary theoroticians espoused something quite significant viz esoteric theory. But (due to zero significance viz operational logic) the masses (as even yet at the time of writing - without the new methods viz vol 1) clung to the same old (operational) shite (as did the cadres) indeed could do no other then.

Why?

Operational methods determine effective policy as always had been the case, was to be in the future and shall always be - Amen.

Re-cap on Chartism

Why was there no worked out program/theory in the Chartist movement?

In Europe (especially Germany) needed (and therefore possible for) to develop a worked out programme - in the context of the requirements of global capital (which Marxism served).

In the English core there was no need for such a programme - because there was no need for any actual uprising to force reforms - merely a threat.

This was because of the different characteristics of the latent centre of pol/econ gravity and legitimacy at the English core and incipient (European expanded) core.

Because English bourgeois could contain the English revolutionary threat - no need/potential therefore for an English rationalism (which Consequantly therefore decomposed) to present such a threat.

Though the core English bourgeois did need post 1848 rev reforms of Europe - to aid (via an expanded core) the development of the next expansionary cycle. Hence the rise of esoteric marxist rationalism in continental Europe atop basically the same old Jacobinism - especially in Germany - too weak to contain it by herself - but strong enough to absorb it via rev reform - in conjunction with England.

In the context of England, Chartism really was held together by its basic program (which only challenged the legitimacy of the landlordist regime - see Vol 1 S. O. F.) - whereas the continentals had a visionary esoteric goal atop basically the same equalitarian mass dialectic.

Viz continentals, in order to cement the international movement (and incipient international industrial capitalism) it was neccessary (if only for sham symbolic reasons) to work out a polished and modern socialist objective (even if bearing no resemblance whatever to operational reality).

Ultimately boils down to the question of differences between continental and (then) English (core) patterns of struggle (prior to merger into 1 core pol/econ post 1848) and their respective requirements/limitations (in the context of the very different pol/econ functions they performed).

The Paris Commune

The Paris commune of 1871 was not the product of orthodox Marxism/laborism - but of war. Eg the Parisian masses detouring Germany - NOT its OWN ruling class. Because it heroically ran away, so that the masses (defacto) were the only ones left to fight.

This accidental character of the revolution explains the decidedly leaden footed policy of the Commune - a complete lack of ruthlessness - even to the point of refusing to seize the Bank of France - never mind execute the pol/econ terrorists of the old regime, taking class hostages and prosecuting an implacable offensive against Versailles. Indeed the enigma as to how it was possible that such a wooden movement could have found itself in power in the first place is only explainable by the aberration of circumstances - the bourgeois running away - NOT seizure of the offensive by the Communards.

The only way the Paris Commune could have achieved world hegemony would have been through worldwide institutional revolution. If it couldn't be done this way, it couldn't be done period.

But to seize control of the agenda (as opposed to it merely falling into our laps as a rarified historical exception), especially on a global scale/ consolidatethe geo pol/econ centre of gravity capable if holding such together - the immortality of the idea is absolutely indispensible.

RUSSIA

The growth of Russian laborism/Marxism was NOT enough in and of itself to overturn Russian capitalism in 1917 (But also earlier in 1905 - though because still room for Russian capital to grow within the wider/global capitalist system and therefore implement reforms to develop class differentiation among the masses, it was possible to put down the revolt - not so in the global conflagaration of 1914-17/18) - it still required a detonator to overturn capitalism/Kerensky - by challenging its right to govern.

This did not really grow organically out of pre 1917 Bolshevism (note the remarkable isolation of LENIN immediately before then). But out of (the) SOVIET potential (of the world war situation) - Which Lenin spotted and re-orientated the Bolsheviks towards (playing the role of a SUB quantum component).

1917 represents Marxism shaking hands with Chartism (challenging the legitimacy of landlordism - as outlined in Vol 1o of S. O. F.), because the lack of legitimacy in 1917. - Which resulted from an inflexible (landlordist) pol/econ system(no parliament possible to confer legitimacy on this system). How did this come about?

The reason is to be found in the weakness/lateness of Russian capitalism/bourgeois.

Germany as we have seen, was able (under periodic mass pressure), as it was integrated by Napoleon into an incipient Euro pol/econ (under hegemony of England) to reform itself. Absolutism carrying out rev reform from above - after rev shocks, particularly 1848.

Affording it the opportunity of piecemeal incremental integration of the radical labor movement into the service of the regime itself (as a stabilising factor - laws against radicals notwithstanding).

For Russian absolutism coming late on the scene (post crimea - in order to renovate its' regime, to enable its survival), there was no such geo pol/econ flexibility.

