DATE: 13 Oct 97
LESSON OBJECTIVES:
510.1 Comprehend how airpower has been employed since World
War I.
510.11 Describe the use of airpower in World War II.
Basic Belief by the Air Force in 1947: Airpower was decisive. Airpower could disable war economies, sink fleets, shatter armies and with atomic weapons perhaps even banish war. (Tilford)
EUROPEAN THEATER:
Airpower was used strategically to undermine the German military, industrial and economic systems to thus cause collapse, and to prepare for the ground invasion. Control of the air was essential to winning, either by strategic bombardment, or by ground invasion; therefore, the defeat of the Luftwaffe was always a primary target.
Expectations: In both the RAF and the United States Army Air Forces there were some who believed that air power could deliver the knockout blow against Germany, and force capitulation. This view, however, was not controlling in the overall Allied strategic plan." Knowing their plan had to get through the War Department and the Secretary of War, the authors of AWPD-1 devised their plan in such a way that it gave the opportunity for airpower to be decisive yet did not rule out a land invasion.
Technological Limitations: There were several deficiencies in technology that impacted strategic airpower. Probably the most critical was the lack of a "battleplane" (bomber) that "would always get through," thus the need for fighter escorts. Early in the war, fighters did not have the fuel capacity for long-range escorting. Ferry tanks were ordered for the P-47C but had serious limitations. It was made of paper, leaked, had a 200 gallon capacity but could not provide fuel above 20,000 feet because it was not pressurized. A metal drop tank, of 100 gallon capacity, that could be pressurized was designed but because of a shortage of sheet metal was not readily available. External tanks were not available in quantity until July 1943. (Hansell) The external tanks and P-51s, available in large numbers in February 1944 added the range needed for deep penetration bombing raids into Germany. Navigation was another problem. The first radar navigational aid (GEE), available in March 1942, still did not provide great accuracy. With GEE, you could drop fifty percent of the bombs within five miles of the aiming point, therefore, an attack on a target smaller than a city area of a 100,000 population was not economical. Accuracy was improved later on, especially during the summer of 1944. Types of munitions available presented a limitation for airpower. The bombs used by the USAAF's were usually too light to accomplish the damage anticipated or required. Early in the war, the average weight was 388 pounds. Later, when they began using the two to four thousand pound bombs, they began to inflict permanent damage to heavy industrial installations. NOTE: The RAF were using 660 pound bombs during the oil offensive.
Conflicting Demands: Bombing operations began on the marshaling yards at Rouen and Sotteville in northern France on August 17, 1942 and were ineffectual. In fact, the first six months of bombing efforts were ineffectual. Within that six months, the chief target had changed to the German submarine campaign because of the effect the German submarines were having on Allied shipping. By August of 1943, ballbearings were the target. Before they could be substantially destroyed, the German aircraft industry, particularly airframe plants, became the target, culminating in February 1944. Then airpower was switched to preparation for the D-Day invasion, with several attacks on German oil production in May, but the bulk of attacks on oil did not occur until after D-Day. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) Team put it most succinctly when they said, "In the European war, Allied air power was called upon to play many roles - partner with the Navy over the sea lanes; partner with the Army in ground battle; partner with both on the invasion beaches; reconnaissance photographer for all; mover of troops and critical supplies; and attacker of the enemy's vital strength far behind the battle lines."
Impact of "Friction" : Watts argues that the shortcomings of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO), as outlined by Hansell, were not merely incidental "errors," rather they sprang from fundamentally flawed assumptions underlying basic US air doctrine. The planners of AWPD-1 and AWPD-42 ignored negative aspects of planning assumptions and accepted only positive aspects. This resulted in the acceptance of assumptions as facts rather than as suppositions or hypotheses. While individual negative aspects may not have led to dire consequences, Watts contends that the planners ignored the all-important feature of "collective risk" which resulted from the cumulative effects of flawed assumptions. Watts further states that "War is not a vast engineering project," therefore, "success in war cannot be reliably engineered." US planners, on-the-other-hand, believed that the campaign could be engineered-it was a simple matter of bringing sufficient force to bear against the proper targets.
