504.1 Comprehend the importance of humanitarian operations in a post hostilities environment.

When planning for war and conflict resolution, humanitarian operations must be considered. Nearly all forms of attack on an enemy will cause conditions that require humanitarian support.

504.11 Summarize the common attributes of post-hostilities humanitarian missions. (from Q&A)

• It is difficult to preplan for humanitarian missions following hostilities.
• No single government or public agencies are willing to accept responsibility as the sole
• coordinator.
• The military is normally the only agency with resources to perform the mission, but outside agency cooperation is still a requirement.
• Other neighboring countries may be in a better position to help than the US.
• The attitudes of citizens requiring aid varies depending on the nature of the conflict.
• Humanitarian missions may quickly strengthen international opinion regarding the US, unlike diplomatic efforts which require years.
• Such missions normally require an extensive and expensive logistics effort.
  

504.2 Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces. [I.1a]

504.21 Describe the military role in humanitarian operations.

Capabilities and roles of US military in Humanitarian Operations::

1. Arms Control. The main purpose of arms control is to enhance national security. Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play a vital role. For example, US military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; may seize WMD; may escort authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or may dismantle or destroy weapons with or without the consent of the host nation. All of these actions help reduce threats to regional stability.
2. Combating Terrorism. These measures are both offensive (counter-terrorism) and defensive (antiterrorism) in nature. The former typically occurs outside the territory of the United States, while the latter may occur anywhere in the world. The Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Aviation Administration are actively involved in antiterrorism operations.
3. DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations. The national drug control strategy (NDCS) is issued by the President pursuant to the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988. The antidrug plans and programs of the Department of Defense are an integral part of the NDCS and include detection and monitoring; support to cooperative foreign governments; support for interdiction; support to drug law enforcement agencies; internal drug prevention and treatment programs; research and development; and C4I support. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major counterdrug responsibilities to the Department of Defense:
   • Acting as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.
   • Integrating the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States.
   • Approving and funding State governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement operations of law enforcement agencies.
4. Nation Assistance. The main objective of nation assistance is to assist a host nation with internal programs to promote stability , develop sustainability, and establish institutions responsive to the needs of the people. Security assistance and foreign internal defense are the primary means of providing nation assistance.
   • Security Assistance. Security assistance refers to a group of programs that provide defense articles and services, including training, to eligible foreign countries and international organizations that further US national security objectives. Public law prohibits personnel providing security assistance services (including mobile training assistance) from performing combatant duties.
   • Foreign Internal Defense. Foreign internal defense (FID) supports a host -nation's fight against lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. US military support to foreign internal defense should focus on assisting host-nation personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. Emphasis on internal defense and development programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to FID programs is essential. Specific tools used in executing the DOD component of FID programs may include multinational exercises, exchange programs, civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support of security assistance, and combat operations.
5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). The purpose of NEOs is to safely and quickly remove civilian noncombatants from an area outside the United States where they are, or may be, threatened. Although NEOs are principally conducted for US citizens, Armed Forces of the United States may also evacuate citizens from host, allied, or friendly nations if the NCA determine it to be in the best interest of the United States. The Department of State has the lead in conducting NEOs. US ambassadors or chiefs of diplomatic missions are responsible for planning for NEOs by preparing emergency action plans to be implemented when NEOs are required.

Example: Operation EASTERN EXIT On 1Jan91, the United States Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationals had sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control of Mogadishu. The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated.. At 0247, two CH-53E helicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the 466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft, the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somali stood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, the Somali scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a special operations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if needed. The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took off for the 350-mile return flight. The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout the day. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the ships had arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security force were extracted during the night. EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people--from 30 different countries--from a bloody civil war, was the result of the synergistic employment of widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly planned and conducted a NEO in the midst of the Gulf War.

1. Other Civil Support Operations These operations encompass world-wide humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, and military assistance for civil disturbances.
   • Worldwide humanitarian assistance operations fall under the umbrella of civil-military operations. They include disaster relief, support to displaced persons as well as humanitarian and civic assistance. Included in support to civil authorities are US domestic actions applicable to disaster-related civil emergencies and civil defense for attacks directed against the territory of the United States. Included in assistance for civil disturbances are military support to US domestic law enforcement agencies, protection of life and federal property, and prevention of disruptions to federal functions.
   • The Armed Forces of the United States can augment domestic governments of the United States. Such operations can include support to education systems, medical facilities, emergency response, and transportation systems in remote or depressed areas. Some of these operations directly contribute to military readiness; others do not.