What in essence made/defined the proletariat as international (aside from the Marxian myth) was the ability to force reform of capitalism within global capitalist hegemony (its operational agenda).

Beyond a given point, reform within the nation state ceased to be possible.

Russian capitalism emerged to serve Russian absolutism (landlordism) and foreign capital - eg therefore did not really possess a viable centre of pol/econ gravity in and of itself.

It wasn't the strength of the Russian working class that led to the regimes' overthrow, as the weakness of Russian absolutism/capitalism - Its' capacity to hold together a viable centre of pol/econ gravity, leading to revolutionary inflation.

Here the classical rationalism of Marxism aided by the sub quantum component of Lenin, triumphed over matter.

Yet classical rationalisms' triumph over matter was its own negation.

Why?

Because in the process it must destroy it or submit to its' hegemony.

Why?

Because it is the derivative of matter THENCE (because could not be contained, within the delimited context of Russia capitalism in 1917) turned against matter.

Only the hegemony of neo rationalism over matter is viable.

How is neo rationalism different?

It is consciousness over matter propelled by blood sacrifice (not dependant on revolutionary inflation - with matter destroying itself in the process), the immortality of the idea being the propellant - NOT revolutionary inflation.

Thence its potential for development was determined by geo pol/econ factors (NOT factors internal to it. Indeed as we have seen in Vol 1, it was destroyed by the very collapse of the capitalist regime - that it supposedly was the negation of).

But why didn't it Collapse immediately? Like France1789-94?

Russia 1917 presented a core radical threat (linked in with established laborism - on a global basis) forcing geo pol/econ reform. Not repression (like France1789-94) as:

There was geo pol/econ room for reform.

Capitalism (then) needed laborism to expand - THIS determined the response to it.

This in turn created room for Russia to expand within geo pol/econ capitalist hegemony (that of matter) unlike 1789-94 - (period of primary accumulation at masses expense and consequent marginalisation of them) - which of consequence collapsed into the supernova of Napoleonic Sub Caesarism.

The partial (immediate) and then absolute collapse of the Marxism/Leninism represents the continuing hegemony of matter over consciousness. If this had not been the case it would have led to the hegemony of consciousness over matter. Which because (classical) rationalism is the derivative of matter was NOT possible.

This process was also geo politically reflected in the wider degeneration of Marxism.

In the communist parties.

In the (red dwarves of the) Trotskyist currents - Militant et al were the true heirs - finding themselves completely squeezed in th regression of the domestic/global pol/econ. And even yet only semi pure (as an esoteric rationalist current - never mind the familiar operational deficiencies); for their taking the Russian Revolution as being the real McCoy.

Furthermore we have seen in Vol I that the latent potential for reform (at the core in Europe/USA) - as expressed by continued adherence, post WWI, to legitimated forms of rule in the Euro component of the capitalist core (which as we have seen Marxism was incapable of overthrowing), led to the rise of fascism in Germany, which in turn played a critical role in driving down wages in Europe, which taken with the threat of USSR core radical expansion and the USA's preponderant power, sufficient to lead a rev reform reconfiguration of the global capitalist pol/econ within the hegemony of finance (of matter over consciousness) enabled this final epoch of rev reform to take place.

At this global level therefore, we finally see the last progressive dynamic, of an already decayed (Stalinised) classical rationalism (the Trotskyist component of classical rationalism was a nugatory factor and conventional radical laborism was not sufficient by itself - it needed the core radical threat, putrified as its rationalism was, to geo politically force rev reforms) played out.

We have seen where classical rationalism finally led. But a further question has to be answered. HOW was it possible for revolutionary elements in Hungary/Czechoslovakia to seriously attempt a revolutionary democratic seizure of power (eg how this doesn't actually disprove the hypothesis of rationalism being subordinate to matter but proves it)?

Hungary 1956

The national liberation struggles (around parliamentary issue), the logic of, had to result (if successful) in capitalist restoration and neo-colonialisation. Because the West could not accommodate a workers' state - such as would have occurred in 1956 (and the involvement of the west was the only way Hungary could break out of the core radical empire).

And because core radical bloc had not (then) collapsed, the west would NOT have been able to throw its weight around (to subordinate the Hungarian revolt to its hegemony) without either:

A general revolutionary turmoil across Europe/world (as insurgents resist the west).

Alternately, a clash of superpowers.

Therefore it was essential that the USSR core elite restore order to their unruly vassals. Concomitant to this dialectic is that there was general control of the masses/agenda by the core elite in the core radical bloc (therefore no viable framework to win over a superior force on the basis of their classical rationalist operational methods) and relative pol/econ stability in the global pol/econ.

