8 THE DEATH OF
RUSSIA
The real reasons for the Gorbachev `reforms'
were not (as some naively hoped) to transform the Stalinist system into a more
efficient worker-controlled socialist (market) system - but rather to enable
the corrupt and criminal bureaucratic elite to cling onto power.
The
Stalinist elite felt it neccessary to dress up their system with `democratic'
trappings, in order to share the blame for the continuing crisis with
`democrats' - as the ultra-reactionary (military-expansionist) option had been
closed of by the debacle in Afghanistan (and continuing rumblings of discontent
in Poland).
But
the continuing crisis (as a result of ruling elite control pol/econ
centralisation as a method to defend/entrench privileges increasingly fed an increasing
crisis in the legitimacy of the whole system. There grew up inertial illusions
(encouraged and instigated by a section of the bureaucratic elite) in western
capitalism amongst the masses in general - on the basis that `Everything we've
been told is a lie, so capitalism must be great (and the west will help
us)'.
Sections
of the bureaucracy (old and new) led by Yeltsin (elected president of the
R.S.F.S.R.) saw that this (`westernization') was a way to retain (and actually
increase) power (via privitisations etc) and secure a (temporary)
popular power base, helping them to take control (some no doubt sincerely
believed this, only becoming cynical when the resultant near-total economic
collapse divorced them from the workers and they had the chance to enrich
themselves) from the old style Stalinists.
At
this stage (pre-August 1991 coup) there were 3 principle tendencies fighting
for power/control:
The old style Stalinists (economic centre & political right) - Old bureaucrats. sensed
that all talk of market relations damaged their legitimacy and
threatened their old-style graft and privileges.
The new pro-western compradors (economic right & political centre-left, insofar as they
needed temporarily, the workers) - Some old & new bureaucrats who may have
genuinely believed the west cared about Russia's fate and some who cynically
saw this as a chance to hold onto power (with popular - albeit temporary -
support from the masses)) The former eventually became
impotent/defected/cynical themselves later on. `Market relations' for these
meant a way to rip of the economy (at the expense of reconstruction) in order
to enrich their emergent monopoly capitalist class.
The new laborists (economic left & political left/far left) - Unions/new left
groupings fighting (by orthodox laborist methods) primarily to prevent decline
in workers' living standards, entrench/extend democratic freedoms and (here and
there)`workers' control'. Lacked both (conceptions of) a clear socialist
hegemonic framework and a military political strategy/framework to accomplish
& execute such a program. They were
by far the worst organised of the 3, with the worst/foggiest conception of what
they were fighting for.
At
this stage the pro-compradorist capitalists needed democracy to struggle
against the (decomposing centre) Stalinists - and the assistance of the masses
(albeit temporarily) in this struggle. Hence Yeltsins' demagoguery in first
denouncing Gorbachev for not raising bread prices by enough and then opposing
them completely when the masses took to the streets in protest.
The
workers for their part supported Yeltsin and co as they defended (albeit
temporarily) the independence of the working class organs from the
Stalinists - though of course they (Yeltsin and co) would inevitably clamp down
on the workers once their power was consolidated against the threat of
Stalinist institutional clampdown. Hence the enormous confusion (much of it
deliberate) concerning left/right designations - Russian politics & power
relations, especially prior to Yeltsins' October 1993 semi-fascist coup
victory, are very complex/complicated (probably surpassed only by the Chinese).
The
August 1991 coup should not therefore be regarded be regarded simplistically as
a rightwing coup. But rather as an attempt by a decomposing Stalinist centre to
try to clamp down on both rightwing compradors and leftist workers (the
only element that had any potential to take Soviet pol/econ forward). Because
Stalinist corruption was an absolute break on further development (the
extremely unlikely), victory & consolidation of the (discredited) coup
plotters would have led to a military fascist dictatorship by another route.
