If a nation is to successfully employ military force to achieve
its desired national endstate, it is critical that military objectives
and the military strategy pursued to achieve those objectives
are developed (and periodically reassessed) with that endstate
in mind. Hannibal's defeat in the protracted 2nd Punic War, despite
a lengthy record of overwhelming tactical battlefield successes,
illustrates the adverse consequences which result when this relationship
is not taken into account. Hannibal's battlefield success does,
however, provide some positive lessons learned with respect attaining
battlefield synergy with joint (in his case, cavalry and infantry)
and combined forces. His success also provides theory-to-practice
insight into theoretical concepts and principles or war raised
by the classical theorists in TH 503.
LOQ. What imperial endstate did the Carthaginians' hope
to achieve through the 2nd Punic War?
DISCUSSION. Rome's meddling in the affairs of the city
of Saguntum (which was well within Carthage's recognized sphere
of influence per the agreement reached between the two empires
in 226 BC) is cited often cited as the event which triggered the
2nd Punic War. This suggests that Carthage's imperial endstate
therefore involved forcing Rome to recognize Carthage's interests
in the area south of the Ebro River in what today is Spain. Carthage's
imperial interests at the time may well have expanded this endstate
to include a reassertion of its dominance of the central Mediterranean
which Carthage ceded to Rome following the First Punic War fifteen
years earlier. This would necessitate its regaining control of
Sardinia, Corsica, and surrounding sea lanes from the Romans.
FUQ. What military objectives did Hannibal identify to support
Carthage's attainment of the imperial objectives discussed above?
Were imperial and military objectives congruent?
DISCUSSION. In prosecuting the 2nd Punic War, Hannibal
sought nothing less than the destruction of the Roman Empire as
it existed at the time. In this sense he was employing "unlimited"
means (the destruction of Rome) to achieve limited ends (a return
to the status quo between the two empires as it existed prior
to the first Punic War). Imperial and military objectives were
therefore far from congruent.
FUQ. Why did this incongruence exist?
DISCUSSION. This incongruence existed for several reasons,
the primary of which was the Hannibal's tremendous personal enmity
towards Rome. This was the direct result of the humiliation his
father, Hamilcar, suffered at Rome's hands during the First Punic
War. Though just a boy, Hannibal was with his father at the fall
of Syracuse, and subsequently shared his father's "exile"
to Spain. The second, no less important reason for the incongruity
was that since the First Punic War Carthage's sea power was distinctly
inferior to that of Rome. If the larger endstate of returning
to dominance in the central Mediterranean was to be achieved,
it would have to be attained through means other than open warfare
on the sea where an already outclassed Carthage would be unable
to win a war of attrition.
FUQ. What military strategy did Hannibal pursue to attain his
military objective? Why was this strategy unsuccessful?
DISCUSSION. Hannibal sought to defeat Rome by maneuvering
a large army through the Alpine passes and invading the Italian
peninsula from the northwest. Once established on the Italian
plains, Hannibal intended to secure reinforcements for his army
from the conquered peoples living in the region. Strengthened
by these reinforcements and sustaining his army on Roman land,
Hannibal hoped to become ever stronger until his army could decisively
defeat the those of Rome and conquer that city.
Hannibal's strategy was unsuccessful for a variety of reasons.
Though he accomplished the unprecedented feat of negotiating the
Alps with an insufficiently provisioned force and magically appeared
behind Roman legions sent to block his expected route of advance,
his army suffered casualties along the way that he would find
difficult to replace. Hannibal assumed that upon his arrival in
Roman territory thousands of disaffected people would flock to
his banner. While he did, in fact, secure alliances with several
peoples, most of those inhabiting the region remained either loyal
to Rome or neutral. Hannibal was unable to significantly alter
this situation in the decade and a half that he maneuvered about
the peninsula despite his unbroken string of overwhelming victories
such as those achieved at the Trebia River, Lake Trasimene, and
Cannae.
Unable to gain reinforcements or adequate supply from his lines of communications which extended hundreds of miles through inhospitable terrain, and unable to gain the popular support necessary to decisively defeat the military might of Rome, Hannibal was reduced to fighting a war of attrition in a countryside with limited resources. His army would be slowly reduced in size by casualties and desertions while the people he hoped to win over became increasingly hostile over its depredations.
FUQ. What lesson can be learned from Hannibal's misreading
the desires of the occupied peoples within the Roman Empire?
DISCUSSION. Hannibal fell victim to his own lack of situational
awareness. He did not possess the degree of information and intelligence
he needed on his enemy that Sun Tzu indicated would guarantee
success in war. The Carthaginian's oppressive, often harsh treatment
of its subjugated peoples inspired little loyalty in them. Hannibal
therefore assumed that the conquered peoples in the Roman Empire
would, like their counterparts in the Carthaginian Empire, view
an invader as a liberator and enthusiastically support him. He
did not understand that Rome's generally benevolent treatment
of such peoples engendered a degree of loyalty which would be
difficult to overcome. Arbitrarily ascribing one's own outlook
to one's adversary is referred to as "mirror imaging".
This fault is often discovered by those critically analyzing military
campaigns.
While Hannibal's military strategy did not permit him to accomplish
his military objective - the decisive defeat of Roman arms - and
therefore did not allow him to attain Carthage's desired endstate,
his campaigns did provide an excellent laboratory from which to
assess the validity of some of the theoretical concepts discussed
in earlier lessons.
LOQ. How were Sun Tzu's hierarchy of strategies, Clausewitz's
concept of center of gravity, and Jomini's concept of decisive
points reflected in Hannibal's campaigns?