America

Russia could only hold itself together (under the hegemony of global finance) with a world idea (which had hegemony over its' utopianism - if NOT its operational jacobinism).

In turn the `Russian Idea' (an almost primeval utopianism - encompassing Christian apocalyptic elements etc) was a very powerful utopian current manifest within the early years of the Bolshevik regime (subordinate to its nominal rationalism). The early reactionary egalitarian Bolsheviks could not/did not kill it and could not/did not substantially REDEFINE it.

This utopianism perished only with the totalitarian consolidation and the stalinist reconstruction.

The American (incipient core state in the 1860's) had no need for (the national hegemony of) such a core rationalism. The closest the USA was to come to this was with the revolutionary shock of the revolutionary Bonapartist/absolutist movement of H. P. Long - when it required it to force the revolutionary reforms of FDR - to establish the USA as the world core pol/econ.

The USA Civil War was essentially a war to consolidate the (already existing) nation over the comprador slaveholders that sought to expand their position North. This caused an unbearable tension between the North and the slaveholding South catalysed with two events:

The test case favoring slaveholders - calling into question the position of the Free States (and consequantly threatening an inexorable dialectic of continuous retrenchment - at the expense of other classes - and so repeating the familiar pattern, seen viz the efforts of other absolutist elements, to consolidate themselves without a viable centre of pol/econ gravtiy. - In certain respects this predatory expansion of the slaveholders represented a more timid version of the original attempt to subjegate the USA by Britain).

Because the slaveholders lacked legitimacy, there was scope for a late utopian (anti slavery) struggle. In a qualified sense a precursor to the modern method of anti legitimacy struggle. John Brown assaulted the legitimacy of the slaveholders' regime with his raid on the Harpers' Ferry arsenal. This was only practicable because the slaveholders (like the contempory OPEN fascists), had NO legitimacy in the eyes of the Northern populace anyway, and. This insured that (the) repressive measures enacted to defend the slaveholders' regime would have the effect of catalysing the development of two clearly defined military political camps. This meant that the party of John Brown had/was able to seize the political offensive (within the strictly defined limitations of capitalist legitimacy/hegemony).

As the USA was already a nation this was in effect an act of consolidation. Compared with the Reformation/Fifth Monarchists this was a manifestation of late utopianism/Neo Christianity - against an absolutist dialectic, threatening the already existing hegemony of rationalism/process of capital accummalation.

Hence it did not require a split/offensive from the very top of the new system to start the civil war - it could and was begun by a plebian element (John Brown and co) - as in effect it merged with labors' interests, which was securely under the hegemony of capital. (John Brown was therefore the real Father of the Nation thence). The existence and NECCESSITY of labor as an institutional part of the system was CENTRAL to this dialectic.

Lincoln and co (like the tendancy of Cromwell before) could not resist joining the political offensive as to do so would mean ceding control of the agenda to the Northern working class (therefore it was inevitable that he or a representative of his element would condescend to take therefore the lead to maintian control).

So to answer Marxian illusions in Lincoln - he could do no otherwise.

To resist the British it required radical rationalism. And yet to purge their own slaveholders, LATE utopianism (still/had become) of value. How? Why?

Because against the British:

Neccessary pure and simple to maintain the independance of the process of accummalation.

There could be no illusions about the `destiny of the nation' in a world with such a comparative superpower - as Britian.

But in the USA Civil War and preceeding period:

Because the war was principally against her own slaveholders there was scope therefore to entertain a late utopian vision (under the hegemony of an already existing rationalism) in a geo pol/econ context in which rationalism had otherwise eclipsed completely utopianism in the radical movement (late utopiainsm effective against slaveholders - NOT against Northern capitalism).

In America laborism on the rise met utopianism on the way down. How? Why?

The old consolidationists (of the nation) were not yet eclipsed and (partially) given a new/extended life by laborism (Knights of Labor)......

Eg the measures required to crush them would impinge on laborism (which was needed, if hated, by the regime). therefore not done - unlike the specific example of the English Civil War and period of primary accummalation (which however was partially repeated in the post civil war era - hence the rise of the Knights of Labor, initially among unskilled elements/rural plebians; until the Haymarket riot, which then caused a split between skilled and unskilled labor - which we shall examine later), where the masses were eliminated politically from the field - until brought into play again by the industrial revolution and the changed requirements of capital.

Why couldn't American rationalists seize the offensive? Or to put it another way , what was the process by which this was avoided?

