WC 502-- MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES FOR WAR AND CONFLICT

LESSON OPR: Becky Cordingly/Major/DEB/DSN: 493-2385

Date: 25 Dec 96

QUESTION: Typically, how are motives for wars often viewed?

COMMENTS: Typically, war is viewed to be caused by something other than the will of those who started it is that it has no cause at all, that it is an accident. The misconceptions, misunderstanding, miscalculations, and technical malfunctioning of international affairs somehow combine to produce tragic, unwanted events in much the same way a traffic accident occurs. Wars are therefore depicted as social accidents, a systematic breakdown, or as events gone awry. Another widely held explanation is that wars occur because we want them to happen. They are products of conscious choices and are preferred to peace (Motives for War, 1).

QUESTION : What three categories have theorist historically focused on when analyzing motives for war?

COMMENTS: Historically, motives for war have been generally categorized to fit three different categories: historical trends or patterns, for example, the creation of empires; individual decision-makers who shape the warrior class; and the examination of the motives of the individual warriors (Motives for War, 1).

QUESTION: The philosophical category is a fourth category that has often been neglected when analyzing motives for war. Explain this category?

COMMENTS: The philosophical category is based on the premise that man's human emotions, values, aspirations and passions have not changed over time. Human technology and science however, change rapidly. Man has always wanted the same things throughout history: he has just used different means with which to acquire them. With regards to explaining motives for war however, theorist tended to focus on the variations used by man, or rather technology, the means of war, to explain the causes of war instead of focusing on the unchanging nature of man's culture as shaped by his emotions and passions (Motives for War, 1-2).

QUESTION: In contemporary times, many theories on the causes of war have been postulated. Have any of these theories produced any new revelations?

COMMENTS: According to Dr. Magyar, there have been many thinkers and theories regarding the causes of war since the time of Thucydides. However, none of the modern theorist, ranging from Kenneth Waltz to Quincy Wright, have produced anything that is new nor have they offered any new insight as to why wars are fought. Thucydides on the other hand, offered us a brilliant assessment of human nature against which we may compare these theories. The factors leading to war between the Athens and Sparta could comprise a discussion of virtually any modern conflict in our own age. Those factors are colonies, supporting revolts, alliances, truces, blockades, protection of one's own nationals in foreign lands, breaking of a truce, the demands for independence, exclusion from ports and from the rich markets, constitutions, ways of life, strategic losses and fleets of ships, and aggression. Thuycidides' causes of war could comprise a discussion of virtually any modern conflict in our own age (Motives for War, 4).

QUESTION: Explain the concept of Just Wars?

COMMENTS: This concept gives war legitimacy provided that sufficiently valuable goods are at stake, they are seriously threatened, the danger is such that violence is necessary if the goods are to be protected, there is reasonable chance of success, and any evils committed in the defense of these goods not outweigh them. What is considered to be a "just cause" however, is socially defined (Motives for War, 5).

QUESTION: Adda Bozeman offers a very stimulating and original context for the study of war. What is the major component of her analytical framework and how is this related to motives for war?

COMMENTS: Adda Bozeman focuses on civilizations, as opposed to nation-states,

as the proper unit of analysis for international relations and for the study of war. Ideas are a product of cultures or civilizations and take into account values, norms images, and traditions. Civilizations, therefore, are the key to understanding war. Motives for war can best be understood through the comprehensive study of an adversary's philosophies, ideologies, myths, religions, and its history ( Motives for War, 10-12).

QUESTION: Can motives be reduced to a single cause?

COMMENTS: Searching for a single cause of war or explaining a particular war based on one cause of war has been the focus of many theorist. These theories take just one or just a few factors such as race, religion, or arms competition, as the sole explanation. However, upon further investigation on the variety of purpose that war has served in history, we realize there are a variety of causes for which men have chosen to fight and cannot be reduced to a single cause (Motives for War, 16).

QUESTION: In the readings there is a common theme that war is a social construct. What do we mean by this theme?

COMMENTS: Because all wars are unique and reflect a different combination of motives, we can never comprehend all the variables involved in dealing with ideas, values, and cultures.