Ex.:JTF Andrew At 0500 on 24 Aug92, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and caused extensive damage. The Governor of Florida requested Federal assistance. The Secretary of the Army, as the President's executive agent, directed initiation of disaster relief operations in support of the Federal response plan. As part of those operations, the Commander in Chief, Forces Command, directed the Second US Army to form JTF Andrew and begin humanitarian relief operations. Eventually composed of elements of all Services and both Active and Reserve forces, JTF Andrew began operations on 28 August 1992. JTF Andrew's mission was to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local and line haul transfer operations, and other logistic support to the populace in affected areas. Commander, JTF Andrew, defined success as getting life support systems in place and relieving immediate hardships until non-DOD Federal, state, and local agencies could reestablish normal operations. Operations were conducted in three phases. Immediate relief provided life support systems--food, water, shelter, medical supplies and services, information, sanitation, and transportation. A recovery phase ensured sustainment of services provided in Phase I while assisting Federal, state, and local authorities to reestablish public services. Finally, a reconstitution phase continued to reestablish services under Federal, state, and local control, while JTF forces redeployed. JTF Andrew coordinated with multiple Federal, state, and private agencies. These included the FEMA, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services Administration, the Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy Scouts of America, and numerous religious relief organizations. This disaster relief effort demonstrated the versatility of the Armed Forces of the US. The training for war that developed and promoted initiative, ingenuity, and flexibility in leadership and conduct of operations, served the Nation well in a noncombat situation.

1. Peace Operations This term encompasses three general areas : diplomatic, traditional peacekeeping, and forceful military actions. Therefore, it may be helpful to view these types of operations with only three terms: peacemaking (diplomatic actions), peacekeeping (noncombat military operations), and peace enforcement (coercive use of military force). Peace operations are not typically conducted within the territory of the United States. The UN has been the most frequent sponsor of classical peacekeeping activities; however, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League have also acted in similar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions.
   • The objective of peace operations is to achieve a peaceful settlement among belligerent parties, primarily through diplomatic action. Military operations may be necessary if diplomatic actions are insufficient or inappropriate.
     

504.22 Define the military role in civil affairs.

Commanders must ensure that Civil Affairs (CA) planners are incorporated at the outset of all military strategic and operational planning. Civil Affairs (CA) is an inherent responsibility of command. CA encompasses the activities that military commanders take to establish and maintain relations between their forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where their forces are employed. Commanders plan and conduct CA activities to facilitate military operations and help achieve politico-military objectives derived from US national security interests. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may entail interaction between US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and governmental and nongovernmental agencies as part of missions tasked to a joint force commander (JFC). These activities may occur before, during, subsequent to or in the absence of other military actions.

504.3 Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint and multinational operations. [I.1e] 

504.31 Predict the military's involvement in future humanitarian operations in a post-hostilities environment.

When planning for war and conflict resolution, humanitarian operations must be considered. Nearly all forms of attack on an enemy will cause conditions that require humanitarian support. As shown in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the success or failure of a particular humanitarian operation depends on the effectiveness of the strategy used to execute it.

504.4 Comprehend current joint doctrine. [I.2a]

Joint Pub 3-0 is the keystone document for describing the doctrine of conducting joint operations.

504.41 Describe current Joint Doctrine regarding nation assistance and other civil support operations (humanitarian assistance and civil affairs). SEE 504.22 above

504.5 Comprehend the relationship between military objectives and how they support national objectives by reviewing wars, campaigns, and operations with a concentration on conflict termination. [I.3d]

504.51 Describe the concepts of a successful military occupation in a post-hostilities environment.

Successful military occupation means bringing wars to a successful conclusion and laying the foundations for a lasting "better state of peace. Although countries may see potential benefits which justify occupation, some problems are likely to arise when military institutions undertake the task during post war hostilities.

504.52 Illustrate examples of successful military occupations conducted in the past.

Alexander the Great and Douglas MacArthur conducted successful military occupations in post-hostilities environments.

