TH 501 emphasized the value of a comprehensive, dynamic body of
military thought as a tool improve one's decision-making ability
and as a foundation for employing the critical analysis process
which is critical to the evolution of the way we think about war.
It remains logical, however, to question the relevance of studying
three seemingly antiquated approaches to war, one of which was
formulated over 2000 years ago, when our primary concern is understanding,
planning, and executing warfare in the 21st century.
LOQ. In the previous lesson, the importance of understanding
the influence of contextual elements on military campaigns or
the development of theoretical concepts was stressed. What were
the main factors influencing the classical theorists' views of
war?
DISCUSSION. All three theorists wrote during periods of
revolutionary change. (Howard would perhaps call them "paradigm
shifts"; Krepinevich might note the presence of RMAs or MTRs.)
In Sun Tzu's day, China was slowly transforming itself from an
area composed of numerous feudal fiefdoms to one consisting of
a handful of more powerful "states". The size and resources
of these new states permitted them to raise, train, and equip
standing armies led not by feudal lords, but by professional military
men with similar concerns and strategies. Sun Tzu attempted to
address their common concerns in his writings.
Clausewitz and Jomini were presented with a similar situation
in early 19th century Europe. Political revolutions spurred a
rise in nationalism which changed the character of war. Up to
that time, war had traditionally been a limited enterprise only
affecting the rulers or aristocracy and their relatively small
forces of retainers and mercenaries. The Napoleonic Era began
the transformation towards near total wars in which the emotions
and resources of the entire nation were involved. This political
revolution, combined with a concurrent industrial revolution which
permitted the mass production of goods, resulted in a military
revolutionary as well. A primary characteristic of this military
revolution was the formation of huge, conscript armies (the "nation
in arms" or levee en masse) fueled by nationalist
spirit and supported by an industrial base which permitted it
to conduct sustained operations over greater distances than ever
before. Large armies were only one aspect of the military revolution.
The sheer size of these armies dictated a larger, more professional,
merit-based officer corps be formed to train and lead them in
battle. Napoleon was the first to recognize and properly harness
the force generated by these three simultaneous revolutions. Clausewitz
and Jomini sought to analyze his success, and develop new ways
of thinking about the proper conduct of war and its relationship
to policy.
LOQ. What is it about the theories of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz,
and Jomini that makes them relevant today?
DISCUSSION. Collectively, the ideas of the classical theorists provide a comprehensive study of warfare. They address critical issues such as the relationship between politics and warfare, the intricacy of strategy, the levels of war, its psychological and physical dimensions, and operational concepts. No less importantly they provide students of warfare with a basic taxonomy with which to discuss its complexities. Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini were all concerned about reducing the chaos and complexity surrounding the study of war. In comparing the essence of their theories we can, perhaps, identify those aspects of war which are of timeless and constitute the core of subsequent theories of war.
LOQ. How did Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz treat the relationship
between political policy and war?
DISCUSSION. They all recognized that politics and war were inextricably linked. But each recognized that while political concerns drove the decision to engage in war and in a large measure dictated its objectives, the planning and execution of combat operations had to be accomplished by military professionals unfettered by rulers or politicians untrained in the military arts.
In his five fundamental factors affecting warfare, Sun Tzu included
the moral influence that a just, righteous ruler has on his people
and his troops. In doing so, he recognized that when the sovereign
exerts a positive moral influence on his people, a unity of purpose
is achieved which is essential to the successful prosecution of
wars. He was adamant, though, that this unity of purpose would
be of little use if a ruler was unschooled in the art of war yet
insisted on controlling military operations. Sun Tzu also recognized
that warfare was often conducted by alliances and coalitions whose
moral unity might be vulnerable to disruption.
Like Sun Tzu, Jomini also recognized the role of statesmen in deciding to go to war, establishing national objectives, and marshaling popular support for the effort. Jomini, too, cautioned against rulers or politicians meddling in military operations, saying that "a general whose genius and hands are tied by an Aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match for one who has liberty of action, other things being equal." He also understood that political and moral factors could influence military results, though he devoted relatively little time to their discussion because their influence could not be analyzed scientifically.
Clausewitz is best known for positing that war is an extension
of political policy. War is but one means to achieve (or contribute
to the achievement of) the desired political endstate. Similar
to the other two theorists, Clausewitz believed that the political
leadership was responsible for determining national objectives
and deciding whether the military was an appropriate tool (means)
to accomplish those objectives (ends). Clausewitz believed that
politicians shared responsibility (with the military leadership)
for ensuring that military operations remained consistent with
national objectives. Clausewitz echoed Sun Tzu and Jomini in his
belief that the planning and conduct of military operations was
best left to professional soldiers..