It wasn't (like Russia) sub hegemonic rationalism - threatening to eclipse capital - but (also) utopianism AVOWEDLY revolutionary inflationary. Capital was strong enough to resist this and contain the rising laborist dialectic (subordinate to capital) within its' hegemony.

Only if capital had been unable to provide a viable centre of gravity eg (as in Russia 1917) eg if (as in Russia 1917) there were no global points of support for American capitalism. And as with Russian landlordism/global finance, this caused the entire centre of gravity to breakdown completely AND a system geopolitically buttressing laborism, force a global reconfiguration of the capitalist system (eg as reform no longer possible on basis of the nation state - as was the case viz WW1 and beyond).

Then how did USA capital provide this centre of gravity?

It already possessed it in the first place (2nd only behind England).

USA civil war pure and simple about consolidating what already existed - against the encroachments of slaveholders and compradors.

If it was not able to provide such a centre of gravity, the bourgeois would not have tolerated the civil war - and in such a case either:

Global revolution a neccessity or (before this became possible):

Integration of said state as a subordinate part of the core regimes' empire (as bourgeois refuse/unable to lead/control, via political representatives the resistance).

Becoming a core radical component of a global pol/econ.

Why should the American radicals be so accommadating as to use outmoded weaponry (against the new plutocracy pre/post civil war)?

American radicalism was comprised of 2 clearly identifiable currents:

Skilled workers on the rise.

Destroyed small commodity producers and unskilled workers - on the decline (even if absorbed later by a new boom) - maintaining social differentiation.

Rationalism as a 2nd distinct historical current did not rise to the task - as unable to seize the offensive (therefore partially falling back) in the USA civil war against slaveholders. John Brown & co therefore performed the function of a utopian sub quantum component (as Lenin as a rationalist sub quantum component was to do in the Russian revolt).

The remnants of an avowedly rev inflation current (from a time when utopianism still had a significant role left to play - against slaveholder forms - thence turned on/breaking itself against, the plutocracy (as the movement exhausted itself and swung back - just as we have seen in the English civil war).

(But) like the English Jacobins they were no longer required by the pol/econ regime and:

Unable to seize the offensive - because no unity of insurgent purpose (logic of `overturn, overtirn, overturn').

Due to the latent centre of gravity and incipient legitimacy tied in with it (aided by the social differentiation, curiously manifest in duel rationalist and utopian currents) NEITHER could laborism.

Unable to be institutionalised (had to be removed to retain/advance social differentiation - dynamic form).

In Englands' case jacobinism evolved towards semi - institutionalised and ultimately institutionalised forms.

In the USA institutionalised laborism already growing in the place of the utopian current, even as it flared up (with John Brown) and decayed (Marxists in Europe, and the AFL - post Knights of labor - in the USA) - of consequance utopianism disappeared in to the ever more lame policy of William Jennings Bryant.

Unlike the Fifth Monarchists, the Knights of Labor were not really an insurgent movement, being a hybrid of utopian and radical forces - and while utopianism (unlike in Russia) possessed internal hegemony - it had to take account of its rationalist/laborist base - which having room to grow within the regime, was not going to commit itself to despairing insurgent ventures, such as the 5th Monarchists did.

Why did USA radicalism/Knights of Labor grow in the form in which they did?

To recap, due to renewed (post civil war) primary industrial accummalation and the impoverishment of the masses thereof. Yet USA capitalism needed laborism (to propel it forward), so unlike England (in industrial revolution) therefore couldn't be smashed entirely.

Of consequance therefore, manifested itself in (hybridised utopian/rationalist form) an alliance of skilled/unskilled labor

This (superficially dangerous) growth of political unionism/radicalism was split by the regime - via the Haymarket riot/police provocation.

The knights of Labor themselves were unable to seize the rev pol offensive - as based on growth within the agenda of the regime. Eg no attempt to delegitimise the regime/advance a rev reconstructionist program. The later growth of the AFL illustrates the (still then existing/latent) scope of the regime for stabilisation based on dynamic social differentiation.

Utopianism retained hegemony of political (as opposed to trades union) radicalism UNTIL (the Revolutionary Bonapartist/Absolutist movement of) H. P. Long. How??? Why???

There was no labor party because trades union leaders refused to accept the lead. If a labor party had been set up, it would have been flooded by black radicals (seeking a way forward) - dragging behind them increasing swathes of poorer whites (as seen in chapter 5 vol 1 revolutionary rationalism could only be expressed in Bonapartist form, forcing reform of the USA core pol/econ - due to the racial division of the working class; eg no permanent institutionalisation of laborism possible).

