Since the advent of warfare, military leaders have recognized
the importance of its study. They realized that the commander
who has the most thorough understanding of all aspects of war
has a decided advantage in battle. There has been less consensus,
however, in the form that the study of warfare should assume.
There are those who subscribe to the pre-Napoleonic idea that
the tremendous number of variables associated with warfare permit
one to learn only through personal experience - a trial and error
method of study largely limited to battle tactics. Others adhere
to the more modern position that warfare includes certain constants
(principles, patterns, or norms), the understanding and application
of which will improve one's chances of achieving battlefield success
at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
This lesson will focus on the concept of war theory. The readings
for this lesson addressed the definition of war theory; why is
it needed and how it is developed; how it evolves; its functions,
applications, and limitations; and associated risks. These ideas
provide a useful foundation upon which to trace the evolution
of selected military thought which influenced the development
current air and space power theories and assess its validity.
In order to properly discuss the concept of war theory, we must
first attempt to define it.
LOQ. Using the Athens and Winton articles as a guide, define "war
theory".
DISCUSSION: The readings suggest a number of possible definitions,
all of which are closely related.
Athens stresses the Greek root - theoros - meaning viewing or observation.
--War theory is therefore a set of beliefs based upon the observation of war (military experience).
--War theory is a framework which permits the accurate assessment of military situations and enhances decision-making.
--Athens emphasizes Clausewitz's warning that theory is descriptive not prescriptive. Commanders must not attempt to apply it dogmatically to battlefield situations.
Winton emphasizes that war theory is a systematic statement of
principles or propositions related to military study.
LOQ: The readings suggest that while war theory may contain some
timeless principles or maxims, it is a dynamic, continually evolving
body of thought. If this is the case, what are some factors which
drive its evolution?
DISCUSSION: Howard believes that changes in war theory result
from "paradigm shifts", many of which are not fully
appreciated until battlefield catastrophes occur. Howard cites
two primary causes of such shifts - technological development
and socio-political or economic change. Today, Howard's paradigm
shifts are sometimes referred to as "Military Technical Revolutions"
or "Revolutions in Military Affairs." These concepts
will be addressed in the next lesson (TH 502 - Critical Analysis
Tools).
FOQ: What are some examples of "paradigm shifts"?
DISCUSSION: Howard cites the magazine-fed rifle as an example
of technologically-based paradigm shift, and the Napoleonic "nation
in arms" as a socio-political paradigm shift. Other more
recent examples may include the development of nuclear weapons,
stealth technology, and precision-guided munitions.
FOQ: Howard suggests that military institutions are extremely
resistant to change, particularly revolutionary change. How does
he support this contention?
DISCUSSION: Howard advances a number of reasons for this, some
of which include the following.
Change is normally the result of teamwork and consensus-building.
This method of decision-making is time consuming.
Military institutions are huge beauracracies; like most beauracracies
they tend to discourage original thought.
Military institutions are hierarchical and emphasize conformity.
The attributes required to succeed in such an environment often
run counter to those possessed by original thinkers.
Change disrupts the status quo; someone's ox is always gored.
FOQ: Can you think of any examples of "original thinkers"
in the military whose ideas, though ultimately accepted, were
resisted or suppressed when initially proposed?
DISCUSSION: Some modern military figures who might fit this category
may include the following:
Billy Mitchell (the father of US airpower theory)
George Patton (early armor advocate)
T.E. Lawrence (W.W.I practitioner of guerrilla warfare)
ADM Grace Hopper (automation advocate)
Col John Warden (strategic bombing thru systems analysis)
FOQ: Howard also suggests that the development of war theory suffers
during "ages of peace". How does he distinguish between
"peacetime" and "ages of peace"? What are
the two greatest obstacles which must be overcome if war theory
is to evolve during the latter?
DISCUSSION: Howard defines "peacetime" as an interval
between wars when another war is anticipated and actively prepared
for. Conversely, an "age of peace" is a period when
people believe that there will be no more major wars. Howard allows
that during "ages of peace" the military is not necessarily
idle. It is often quite busy with military operations other than
war (MOOTW) - a concept which was introduced in the War &
Conflict course. Some might argue that the US is currently in
an "age of peace".
The two primary challenges which must be overcome if military
theory is to advance during "ages of peace" are public
indifference and an environment unsuited for validating new military
ideas. Society tends to place military concerns on the back burner
during "ages of peace". Impetus for change (and the
resources necessary to affect change) is generally absent as the
population focuses on other concerns. Additionally, it is extremely
difficult to fully validate new military concepts (particularly
those dealing with combat) short of employing them in actual operations.