Perhaps the biggest flaw in the ACTS/AWPD approach to war was the failure to regard the enemy as a thinking, reacting entity.
Contributions of Strategic and Tactical Airpower:
Airpower resources were used more strategically than tactically
in the European theater and the results of strategic bombing were
more significant in causing the collapse of Germany. Although
tactical airpower was significant in preparing the battlefield
and disrupting transportation lines so Germany could not move
troops and supplies to the battlefield, it was strategic airpower
that kept the skies virtually clear for the invasion and destroyed
the German economy. The strategic bombing of oil production
was felt throughout both the military and economic structures.
The lack of fuel adversely affected the supply lines, armor capabilities,
and the Germans' ability to train pilots. It also impeded German
industry's ability to maintain the war and attacks on the transportation
system delivered the decisive blow, completely disorganizing the
German economy. (USSBS)
PACIFIC THEATER:
Airpower in the Pacific was more tactically oriented initially. Close air support, interdiction, and counter-air were the primary employment. However, in the fall 1943 strategic attacks against Japanese industrial targets in Manchuria and Kyushu began. Two thousand of these B-29 sorties were diverted from attacks on Japanese cities and industries and sent in strategic attacks against Kamikaze air fields in Kyushu. Long-range strategic bombing against the home islands was initiated from the Marianas in November 1944. Initial targets included the standard aircraft factories, arsenals, electronics plants, oil refineries, etc. Then, in March 1945, urban attacks were initiated in force. This revision, initiated on 9 March 1945, instituted low-level, night attacks against four principal Japanese cities using incendiaries. Twenty-four percent of total tonnage of bombs dropped by Allied planes in the Pacific war was dropped on the Japanese home islands. (USSBS)
Expectations: The original plan was to
succeed in the European theater before moving to the Pacific theater.
Forces in the Pacific theater would be defensive until
the European campaign was successfully completed. Because of this
plan and the underestimation of the Japanese, air forces in the
Pacific were small and technically inferior to the Japanese. (USSBS)
Airpower in the Pacific was more intertwined with naval and
ground forces than in the European theater, therefore, more tactically
used than strategically, at least initially. Airpower is
used to attack Japanese transports carrying troops, supplies,
etc., warships, troops, aircraft support structures, e.g., warehouses,
runways, etc. There were not many strategic targets until
we began attacks on Japanese industrial targets in Manchuria and
Kyushu in the fall of 1943 (USSBS) and then again when we attacked
the Japanese home islands. An early exception to this was Doolittle's
raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942.
Technological and Operational Limitations:
There were few strategic targets available in the Pacific during the early years of the war. The lack of long-range bombers delayed attacks on Japanese industry and her home population until bases could be secured within striking distance (1,500 nautical miles) of Japan. (USSBS) This drove Allied strategy to plan campaigns that brought them closer and closer to the Japanese home islands. This assault took two routes. "One was up the north coast of New Guinea to the Philippines, the other across the Central Pacific through the Marshalls to the Marianas and Palaus and then subsequently on to Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Basically, the advance was for the purpose of projecting United States power to points which cut Japan's supply lines to the south and were within striking range of the Japanese home islands." (USSBS)
Conflicting Demands: Conflicting demands on airpower within the Pacific theater were not as varied as in the European theater because, as mentioned before, there were not that many strategic targets available initially. The major conflict was not so much how they would be employed but where they would be employed. Because the Allied plan was to eliminate Germany first and then turn to the Pacific concerns and because the Allies had underestimated the Japanese, the forces in the Pacific were inadequate and technologically inferior to the Japanese forces.
Contributions of Strategic and Tactical Airpower:
Initially tactical, rather than strategic, airpower contributed
more significantly to the Allied war effort in the Pacific.
This was because of the lack of strategic targets within bomber
range during the first several years of the war. However, in 1944,
when the Japanese home islands came within range of the bombers,
strategic airpower became dominant with attacks against Japanese
industries and increasingly effective with the fire bombing of
Japanese cities and the dropping of the atomic bombs.