Yeltsins'
victory (over August 1991 coup plotters) therefore represented both a victory
for and the consolidation (against Stalinists) of (power for) western
(resource/finance imperialists) backed compradorism and semi-legalised (as
opposed to simply covert) gangsterdom - and workers' political autonomy
over a (totalitarian) decomposing/rightward drifting centre. But of course with
(pro-) western compradorism in control of the pol/econ agenda - free to
implement fully (and take the blame for, rather than passing it onto the
Stalinists as before) their asset-stripping investment sapping policies. Eg.
the privitisations enriching the mafias (of various descriptions) impoverishing
the workers and cannibalising (through speculative profiteering, capital
flight, opening the country to imports of consumer goods from the west who in
turn prevented exports to the west - all doing nothing to increase productive
civil capital investment) the capital base of the country; leading (exacerbated
by the break up of the USSR) to near complete industrial meltdown.
This
led to rising anger amongst workers and the rapid popular marginalisation of
the compradorist elite. And the rise of a bureaucratic socialist `Peronist'
type left - led by the opportunist vice president General Alexander Rutskoi
(Yeltsins' own deputy), Parliament, and sections of the industrial bureaucracy
being ruined by the compradors/resource & finance imperialist cabal. The
masses were understandably suspicious of this bunch of old crooks, but the new
crooks (compradors) now represented the greater danger. And following
orthodox (conventional laborist) patterns of struggle, it would have been
possible for the historic gravity/balance of forces to have shifted in favor of
the working classes by agreeing to (temporarily) join forces with them (whilst
maintaining the autonomy of their organisations) in the struggle against the
compradors (Yeltsin & co).
Of
course the workers would have got nowhere by abandoning their own
autonomy/interests as inevitably the old crooks would try to reconsolidate
their power on leading to fascism by another route (eg. by playing the nat.sec.state
card over Serbia etc to resecure
control over the pol/econ agenda). Wether the workers could have gone in for
the kill however is another matter. The only genuine possibility would have
been if sheer institutional momentum carried them all the way to the final
victory. To a certain extent this had been partially achieved in Poland - where
(contrary to bourgeois expectations) the reconstituted state-industrial sector
led economic revival in '92. - Generalisation of this process in the Eastern bloc
(Russia was all important) combined with democracy/federalism and
political/international expansion of this tendancy may (conceivably, extremely
remotely) have offered a way forward - Though it doesn't anymore. Though
it should be further noted that the potential for sabotage, by both the
Stalinists and the west seeking (probably in alliance with the Stalinists) to
undermine this process, would have been extremely formidable.
In
many respects there are dialectical parallels with WW2 - in terms of a predatory
external stimulus (resource/finance imperialism) forcing the (remnants of) the
bureaucratic socialist state to fight to survive and lean on the workers
for support to fight.
But
in WW2 there was a predatory advance on Russia by an individual collapsing
capitalist state (Germany). When Russia resisted/advanced its' bureaucracy had room
to develop reform/reconstruct itself because - (FDR/USA led) global capitalism
could still reform itself (led of
neccessity by a SINGLE state - USA, reformed internally, in response to H.P.
longs' movement) could still reform itself in response to such a radical
shock to the capitalist system.- maintaining, all importantly, hegemony
for capitalism (and the USA in particular).
Not
threatening to become a hegemonic power (but with an expanding capitalism -
meaning the USSR could expand without threatening capitalist hegemony -
triggering reaction in the capitalist states in turn justifying a nat.sec.state
reconsolidation/clampdown by the elite in the USSR) was a precondition
for further development of the USSR - no justification for a core-elite
clampdown on the grounds of `national security'.
Today
however, the regime of Yeltsin and co represents a predatory advance on Russia
by the global capital markets - speculation/resource imperialism with now no
single state capable of reforming itself by itself (as FDR did in
response to H.P. Longs' movement).
The
trigger cause of this attack was the internal collapse of Stalinism (and
politically the prior exhaustion of the ultra-reactionary option with the
Afghanistan debacle) and its' consequent re-integration into a decomposing
global capital market economy (meaning the old bureaucracy had to adopt
semi-democratic & radical mobilisation of the masses - which could have led
them to lose control over the agenda - merely in order to save their skins from
the compradors).