This the trades union leaders wouldn't do. White T. U. bosses didn't create a labor party because they didn't have to. Why?

Because there was plenty of room to bargain within the system for white labor as long as they didn't take the political front. As this would have called into question the entire existence of the USA pol/econ regime - propped up by racial division.

So post H. P. Long the white masses were institutionalised directly or indirectly via trades unionism (the effects thereof even on non-union workforces), but (viz radicalism) largely apoliticised.

As we shall see in the next sub section, post WWII, the Black American Revolutionary movement took the political lead in the USA (viz radicalism). Though only the dumping in the crapper of the white masses would create the (current) potential to mount a successful revolutionary offensive.

Black Radicalism In The USA

(Due to marginal pol/econ position) - Began largely utopian in form (eg Marcus Garvey, Nation of Islam).

But the post war boom brought them into the game (which they weren't before).

BOTH the currents of Martin Luther King AND Malcolm X the product of the process of -economic integration (by the boom).

In rural South: Integration within the pol/econ agenda of the system - eg absorption of the reserve army of labor.

In Urban North: An ULTRA advanced rev current (3 decades ahead of its time - globally)How? Why?

Because the boom had given them strength they did not have before. Yet crucially, still for the black masses, the regime had no legitimacy (causing a section of them to take on the regime - with the most advanced political weapons - 3 decades before viable - eg the world/USA caught up with them).

They raised these ideas not as a mere reserve army (in the south) nor as a `colony' - but (because they were) as an integral territorial part of the USA - challenging the legitimacy of the regime.

Vietnam & Black Radicalism

To what degree are the 2 linked?

Did Black radicalism impel/catalyse as of neccessity (for the regimes' survival) a switch to a deflationary dynamic for which Vietnam (and an intensification of the cold war was the pretext?

If so how?

It was only possible to pull out of Vietnam after Black radicalism was crushed. The REAL war was to divide the USA people (or at any rate keep them divided - through a new dynamic of social differentiation based on intensified credit/military expansion; so that the finance /war dynamic - which originally drove capitalism forward, began to go in reverse) - and this the enemy won.

Contradicting this notion, we know there was a fall in the rate of profit, causing a shift of capital into L.America. BUT Vietnam didn't help.

Nevertheless black radicalism as a very powerful adjunct would certainly have harmed the manoeuvrability of the regime (based on the old expansionary dynamic).

And fear of merger with white masses (which in no way contradicted the policy of expanding the black middle class as a medium of social control/division - For the regime could not engage in totalised war against black masses - as this would have meant an IMMEDIATE ALL OUT assault on white workers' position, and this was a non starter - while workers' interests could be accommadated within hegemony of the regime, to the benefit of the regime - essentially state policy was about the strategic management of racism in order to keep masses divided without an immediate totalised showdown) catalysed a policy based on ever increasingly intensified socio-econ division/repression (hence also COINTELPRO).

(Under cover of the Vietnam war) This political crisis, was actually resolved through the geo economic crisis.....

(rise in oil prices as a result of the long term boom creating shortages/ strengthening the hand of the oil producer states in relation to the USA/ core states....

......which impact of led to capital eclipsing the USA core empire....& therefore meant that USA radical forces were outflanked by switch to credit/ speculative expansion.... (which meant that while USA radical forces were trashed, there were enough profitting from this system to keep USA regime stable while the radicals could be outflanked/ crushed under cover of ideological `anticommunism'/ Vietnam war)

........as an organic process

Unfortunately for Malcolm X and co, until white masses dumped in the crapper with them, it was impossible to get them to break out of the old pol/econ construct. Hence all along the line the enemy retained control of the agenda.

The Declention of Black USA Radicalism

Eg starting from the highest point and then declining:

Malcolm X, then Panthers, then Nation of Islam (Farrakhan).

Black radicalism did not begin as a fratricidal (internecine sub state) component - as was a territorial part of USA pol/econ and integrated by the boom.

With the boom, a part of the NOI sublimated into Malcolm X (the harbinger, 30 years early). An incipient prototype (Quantum Materialist) current centred on the (offensive prosecution of the) legitimacy question, and an extreme revolutionary multiracial vision. And underpinned by a commitment to blood sacrifice (incidentally drawing on a notion of an immortality of the idea, as a major philosophical aspect - WITHOUT recourse to priests/party or ideological shibboleths of any description).

If the idea was NOT fully developed & polished, this is hardly surprising given that it wasn't given time before being snuffed out militarily and emerged so early on. And indeed was borne out of the practicalities of the alas doomed black radical struggle - reaching for the most advanced weapons to fight before the global situation ripened.