504.53 Explain why Alexander the Great's concept of military occupation furthered his pursuit of strategic objectives.

In pursuit of his overall objectives, Alexander the Great had specific intentions in conducting his occupations. Recognizing the interface between political objectives and military actions, and faced with limited resources, he realized that he could not detail a large portion of his army to the wasteful task of pacifying and occupying conquered territory and peoples. Alexander adopted a policy of conciliation, rather than the brutal repression that was the norm for his time, towards conquered peoples. This had the effect of stabilizing the occupation from the inside. As Fuller noted, "without the establishment of an inner front it would have been impossible for Alexander, with the limited resources at his disposal, to have overcome the military power of Persia when related to the enormous extent of her empire."

Alexander used several methods to ensure he could control the occupied territories at minimal cost to himself. First of all, he respected the cultural and social integrity of the conquered regions. He also adopted a policy of "empowerment," elevating defeated leaders to positions of importance within his expanding empire. For example, he allowed local "satraps" to continue practicing native customs and wearing traditional garb. Besides dealing with social issues, Alexander undertook financial reform within the conquered territories--even the conquered reaped the economic benefits. Thus, once bitter enemies were given a stake in the new empire. In fact, the Macedonians eventually pursued a consistent policy of leaving local leaders in power rather than seeking to overthrow them by force. As a result, Alexander's army, its combat strength virtually undiminished, continued its victorious advance.

Rather than conduct a brutal campaign of exploitation and repression, Alexander the Great instead chose a low-cost policy of conciliation that enabled him to terminate regional conflicts along his advance route at minimal cost. Indeed, instead of acting as a drain upon his resources, the conquered territories served to strengthen his overall strategic position.

504.54 Describe CA operations in Kuwait following Operation Desert Storm.

At first, the Kuwaiti government-in-exile was unaware that any civil affairs capability existed. However, once the US State Department and Department of Defense (DoD) informed the Kuwaitis that US Army troops were available to help rebuild the country, the Kuwaitis requested a full briefing and, in October 1990, asked President Bush for his help. At the time, deployments for DESERT SHIELD were of prime concern to the DoD, which meant reconstruction issues stayed in the background. This left the Kuwaitis alone to struggle through the initial planning work with only informal assistance from the US. By early November, an interagency steering committee drafted the charter for the KTF, and later that month the order was given to mobilize the reserve Civil Affairs personnel who would comprise the bulk of the KTF.

On 31 January 1991, the KTF identified a shortcoming in USCENTCOM planning. No allowance had been made for phasing Civil Affairs forces into the country.

The KTF went to work to include this "emergency phase," which included seven essential areas: food, water, medical care, transportation, telecommunications, power, and sanitation. The KTF developed plans, forces, and supplies for each of these areas, relying on a concept they called the "push package."4 In this concept, the KTF loaded a flat-bed truck (representing one push package) with food, water, and medical supplies. The push packages were then distributed through a system of cooperatives.

The KTF mission: restoring the infrastructure of Kuwait while taking the Kuwaiti issue off the minds of the combatant commanders. Finding the right people to do the job was essential.

504.55 Describe the planning and interagency coordination which occurred; assess its effectiveness and determine how the existing processes can be improved upon.

Coordination among other US agencies and between the US and the Kuwaitis was more exemplary. Whether the issue was putting out oil fires, stabilizing financial and currency issues, restoring the educational infrastructure, or repairing the sanitation system, the KTF, US Embassy, and the Kuwaitis displayed a noble spirit of cooperation. In the words of Colonel Randall Elliott, commander of the KTF, "the single most important ingredient in success turned out to be people

504.56 Relate the effect of CA operations on the reconstruction of Kuwait and the war and conflict resolution process in SWA.

Took the Kuwaiti issue off the minds of the combatant commanders and let them work on the war hostilities.

504.6 Comprehend how Civil Affairs (CA) operations enhance military efforts in all operational environments. Civil affairs support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory.

504.61 Explain the two CA supporting missions (conducting CMO; supporting civil administration) and discuss their associated mission activities.

1. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) The term "civil-military operations" is a broad, generic term used to denote the decisive and timely application of military capabilities to enhance the relationship between the military and civilian populace in order to ensure accomplishment of the commander's mission. CMO range from support to combat operations to traditional nonmilitary roles assisting countries in bringing about political, economic, and social stability. CMO are undertaken to encourage the development of a country's material and human resources to assist in achieving US and host-government political, economic, and psychological objectives. CMO involve liaison and coordination among US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and among US forces and other government agencies as well as nongovernmental (NGO) or private voluntary organizations (PVO). A variety of types of units, including engineer, medical, intelligence, security, special forces, psychological operations, civil affairs, communications, and transportation provide capabilities, in varying degrees, to plan and conduct CMO and achieve political, economic, and psychological objectives. Dedicated CA forces, by virtue of their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, experience in military-to-host-nation advisory and assistance activities, as well as in civil-oriented functions paralleling governmental functions, can be essential in CMO designed to secure support from the civilian population, fulfill essential civil requirements consistent with military missions, and create as positive an effect as possible on friends, allies, and host-nation counterparts and governments. b. As a fundamental precept, CMO should be closely coordinated with the Country Team and other USG agencies. Most military responses or efforts, especially those in military operations other than war, require the military-civil partnership that successful CMO provide. CMO also may be manifested through activities associated with humanitarian assistance, civil defense, counterdrug (CD) operations, and counterterrorism. Successful CMO should use military CA functional specialty skills, but do not necessarily require their use. In all cases, actions by the Armed Forces of the United States should support the host or friendly country's control over CMO programs and enhance popular perceptions of its stability and legitimacy. Security is a fundamental objective during the initial stages of civil-military operations
2. Civil administration missions in friendly territory are normally undertaken pursuant to an agreement with the government of the area concerned. This form of civil administration is also called civil affairs administration. In a civil administration by an occupying power, also called military government, agreements will contain provisions as to the authorities of the occupying power and the obligations of the submitting government. Furthermore, the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial authority by the occupying power will be determined by policy decisions at the highest level and may even involve an international policy making group.
   

504.62 Describe how CA supports operations across the operational continuum.

CA forces are uniquely designed to conduct operations across the operational continuum.

a. CA support in peace or conflict is subordinate to the political element of national power. Approval authority for CA operations is normally reserved for the National Command Authority (NCA) or Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict). 

b. CA planning and execution thoroughly integrates both contextual and operational elements.

Setup of CA: Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF).

A JCMOTF is normally a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a joint special operations task force or joint task force, flexible in size and composition depending on mission circumstances. It may be developed to meet a specific CMO contingency mission, supporting humanitarian or nation assistance operations, a theater campaign of limited duration, or a longer duration CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional or general conflict, depending on NCA or theater guidance. In rarer instances, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization, depending on NCA or theater guidance and resource availability. A JCMOTF may be formed in theater, in CONUS, or in both locations, depending on scope, duration, or sensitivity of the CMO requirement and associated policy considerations. Joint commanders may organize JCMOTFs to perform some or all of the following CMO-relevant functions:

• Provide C2 or direction of military host-nation advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by joint US forces.
• Help establish US or multinational and military-to-civil links for greater understanding and efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements.
• Perform essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies, Country Team, UN agencies, other USG agencies, and deployed US, multinational, and host-nation military forces and supporting logistics organizations.
• Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects, to build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
• Plan and conduct joint and multinational CMO training exercises.
• Allocate resources and sustain and coordinate combat support or combat service support elements, including necessary medical, transportation, military police, engineer, and associated maintenance and communications capabilities.
• Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services and otherwise facilitate transition t o peacekeeping o r consolidation operations and associated hand-off t o other USG agency, international organization, or host-nation responsibility.
• Assess or identify host-nation civil support, relief , or funding requirements to the CINC or JFC commander for transmission to supporting CINCs, Military Services, or other responsible USG agencies.
• Advise the CINC or JFC on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or host-nation sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.
  

504.63 Explain CA functions and capabilities in support of joint, combined, contingency and interagency operations.

Inter-Service Support: Careful coordination is required in such areas as responsibilities for logistic support, channels for civilian supply, and administrative aspects of attachment of Army CA elements to a force of another Service. Coordination is also required to ensure integration of the efforts of all Services to support CA requirements. Army CA forces are apportioned and available for regional or contingency support. Marine Corps CA groups, as integral units of a MAGTF, support operations of forces, activities, and facilities of the Navy and Marine Corps. This does not, however, preclude the assignment of functional specialists from one of the Services to CA organizations of another Service, or the assignment of Army CA organizations to other Service components to assist in the conduct of operations.

