War Theory Notes: Th 506 Theory at Sea: MAHAN & CORBETT

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

506.1 Comprehend the factors influencing joint doctrine. [I.2(b)]

506.11 Explain how Mahan linked production of goods, shipping, and colonies to sea power.

Mahan was adamant that naval power alone could win a war involving an enemy with significant sea trade by securing command of the sea and reducing the enemy's country via economic blockade. much of Mahan's argument in favor of developing sea power (naval power, merchant shipping, and related industries) was based upon colonial trade. He believed that truly great powers required colonies to sere as sources of cheap raw materials and easily controlled markets for finished products.

506.12 Describe Mahan's six "principal conditions" of sea power, discussing examples of each.

Mahan believed sea power was vital to national growth and prosperity as it alone could ensure the security of overseas trade routes. He believed that nations capable of becoming great sea powers shared six "principle conditions". Those conditions are: geographic position, physical conformation, extent of territory, population, national character, and the character of government.

In Mahan's view, the geographic position of the US was generally favorable, but was not ideal. While generally isolated from foreign attack, the US and lengthy land borders which theoretically required defense, and could therefore not focus exclusively on coastal defense and a navy as England could. The US's extent of territory also presented some problems. Mahan recognized that the length of a country's coastline could be either a strength or weakness depending upon the density of the population living along it. The US coastline was incredibly long and its population relatively sparse (particularly so when Alaska is considered along with the continental US). this made adequate coastal defense virtually impossible. The US was also lacking in population. Mahan used this term to encompass both a nation's ability to defend itself from attack from the sea as well as its ability to mobilize undeveloped sea power capabilities if required it reinforce its existing merchant shipping and navy. The latter was primarily dependent upon shipping and related industries, and Mahan recognized that the United States' vast natural resources had allowed its citizens to largely disregard their development. The country's natural wealth also made the US's "character of government" less receptive to the development of sea power to broaden its trade base.

506.13 Explain how Mahan's sea power: theory supported imperialistic impulses in the late 19th/early 20th century.

Much of Mahan's argument in favor of developing sea power (naval power, merchant shipping, and related industries) was based upon colonial trade. He believed that truly great powers required colonies to serve as sources of cheap raw materials and easily controlled markets for finished products. Mahan's work was popular in countries heavily involved in colonial expansion at the outset of the 20th century such as Germany and Japan, but establishing a direct cause-effect relationship would be difficult.

506.2 Analyze how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war. [I.3(b)]

506.21 Compare and contrast Mahan's and Corbett's seapower theories.

Compare:

Mahan believed in using the navy exclusively as an offensive tool to gain command of the sea. Corbett agreed that the navy was best used offensively, but recognized that it could also be used in limited defensive actions to dispute an enemy's attempt to secure command of the sea.
Mahan was adamant that naval power alone could win a war involving an enemy with significant sea trade by securing command of the sea and reducing the enemy's country via economic blockade. Corbett believed that naval power made significant contributions to military victory (thru exercising the roles mentioned above), but that the joint efforts of naval and ground forces were also required.

Contrast:

Mahan defined command of the sea in strictly military terms. He believed that to command the sea entailed total naval supremacy. It was only achieved when hostile navies were decisively defeated or driven from the seas. Corbett defined command of the sea in terms of access. He believed that command of the sea was simply the ability to ensure unhindered use of the world's shipping lanes and deny that same freedom of navigation to the enemy if necessary. In Corbett's view, there was no requirement to engage in naval combat provided freedom of navigation was not threatened. Applying a Clausewitzian term, Mahan believed the centers of gravity with respect to obtaining and maintaining command of the sea were opposing fleets whereas Corbett identified sea lines of communications as the sole center of gravity.

Corbett generally took a more expansive view of the role of the navy than did Mahan. Corbett believed that in addition to engaging in decisive battles at sea, naval forces could be employed to good effect to blockade enemy coastlines, as convoy security, to conduct limited operations against enemy shipping (<+">guerre de course<-">), and to project power by transporting troops to the area of operations. Mahan's focus on decisive battle at sea theoretically precluded dividing the fleet assets for those types of missions.

506.22 Describe how Mahan's and Corbett's seapower theories influenced the subsequent employment of naval force by the US, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan.

Mahan and Corbett's ideas influenced both the compositions and employment of navies at the dawn of the 20th century. Mahan's emphasis on winning the decisive battle provided incentive for technological developments which produced the heavily armed and heavily armored dreadnought class ship which dominated the seas during the First World War. Readily adopting Mahan's belief in the decisive naval battle, admirals have since sought to keep their fleets concentrated until they could engage in fully-pitched battles. The naval battles at Tsushima Straights during the Russo-Japanese War, Jutland in W.W.I, and Leyte Gulf in W.W.II are examples of potentially decisive 20th century naval battles.