Whilst
dynamic (reformist) capitalist hegemony is neccessary (for Stalinism to
survive) to give the Stalinist economies room to develop (WITHOUT threatening
capitalist hegemony - triggering reaction in the dominant capitalist power, in
turn triggering reaction in the core-radical states), Stalinism is also
neccessary to (global capitalist development) encourage the furthest
development of this (reformist) process on a global scale.
And
as no single (contempory) capitalist state can take the hegemonic lead,
the system, it follows, cannot be reformed on a global scale; so therefore
neither was/is there scope for reform of the Stalinist system.
To
clarify, the factors making this Peronist-type form of struggle (almost
uniquely) at least partially viable were:
Yeltsin had no legitimacy/popular support, once
revealed as essentially a puppet of resource & finance imperialism.
Russia was still a strong state (enough to be)
easily able (militarily) to stand up to compradorism and imperialism - unlike
other semi-colonial states.
(Partly following on from 2) The national (old)
crooks (led by Rutskoi) were uniquely (compared with Latin America) willing to
stand up to imperialism (as now it had turned into an immediate struggle
for their very survival) and to mobilise the masses against
compradorism, recognising that only the workers could break Yeltsin
(they themselves were being ruined/downwardly mobile).
The
single decisive factor enabling Yeltsin to have a chance of survival was the
enormous disabling confusion of the masses who (understandably) hated the old
crooks (as well as the new crooks) for reducing them to penury over several
decades. They were therefore very slow to get moving (a `plague on both your
houses' mentality ruled) and so they were largely divided/confused as to what
to do.
Also
Yeltsin (pre- October '93 coup) had still some (waning) credibility as a
democrat (defending or whom had once defended workers' autonomy) - which made
the masses even more reluctant to ally themselves (temporarily) with the old
crooks (against the new crooks). A relative credibility which died only with
Yeltsins' murder of the parliament - by which time it was too late.
Rutskoi
and parliament lost because they launched a premature insurrection (after siege
lifted) before the bulk of the masses had been decisively won over to
their side. They should have sat on their butts, made their case,
gathered their forces and either waited until Yeltsin had done something stupid
(launch a rash military adventure - although rather unlikely) or they
themselves were strong enough (with the bulk of the army rank and file won over
or at least neutralised) to overthrow the regime.
Though
it is highly probable that (on the regimes' orders) the police were withdrawn
from the siege as a calculated measure, knowing that the anti-coup
(pro-parliament) resistance was likely then to (under its' own momentum - after
an artificial victory) slide into a premature assault on power before the broad
masses had been won over. This would certainly have been a much smarter move on
Yeltsins' part than to wait for the movement to really gather sufficient
forces so that they really could lift the siege whatever (increasingly
unreliable) forces Yeltsin tried to deploy - and actually be in a genuine
position to overthrow Yeltsin and co. The whole scam was almost certainly
prepared prior to the August-October '93 crisis.
The
victory of Yeltsins' coup represented a consolidation of the pol/econ position
of the imperialist compradors/mafia and a grave defeat (contrary to the
assessment of some Marxists eg. `Militant') for the Russian working class.
As
to the (deliberately) over-hyped political significance of (revanchist)
fascists in the then (pre-coup) Russian Peronist nationalist bloc. They were of
little significance pre- October 1993 as a victory over Yeltsins' coup (which
could only have been gained by workers' mass intervention) would have led to a
massive strengthening of the position of the Russian working classes - Which
would have meant that the historic gravity of fascism - dependant on workers'
demoralisation (even if some revanchist fascists had taken part on the winning
side) would consequently have been much weaker.
This
isn't so bizarre when considering that the NF supported the miners' strike in
Britain 1984. Or that Lenin acknowledged the theoretical possibility that
revanchist monarchists might vote with the Bolsheviks to dissolve the Kerensky
regime - even if the Bolsheviks controlled events; and either have to
disperse freely afterwards or be crushed by the new power.