Our increased emphasis on war gaming and simulations is one way
we are attempting to address this problem.
The United States may well be in the midst of an "age of
peace". The impact this will have on our future war theory
and resulting force structures and doctrines has yet to be determined.
LOQ: Given occasional paradigm shifts and the tremendous number
of variables which make every war, campaign, and battle distinct,
what relevant functions does war theory perform?
DISCUSSION: Perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of war theory's
functions is provided by Dr. Winton. He believes that war theory
ideally:
Defines the field, providing the necessary focus to the study of war.
Categorizes warfare into subordinate parts, thereby distinguishing between ideas that at first appear fused.
Explains the relationship between the subordinate parts.
Connects warfare with other phenomena (war does not occur in a vacuum).
Anticipates new relationships.
FOQ: What does Winton mean when he states that war theory should
anticipate new relationships?
DISCUSSION: Winton's inclusion of an anticipatory (predictive) function for war theory is consistent with its evolutionary nature discussed earlier in the lesson. It is critical that war theory be able to anticipate future trends if, in Howard's words, the military is to spot "essential currents" (paradigm shifts?) on which it can negotiate "a disturbed and by no means friendly" sea of change.
The military can gain tremendous, perhaps decisive, advantages
by identifying and leveraging future trends, the most significant
of which we will refer to in the next lesson (TH 502) as Military
Technical Revolutions (MTR) or Revolutions in Military Affairs
(RMA).
FOQ: Athens discussed Clausewitz's insistence that war theory
can not be prescriptive. How then does a commander benefit from
his knowledge of war theory on the battlefield?
DISCUSSION: A knowledge of theory provides the battlefield commander
with a guide to action. It gives him with a broader, studied perspective
(Athens refers to an "intellectual foundation") and
understanding of the "normal" patterns of war. This
enhanced understanding of war will allow him to rapidly exercise
sound judgment under stressful, uncertain combat conditions.
FOQ: Who does Athens cite as examples of leaders who properly
applied their knowledge of war theory?
DISCUSSION: Athens cites T.E. Lawrence and Mao Tse Tung as two
leaders who were well-versed in war theory, and who applied their
theoretical knowledge properly to meet unique combat requirements.
FOQ: What is the relationship between "theory" and "doctrine?"
DISCUSSION: Doctrine puts theory into practice.
Athens explains the distinction between the terms (which are sometimes used interchangeably) using a computer analogy. Theory is the computer's operating system and doctrine is the application software.
Howard points out that no one will get doctrine right in peacetime.
Victory will go to the side whose theoretical foundation is sound
enough that his doctrine is least wrong, and can be readily adapted.
LOQ: What are some of the limitations of war theory that can be
discerned from the readings? Are they valid?
DISCUSSION: Some limitations raised in the readings include:
Warfare is too complex and varied for theory to have any relevance.
War theory often discounts contextual elements which play a critical role in the battle outcomes. (Note: These elements will be discussed in the next lesson, TH 502 - Critical Analysis Tools.)
War theory does not take a thinking, reacting opponent into consideration.
Elements of war theory are not equally applicable at all levels
of war (e.g. the strategic, operational, tactical).
FOQ: How does one assess the validity of war theory?
DISCUSSION: Our current theory of war and, more specifically,
the way we think about air and space power is a composite of concepts
and ideas drawn over the years from a number of theorists. Many
of these theorists will be discussed in upcoming lessons. The
best way to determine the validity of our theories of war is by
evaluating the success of our doctrine (which flows from them)
in the conduct of operations.
LOQ: What is the primary risk associated with war theory?
DISCUSSION: Perhaps the greatest risk associated with war theory
is that it's concepts will be applied inappropriately (e.g. prescriptively
or dogmatically). This is always a concern given the military's
institutional resistance to change in the absence of catastrophe
on the battlefield.
Despite the impractical connotations of the word "theory," the development of a war theory rooted in practical historical experience will, as Clausewitz suggests, provide a foundation for historical study which supplements battle experience. It therefore will play an increasingly critical role in our development of combat-ready leaders during extended "ages of peace". A sound military theory will also help the military better anticipate and accommodate the proliferation of 21st century technologies. Leveraging such technologies will allow us to maintain battlefield dominance at a reasonable human and material cost.