510.12 Describe the use of airpower in Korea.
From the first day of the Korean War, the importance of fighter-bombers in a close support role was beyond doubt. The Yak piston-engined fighters of the North Korean Air Force were cleared from the skies within a matter of weeks, and the USAF's Mustangs, together with carrier-based American Corsairs and British Seafires and Sea Furies, played a critical tactical bombing role. In the last months of 1950 land-based UN aircraft were flying almost 700 fighter-bomber sorties a day, matched by a further 300 from the offshore carriers. The air war over Korea gave birth to a new concept-combat between jet aircraft-and revived all the traditional arguments about air support for ground operations. The vast majority of the 1,040,708 aerial sorties flown by UN aircraft in the course of the Korean War were close support, or fighter cover. Their importance was undisputed. But America's leading airmen persistently urged a more ambitious role for their forces in Korea and chafed at the frustrations of ground support. (Hastings)
What Impact did Airpower have on the Early Fighting?
Airpower was vital to the survival of the retreating South Korean
& American forces. F-51 fighters provided air cover while
attacks upon the ever-lengthening North Korean supply lines weakened
their advance. (Tilford) Airpower seemed so effective there
were some who believed the war might end before UN forces could
intervene. (Tilford)
What Factors Increased/Decreased Airpower's Impact?
Lack of Korean air bases and lack of engineers to
build then forced short loiter time "I have twenty minutes
on station. Use me or loose me" (Hastings) and poor sortie
rates. Also, the lengthy supply lines of the North Korean forces
exposed a lucrative target to strikes (Tilford)
What Impact did Airpower have on the Pursuit North?
As the UN forces advanced out of Pusan toward the
Yalu, close air support was vital to the effort. (Tilford)
What Impact did Airpower have on the US Retreat South?
Airpower bought time for UN forces to escape. When Chinese
forces moved fast they were decimated. When the Chinese moved
at night and with greater care their advance slowed. After Chinese
forces were committed, the fight was for air superiority as the
number of MiGs increased (Tilford)
What Impact did Airpower have on the Stalemates?
This is perhaps the most controversial. Even Futrell
admits interdiction was not decisive, at least throughout most
of the war. Why? Hastings sights low supply needs by the Communists
while Futrell sights outstanding Communist countermeasures, extremely
heavy air defenses, and too few UN air assets for the job. The
eventual attacks on the hydroelectric plants had a greater impact
as factories on both sides of the Chinese border depended on this
electricity. Hastings dismisses the entire notion of strategic
attack as if the Chinese grew their tanks in rice paddies.
What Impact did Airpower have on Ending the War?
Authors vary. Many speculate that Eisenhower's threat of using
atomic bombs may have been decisive. Futrell speculates the destruction
of some of North Korea's excess rice crop that had been feeding
the Chinese army had placed an additional burden on the Communist
logistic system so that it could not sustain additional offensives.
Others say the war ended because Stalin died or for some other
reason that had nothing to do with airpower at all.
510.13 Describe the use of airpower in Vietnam.
From day one, the US felt a armed force capable of winning a conventional
war could easily handle any conflict from within. They felt the
US-trained South Vietnamese Army could handle and defeat the Vietcong
and the Vietnamese Air Force, though small, could perform its
support mission well enough. Americans first went to Vietnam to
train our allies in the South to stop the spread of communism.
How did we use the Principles and Concepts of the Early Airpower Theorists in Vietnam? How Effective were these Principles?
BOMBING OF VITAL CENTERS: This doctrine never changed even after the experiences of Korea. It led Air Force leaders to believe that North Vietnam, a pre-industrial, agricultural nation, could be subdued by the same kind of bombing that helped to defeat industrialized nation like Germany. (Tilford)
DEFENSE AGAINST AERIAL OFFENSE: "The Air Defense Command (ADC) ranked below TAC in the SAC-dominated Air Force of the 1950s. The Air Force leadership assumed that since the bomber would always get through, the possibility of an effective air defense was remote; hence, air defense was somewhat heretical. Nuclear bombs made defense against aerial attack even more futile." (Tilford)
ATTACK AVIATION: Another indication of ADC's low status within the Air Force hierarchy was that the last requirement for an airplane specifically built as an interceptor was placed with Convair in September 1956 thus resulting in the F-106. TAC resembled a "junior SAC" According to Tilford, General Weyland figured the way to gain a measure of equality was to imitate the premier command's nuclear mission. Eventually, the F-105, a single engine jet fighter-bomber was produced that could deliver a tactical nuclear bomb. (Mark)
INTERDICTION: Before the Tet Offensive, the Southern war was a guerrilla conflict. Viet Cong units composed five-sixths of the Communist army and intermingled with the local populace. Together with North Vietnamese troops, they fought an average of one day in thirty. The infrequency of combat produced external supply needs of only 34 tons of materiel daily, and no amount of bombing could stop this meager amount from reaching the South.