Conversely
defeat for the Russian Peronists, led to a rightwing hegemonic realignment in
the composition of the nationalist bloc (paralleling in telescoped and
exaggerated form the degeneration of Arab nationalism from a semi-socialist
Peronist type movement - albeit with morbid anti-Jewish characteristics - to
outright fundamentalist fascism - as a consequence of a series of defeats by
imperialism and the demoralisation of the working class) as workers
consequently lost confidence in their own strength/became demoralised in the
face of a now strengthened & reconsolidated enemy. Consequently the
fascists' gravity within the nationalist bloc increased (despite some of
them taking part on the losing side), to become no longer a morbid but
incidental factor, but the dominant factor in the/any such bloc.
As
demonstrated by the rise of Zhirinovsky (a superb guide to the impact of the
coup on the Russian working class), Yeltsins' murderous war on Chechnya
(bankrolled by the EU & Britain, aiding the consolidation of a nuclear
armed mafia regime - in exchange for corporate profits) and the Communist
party's treasonous cosying up to the
fascistic & militaristic forces waging this war.
But,
after the defeat by Chechnya, there was nowhere else for national
fascist expansionism to go - except as mafia compradorism.
Chechnya
merely exhausted the remaining strength of Russian national fascism, leaving
nowt but fascist compradorism.
As
to the Q, `WHY were the Russian masses not set in (generalised classical
fascist) motion, as in Germany in the 30's?'
As
the defeat of core radicalism (consolidated by Yeltsins' coup) already
represented a crushing national/institutional defeat of the Russian state;
Russia's hollowed out institutions were/are both incapable of sustaining
such a continuous (popular/institutional) expansionist momentum, nor consequantly
does her compradorist ruling mafia need to resort to such adventures to retain
control of the pol/econ agenda - Such as German capitalism did in the
30's.
Instead the Russian state is geared
ever increasingly towards ministry of interior forces, designed to serve the
specific purpose of the ruling mafia - keeping the civil populace down
and ultimately securing hegemony over the old unwieldy, unpaid, unfed &
unreliable army. Which, as Russia is now a conquered power (by global finance),
exists as an armed force without a clearly defined purpose (eg such as
safegaurding the borders or fascist expansionism). Especially after the
defeat by Chehcnya.
This
war at first glance, appears to have been unsuccessful (for
Yeltsin/ruling mafia etc). But its effective purpose was/has been to stabilise
the regime, EITHER through continuous foreign adventure (which be cut dead by
defeat), OR through exemplary defeat, which by further breaking the strength of
the army and therefore its capacity to effectively threaten the compradorist
mafia, actually strengthened the hand of the regime. So that the regime
universally hated by civilian and soldier alike, is propped up by sheer
inertia.
It
is just concievable that the collapse of the mafia/ comprador regime due to the
global econ implosion or internally, may enable the rise of a pol/econ based on
import substitution, for a period. The civil reconstruction of society
orchestrated by a radical bonaprtist figure leading on civil society for
support against both the mafia and the military industrial complex. General Alexander
Lebed is the most obvious candidate for such a role.
But
outright collapse leading to mass migration westwards, friction with the west
(eventually responding as one with fascistic terror), leading in turn to
warlordist revanchism a la Genghis Khan is likely to gain its own momentum
before such a reconstructionist policy can be consolidated.
Furthermore,
for Russia to actually begin to recover while capitalism goes down the toilet
would be a truly unforgivable outrage for the western military plutocrats. Who
to cut down such an outrageous embarressment (including divert their own
domestic discontent), will resort to all sorts of provocations to drag Russia
down into the abyss with it. Most particularly over Serbia. Whose regime has
undeniably committed appalling atrocities.