Because they were part of the territorial USA, they could uncover this (having accumulated the strength in the preceding period & emerged from utopianism). But the same LEGITIMACY dynamic which made it possible for this ultra modern current to emerge so early - also doomed the movement - until the white masses dumped in the same crapper AND rediscovered anew, through a theoretical revolution, what a fraction of the black masses had learned 30 years previous.

Yes we have been here before bro' but it won't grow organically out of any existing current, it requires a theoretical revolution - to uncover (& polish) what you knew 30 years ago.

The Black Panthers - a current based most particularly on the black community (when racial division had been further buttressed by the execution of the deflationary dynamic) - arose as a form of Black Chartism - able to arise because black masses not yet defeated in military combat.

Defeat came about through COINTELPRO. Manifestation of the historic weakness of the black masses position was the split (a fetishistic antagonism between) militarist and political wings of the Black Panthers. Which arose principally because there was no viable way of winning over the white masses (symptomatic of the historical cul de sac they found themselves in).

The contemporary Nation of Islam (of Louis Farrakhan) however, arose as a direct consequence of all the military political defeats and the consequent pol/econ degeneration of black radicalism - As a result of COINTELPRO and the CIA drug running programs - aimed at containing the revolutionary threat from both Latin American and black radicalism - through a systematic campaign of genocide and barbarisation - aimed at creating a community incapable of rebellion.

The Farrakhan dialectic is in effect an internecine state, created by the fascizing USA pol/econ regime, in its own image - a despotic pseudo radical current that serves (via the notion of separatism) the function of keeping the black (and white) masses in their place - by aiding their division - As opposed to forging unity over the dead bodies of the ruling Mafia.

The Shabbaz Affair

- Was designed by the regime to get the black community acting in a way consistent with the regimes' interests (eg lining up behind Farrakhan - so keeping masses divided). As for his much vaunted `magnanimity', what else would he do? He has nothing to gain by being hostile to Shabazz and everything to gain by appearing to be `forgiving'. The USA national security state could therefore rely on Farrakhan (without any prompting) to do what was in their mutual best interests.

As to the question that arises - how can we say something `special' died with Malcolm X? When followed by the Panthers?

The Malcolm X tendancy positioned itself (via the legitimcay struggle) to attempt to take the political offensive - which because the historical conditions were not yet ripe immediately precipitated its military destruction.

The Panthers however were largely a defensive (like the Chartists - who were only revolutionary insofaras they challenged the legitimacy of landlordist hegemony, before the rise of laborism yet in the opposite historical direction, preceeding its eclipse) formation - against attacks by the the regime - no general attempt to seize the offensive.

Why were both doomed? No viable centre of pol/econ gravity? No unity of insurgent purpose?

In the case of the Chartists certainly (due to the latent centre of pol/econ gravity - otherwise tipping over into reactionary egalitarianism).

But the Panthers?

They had NO potential to mobilise sufficient force - Due to racial division, white masses not dumped in the crapper - and the precondition for so dumping them was the defeat of the Panthers. Which (defeat/crushing of) paved the way for the crushing of institutionalised laborism GLOBALLY - as Chartism had paved the way for its BIRTH.

The Black radical struggle can be seen as the USA civil war round 2.

Originally with room for dialogue between capital & labor, white laborists were the key radical component in the struggle, in the civil war round 1. - with the Blacks on the margin.

But with room for dialogue between capital & labor progressively evaporating, Black revolutionaries were the key radical component in round 2 of the civil war (against the militarised plutocracy) - with the white left/labor on the margins of significance.

So in conclusion, the violent dialogue of the renewed but muted civil ar gathered its own momentum until:

Paper constitutional rights of Black people had been asserted/recognised.

Black revolutionaries were militarily defeated via COINTELPRO..

A black middle class was fostered to legitimate/entrench the fraudulent legitimacy of the regime - even as the regime carried out its re-armament & speculative credit expansionist based scorched earth policy, on the USA pol/econ in general and on the Black communities in particular - via CIA aided drug barony in L. America, which created communities incapable of rebellion, negating defacto, much of what had been won on paper.

But as for white radicals, the regime possessed still legitimacy among a sufficiently strong white mass base.