COMMAND AND CONTROL: Paret argues that from a theory and doctrine point of view, the US efforts in Indochina from 1965 through 1972 presented several problems. He argues that at it appeared five separate air wars were under way simultaneously in the conflict. Decisions regarding how to accomplish initial goals of interdiction were controlled by the government in Washington, which dictated the timing, pace, target priorities and even sortie rates. ROE limited the options open to commanders on the scene (no Auflragstaktik here) and even prohibited the necessary steps to achieve air superiority by preventing attacks against SAM sites under construction and even enemy airfields. (Paret)
"Wedded to strategic bombing, the Air Force neglected other mission, particularly CAS, which tended to tie air assets to the needs of ground commanders. This single-mindedness exacerbated interservice rivalries because, while the Air Force did not especially want the CAS mission neither did it want the Army to co-opt that mission and avail itself of the opportunity to procure combat airplanes." (Tilford)
The absence of a single air commander produced chaos. It prevented
military chiefs from integrating Rolling Thunder with other air
efforts in SEA. Besides bombing North Vietnam, American fighter
squadrons raided Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and provided CAS for
Laotian government forces battling in northern Laos. Pilots flew
by far the largest number of sorties in support of friendly ground
troops in South Vietnam. Interservice rivalry between the Navy
and the Air Force also constrained Operation Rolling Thunder which
led to "route packages." (Head)
510.14 Describe the use of airpower in Southwest Asia.
Rejection of incrementalism of the Vietnam War's Rolling Thunder air campaign, Warden called his plan Instant Thunder. Its intent went beyond ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait, for that would merely recreate the status quo ante bellum and leave open the door for a repeat invasion at a later date. Instant Thunder was to be quick, violent, and focused on true Iraqi strategic centers of gravity-targets such as national-level leadership and command-control facilities, electric power, Iraq's capability to develop and possibly deliver weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological, and so-called NBC systems), and its military capability to reach beyond its borders with airpower or Scud missile attacks. General Schwarzkopf fervently endorsed this first effort and told them to keep working on the plan. Whereas Instant Thunder had eighty-four targets, for example, the final prehostilities Desert Storm plan had more than 300.
In the Gulf War, the Coalition's strategic-operational goal of the air campaign, particularly during the elaborately planned first two days, was more ambitious: to paralyze Iraqi national leadership by destroying its telecommunications, strategic air defenses, and air force.
What Strategy did General Horner Advocate at the beginning
of Desert Storm? Was it Changed?
Horner advocated, "Build a hose and point it
where the ground commander sees that it's needed." (Mann)
He and TAC resisted a strategic role for airpower.
This changed when Schwarzkopf called the Pentagon and asked for
a strategic bombing campaign plan. (Mann)
Using new military technologies that promised to make the predictions
of Douhet, Mitchell, and the AWPD-1 war planners come true, Warden's
staff expected to demonstrate the decisiveness of modern airpower...while
essentially ignoring the Iraqi army in Kuwait." (Mann)
Warden's plan includes a "new (not really) method of analysis,
parallel warfare, targeting for effect, etc. (Mann)
Warden's plan becomes Phase I of the air campaign against Iraq.
(Mann)
What Principles of the Early Airpower Theorists were used in Desert Storm?
AIR SUPERIORITY: Unchallenged
INTERDICTION: The road to KhafJi...