Although a great amount of theories have been postulated on why wars begin, one common theme is evident in the majority of the writings ranging from Thucydides to the early Christian writers to the modern social theorist: all consider organized society to be the major variable. War is a social affair and its motives reflect cultural values. Individuals, in the final analysis, do not make wars. Societies do. Motives for war are a complex combination of drives. Differences in motives may be gleaned in different cultures. Thus, societies make wars for a multitude of reasons that are culturally driven--the origins of war cannot be found in a single, clearly identifiable cause (Motives for War, 15).

QUESTION: According to Magyar, what are the three levels of interests that all states exemplify in their foreign affairs?

COMMENTS: CORE, INTERMEDIATE and PERIPHERAL interests (Conflict in the Post Containment Era, 29).

QUESTION: How are these level of interests defined?

COMMENTS: CORE interests are usually related to national security matters. The perception of a challenge to the survival of a society invariably results in war. Each society however, may define "survival" differently, depending on given societies values and perceptions. Thus, the socio-cultural and political survival of a society can be proposed as its core interest. Other core interest areas include defense, threats, alliance obligations, balance of power factors, etc. Wars fought over core interests are often unlimited in the scope of their violence and involve not just the institutions of military force, that is, armies, navies and air forces, but the participation of the entire society. Conversely, the entire society becomes, under such circumstances, the target of war.

INTERMEDIATE interests are, of course, other reasons to fight a war which do not affect survival. Societies may fight for political and economic domination, expansion, or hegemony. Because such reasons are not germane to the need to survive, they may be classified as intermediate interests. Thus, intermediate interests are generally related to the socio-economic welfare of the state. They include such factors as economic improvement, aggrandizement, maximization of social welfare, and maintaining existing status.

Societies may also go to war for reasons that are ideological; that is, a society may fight for the sake of imposing globally a universal idea for which it believes it possesses the perfected political expression. These are PERIPHERAL interests. These reasons for war occur much less frequently than the first two so they're called peripheral interests. Peripheral interests cover a broad range of motives along the psycho-political dimension. They include such concepts as ideology, religion, nationalism, humanitarian intervention, peace-keeping, "machismo," and other attitudinal factors (Conflict in the Post Containment Era, 29-30).

QUESTION: Do societies primarily go to war over core interests? Why or why not?

COMMENTS:: In general, the social actors to war will tend to fight only over core interests. In most societies, the decision to go to war is a "drastic" step and almost irrevocable when made. Practically all societies, even dictatorial regimes, are concerned about the support of the people before engaging in war. As Clausewitz says about trinitarian warfare: The passions that are to be kindled in war (including violence, hatred, and enmity) reside in a society's populace -- and they tend to enrage only over core interests, or threats to their survival. However, other motives may in fact drive the conflict, especially for great powers who face little threat to their core interests (Conflict in the Post Containment Era, 28-29).

QUESTION: In terms of threats to core, intermediate, and peripheral interests, how should the US respond according to Dr. Magyar? Do you agree with his assessment? Why or why not?

COMMENTS: Threats to core interests should be faced unilaterally, with our full range of military capability, as they are immediate and concern our physical survival. Distant or indirect threats may be addressed with diplomatic or economic instruments or along with allies. Intermediate interests should be safeguarded by allied political and economic means -- before allied military action is engaged. At no time should the US undertake unilateral military action in pursuit of such interests as our economic welfare is inextricably tied to that of the global economy. In defense of peripheral interests, the US should never act unilaterally, not with only a token multilateral force. In our own hemisphere, after exhausting political and economic means, the US may lead an effective regional military alliance. Outside of our own hemisphere, the response should only be within the context of a meaningful international effort. However, there the US should first encourage regional efforts (Conflict in the Post Containment Era, 29-33).

QUESTION: Magyar contends that throughout history, all states have evolved from initially minor political units towards great power, but they have done so at different rates and, of course, not all succeed at attaining great power status. What are the different stages of development for states according to this evolutionary theory? What are the characteristics of states within each of these stages?

COMMENTS: The stages of evolution and their associated state characteristics are as follows:

Formative stage -- Here we find a new political entity being formed that aspires to attain sovereignty. Typically, it is a colony or an identifiable part of another state. Examples include Eritrea, Western Sahara, and the Kurds (Conflict in the Post Containment Era, 9).

Consolidative stage -- Once a state achieves independence, it embarks on incorporating the entire land and its population into a recognized sovereign unit. Two paths are followed here:

Mature -- Consolidation involves slow evolution and disdainment of immediate external ambitions.

