TH 504-- GREAT CAMPAIGNS: 2ND PUNIC WAR AND CANNAE

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

504.1 Comprehend the considerations of employing joint and multinational forces at the operational (and tactical) levels of war

504.11 Discuss how the numbers and varying capabilities of Hannibal's "colonial" troops affected his planning and conduct of operations during the Cannae campaign.

Hannibal faced the primary challenge of gaining a rapid appreciation for the military capabilities of each element of his army. Upon completing his assessment, Hannibal had to improvise methods to best employ these elements as a team. His efforts would be complicated by the need to reconcile different warfighting philosophies , styles (doctrines), and weapons. The Yocherer reading and Cannae Toolbook suggest that one method Hannibal used to partially overcome these obstacles was to place Carthaginian leaders within each element, and standardizing weaponry by making full use of Roman equipment left on the battlefields. Hannibal's creativity with respect to fully maximizing the unique capabilities of his diverse forces is most apparent in his disposition of his infantry at Cannae. In that battle, he positioned his stronger African (Phoenician) infantry on the shoulders of his infantry line to anchor it against the Roman assault and provide an interior encircling force once the Roman advance was halted. The center of the infantry line was composed of the more lightly armed, yet audacious Spanish and Celtic infantry who could be counted upon to fight ferociously against the superior Roman force. Their apparent defeat was key to the deception necessary to the success of the double envelopment.

504.2 Analyze how theory and principles of war apply at the operational ( and tactical ) levels of war.

504.21 Compare and contrast the qualities of military genius ( as espoused by Sun Tzu and Clauswitz ) possessed by Hannibal and his Roman adversaries.

Like Sun Tzu, Hannibal recognized the advantages associated with attacking Rome's alliances prior to or in conjunction with his attack on Rome itself. His failure at successfully doing so was a primary reason his strategy failed. Hannibal correctly identified two centers of gravity within Rome: its conquered peoples and its armies. His Ability to adequately influence the former resulted in his inability to complete the latter. Hannibal also contributed to his own failure by failing to fully consider the difficulty of receiving reinforcements or resupply along a tremendously long, vulnerable line of communication. This umbilical cord constituted Hannibal's center of gravity. Hannibal therefore fails to meet Sun Tzu's dictum that a good commander 'knows himself.' Hannibal's operational and tactical successes seem to validate the emphasis that Sun Tzu placed on obtaining as much information and intelligence as possible. Among the more important consequence that superior intelligence had on Hannibal's campaigns were the following: Information on the Alpine passes suitable for his army allowed Hannibal to adopt a military strategy involving an invasion of Rome by land, and intelligence gained by Hannibal enroute allowed him to avoid passes which Rome had garrisoned in anticipation of his possible invasion. Superior familiarity with the geography in his area of operations also permitted Hannibal to outmaneuver the Roman armies sent against him and assume positions from which he could launch successful attacks. Most significantly, Hannibal's knowledge of the Roman philosophy of command in situations where forces of two consuls were combined, coupled with his understanding of the personalities of the opposing consuls allowed him to take advantage of Varros' rashness and lure him into attacking at Cannae.

Hannibal's battlefield successes also support the importance that Sun Tzu's and Jomini's theories place on two related concepts: deception and surprise. In "The Art of War". Sun Tzu writes at great length about employing deception and surprise at all three levels of war. Jomini does not discuss these concepts at such length, but the importance he attached to both at the operational and tactical levels may be inferred by his concern for intelligence (through knowledge of enemy dispositions precludes surprise ) and premise of his fundamental principle (after all, doesn't deception facilitate massing decisive force at a deceive point, thereby surprising the enemy?). Hannibal's attack at Lake Trasimene was nothing more than an ambush on an army scale, and his deceptive disposition of tops at Cannae resulted in the complete encirclement and near massacre of two consular armies.

504.22 Assess the double envelopment in the context of Jomini's principles of war.

According to the U.S. Army's "Field Manual 100-4: Operations", an envelopment occurs when an attacking overlaps enemy flanks, allowing him to secure objectives in the enemy's rear. Thus, a double envelopment occurs when an attacking force is able to overlap both enemy flanks and exploit the enemy's rear area. At Cannae, once the Carthaginian cavalry successfully enveloped both Roman flanks, it was able to encircle the entire Roman force, allowing it to be annihilated where it stood.

Hannibal was most successful at identifying and exploiting Jominian decisive points on the battlefield. At the Trebia River, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae, Hannibal consistently maneuvered his inferior army so as to mass overwhelming force at Roman weak points. The best example of this was his successful massing of an overwhelming cavalry force on his left flank at Cannae. This force was key to be successful of his double envelopment.

504.3 Comprehend the relationship between military objectives and how they support national objectives by reviewing wars, campaigns, and operations with a concentration on defined conflict termination.

504.31 Explain the impact of the factors which contributed to the incongruence between Carthaginian imperial objectives and Hannibal's military objectives.

Rome's meddling in the affairs of the city of Saguntum ( which was well within Carthage's recognized sphere of influence per the agreement reached between the two empires in 226 B.C. ) is often cited as the event which triggered the 2nd Punic War. This suggests that Carthage's imperial endstate therefore involved forcing Rome to recognize Carthage's interests in the area south of the Ebro River in what today is Spain. Carthage imperial interests in the area at the time may well have expanded this endstate

to include a reassertion of its dominance of the central Mediterranean which Carthage ceded to Rome following the first Punic War fifteen years earlier. This would necessitate its regaining control of Sardinia, Corcisca, and surrounding sea lanes from the Romans.

In prosecuting the 2nd Punic war, Hannibal sought nothing less than the destruction of the Roman Emoire as it existed at the time. In this sense he was employing "unlimited" means (the destruction of Rome) to achieve limited ends (a return to the status quo between the two empires as it existed prior to the first Punic War). Imperial and military objectives were therefore far from congruent. This incongruence existed for several reasons, the primary of which was the Hannibal's tremendous personal enmity towards Rome. This was the direct result of the humiliation of his father, Hamilcar, suffered at Rome's hands during the First Punic War. Though just a boy, Hannibal was with his father at the fall of Syracuse, and subsequently shared his father's "exile" to Spain. The second, no less important reason for the incongruity was that since the First Punic War Carthage's sea power was distinctly inferior to that of Rome. If the larger endstate of returning to dominance in the central Mediterranean was to be achieved, it would have to be through means other than open warfare on the sea where an already outclassed Carthage would be unable to win a war of attrition.