Civil affairs planners assisted the Saudis in civil defense emergency planning. They kept the status of the Saudi civil defense preparedness including dispersal locations, warning systems, shelters, and NBC defense resources for civilians. Prior to offensive operations and at the request of the US embassy, civil affairs officers met with US civilian nationals living and working in Saudi Arabia to assure them of Coalition military capabilities so as to relieve some of their anxiety about being in a war zone.

Interagency Coordination Department of State officials and chiefs of diplomatic missions, depending on policy guidance and the operational environment, may have a primary or collateral interest in CA activities or requirements entailing coordination with HN government officials. CA annexes or portions of campaign plans, and operation plans should clearly delineate responsibilities, reflect constructive (things that must be done) or restrictive (things that must not be done) guidance for military forces, and emphasize the importance of coordinating CA activities with all concerned. a. The nature of CA activities, focusing on sociological, economic, and political factors, as well as military mission requirements in foreign or HN areas where US military forces are present, may entail research, surveys, planning, and coordination of both DOD and non-DOD organizations and agencies. b. Other governmental elements, international agencies, church groups, commercial interests, and private institutions may be working toward common or associated objectives, especially during conditions other than war and periods immediately after cessation of hostilities. Close coordination and cooperation with these groups should reduce costs, prevent duplication, lessen the friction of potential rivalry, and improve results. This is as true in military civic action that originate from USG country plans as in humanitarian or disaster relief contingency or crisis-response operations. Such activities usually entail sensitivities, political consensus, central funding, authorization to use indicated resources, and joint participation with non-DOD, HN, and international agencies.

Theater-Unique Procedures Use of foreign and/or multinational resources and of US domestic commodities may be required to support military operations and should be in consonance with bilateral or multinational agreement and/or statutory law. Organizational and operational procedures that implement those agreements may vary according to theater (e.g., Civil-military cooperation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries of the US European Command; foreign area nation support and wartime HNS in the US Pacific Command) .

504.64 Explain how CA military planning is accomplished and how CA is incorporated into the theater CINC's campaign plans.

The National Command Authorities policy guidance and mission orders to military commanders will determine the objectives and scope of joint CA activities. Commander's CA requirements in war include activities more often associated with peacetime military operations. Civil affairs activities are controlled or accomplished through one or more of the following CA-relevant functions: supporting, assisting, advising, coordinating, analyzing, informing, planning, preparing, training, supervising and evaluating. The rapidly moving character of modern warfare and the use of weapons of mass destruction magnify problems associated with dislocation or distress of civilian populations, resources, and institutions or services. However, the increased tempo of these operations, particularly those requiring agreements with host-governments covering civil-military relationships will likely employ more extensive CA forces than required for military operations other than war. In addition, CA activities will shift focus to transition, stabilization, and restoration programs. Planning for post-crisis or conflict CA activities requires continuous planning and regional expertise, and should begin in conjunction with pre-crisis operation planning. Support to special operations, joint and multinational exercises, civil affairs and psychological operations, and intelligence requirements of civil affairs activities all involve the use of CA resources. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joint force commanders, the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command, and the Chiefs of the Services all have the responsibilities in the area of civil affairs. Civil affairs activities require a responsive and unified command and control structure to ensure timely and effective command actions in attaining established objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff helps obtain and interpret policies as they pertain to CA while ensuring that all plans, resources and policies are adequate and up to date. The joint force commanders (JFCs) plan, integrate, and monitor the employment of available CA functional assets in appropriate operational areas and take actions necessary to control dislocated civilians, maintain order, prevent and treat disease, provide relief of civilian suffering, and provide maximum protection and preservation of property and other resources. The Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) is responsible for the development of strategy, doctrine, and tactics for joint CA. As heads of their respective Services, the Chiefs of the Services (US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force) have the capability to support United States Government agencies, Office of the Secretary of Defense, other Services, and multinational and US combatant commanders with appropriate forces or specialists capable of performing CA activities. The combatant commander is responsible for the organization and centralized direction of CA activities in the assigned operational area.

504.65 Explain the interagency coordination necessary for successful CA operations. The nature of CA activities requires interagency, and intra-agency, command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence interface with US and HN commercial networks to augment DOD communications that are supporting CA activities.