Forced -- Consolidation are where states seek to advance rapidly and attempt to attain domestic legitimacy by early expeditions into neighboring lands (Conflict in the Post Containment Era, 9-10).

Expansive stage -- Once states attain consolidation via either of the two paths they begin to export their power into neighboring lands. This involves contests over disputed borders, incorporation of further populations, rectifying historical disputes. Much of this depends on the neighboring victim's weakness (Conflict in the Post Containment Era, 10).

Global-Imperial stage -- Having consolidated and reaching a dominant regional position, states qualify as great powers and now try to project their power and expand their political influence beyond their region. A global power is a nation with global interests (Conflict in the Post Containment Era, 11-12).

Compulsive stage -- This is marked by a great power's growing imbalance between resources and ambition; results in weakening of the state and eventual fall down the pyramid of evolution (Conflict in the Post Containment Era, 12).

QUESTION: How does this evolution theory relate to motives for war?

COMMENTS: At each stage of evolution, a state fights for differing motives. To some extent, if we can determine a state's evolutionary stage, we can "predict" what factors and reasons that will motivate them to fight. For example, a newly developing state will fight for independence from colonial powers, recognition in the regional and global arena, and the right for self-determination. A compulsive state may fight for its continuing status as a world power by employing its power to gain the necessary resources or it may decline orderly and peacefully as it tries to consolidate and down-size, fighting only over essential core interests (Conflict in the Post Containment Era, 14-20).

QUESTION: What is the purpose of 'instruments of national power?'

COMMENTS: The various tools (political, military, economic, information) are used by nation-states to achieve their desired ends and exert influence on other nation-states. These ends are defined politically in terms of desired policies of the state. Instruments of power, then, gain meaning only to the extent that they serve national objectives (Lexington to Desert Storm, 3).

QUESTION: If these desired ends are politically determined, how do states justify using violent military force to achieve them?

COMMENTS: Independent states are sovereign. This means they have absolute authority within their borders. In relations among states, no authoritative force exists to resolve disputes when the policies of one state clash with another. Although international organizations exist to help mediate and resolve disputes (UN, World Court, World Trade Organization, etc.), these do not carry any authority to resolve them. If a country's core or intermediate (or even peripheral) interests are at stake, it may be compelled to resort to war if other IOPs fail to resolve the disputed issue (From Lexington to Desert Storm, 4).

QUESTION: According to Drew and Snow, what constitutes meaningful national objectives?

COMMENTS: Drew and Snow list four characteristics, from a US perspective, for national objectives to be sufficient to justify use of the military IOP:

1. They must be simple, straightforward and unambiguous.

2. They must be 'lofty,' appealing to the moral fiber of the nation.

3. They must be vital to national interest.

4. The interests of most citizens must be served if war results (Lexington to Desert Storm, 12-14).

QUESTION: Are these characteristics realistic?

COMMENTS:. While these criteria are admittedly simplistic, history indicates more success when they are adhered to. Particularly with regards to total war because the objectives of a total war tend to meet the criteria for a "good" political objective. Total defeat of the enemy is an unambiguous and simple goal. Limited wars, on the other hand, typically violate one or more the characteristics listed by Drew and Snow. In limited actions, vital interests of the US may or may not be involved. Limited objectives may divide the American public and may be difficult to understand by most Americans (From Lexington to Desert Storm, 14).

QUESTION: What, then, is the objective of the military when employed as an IOP?

COMMENTS: Directly, to overcome the hostile will and ability of the adversary on the battlefield. More broadly, the objective relates to national objectives of exerting influence on other states. This is where "congruence" (as discussed in the lecture) is key. The military objectives must support the national objectives. If not, the nature of the conflict or the post conflict period will not serve national interests. (From Lexington to Desert Storm, 9).

QUESTION: Are 'ability' and 'will' the same thing?

COMMENTS: No. Ability as used here relates to military capability on the battlefield. Will, as used here, means the desire of the enemy system to survive and persevere. There are many examples of military forces of inferior ability who persisted and achieved the national objective. One example is the American Continental Army in the US War of Independence. The British had superior military force, but the Americans persisted in the face of multiple defeats until the national objective of independence was achieved (From Lexington to Desert Storm, 16).

QUESTION: What factors can create problems in matching national and military objectives?

