Throughout this course we have learned how war theory defines the field of military thought and doctrine, and provides an orderly methodology for thinking about war (including the use of air and space power). This lesson wraps up the War Theory course with a discussion of emerging air and space power theory.
Airpower theory since the time of Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) focused upon strategic bombardment doctrine which advocated economic warfare based upon industrial targeting. Desert Storm marked a shift from this economic-based form of warfare to what has been called "control" warfare. You will study two control warfare theorists who are part of the leading edge in this transition. As your reading by David S. Fadok notes, Col. (Ret.) John Warden advocates parallel, inside-out attack against five target categories he refers to as the "five rings," while John Boyd's concept is one of operating inside an enemy's decision cycle. In both cases, these theorists contend that the airpower objectives and associated strategies should focus on enemy command and its paralysis. This lesson will afford the opportunity to compare and contrast Warden's and Boyd's ideas, and analyze the possible future direction of airpower theory's development.
Another important area of emerging theory is that dealing with
space. Lt. Col. Michael R. Mantz is a leading advocate for the
development of a separate theory for space. His theory divides
military space operations into three broad categories: space denial,
space strike, and space protection. Mantz then proposes a set
of space combat power axioms that defines these categories and
synergize their combat effects.
LOQ. How does Fadok describe the evolution of airpower theory?
DISCUSSION. Before airpower, most theorists sought to achieve
war aims through either annihilation or attrition of the enemy's
armed forces. Early airpower theorists argued that war aims could
be achieved more effectively and efficiently by rising above and
reaching beyond surface forces. What emerged during the interwar
years was a strategic bombardment doctrine advocating economic
warfare based upon industrial targeting. As the previous lesson
shows, this doctrine continued to be employed with mixed results
through Viet Nam. In Desert Storm one could argue that the shift
towards the control warfare discussed by Warden and Boyd began.
Control warfare is based upon command-based targeting rather
than industrial targeting.
FUQ. How would you define the strategic paralysis Fadok recognizes as a by-product of our emerging airpower theory?
DISCUSSION. Fadok argues that the roots of the concept
of strategic paralysis go all the way back to Sun Tzu, who said
"those who win every battle are not skillful--those who render
others' armies helpless without fighting are the best of all."
Clausewitz, though often seen as bent on destruction of the enemy,
was even closer to the concept of strategic paralysis when he
defined destruction of the enemy as follows: ".... they must
be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the
fight." Fuller's Plan 1919 (TH 507) may have been the first
operational plan aimed at enemy paralysis He described man as
consisting of three components: body, mind, and soul. These formed
the basis for his analogous three spheres of war: that aimed towards
the physical (destruction of the enemy's physical strength), the
mental (disorganization of his mental processes), and the moral
(disintegration of his moral will to resist). Again, great similarities
with Sun Tzu's are evident. Fadok adds to Fuller's original concept
the idea of nonlethal intent. This idea does not necessarily imply
the elimination of destructive actions or fatalities during combat,
but their minimization through application of non-lethal means.
In summary, Fadok describes strategic paralysis as a military
operations with physical, mental, and moral dimensions which ideally
focus on disabling rather than destroying the enemy. This will
permit military objectives to be attained with minimal impact
upon the post-hostility environment.
FUQ. How are Col Boyd's and Col Warden's theories of strategic paralysis similar and how are they different?
DISCUSSION. Fadok compares Cols. Boyd and Warden to Jomini
and Clausewitz, respectively. This comparison is not without merit.
Boyd's theory is process-oriented and aims at psychological incapacitation.
He talks about conducting military operations inside the enemy's
decision-making cycle (OODA loop) to induce an enemy force to
collapse of its own weight. Boyd's theory is quite esoteric. He
speaks of getting inside his "mind, time, and space,"
yet offers few, if any, operational details as to how to go about
accomplishing these abstract aims.
Warden's strategic paralysis theory is form-oriented and aims
inflicting physical incapacitation through parallel, inside-out
strikes against an enemy's five strategic rings, always focusing
on the effects strikes have on the inner, "leadership"
ring, whether that ring is specifically targeted or not. Adoption
of Warden's strategy requires one to view the enemy through a
systems analysis approach. Adoption of a systems approach permits
a complex enemy system to be reduced to its basic parts or functions,
the thorough analysis of which yields appropriate target sets.