Eg anti Vietnam war radicalism was essentially episodic in character - actually held together by the war (as opposed to Black radicalisms structural character - neccessitating their military defeat via COINTELPRO) - that is after the defeat of Black radicalism and with the evolving switch to military, credit, speculative expansionism, it became possible to shoot the fox of the white left by pulling out of Vietnam - as there was still a sufficiently strong social base of support benefiting from the military, credit, speculative expansionist policy to stabilise the regime. The episodic white left therefore, robbed of its immediate legitimacy card (anti Vietnam war), was unable to deploy the new model rev theory to delegitimise the regime for its criminal military plutocratic character per se, as there was still too strong a base of support to buttress the regime.

CHINA

The reaction to increasing social differentiation began with the `White Lotus' conspiracy in the 1770's.

This time however the old elite was to be globally re-inforced (rendered impregnable to the old radical entity modes of struggle) through the Opium Wars.

The initial reaction to which provoked the Taipeng rebellion (1851-66).

But as the central pol/econ regime was (even as it half heartedly fought the invader) now globally re-inforced - there was no mode of social accummalation possible on the basis of the radical entity construct (or core radical - nor any such geo pol/econ point of support making this possible until the USSR).

The reason for this was because social differentiation within the radical entity was no longer viable without imperialist backing - simply because such differentiation was now consolidated by imperialist points of support (bursting for all time the pol/econ dialectic/membrane which had kept China's pol/econ development largely autonomous from the global process of capital accummalation).

Consequantly the Taipeng exhausted/burnt itself out rather than a straightforward consolidation of national capital (consolidating ac centre of pol/econ gravity) - Hence massive extermination (50 million out of 400 million), as lacked a viable centre of gravity, logic of `overturn, overturn, overturn' ; and weak compradorism. Eg no national centre of gravity established, mere exhaustion of Taipeng - leading to consolidation of compradorism.

In the geo pol/econ context of imperialist buttressed landlordism it wasn't therefore the aristocracy which burnt itself out so much as the insurgent people (eg their military pol/econ scope for the old radical entity butressed modes of social accummalation - which made previous rebellions viable).

The defeat of the Taipeng led to the regime thinking that the radical entity renewal current could be controlled - by the Chinese state regime - Hence state involvement in the Boxer Rebellion.

Defeat of this (for ultimately the same reason the Taipeng were unsuccessful - eg the Chinese state baulked at the idea of a total war with Britain, by mobilising the peasantry, which would have consumed their own interests, via the logic of `overturn, overturn, overturn' - led to defeat) led to (the abortive growth of) modern bourgeois nationalism of Sun Yat Sen - the basis of which however was too weak for China to sustain it (the same reason why colonised in the first place) through a national bourgeois able to consolidate a viable centre of pol/econ gravity. As the national (as opposaed to compradorist/imperialist based/reliant) bourgeois was too weak to keep down BOTH the masses AND (act as a viable point of support against/consolidator of the nation - eg like the American post 1789) imperialists.

Only with the birth of the USSR and general construct of/formation new global pol/econ in WWII etc, with the impact on the core regimes masses - causing them to restrain their ruling classes) - leading to victory of the CCP essentially a peasant (military) revolt with a (partially decomposed) rationalism (in geo pol/econ context) grafted on top.

The USSR acted as a geo pol/econ point of support. The USSR did everyting in its power to sabotage the Chinese peasasnt war. But in spite of themselves, because of the geo pol/econ position they occupied, however much they tried not to, they couldn't but provide a gfeo pol/econ point of support for the Chinese Revolution - To do so they would have had to ally themselves totally with the USA, and this was a non starter, as would have undermined their own regime.

Capital (like with the American Revolution) could not attack (in totalised conflict) USSR/China - as to do so:

Conflicted with laborism - which would therefore restrain it.

Regime (then) both needed and able to absorb laborism/rationalism (which no longer able to do now).

Now that it is able to crush laborism (due to the collapse of the global pol/econ) - the process of accummalation in (still) maintaining its independance from the control of (any) state has actually completely undermined the capacity of the state to act as a dynamic framework/scaffolding for the geo pol/econ reconfiguration of the process of accummalation to take place. Leading to the TOTAL fragmentation of all existing structures.

How was it that Maoism (and even to a lesser extent, Leninism) represented partially decomposed forms of (Marxist) rationalism?

As the global pol/econ emerges, as the old rationalism/ matter symbiotic relationship cannot continue forever, the consequant threat of reducing class differentiation via laborism (which as a linear development would otherwise happen) - produces a classical dialectic to reactionary egalitarianism (Rationalism being the mere derivative of matter cannot gain hegemony over it without undermining the material basis of it/rationalism in the process) - where it was actually required to take power to stimulate the development rev reform of a global pol/econ (as contained within the overall hegemony of capitalism/automatic material development).