STRATEGIC ATTACK: Introduction of parallel warfare; overwhelming an enemy through concentration and mass (Mann)
COMMAND AND CONTROL: Dispersion of much command and control activity outside the theater. Pentagon, Langley, Space Command, etc. (Head)
SEAD: The Gulf War operation departed from other conflicts in the speed, scope and relative cheapness in terms of casualties. Coalition forces conducted SEAD as an integrated attack designed to disable the entire Iraqi national level air defense system not in isolated efforts. (Head)
GWAPS States that the Argument, "This War Confirmed
the Theories of Airpower Theorists from the Inter-war Period",
does not hold up well. Why do you Agree or Disagree with this
statement?
The argument in Keaney is that Desert Storm focused
on disorganizing the "central nervous system", not industrial
production as evidenced in the theories of Douhet et al and attempted
in Korea & Vietnam. Is this really a change?
510.2 Comprehend the relative decisiveness of airpower in the
above-mentioned conflicts.
510.21 Explain the factors which limited airpower's success.
WWII: EUROPE - The USSBS did not differentiate between tactical and strategic airpower. (letter from Franklin D'Olier, Chairman of the USSBS to Louis Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, which says, "The document seems to differentiate between strategic bombing and tactical bombing and to discredit the former. It calls all bombing after D-Day in Europe tactical bombing, ignoring the fact that the Survey made no such distinction and that almost 80% of all heavy bomber work was done after D-Day.") The USSBS states that "Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe," but does address several exceptions to the successful employment of airpower which include:
PACIFIC - The USSBS concluded that overall, airpower was decisive in WW II. It included several exceptions in the Pacific employment, as it did in the European employment. The major exceptions are:
KOREA: The chief reasons for the general lack of success (as discussed in Chapter 9) were the low consumption of the Chinese armies, the privileged sanctuary of the Chinese Air Force in Manchuria, the U.S. Air Force's small number of tactical aircraft, and the effectiveness of Chinese antiaircraft defenses. North Korea was a relatively primitive society that contained only a fraction of the identifiable worthwhile targets of Germany or Japan. Hastings points out that airmen could not claim that this problem had never been foreseen. Alexander de Seversky was only one among many students of air warfare and as early as 1942 he wrote: "Total war from the air against an undeveloped country or region is well nigh futile; it is one of the curious features of the most modern weapon that it is especially effective against the most modern types of civilization." In Korea, the USAF belief in "victory through air power" was put to the test and found sorely wanting by many of those who were promised so much from it. (Hastings)
Hastings also writes that despite the all-out efforts of the air
force in Korea, there was never a day when the trains did not
run and the trucks did not roll behind the enemy lines in North
Korea. "...it is plain that it could not, or at least
did not, accomplish the mission Air Force theorists had repeatedly
told the Army and the American people was sure to be accomplished,
under conditions of such overwhelmingly one-sided aerial strength."
(Hastings)
VIETNAM: Tilford Suggests that Airpower Failed in Vietnam-What were his Reasons for that?
History - We were "wedded" to strategic bombing
at the expense of CAS.
Doctrine - Strategic bombing dominated Air Force doctrine.
Technology - Fascinated with technology and finding the "right"
weapon to end the war. "...in the end, technologically
sophisticated weapons proved no substitute for strategy."
(Tilford)
Management - Sortie counts, bombs dropped, etc.-statistics
were also no substitute for strategy.
Decreased Intellectual Acumen - Tilford argues that one of
the reasons air power failed in Vietnam was because of a marked
decline in doctrinal thinking. Air power leaders abdicated
strategic thinking to civilian think tanks like RAND. "In
Vietnam, the Air Force along with the other services was rarely
outfought, but like the other services it was often outthought.
(Tilford)
DESERT STORM: When Comparing Korea, Vietnam and Desert Storm, What made Desert Storm so much more Successful?
However, Bush did not believe in the purported decisiveness of
airpower because he did, indeed, order the ground forces to attack
to dislodge the Iraqis in fulfillment of the UN mandate.
510.22 Explain how "lessons learned" were/are
being integrated into subsequent airpower thought.
How did what the Air Force Believed (from WWII) Influence how it Fought in Korea?
Tactical forces were outmoded by the atomic bomb and development
of the jet airplane cut funds for tactical aviation even further.