COMMENTS: Drew and Snow list four:

1. Confusing ends and means. That is, losing sight of the overarching national objective and fighting the war only to achieve combat victory.

2. National objectives clash with military expediency. That is, the favored military strategy makes the postwar period more difficult. "Burning the village to save the village" does not make the villagers want to cooperate in the postwar environment.

3. Abstract national objectives. When the US Marines landed in Lebanon in 1983, there was no clear-cut national objective, hence no concrete military objective resulting in tragedy and withdrawal.

4. National objectives that are inappropriate for the military. As the national (or supranational - UN) objective in Somalia shifted towards eliminating the competing factions, the military was incapable of accomplishing this mission while keeping casualties near zero (a competing national objective) (From Lexington to Desert Storm, 15-17).

QUESTION: How does the national-military objectives relationship change as a conflict progresses?

COMMENTS: Ideally, as national objectives evolve during the conflict, military objectives will be modified to serve the new national objectives. History indicates that the opposite situation has occurred more often; where military objectives become the predominant factor and battlefield success becomes the focus of effort. In total war where the national goal is total capitulation of the enemy and the military goal is destruction of the enemy military (or unconditional surrender), it is easier to keep national and military goals in balance. Even here, though, it is possible to lose sight of the national objectives of 'a better state of peace' and conduct military operations in a manner that does not facilitate the desired post war environment.

In limited war, where national objectives fall somewhere short of eliminating the enemy system and military objectives do not extend to destruction of the total enemy military capability, military objectives must constantly be reassessed in light of the current national objective. The Reassessement is crucial to ensure relevance is maintained between military and national objectives (From Lexington to Desert Storm, 20-23).

QUESTION: Does the national objective affect the specific military strategy that is chosen?

COMMENTS: Yes, the level and type of military force applied to a situation (the military strategy chosen) is derived from the military objective and must therefore match or be congruent to the military objective. The military objective must also be congruent to the national objective. Failure to harmonize these factors jeopardized either national objectives or military success, or both (Making Strategy, 14-15).

QUESTION: What is the relationship of military strategy to military objectives?

COMMENTS: Objectives are what you want to do (or achieve), while strategy is how you intend to do it. The strategy chosen must be appropriate for the objective selected. The strategy is derived form the objective as seen in the "Z diagram." The "Z" diagram is an ACSC model derived from the President's National Military Strategy Document. Choosing special forces, a major conventional force, or nuclear operations would be alternative strategies to achieve a desired military objective (From Lexington to Desert Storm, 15).

QUESTION: In Making Strategy, what do Drew and Snow say is the forerunner or precursor to military strategy?

COMMENTS: Drew and Snow discuss how military strategy evolves from the Grand Strategy. Grand Strategy is developed to meet national objectives. What is fascinating is that Drew and Snow do not address the need for or the presence of military objectives during the formulation of military strategy (p.18). This points out an interesting departure from Drew and Snow's model. "ACSC "Z model" stresses the importance of military strategy developing from military objectives. Each level in the "Z diagram" becomes the basis of the next level's objectives and strategies.

QUESTION: According to the Eagle's Talons, what were the causes of the Civil War?

COMMENTS: Slavery, imposition of northern industrial system on the South, and States rights. Ultimately, the war occurred as a clash between two cultures and societies--one industrialized with its own set of values and the other an agrarian society with a different set of values (The Eagle's Talons, 3-10 ).

QUESTION: What were the strategic objectives for both the North and South?

COMMENTS:

North: Reestablish the Union, by force if necessary. Although straightforward, it was not strong enough to gather total support of the Northern population; it lacked moral power and persuasiveness to galvanize the public opinion. Part of Lincoln's solution was the Emancipation Proclamation which made the cause a moral crusade. It also ended the possibility of France and Great Britain recognizing the South's right to secede (The Eagle's Talons, 11-13).

South: Confederate objective was to maintain independence and avoid emancipation of the slaves. This objective was overwhelmingly popular in the South as was the idea that the South's part in the war was defense of the homeland (The Eagle's Talons, 14-15).

QUESTION: What were the military objectives and strategies of both sides?

