TH 506 DISCUSSION.
The classical theorists we studied in TH 503 based their concepts
almost exclusively upon their study of and experience in ground
combat. Jomini alone mentions the joint employment of air or naval
assets in very brief discussions of aerial observation via hot
air balloon and "ascents" (what we refer to as amphibious
operations) in his Summary.... While their narrow perspective
is unfortunate in hindsight, their concepts did, in fact, provide
a useful foundation upon which modern sea and air and space power
theorists built their respective theories. Foremost among the
sea power theorists are Alfred Thayer Mahan of the United States
and Julian Corbett of Great Britain.
Prior to assessing Mahan's and Corbett's theories it is important
to understand their motivations for writing. The tone and content
of their works are strongly influenced by these motivations. Mahan
was forced to be a sea power advocate. He addressed his theory
of sea power as reflected in The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History.... to an America which he believed was ignorant of
the tremendous benefits which it could derive from the development
of its sea power potential. He therefore spent a great deal of
energy explaining the how sea power contributed to national power
and buttressing his contentions with historical examples. As a
subject of the world's premier sea power, Julian Corbett did not
have to win over a skeptical country. He therefore was able to
focus his sea power theory (best recounted in Some Principles
of Maritime Strategy) not on whether sea power and a navy
were critical to national power, but on how sea power (particularly
naval power) should be employed.
In discussing Mahan's and Corbett's ideas concerning the employment
of sea and naval power, it is important to the understand the
conditions Mahan believed must exist if a nation was to become
a sea power. Those conditions are: geographic position, physical
conformation, extent of territory, population, national character,
and the character of government.
LOQ. In what ways did the United States not fully satisfy Mahan's
six conditions at the time of his writing (1889)?
DISCUSSION. Application of Mahan's own criteria to the
US in the latter years of the 19th century suggests that he would
have to be an extremely persuasive advocate if the US was to develop
into a true sea power in the British mold. In Mahan's view, the
geographic position of the US was generally favorable,
but was not ideal. While generally isolated from foreign attack,
the US had lengthy land borders which theoretically required defense,
and could therefore not focus exclusively on coastal defense and
a navy as England could. The US's extent of territory also
presented some problems. Mahan recognized that the length of a
country's coastline could be either a strength or weakness depending
upon the density of the population living along it. The US coastline
was incredibly long and its population relatively sparse (particularly
so when Alaska is considered along with the continental US). This
made adequate coastal defense virtually impossible. The US was
also lacking in population. Mahan used this term to encompass
both a nation's ability to defend itself from attack from the
sea as well as its ability to mobilize undeveloped sea power capabilities
if required to reinforce its existing merchant shipping and navy.
The latter was primarily dependent upon shipping and related industries,
and Mahan recognized that the United States' vast natural resources
had allowed its citizens to largely disregard their development.
The country's natural wealth also made the US's character of
government less receptive to the development of sea power
to broaden its trade base.
LOQ. How do Mahan's and Corbett's views on this subject differ?
DISCUSSION. Mahan defined command of the sea in strictly
military terms. He believed that to command the sea entailed total
naval supremacy. It was only achieved when hostile navies were
decisively defeated or driven from the seas. Corbett defined command
of the sea in terms of access. He believed that command of the
sea was simply the ability to ensure unhindered use of the world's
shipping lanes and deny that same freedom of navigation to the
enemy if necessary. In Corbett's view, there was no requirement
to engage in naval combat provided freedom of navigation was not
threatened. Applying a Clausewitzian term, Mahan believed the
centers of gravity with respect to obtaining and maintaining command
of the sea were opposing fleets whereas Corbett identified sea
lines of communications as the sole center of gravity.
LOQ. Mahan (called by some "the Jomini of the Sea")
spoke in terms reminiscent of that classical theorist when he
spoke of the importance of strategic points and interior lines.
How did Mahan define these terms and how were they important to
his theory of sea power?
DISCUSSION. There is no difference in the way Mahan and
Jomini defined the concept of interior lines. In both cases, it
involved positioning a friendly military force between possible
opposing forces. Achieving this central position would allow the
friendly force to maneuver rapidly and securely to engage one
or the other force along shorter lines of communications than
the divided forces would have to use to communicate with one another.