FUQ. Recent conflicts suggest that wars in the 21st century
may fail to conform to the nation-on-nation model which was typical
of the warfare observed by the classical theorists. Will their
views concerning war's relationship to policy continue to have
relevance in such non-traditional wars?
DISCUSSION. Some may argue that in situations involving
tribal or ethnic hatred, war is a socio-cultural phenomenon totally
dissociated from politics. Yet, the survival of one's culture
is inherently a political objective. Colonel John Warden has argued
that no matter what "system" are involved in warfare,
every bomb is a political bomb. In other words, it is impossible
to employ military force without political consequences. Col.
Warden's "systems approach" will be discussed in TH
511.
FUQ. Although Sun Tzu and Jomini did not actually use the term
"center of gravity," they recognized, along with Clausewitz,
the existence of certain "hub[s] of power and movement upon
which everything depends". What did these three theorists
consider to be important centers of gravity?
DISCUSSION. Sun Tzu's centers of gravity were the enemy's
strategy, his allies, his army, and-as a last resort-his cities.
He recognized that the key was to dominate the center of gravity
by maneuvering in such a way as to place the enemy at a decisive
disadvantage. This would either preclude the need to fight, or
ensure decisive, relatively low cost victory if combat occurred.
For Sun Tzu, an enemy's weakest point, not his strongest, was
his center of gravity.
Jomini's fundamental principle of throwing the mass of his forces
against the decisive points in the theater of operations is related
to the concept of center of gravity. From a strictly military
standpoint, points were judged to be potentially decisive if they
dominated key terrain (e.g. a river, a valley, a fortress, a capital)
or were key to the scheme of maneuver (e.g. flanks for armies
on the offensive; the object being defended for armies on the
defensive). However, in the Mendell translation of The Summary....,
Jomini stated that "another class of decisive points …
are determined more from political than from strategic considerations:
They play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations
and plans of cabinets. They may be called political objective
points." He goes on to say "in most campaigns some military
enterprises are undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes
quite important, but often very irrational. They frequently lead
to the commission of great errors in strategy." Jomini concludes
that "either the political objective points should be selected
according to the principles of strategy, or their consideration
should be postponed till after the decisive events of the campaign."
For the most part, Clausewitz allowed the context of the war to
determine the center of gravity. In keeping with his 19th century
perspective, he believed that the center of gravity was most likely
to be the enemy's army, capital, or leaders, depending on the
nature of the conflict. The difference between a Jominian decisive
point and a Clausewitzian center of gravity can be illustrated
in this way: It might be possible to gain access to a Clausewitzian
center of gravity through a successfully attacking a Jominian
decisive point.
Although all three theorists had definite views concerning the
focus of military operations, the important thing is not what
they would attack, but why. Sun Tzu's hierarchy of offensive strategies,
Jomini's decisive points, and Clauswitz's centers of gravity are
important in that in their own ways they focus on achieving specific
effects which contribute to attainment of previously determined
political objectives.
FUQ. What do Sun Tzu's hierarchy of strategy, Clausewitz's
concept of center of gravity, and Jomini's "fundamental principle"
suggest about their views concerning defensive and offensive warfare?
DISCUSSION. While Sun Tzu's hierarchy and Clausewitz's
concept of center of gravity can address all levels of warfare
(e.g. strategic, operational, and tactical) and Jomini's fundamental
principle has an operational or tactical focus, all recognize
the importance of initiative. Exercise of initiative is inherent
only to the offensive (or Jomini's "active defensive").
FUQ. How do these three theories account for the role of psychological
forces in warfare?
DISCUSSION. Sun Tzu's whole approach to war focused on
creating a psychological imbalance within the enemy by attacking
his strategy using deception and surprise. The effects achieved
through this psychological imbalance will disrupt the psychological
stability provided by a righteous ruler with a moral purpose.
Like Jomini and Clausewitz, Sun Tzu offered a psychological profiles
of the good and bad commander. He contrasted the five virtues
of a commander (wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, strictness)
with five dangerous qualities (recklessness, cowardice, hot-headedness,
pride, compassion).
In describing war as a great drama, Jomini acknowledged the role
that moral forces and natural genius play in it. He also recognized
that some types of conflict release psychological forces which
defy the principles of warfare he sought to establish. Jomini
believed that "Peoples' wars" (civil wars) and "wars
of opinion" (e.g. religious or ethnic wars) were so passion-filled
that otherwise useful principles of war did not apply. Jomini
believed that such wars could only be resolved through exhaustion
over time.
Like Sun Tzu, Jomini discussed the psychological make-up of a
good commander. Jomini believed that great captains could dominate
the outcome of warfare through intellect and force of will (his
example, after all, was Napoleon Bonaparte). He also emphasized
the importance of such qualities as high moral and physical courage,
firmness, and the ability to properly judge character. This latter
skill permitted the commander to recognize and exploit superior
capabilities in subordinates while compensating for their weaknesses.