This decomposition of automatically emergant matter (in the core component on the core pol/econ), produces a decomposition of rationalism (being the mere derivative of matter).

Which correspondingly manifests itself in the increased tendancy to decomposition of rationalism before it seizes power. - Hence marxism descends into Leninism, collapses into Chinese Maoism and the red dwarves of Trotskyism.

The Chinese Revolution mimicked in certain respects the English Civil War.

Core radical rationalism unlocked the latent potential of the Chinese pol/econ (latent centre of gravity), after Maoist plebian (decomposed) rationalism burned itself out - just as the 5th Monarchists had before them (although the ultras were not in power in England, when they had done so).

This laid the basis for a resurgence of Chinese capitalism (confronting masses and rationalism thereof) - within the framework of a strong state/core radical ideology.

But no (typical buffer state) long term basis for export led growth - because the West is in terminal decline. Therefore no basis for continued growth, absorption of buffer states' products, which dependant on :

Core radical threat.

Wests' ability to absorb products.

In the case of typical buffer states (as opposed to Scandinavian style hybrid states - vestigial Nazi elements notwithstanding), export led growth led to internal expansion (as labor shortages pushed up price of labor - leading to trades union aided demand growth).

The point is that China unlike FDR/USA (& England before her) does not have pre existing capacity to reform itself viz globalised finance (eg viz USA - with aid of the USSR). Therefore unable to lead geo pol/econ revolutionary reform - (as does not have pre existing control). Therefore can only regain/reconsolidate control over own people via repression.

Observe the curious phenonemon of the buffer states still expanding as the core enters a state of rapid decomposition.

These states were allowed to come into being to face down the core radical threat. As well as having been(still to a degree appearing as) a core radical threat, China is the very last and greatest of the buffer capitalist states.

Though incapacity to lead geo pol/econ reform will force a shift towards fascized re-armament - to cling onto power. Hence the phenonemon of Chinese capital/matter being squeezed between 2 `left' rationalisms/ideologies (as unable to institute revolutionary reform) - with the consequance of both rationalisms entering into a state of decomposition.

China's position is related to its being a MEGASTATE. Its strength as a radical entity become its weakness, vis its insularity leaving it prey to modernised inudustrial powers.... with rise of USSR, its size again worked in its favor, vis anticolonialist revolt. BUT, its size also means that as it grows the nat sec state is seen as the main enemy by its own people, it is impossible to maintain dynamic imperial social stratification in the same way as the USA has been able to (playing the nat sec state card to stabilise its rule internally as well as externally); hence the aforementioned tendancy for the nat sec state to cut across China's own development to maintain control of the pol/econ agenda - as capitalism cannot rule in its own name unlike the smaller USA (though global econ crash shall render this academic).

The Falung Gong

We have already analysed how to deal with the threat of China's collapse in C1 Vol I - so we shall confine ourselves here to an analysis of what the falung gong represent dialectically.

China's rising power has eclipsed regime legitimacy (which is/ was based on being anti colonial), & led to the re-emergence of the ancient radical entity pattern of struggle (eg via falun gong), which as we have seen, CANNOT consolidate a new bureaucratic caste (as China is no longer a self contained pol/econ) but CAN eclipse the CCP. This means chaos.

This means the utopian god dialectic has gained hegemony over matter.

Now (as we have seen vis Russia etc) when (esoteric) rationalism gains hegemony over matter, because it is the mere derivative of matter, it destroys itself (eg via revolutionary inflation)/ matter. ONLY the FUSION of the God dialectic & rationalism can enable human consciousness to gain hegemony over matter - via blood sacrifice of martyrs/ immortality of the idea (as elaborated).

The crisis of classical rationalism in Russia only affected Russia/ core radical bloc, propelled rev reform in the west (creating further geo room for pol/econ development in Russia), until matter, the core imperial bloc could expand no further on the basis of social differentiation.

But the chaos in China creates a global pol/econ BACKDRAFT. So that utopianism collapses in on itself creating its own diabolic momentum..... becomes OVERT evil worship - eg collapse of Chinese/ global econ means the land cannot support so many people/ which in turn, become the most obvious source of food. BUT IT CAN BE DEFEATED IN AN ELEMENTAL STRUGGLE AS OUTLINED IN THE SCENARIO OF TRIANGULAR WARFARE IN VOL 1 CHAPTER 1 - VIA FUSION OF GOD DIALECTIC & RATIONALISM - REDEMPTION THROUGH SACRIFICE, FOR GLOBAL RECONSTRUCTION.

(see also `China syndrome' in same chapter)