But
it will be equally clear to Russia (and would be intended to be) that such
adventures are about western expansionism (& bugger all to do with
humanitarianism, looking at the USA's `backyard'). This will either drag the
Russian govt into the pit, or lead to its deposition by military industrial
complex, leading to the collapse of Russia & the apocalyptic scenario
outlined above (there is a threat of war gathering its own momentum in the
region & the Russian mafia compradors being eclipsed by warlordism via
popular intervention over Kosovo/ Serbia in any case).
(We
have already examined how Russia must link up with the west European revolution
in Chapter 1 Vol I)
The 2nd Chechen War 27/11/99
Russia's
bombing (ostensibly in retaliation for Russia's offensive in Dagestan/
Chechnya) is consistent with both strategy of tension (to strengthen the hand
of the nat sec state) and an IRA type retaliatory response (though the Chechens
have denied all invlovement, and have no history of such atrocities; certainly
not President Aslan Maskhadov and even the fundamentalist civilian hostage
taker Shamil Basayev has a record of claiming all his actions).
But as the
latter proved even more conveniant for the British nat sec state, such would be
consistent with a more sophisticated model of strategy of tension anyway;
designed to bind Russia to a 2nd Chechen war (which otherwise Russians would
NOT swallow) as a foreign diversion AND to deliberately (further) destroy
the army as a potential power base against Yeltsin (by bogging it down in a
festering campaign).
If the
bombing WAS carried out by the nat sec state, then while it was initially
sufficent to bind Russia into the war, it is doubtful that it can be replayed
ad infinitum (unto the abyss) when things go wrong (eg the
obvious stench of the plot would likely lead to Lebed deposing regime with
popular support); so the 2nd Chechen war is most likely to exhaust Russian army
UNTIL THE GLOBAL ECON IMPLOSION; rather than lead to collapse of the mafia
regime immediately (with either a Lebed type taking power or the total
implosion of Russia) UNTIL then.
8th January 2000
It should
further be noted that the LACK of any follow up to the bombing, when with the
bombardment of Chechnya there be a MUCH reater impetus to such IRA type action, seems almost certainly
to point away from the idea that this
was an IRA type response from the Chechens & WAS a strategy of tension
action.
(see also potential, albeit highly unlikely, for western
expansionism into Russia outlined in Chapter 1 in `DANGER UXB' vis `core imperial backing for Chechnya?')
31 December 1999
The
displacement of Yeltsin by Vladimir
Putin does not of course change by one iota the fundamentals of the Q.
And ONLY a
military political movement willing & capable of mobilising sufficient
force to crush the compradors (eg a Lebed/ [possibly]Victor Anpilov & Co/
western revolutionary alliance) is capable of breaking compradorism/
warlordism. Even should Putin fail to be elected & the Communist party
wins; without (mobilising) ACTIVE support from the army (& wider Euro revs/
civil society), it be same shit different packet. In Russia, the mafia barons
must be crushed by a strong military political centre mobilising the masses from
above (refer back to`The Battle for Russia' in Chapter 1).
Accounting for past errors
The
reason why I made the error of discounting completely the potential of import
substitution (while mentioning it in an earlier version of S.O. F.) bears
similarity to my error over N. Ireland in assuming that the paramilitaries
would detonate the conflagaration in N. Ireland rather than the politicians.
I
made the error of asssuming Russia would inevitably be sucked into the abyss
immediately - rather than dragged into it by western military plutocracy, which
can be the case.
I
made this error because:
Russia CANNOT hold out by itself against global
military plutocracy, when the global econ implosion destabilises the west,
insuring that it CANNOT tolerate Russian stability/ progress as an indictment
of it.
The formerly independant Russian
state HAS collapsed under Yeltsin (especially since the 1993 coup).
Geo proximity with the west, WILL very likely
cause Russia to be dragged into the mire BEFORE a Lebed type figure can enable
a temporary reconstructionist centre of
gravity to be established - BEFORE dragged down by western expansionism/
provocation as outlined.
Recognising
the above devastating factors, I made the error of giving no further thought to
the potential of import substitution