(Mark)
How we expected to fight determined what force we retained and
purchased. Our expectation was that bombers and fighters who would
fly from fixed bases to destroy the Soviets. Hence we allowed
expeditionary base engineering forces and attack aviation atropine.
What Conclusions did the Air Force Draw Concerning Airpower due to the Korean War?
A trick question! The Air Force did not draw any lessons - they viewed Korea as an anomaly unique.
Following Korea, the American attack aviation went into decline once again. (Paret, Mark) Overwhelming emphasis was placed on the buildup of SAC. (Paret, Mark) The Korean experience was looked on as an aberration, unlikely to be repeated in the future. Even the Secretary of the Air Force during the Korean War, wrote that the war had been "a special case, and air power can learn little from there about its future role in US foreign policy in the East." (Paret) The final report of the FEAF agreed and stated that "certainly any attempt to build an air force from the model of the Korean requirements could be fatal to the US. (Paret)
Not all airmen shared those views. General Weyland returned from Korea to take over TAC. He began an unsuccessful attempt to gain an equal footing for tactical air Forces. Most of his effort was directed toward creating a nuclear capability for fighter-bombers. As a result, aircraft designed strictly for the air-to-air mission role (or air superiority) were neglected. (Paret)
Ironically, it was the British who seemed to grasp the impact of Korea...Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor said: "We must expect to be faced with other Koreas.... The idea that superior air power call in some way be a substitute for hard slogging and professional skill on the ground in this sort of war is beguiling but illusory;. . .all this is cold comfort for anyone who hopes that air power will provide some kind of short cut to victory." (Paret)
Finally, Tilford discussed Korea in his section on "Preludes
to Vietnam" in his book Setup. He posits that Korea was a
limited war where the threat of using nuclear weapons is inconceivable.
He acknowledges that it was a limited war for the US "NOT"
for the Koreans.
What were the Lessons Learned in Vietnam?
Technology has created a modern vision of air power that focuses on the lethality of its weaponry rather than on that weaponry's effectiveness as a political instrument. (Head, pp. 303) American civilian and military leaders entered Vietnam convinced that bombing's lethality assured political results. They never really realized that air power's political efficacy varies according to many diverse elements, and that no specific formula guarantees success. (Head)
Did the Air Force Learn from Vietnam IAW the History,
Theory, Doctrine, Strategy, Execution Cycle or Remain Stuck in
Dogma?
Ziemke suggests (Head) that after Vietnam "the rest of
the airpower community began to assert itself." This is an
interesting twist...in Korea/Vietnam, the Strategic bombardment"
faction was in charge prior to the war and the TAC Air faction
fought for recognition. In Desert Storm, the TAC guys were predominant
and were usurped by Colonel Warden and Checkmate, who were in
favor of strategic bombardment. This is an argument that has been
around since ACTS....
What Lessons did we Learn from Desert Shield/Storm?
What Lessons did other Nations Learn from Desert Shield/Storm?
Don't fight the United States unless you have Nukes. (Retired Indian Chief of Staff)
Airpower is now the decisive arm in major wars. (Soviet/Russian Staff - a bit of an over simplification)
Never give the U.S. 6 months to get ready. (apparently universal)
Ziemke Finds Several Areas where the "Apostles" of Airpower have gone Wrong over the Years. What were Her Points? Do you Agree?
First, airpower theorists generally failed to anticipate the impact
of non-aviation technologies on the theoretical capabilities of
airpower. Future enemies are no doubt already looking for ways
to defeat the US. Second mistake, compressing the time necessary
for strategic bombardment to achieve its desired effects on enemy
morale and capabilities. Third, failure to consider the effect
of political and cultural differences among nations. Ethnocentrism
has limited our ability to see war as limited for us, unlimited
for our enemies. Forth, strategic tunnel vision. Making "airpower"
synonymous with strategic bombardment limits the other uses of
airpower. Finally (and the worst) is ahistoricism; not learning
the lessons from past wars, dismissing as anomalous any disappointing
experience.
How do Some of your Authors Feel about the Role of Technology in the Future of Airpower?