COMMENTS: The North's national objective of reunification was straight forward. However, to achieve this objective, the Southern rebel government had to be disbanded by using military force. Because the military was required to first defeat the Confederate Army and then disband the newly formed rebel government, the objective was more likely to alienate and not unite a defeated Southern population after the conclusion of the war. To compensate for this problem, the North hoped to employ an offensive strategy in attempts to achieve a quick and decisive victory. However, because the military objective was not readily achievable by the North

by the North because the Army was too small to meet the task as well as the economy had not been mobilized to meet the demand for the materiel. Winfield Scott presented the Anaconda plan which was a naval blockade of the southern waterways. The problem with this plan was it took time to have effect. Lincoln envisioned an offensive that attacked the South on several fronts. This plan required additional trained soldiers which in turn added to the time required to achieve the objective. The strategy that evolved was one of compromise and initially the war looked like two separate wars instead of one (The Eagle's Talons, 15-21).

The South's best position would be one of defense against northern aggression. Although a defensive war may be a stronger position, the South lacked the resources to support the war effort. States rights issues also affected the solidarity of the South in the beginning. One means to overcome their shortages in resources was to solicit assistance from other countries. General Lee convinced Jefferson Davis to use a offensive-defensive strategy with the intent to attrit northern resources by controlling the location and timing of battles. The other key to this strategy was drawing the war out to the point where those in the northern population, who were not totally committed to the cause in the first place, would cry for its end (The Eagle's Talons, 21-24).

QUESTION: Now that we have discussed the objectives and strategies for both sides during the Civil War, let's move to congruence. Congruence refers to whether the strategy was the right type to employ based on the objective. Given the national (political) objectives for both sides, was the choice of the military instrument of power congruent with their strategic objectives? If so, how? If not, how were they incongruent?

COMMENTS: Given the resources for both sides, you can argue either position (yes and no) that both sides chose. Time was the key element for both sides in using the military successfully. The North had to prosecute and end the war quickly or run the risk of losing its public support. On the other hand, time was what the South also wanted to use but for the opposite reason. They wanted to draw the war out and hope to diminish the popular support in the North. All they had to do was force the North to give up and go home. They did not have to win the war. The South unfortunately did not have the resources to continue this strategy indefinitely (The Eagle's Talons, 18-19).

QUESTION Did the strategies change over the course of the war? Why?

COMMENTS: Military strategies changed for the North after the first few years. The problem with the North's initial strategy was it was conducted as a two front war and at the tactical and operational levels. The military men in charge during these years were not fighting a strategic war. After Lincoln placed Grant in charge, however, the focus became centered on the strategic objective of reunification thus combining all available resources on the destruction of the South's will to continue the fight. With the help of Sheridan, Sherman, and Sigal, the North did this by destroying the South's source of livelihood--its agricultural base.

The South on the other hand, felt their best strategy was an offensive-defensive one. Although successful in the beginning, at the tactical level, this ultimately squandered limited resources to the point where they could no longer prosecute the war. The South had the will of the people to fight the war, but their resources limited their flexibility in what type of position to take. Strategically, their best opening strategy may have been strictly a defensive one until they were able to gain the support from other allies, or achieve their objective of attriting the popular support in the North had been achieved (The Eagle's Talons, 24-30).

SUMMARY

Today we've given much thought to the meaning of motives for war. By now we should understand that all wars are fought for a multitude of reasons, there rarely, if ever, is a single, clearly definable motive for war. In addition, these motives for war are highly complex, multifarious, culturally dependent, while remaining constant over time. We've also seen that we can rank these motives in terms of social interests, including core, intermediate, and peripheral

In this lesson, we have considered the military instrument of power as a subset of national objectives. We discussed how it functions as an Instrument of Power (IOP), how military objectives are derived, how the application of force must fit the situation, and why the force structure must be able to deal with the real world of potential threats, not just what "we like to do best."

CONCLUSION

This was the second lesson in the War & Conflict course. In our first lesson we argued that while individuals fight wars, it is societies that make war -- only the technologies of war change. The first lesson we answered the WHO question as it relates to war. We saw that the actors to conflict must be understood in the context of their social-political organization. Building on this foundation, today's lesson attempted to answer the WHY question. We examined the rationale of why these social actors go to war.

This lesson also allowed us as military members to see how we fit in to the picture of actors to and motives for war. Appreciating how our objectives must serve national interests helps us to conduct military operations with an eye towards how to end the conflict and what the desired end state should be. Our objectives also serve to determine the level of the war as we will discuss in WC 503.