TH 505-GREAT CAMPAIGNS: THE VON SCHLIEFFEN PLAN

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

505.1 Analyze the Von Schieffen Plan

505.11 Asses logistics deficiencies in the Von Schlieffen Plan

In the VS Plan, insufficient logistics planning was one of a number of surprising weaknesses that reflected institutional biases which the reform movement did not recognize or was unable to overcome. German planning was flawed in two respects: First, it assume that the war in France would be short; second, it failed to adequately consider the difficulties of supporting such a large force over such long lines of communications. Planning for a short war of maneuver, the Germans were ill-prepared to transport the large quantities of ammunition and artillery required for set-piece battles. While the rail system within Germany was marginally sufficient to keep supplies flowing to the frontiers, the railroads along the invasion route were grossly inadequate. Until additional miles of rack were constructed by German pioneers, supplies would have to be transloaded from rail terminuses onto wagons or the occasional lorry and moved many miles along roads whose poor quality was only made worse by the troops which had advanced over them. The momentum required for a successful german envelopment simply could not be sustained.

505.12 Relate how the VS Plan was consistent with the ideas of Clausewitz and Jomini.

Clausewitz: Domestic politics played a role in the miscalculation and failure of the VS Plan. Failing to appreciate the closely integrated relationship between the government and the military was key to Clausewitz's theory of war, the German General Staff considered its options completely divorced from political concerns. The German General Staff essentially developed the Plan independent of government oversight. If the nascent German government did share that view, it was unsuccessful in subordinating German military planning to political policy.

Jomini: Schlieffen clearly recognized that Germany's army was its center of gravity, and that the Plan's success depended upon keeping it concentrated and in motion using the Jomanian concept of interior lines. He also recognized that the French center of gravities were her armies and her capital, Paris. Encirclement of the French armies combined with the occupation of Paris would deal the French physical and psychological blows from which they were unlikely to recover, particularly with the memory of the Franco-Prussian War still etched in their minds. The tremendous physical expanse of Russia suggests that its army was the sole center of gravity which the Germans could reasonably affect. Schlieffen also seemed to adequately consider the Jomini's concept of decisive at both the strategic and operational levels. Strategically, he recognized that he could decisively defeat the French by massing his forces against the least well defended portion of the French frontier - that opposite neutral Belgium. The frontier opposite neutral Luxembourg was comparatively lightly defended, but the geography was not suitable for the conducting of large scale attacks. Operationally, Schlieffen recognized the importance of key road and rail hubs such as Liege and bridges spanning the rivers along his line of advance, and securing them were primarily objectives for specified forces.

505.2 Comprehend the relationship between military objectives and how they support national objectives by reviewing wars, campaigns, and operations with a concentration on conflict termination.

505.21 Explain how and why the Schlieffen Plan failed to adequately consider international relationships prior to WW I.

It is apparent that the German General Staff did not adequately consider international politics in its formulation. First, it did not believe the German violation of Belgian neutrality would result in that country taking up arms to contest their movements. Belgian defense of key mobility nodes such as Liege greatly slowed the initial German advance. The Germans also miscalculated the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in calculations of the force necessary to complete the envelopment. The unexpected addition of the BEF to French forces deployed to the area under Plan XVII, coupled with von Moltke "the Younger's" pruning attack forces to buttress German defensive positions drastically reduced the Germans chance for success.

The leadership element also played a role in the Plan's failure. Stronger political leadership (along the lines of that provided by Bismarck might have precluded the development of a Plan so fraught with international land mines, but once the Plan was developed, a stronger leader than von Moltke "the Younger" might have had the foresight and strength of will to execute it successfully in its original form.