DISCUSSION. Elements of all three concepts are evident
in Hannibal's campaigns. Like Sun Tzu, Hannibal recognized the
advantages associated with attacking Rome's alliances prior to
or in conjunction with his attack on Rome itself. His failure
at successfully doing so was a primary reason his strategy failed.
Hannibal correctly identified two centers of gravity within Rome:
its conquered peoples and its armies. His inability to adequately
influence the former resulted in his inability to completely defeat
the latter. Hannibal also contributed to his own failure by failing
to fully consider the difficulty of receiving reinforcements or
resupply along a tremendously long, vulnerable line of communication.
This umbilical cord constituted Hannibal's center of gravity.
Hannibal therefore fails to meet Sun Tzu's dictum that a good
commander 'knows himself.' Hannibal was most successful at identifying
and exploiting Jominian decisive points on the battlefield. At
the Trebia River, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae Hannibal consistently
maneuvered his inferior army so as to mass overwhelming force
at Roman weak points. The best example of this was his successful
massing of an overwhelming cavalry force on his left flank at
Cannae. This force was key to the success of his double envelopment.
FUQ. What other theoretical concepts of the "classical"
theorists studied in the previous lesson seem to have been validated
by Hannibal's campaigns.
DISCUSSION. Hannibal's operational and tactical successes
seem to validate the emphasis that Sun Tzu and Jomini placed on
obtaining as much information and intelligence as possible. Among
the more important consequences that superior intelligence had
on Hannibal's campaigns were the following: Information on the
Alpine passes suitable for his army allowed Hannibal to adopt
a military strategy involving an invasion of Rome by land, and
intelligence gained by Hannibal enroute allowed him to avoid passes
which Rome had garrisoned in anticipation of his possible invasion.
Superior familiarity with the geography in his area of operations
also permitted Hannibal to outmaneuver the Roman armies sent against
him and assume positions from which he could launch successful
attacks. Most significantly, Hannibal's knowledge of the Roman
philosophy of command in situations where the forces of two consuls
combined, coupled with his understanding of the personalities
of the opposing consuls allowed him to take advantage of Varros'
rashness and lure him into attacking at Cannae.
Hannibal's battlefield successes also support the importance that
Sun Tzu's and Jomini's theories place on two related concepts:
deception and surprise. In The Art of War Sun Tzu writes
at great length about employing deception and surprise at all
three levels of war. Jomini does not discuss these concepts at
such length, but the importance he attached to both at the operational
and tactical levels may be inferred by his concern for intelligence
(thorough knowledge of enemy dispositions precludes surprise)
and the premise of his fundamental principle (after all, doesn't
deception facilitate massing decisive force at a decisive point,
thereby surprising the enemy?). Hannibal's attack at Lake Trasimene
was nothing more than an ambush on an army scale, and his deceptive
disposition of troops at Cannae resulted in the complete encirclement
and near massacre of two consular armies.
FUQ. Hannibal's successful double envelopment of the Roman
armies at Cannae enthralled later military leaders. Generals von
Schlieffen and von Moltke were inspired by the maneuver to in
the development and refinement of what is commonly referred to
the Schlieffen Plan. We will study this plan in the next lesson.
What does a double envelopment entail?
DISCUSSION. According to the US Army's Field Manual
100-5: Operations, an envelopment occurs when an attacking
force overlaps enemy flanks, allowing it to secure objectives
in the enemy's rear. Thus, a double envelopment occurs when an
attacking force is able to overlap both enemy flanks and exploit
the enemy's rear area. At Cannae, once the Carthaginian cavalry
successfully enveloped both Roman flanks, it was able to encircle
entire Roman force, allowing it to be annihilated where it stood.
FUQ. Hannibal's army consisted was a polyglot of numerous
peoples whose composition doubtless changed periodically over
the course of his fighting on the Italian peninsula. What unique
challenges attend commanding such a force?
DISCUSSION. The primary challenge Hannibal faced was gaining
a rapid appreciation for the military capabilities of each element
of his army. Upon completing his assessment, Hannibal had to improvise
methods to best employ these elements as a team. His efforts would
be complicated by the need to reconcile different warfighting
philosophies, styles (doctrines), and weapons. The Yocherer reading
and Cannae toolbook suggest that one method Hannibal used to partially
overcome these obstacles was to place Carthaginian leaders within
each element, and standardizing weaponry by making full use of
Roman equipment left on the battlefields. Hannibal's creativity
with respect to fully maximizing the unique capabilities of his
diverse forces is most apparent in his disposition of his infantry
at Cannae. In that battle, he positioned his stronger African
(Phoenician) infantry on the shoulders of his infantry line to
anchor it against the Roman assault and provide an interior encircling
force once the Roman advance was halted. The center of the infantry
line was composed of the more lightly armed, yet audacious Spanish
and Celtic infantry who could be counted upon to fight ferociously
against the superior Roman force. Their apparent defeat was key
to the deception necessary to the success of the double envelopment.
The above discussion of Hannibal's conduct of the 2nd Punic War
and Cannae was the result of the informal exercise of some of
the critical analysis tools to which we were exposed in TH 502,
particularly the consideration of how contextual elements influence
military strategy and objectives. In examining Hannibal's campaigns,
we were also able to assess the validity of some aspects of military
theory in practice. Perhaps the single greatest lesson learned
was the importance of ensuring congruence between military objectives
and strategy and the national strategy they are supposed to support.
Keep this consideration in mind as you examine the Schlieffen
Plan in the next lesson.