This approach permits enemy combat effectiveness to be mathematically
represented as follows:
Warden contends that by inducing physical paralysis and reducing
the physical component to zero, the moral component will no longer
be relevant.
To sum up, Boyd's and Warden's airpower theories both focus on
inducing strategic paralysis in an enemy. They differ in that
Boyd would induce this paralysis through psychological incapacitation
which renders military forces powerless whereas Warden advocates
inducing physical paralysis on the enemy's fielded forces, thereby
rending moral strength irrelevant.
FOQ: What does Boyd mean when he talks about "psychological dislocation"?
DISCUSSION. This entails rendering the enemy powerless
by denying him the time to mentally cope with the rapidly unfolding,
and naturally uncertain circumstances of war. This is best accomplished
by conducting military operations which force the enemy to respond
to fluid, uncertain situations at a faster rate than his decision-making
apparatus can easily handle.
FUQ: What does Col. Warden mean by the concept of "cascading effect"?
DISCUSSION. A "cascading effect" is achieved
by thoroughly and simultaneously incapacitating the entire enemy
system from the inside (leadership ring) out (ending at his fielded
forces). Employing airpower in parallel, near-simultaneous attacks
against multiple, diverse target sets throughout the 5-ring system
overload his decision-making apparatus to the extent that it can
no longer react to defend itself.
During this course we have discussed the evolution of the way
we think about war from the classical theorists' basic concepts
through the modern medium-based theories which tailor those concepts
to best reflect their unique concerns. This evolution will continue
as we enter the 21st century.
LOQ. From the Fadok reading, what will future warfare entail?
DISCUSSION. Fadok envisions a transition from economic
warfare based upon physical destruction to control warfare based
upon informational targeting. He differs from both Boyd and Warden
in the target sets he attempts to affect. Instead of targeting
the leadership (either psychologically or physically), Fadok believes
his information processing systems must be attacked. Fadok believes
such "information dominance" will grow to be even more
important than it was in the Gulf War. Some have called this new
form of warfare "cyberwar" - the planning and execution
of military operations in accordance with information-related
principles. Fadok postulates that as technological advances permit
decision-making and command structures to shift from top-down
organizations to more horizontal structures, the leadership element
may diminish in importance. This would arguably reduce the importance
Warden and Boyd attach to the leadership ring of the enemy system,
while increasing the importance of information networks.
Another factor to take into account when considering our transition
to "cyberwar" is the uneven rate at which nations (or
any politically significant organizations) reach maturity in the
ongoing information or cyber MTR/RMA. The US military in the 21st
century (and by extension, US air and space power) will have to
be capable of successfully responding to what the Tofflers refer
to "first wave" (agrarian) threats and "second
wave" (industrial) threats, as well as "third wave"
(information pr "cyber") threats simultaneously.
FUQ. What does Col Warden view as primary characteristics of 21st century airpower?
DISCUSSION. Warden believes that airpower in the 21st century
will continue to emphasize precision, nonlethal technology, and
information. These may be incorporated into a "reconnaissance-strike
complex" which fuses sensors and shooters either physically
or electronically. While this makes the shooter more dependent
upon the sensor, such vulnerability is nothing new and is, in
some respects, a strength.
Current USAF doctrine considers air and space as an indivisible
whole and emphasizes the following traditional space capabilities:
communications, reconnaissance, navigation and warning, and surveillance.
The advent of "cyberwar" suggests that space will become
increasingly important in future warfare. One must therefore ask
the following questions: Does our current airpower theory adequately
addresses space concerns? If it does not, is a distinct space
theory required? What concepts should our space theory include,
and how will these concepts be integrated into other theories?
Much of the theoretical underpinning for space control should
be familiar from to you from your earlier study of Mahan and Corbett.
The vast, open, and unobstructed nature of both the air and space
and sea mediums suggest that their respective theories should
share some common themes. It is useful to reconsider Corbett's
and Mahan's ideas on sea control in assessing Mantz's theory of
space. Lt Col Mantz's views concerning space combat are derived
from his views on space control just as Mahan's and Corbett's
thoughts on naval warfare flowed from their views on command of
the sea.
LOQ. How does AFM 1-1 define the aerospace environment?