The Country Team is a forum for planning and control and a means of generating the close cooperation and liaison essential for unity, cohesion, and effectiveness of effort.

504.7 Evaluate air power's potential as a means of carrying out military occupation.

When we deal with war termination missions, military services may have to occupy then they must deal with politics and administration of occupation. We have not seen war termination in Iraq.

504.71 Relate apparently successful use of "air control" in historical scenarios to the potential uses of airpower in present and future scenarios.

In his essay on air occupation, Major Gary Cox suggests a number of historical precedents for this role.3 The first involves German plans for controlling the unoccupied areas of the USSR with long-range airpower in World War II. Although this was never executed, the intent was to avoid having to drive deep into the soviet hinterland with large land forces by "smashing Russia's strategic areas" and keeping them permanently off-balance. Another precedent for air occupation was the U.S. "Air Pressure" campaign in Korea. In the course of a ground stalemate, the Far East Air Forces employed airpower as a means of coercing the North Korean government and convincing them of their helplessness in the face of UN airpower. In the 1980s, the soviets offered another example of air occupation against the Afghan mujaheddin. Ground forces had a hard time fighting the mujaheddin in their natural environment, so soviet ground forces controlled the cities while aircraft (fixed and rotary-wing) patrolled the countryside. In DESERT STORM and its aftermath, the coalition used airpower to restrict ground activity in a given territory during the conflict, and create no-fly zones afterwards. Finally, we have the example that has attracted the most attention--the British policy of "air control" of large areas of the British Empire in the 1920s and 1930s.

The British air control experience is the one most often cited as having demonstrated airpower's ability to "control" or "occupy" territory. What were the factors that made British air control operations so successful? First of all, the British had accurate, on-scene intelligence. The British Empire was of very long duration, and there existed a class of colonial administrators as well as military officers intimately acquainted with the language, customs, and politics of a given region. Couple this with the extremely close coordination between military authorities and the colonial administration, and the British enjoyed a powerful information tool. Another factor contributing to British success was that British air control was very discriminate. Only the "guilty" parties were subjected to coercion and harm; the mass of the population had little to fear and was scarcely affected by the action.

Nevertheless, fear also played a role: Air control took place in parts of the world where aircraft were rarely encountered; many of the rebellious natives had never seen one before and were terrified. In many cases, the threat of force (psychological effect) was sufficient; if not, a judicious application of force usually did the trick. In all cases, British air control depended upon at least in part on the presence of ground forces. Without such support, many of its positive attributes were lost. Finally, British operations benefited from their economic appeal. The action in Iraq was known as "the cheapest war in history"--it had to be, since the British defense budget had no room for extravagant expeditions. Critics of air control sourly noted that the operations looked better to the bankers back home than they did to the people on scene.

504.72 Assess whether or not air power may function as a substitute for ground forces in an occupation role.

The suggestion that airpower can accomplish what has historically been the

responsibility of ground forces--to seize and hold territory--is a controversial one.

• Airpower would seem to be of limited utility in gaining access to raw materials or other physical objects.
• While it is certainly possible that airpower could be used to exterminate a population, certain international and moral constraints tend to rule this out.
• It would be difficult to envision using airpower as an agent of constitutional change or "social engineering" as in Japan after World War II.

Course Objectives:

Know the capabilities and limitations of US military forces across the range of military operations. [PJE Area 1 - National Military Capabilities and Command Structure]
Comprehend solutions to operational problems with particular attention to issues where doctrine conflict. [PJE Area 2 - Joint Doctrine]
Know the employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war and comprehend the linkage of campaign plans to attainment of national objectives. [PJE Area 3 - Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War]
Comprehend the basic concepts and issues in planning and executing a conflict resolution strategy in support of a desired end state.
Comprehend the roles of the State Department, Private Voluntary Organizations, International Organizations and US military forces in post-hostilities environments.
Comprehend conflict resolution concepts and issues in historical, current and potential scenarios to achieve a desired end state.
Comprehend conflict resolution concepts and issues in historical and current scenarios.