Clausewitz was also keenly aware of the psychological forces present
in war. He recognized that success in warfare depended upon the
commander's ability to overcome fog, friction, and chance as well
as the fear borne of extreme violence. He emphasized that warfare
involved a continuous, complex interaction of opposing forces
driven by diverse and sometimes irrational motivations. While
like Jomini he recognized that psychological forces are not easily
measured or predictable, Clausewitz made a convincing case that
if a commander ignores such forces, he dismisses a dominant factor
which shapes the outcome of battle.
FUQ. In our modern conception of warfare, do we tend to emphasize
psychological or material forces? Where should the emphasis be?
DISCUSSION. Some may argue, as Russell Weigley does in
The American Way of War, that the US military is most comfortable
using its overwhelming material force to achieve victory through
the annihilation of the enemy. However, considering the increasing
role our armed forces are assuming in military operations other
than war (MOOTW), and the likelihood that our involvement in hostilities
will be of a more limited nature than that for which we prepared
prior to the dissolution of Soviet Union, we may well find ourselves
depending more on psychological measures. In a certain sense,
overwhelming material force has a psychological force all its
own, but it is unlikely that the ongoing drawdown of our force
structure and the limited nature of future wars will allow us
to rely on the physical (and psychological) effects created by
sheer numbers.
LOQ. Based on your interpretation of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz,
what inferences can you draw about the role of information in
warfare?
DISCUSSION. The importance of intelligence is thoroughly
woven into every aspect of Sun Tzu's theory of war. Successful
implementation of any of his hierarchy of strategies depends upon
a thorough understanding of one's opponent. One can posses such
an understanding only if thoroughly informed. The importance Sun
Tzu attached to information gathering at the what we now refer
to as the strategic, operational, and tactical levels is reflected
in his lengthy discussion on the advantages gained through the
proper employment of spies. No less important to Sun Tzu was a
comprehensive knowledge of one's own capabilities and limitations.
Sun Tzu's feelings on the importance of information and the intelligence
that it produces was concisely illustrated in his observation
that if one knows both himself and his enemy he will always
be victorious; if one lacks knowledge of either himself or
his enemy he may be defeated; if one has insufficient understanding
of both himself and his enemy he will be defeated.
Jomini attached similar importance to the role of information,
though his focus again is more at the operational and tactical
levels. He stated that "nothing should be neglected to acquire
a knowledge of the geography and the military statistics of other
states, so as to know their material and moral capacity for attack
and defense as well as the strategic advantages of the two parties."
It is easy to see how intelligence borne of detailed information
is necessary if one is to be able to employ Jomini's fundamental
principle of warfare and mass force at the decisive point at the
proper time.
Clausewitz's views regarding the importance of information and
intelligence were so ambiguous that some critics assert that he
did not recognize their importance. Clausewitz did not dismiss
intelligence out of hand. He did, however, recognize that information
and intelligence are always imperfect and can therefore just as
easily contribute to fog and friction as alleviate it. Clausewitz
stressed that a critical feature of military "genius"
was the ability of the commander to not allow himself to be swayed
from his course or paralyzed to the point inaction by the inevitable
tidal wave of often-conflicting information.
FUQ. How does modern technology affect how we view these theorists'
conclusions regarding the role of information?
DISCUSSION. When Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz wrote their theories, information and intelligence gathering was essentially limited to forms of human observation. Occupying the high ground, sending out reconnaissance patrols, and using espionage were the primary means of gathering information and intelligence. Despite these limitations, Clausewitz was concerned that the volume of possibly conflicting information would adversely affect a commander's decision making ability.
We have entered an age where information technology dominates
war planning and execution. The "information overload"
which Clausewitz recognized nearly two hundred years ago remains
a major obstacle to decision making at every level. The challenge
is to properly tailor our intelligence gathering and dissemination
techniques to provide the commanders with timely, useful, intelligence.
Thorough study of the ideas contained in The Art of War,
On War, and The Summary of the Art of War reveals
inconsistencies in the way the three classical theorists view
certain aspects of warfare. Because Clausewitz and Jomini both
developed their theories based upon their experiences in the Napoleonic
Wars, their differences of opinion are particularly noted by critics.
Many of the inconsistencies between the three theorists can be
explained by differing contexts in which they wrote, others still
by the levels of warfare (strategic, operational, or tactical)
which they emphasized in their analyses. The remarkable thing
about these theorists is not that they sometimes appear to disagree
on particulars, but that they tend to agree on the larger concepts
concerning war which must be explored, and so often reach similar
conclusions with respect to those concepts. These areas of agreement
constitute the foundation upon which all our subsequent theories
of war are based. The influence of the ideas of the classical
theorists will be apparent in subsequently developed air, sea,
and ground warfare theories which will be studied in later lessons.