The Paret article argues that the effects of technology and the
actions of practitioners have from the beginning played greater
roles than have ideas. The author believes that we are at a threshold
of technological advance that may markedly change the identity
of air power. He voices concern that "technology itself may
be today's primary air power theorist; that invention may, for
the moment, be the mother of application."
With 20/20 hindsight, we can see when potentially valuable lessons
were not learned. The tuition to relearn these lessons was paid
in blood. Tilford states in Setup, "Too few Air Force officers
in the 1970s and 1980s read history books." He and others
have decried the "decreased intellectual acumen" of
airpower advocates and theorists. Did this lead to a Dogma of
strategic bombardment and its use where it wasn't appropriate?
Or was the patience of the airpower theorists finally rewarded
in Desert Storm?
READING RATIONALE:
The Watts readings argue that US Air Doctrine has always ignored
friction and that efforts must be made to determine how friction
might be incorporated into the campaign process. Hansell's reading
provides background on how airpower theory evolved into doctrine
based on combat experiences and their effect upon AWPD-1, AWPD-42,
and the Combined Bomber Offensive. In Addington's reading, an
overview the events and use of airpower in the Pacific theater
of WW II. The US Strategic Bombing Survey readings, an analysis
of the employment of air power in the European and Pacific theaters
during WW II is provided. Hastings, noting the airpower lessons
learned in WW II, reviews the use of airpower in the Korean conflict
and the failure to recall those lessons. Paret offers a brief
capsulation of these failures as well, while Tilford compares
the early airpower theorists to nuclear strategy, then discusses
the failures of airpower in Korea and Vietnam. The Head reading
provides an overview and assessment of the use of airpower in
the Gulf War and an intriguing comparison of early airpower theorists
to the Korean, Vietnamese, and Gulf conflicts; offering his opinion
of where the apostles of airpower went wrong. The Mann readings
discuss the evolution of the air campaign used in Desert Storm
and reviews long-standing issues and debates regarding the use
of airpower. Keaney also compares the early theorists to the Gulf
War air campaign and provides detailed treatment of airpower in
Desert Storm. Finally, Mark's Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars
offers an unusually succinct discussion of the impact of airpower
doctrine upon tactical aviation.
LESSON OUTLINE:
Thesis: ACTS provided the theoretical foundation for strategic bombing campaigns conducted in both the European and Pacific theaters during World War II. While the official verdict expressed in the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys considered the campaigns only qualified successes, airpower advocates believed that W.W.II had validated their contention that strategic bombing could be the decisive factor in warfare, particularly in light of the tremendous destructive force of nuclear bombs. Little theoretical/doctrinal change was, therefore, forthcoming. The employment of airpower in Korea followed the strategic bombing theory of W.W.II, but gained little success. Airpower theory did not respond to the lessons of Korea, choosing instead to view the poor results as an anomaly. Strategic bombing was again attempted in Viet Nam, and again results were only mixed. Again, no fundamental change in the strategic bombing theory and doctrine were forthcoming. Most recently, strategic bombing was employed in Southwest Asia in conjuction with Operation Desert Storm. Unlike Korea and Viet Nam, the results were exceptional, adding new vigor to the generations old claim of the decisiveness of airpower. What conclusions can we draw from our strategic bombing record?
Main Point 1: Airpower employment during W.W.II closely adhered to ACTS daylight precision strategic bombing theory. Unexpectedly high losses forced the theory to be modified to integrate pursuit aircraft into the bomber streams to provide some security for the bombers, but the air war was considered an overall success.
Main Point 2. The employment of strategic bombing in Korea (Operation Strangle) and Viet Nam (Operations Rolling Thunder and Linebackers 1 and 2) did not yield the results expected by airpower advocates of strategic bombing. Aircraft losses were high, yet the interdiction efforts did not substantially weaken the enemy in the field or the morale of the his civilian population.
Main Point 3. The air portion of Gen Schwartzkopf's theater campaign plan focused on a strategic bombing campaign targeting Iraqi command and control, infrastructure, and fielded forces. It is generally thought to have played a major if not decisive role in the rapid collapse of the Iraqi forces during Operation Desert Storm.