Readings Maxwell, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT" Muller,"Occupation" Maxwell, "The Kuwait Task Force" Joint Pub 3-0, Chapter 5, "Military Operations Other Than War" Reading Rationale The essay on Operation PROVIDE COMFORT outlines a strategy for war and conflict developed by John Fishel and analyzes its application in this humanitarian operation. The essay on air occupation will serve as a vehicle for assessing the viability of the concept. The essay on the Kuwait Task Force illustrates the capabilities of civil affairs in supporting the governments of liberated territory to restore vital services, both for humanitarian reasons and for the positive impact such restoration can have on friendly military operations. Joint Pub 3-0 is the keystone document for describing the doctrine of conducting joint operations. Chapter 5, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), discusses those military operations where the military instrument of power is used for purposes other than large-scale combat operations usually associated with war.

Thesis: Humanitarian Issues. When planning for war and conflict resolution, humanitarian operations must be considered. Nearly all forms of attack on an enemy will cause conditions that require humanitarian support. As shown in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the success or failure of a particular humanitarian operation depends on the effectiveness of the strategy used to execute it.

Occupation. In many wars of the past, a victorious power has chosen to physically occupy the territory of the defeated nation, with varied success. In today's international environment, the likelihood that the United States will choose this option is rather remote. Some theorists have proposed that airpower, correctly applied, can fulfill many of the tasks once required of an occupying army.

Civil-Military Operations. The first step in the long process of winning the peace after some future conflict is acquiring an understanding of Civil Military Operations (CMO) and the Civil Affairs (CA) career field. All military relations with friendly, neutral and enemy governments are the concern of CMO. Experience shows that if CMO are effective, national objectives are more likely to be met, therefore these activities must be included in military planning. Many military victories have been tarnished or negated by events that occurred (or failed to occur) after hostilities. CMO activities provide the bridge between the military and political agencies in building the desired end state.

Main Point I: Alexander the Great and Douglas MacArthur conducted successful military occupations in post-hostilities environments.

Main Point II: Airpower may have the potential to successfully conduct an "occupation" by controlling/limiting access to the air.

Main Point III: The relative success of an occupation mission springs directly from the national/military objectives.

Main Point IV: Discuss the importance of humanitarian assistance operations in a post-hostilities environment. a. Attributes of post-hostilities humanitarian operations. b. Humanitarian operations as a military mission : Legal and moral obligations.

Main Point V: Planning for humanitarian assistance operations is absolutely essential.

Main Point VI: Discuss implications for future post-hostilities humanitarian assistance missions. a. Insights from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE.

Main Point VII: Commanders must ensure that Civil Affairs (CA) planners are incorporated at the outset of all military strategic and operational planning.

Main Point VIII: CA forces are uniquely designed to conduct operations across the operational continuum. a. CA support in peace or conflict is subordinate to the political element of national power. Approval authority for CA operations is normally reserved for the National Command Authority (NCA) or Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict). b. CA planning and execution thoroughly integrates both contextual and operational elements.

Main Point IX: US active component CA capabilities are extremely limited. a. Though a number of senior headquarters have civil affairs officers in their J5/G5 sections, there is only one CA battalion in the active component. This unit is globally oriented and aligned with USSOCOM. b. The remaining CA units are in the reserve component. They are regionally oriented, CAPSTONE aligned, and activated as needed. Lesson Integration and Rationale War and Conflict Resolution: WR 501, End State; WR 502, Role of the State Department; WCR 503, Role of the United Nations, Non-governmental Organizations and the Military. For a variety of reasons which we will explore in this lesson, post-hostilities humanitarian operations are likely to occupy the US military for years to come. This lesson reminds us of one of our responsibilities as "victors" or "liberators" and, using Operation PROVIDE COMFORT as an example, analyzes a strategy we can use to exercise that responsibility. This lesson also permits the students to link some of the airpower application concepts developed in earlier courses to problems posed by war and conflict resolution and the changing international environment. Finally, civil military operations connect with most war and conflict resolution lessons because CMO is one important way the military executes its war and conflict resolution responsibilities. While most military members have some involvement in CMO (whether they realize it or not) the planning and management of this function is accomplished by Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs personnel work with NGOs, are principle players in planning the mechanics of war and conflict resolution, are the experts in applying international law, plan and manage the humanitarian support, establish/manage occupations, provide emergency restoration, and manage the transition to non-military agencies. Finally, funding for CMO is critical to accomplishing the desired end state.

Lesson OPR: War Theory and Campaign Studies Department