Jominian decisive points and Mahanian strategic points are distinct
but related concepts. Jominian decisive points were those points
against which force could be massed to attain military objectives,
whereas Mahanian strategic points were those areas on the globe
whose domination permitted control of the sea lanes. An example
of a decisive point would be an enemy flank or rear area. Gibralter
would be an example of a strategic point. It is possible, however,
that a point could at once be strategic and decisive.
FUQ. How did Corbett and Mahan differ in their views on the
proper roles for naval forces?
DISCUSSION. Corbett generally took a more expansive view
of the role of the navy than did Mahan. Corbett believed that
in addition to engaging in decisive battles at sea, naval forces
could be employed to good effect to blockade enemy coastlines,
as convoy security, to conduct limited operations against enemy
shipping (guerre de course), and to project power by transporting
troops to the area of operations. Mahan's focus on decisive battle
at sea theoretically precluded dividing the fleet assets for those
types of missions. Similar differing views on roles will be apparent
when we examine the ideas of the air pioneers in TH 508.
FUQ. Is the navy an offensive or defensive tool?
DISCUSSION. Mahan believed in using the navy exclusively
as an offensive tool to gain command of the sea. Corbett agreed
that the navy was best used offensively, but recognized that it
could also be used in limited defensive actions to dispute an
enemy's attempt to secure command of the sea. Critical to Corbett's
theory was the idea of maintaining a "fleet in being".
Given that Corbett viewed the primary role of the navy being to
ensure sea lines of communications remain open, fleets must avoid
decisive battle except when both victory and fleet survival is
assured.
FUQ. Could naval power be decisive?
DISCUSSION. Mahan was adamant that naval power alone could
win a war involving an enemy with significant sea trade by securing
command of the sea and reducing the enemy's country via economic
blockade. Corbett believed that naval power made significant contributions
to military victory (thru exercising the roles mentioned above),
but that the joint efforts of naval and ground forces were also
required. Again, the air pioneers would differ on the same point.
LOQ. Some critics believe the world-wide popularity of Mahan's
work contributed to the surge in imperialism prior to World War
I. What aspects of Mahan's theory of sea power support this view?
DISCUSSION. Much of Mahan's argument in favor of developing
sea power (naval power, merchant shipping, and related industries)
was based upon colonial trade. He believed that truly great powers
required colonies to serve as sources of cheap raw materials and
easily controlled markets for finished products. Mahan's work
was popular in countries heavily involved in colonial expansion
at the outset of the 20th century such as Germany and Japan, but
establishing a direct cause-effect relationship would be difficult.
FUQ. What impact did Mahan's and Corbett's ideas have on naval
operations in subsequent wars?
DISCUSSION. Their ideas influenced both the compositions
and employment of navies at the dawn of the 20th century. Mahan's
emphasis on winning the decisive battle provided incentive for
technological developments which produced the heavily armed and
heavily armored dreadnought class ship which dominated the seas
during the First World War. Readily adopting Mahan's belief in
the decisive naval battle, admirals have since sought to keep
their fleets concentrated until they could engage in fully-pitched
battles. The naval battles at Tsushima Straights during the Russo-Japanese
War, Jutland in W.W.I, and Leyte Gulf in W.W.II. are examples
of potentially decisive 20th century naval battles.
Corbett's influence is apparent in the use of naval blockades and commerce raiding. The most notable example of both is the German's use of submarines in attempts to blockade England during W.W.I and W.W.II, and their engage in guerre du course and limited naval engagements in both wars.
Mahan's and Corbett's sea power theories were heavily influenced by classical theory concepts. Applying these concepts to the sea medium, the two fundamentally altered the way sea power was subsequently developed and employed world-wide. Their influence also extended beyond their medium. J.F.C. Fuller incorporated some of Mahan's ideas as he developed his theory of armored warfare. His theory will be discussed in the next lesson. Air and space theorists have also benefited from sea power concepts. They have recognized that the sea, air, and space mediums are fundamentally similar and can be commanded or controlled in similar ways. Air and space power theories will be examined in TH 508 and TH 511.