DISCUSSION. AFM 1-1 notes that there are physical differences
between the atmosphere and space, but defines no absolute boundary
between them. Thus, the term "aerospace" comprises the
entire expanse above the earth's surface outwards towards infinity.
The entire earth's surface is therefore accessible to aerospace
forces.
FUQ. What are the roles and typical missions for aerospace power outlined in AFM 1-1?
DISCUSSION. Aerospace power can be employed across the
traditional Air Force operational spectrum. AFM 1-1 begins its
discussion of aerospace control by addressing the typical missions
of counterair and counterspace. It then discusses possible force
applications including strategic attack, interdiction, and close
support missions. AFM 1-1 also recognizes aerospace contributions
to force enhancement such as airlift, air refueling, spacelift,
electronic combat, surveillance and reconnaissance, and special
operations. Force support roles including base operability and
defense, logistics, combat support, and on-orbit support are also
addressed.
FUQ: How do Mantz define "space control"?
DISCUSSION. Space control (like command of the air and
command of the sea) involves operations to ensure the unencumbered
use of space while denying such use to the enemy.
FUQ: "How is space control similar to command of the air or sea?
DISCUSSION. All three recognize that success in their respective
mediums depends upon the ability to operate in an unconstrained
fashion. Therefore, to exercise command of the air Douhet recognized
that the skies had to be cleared of opposing air forces. In the
same way, Mahan argued that sea control depended upon clearing
the seas of enemy fleets. Both concepts are similar to Mantz's
concept of space denial operations.
FUQ: How do Mantz's proposed space roles and missions differ from AFM 1-1?
DISCUSSION. Mantz changes AFM 1-1's roles from space support,
force enhancement, space control, and force application to threespace
support, force enhancement, and space combat (roughly incorporating
AFM 1-1's concept of space control and force application). Space
combat is the focal point of much of Mantz's space theory. He
suggests that a theory of space combat is necessary to the understanding
and proper employment of our space capabilities, particularly
given the rapid proliferation of space based capabilities throughout
the world.
FUQ. What elements does Mantz's include as components of space combat?
His concept of space combat includes space denial, space strike,
and space protection. In his study, Mantz defines space denial
as "hostile application of destructive or disruptive force
against enemy space systems to deny the enemy's use of the space
medium." He defines space strike as the hostile application
of destructive force "from space against natural-body-based
(earth, moon, and asteroid) targets." Space protection, meanwhile,
is defined as "defensive application of...force to defend
friendly space systems."
FUQ. What arguments does Mantz cite which oppose the concept of space combat?
DISCUSSION. Mantz notes several current arguments against
space combat, the first of which is the physical challenge of
getting into space. He suggests that the US space launch capability
is not responsive enough. He is also concerned about the cost
of spacelift, and political resistance to the militarization of
space which many view as a violation of the 1972 Antiballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty. Finally, Mantz recognizes possible technology
shortfalls which may preclude effective space combat even if other
constraints were removed.
FOQ. Mantz proposes a preliminary set of space combat power axioms which highlight the difficulty in establishing a distinct space theory. How do his space combat power axioms compare with airpower tenets?
DISCUSSION. The initial impression one gets in reviewing
Mantz's theory via his space power axioms is that there is nothing
that really distinguishes space concerns from those of airpower
generally. His axioms seem to be founded upon the same airpower
tenets which have been evolving since W.W.I. This contradicts
his major contention that the term "aerospace" theory
is invalid because it does not recognize the inherent differences
in the air and space mediums. It would seem that if space theory
is to be considered apart from airpower theory, its body of thought
should diverge from or transcend in some way that of airpower.
Throughout this course we have observed how war theory - how we think about war - has evolved over time as a result of fundamental changes in contextual or operational art elements which sometimes manifest themselves as MTRs or RMAs. The validity of theory is assessed as it is put into practice in a variety of settings. Theory and the doctrines which flow from it are then modified as required by the lessons learned. If we fail to capture the lessons learned in combat into our theory of war, our doctrine becomes dogma and will ultimately result in our defeat on the battlefield. Our current doctrine seems to have served us well during Desert Storm. How long it will remain adequate is a matter of debate. It will be up to you, the airpower planners and leaders of the next century to ensure that our ideas concerning the proper employment of air and space power continue to evolve when necessary based on our past experiences, our present requirements, and our most informed guess as to what the future holds.