SE508 SUMMITS, TREATIES, AND SELF-INTEREST

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this lesson is to provide you with an introduction to summits, treaties, and self-interest. The lesson addresses reasons why nation-states enter into international agreements and then addresses why (in some cases) nation-states may choose not to abide by these agreements.

LESSON OUTLINE:

Thesis: Through a variety of international conventions and understandings, states have attempted to limit the potential consequences of external influences and threats from both military and non-military sources. Relentless challenges to traditional state authority and international law coupled with the self-interests of emerging regional powers, the transfer of technologies, and posturing to protect economic interests will force treaty and alliance signatories and non-signatories to reexamine the appropriateness of compliance.

Main Point I: Identify the purpose and main players of SALT, START, CFE, ABM, NPT, INF, the Treaty of Rome and the Rio Earth Summit.

Main Point II: The motives for entering into international agreements range from altruistic global concerns to unadorned self-interest.

Main Point III: As the international environment undergoes dramatic and swift change, pressures on international agreements will increase. At the same time, the very nature of an uncertain future will prompt more nations to seek the perceived stability of international agreements.

LESSON INTEGRATION & RATIONALE:

This lesson provides a focus on one of the facets of the complex strategic environment along the lines of international law. Discussion revolves around the reasons a nation-state enters into international agreements, and chooses to abide by these agreements, or not. These choices can be polarized for analysis along the theories of Realism vs. Idealism, and the agreements themselves can be viewed in light of military, economic, socio-cultural and political/diplomatic dimensions.

SE COURSE OBJECTIVES:

Comprehend the characteristics of the contemporary strategic environment.

Comprehend different conceptual frameworks which help us analyze the nature of the strategic environment.

Know that major regional issues and relationships shape the strategic environment.

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

508.1 Know the purpose of SALT, START, ABM, NPT, CFE, INF, the Treaty of Rome, and the Rio Summit.

508.11 Identify the purpose and main players of various treaties, summits, and international agreements

Agreement	Main Players	Purpose
SALT	US/USSR	Centerpiece of 70s US/USSR détente
START	US/Russia/CIS	USSR breakup caused renegotiation (START II)
CFE	US/USSR	1990, Limit types/number of Conventional forces
NPT	"Nuclear Club"	1968, 98 countries signed, except Fr, China, etc
ABM	US/USSR	Limit number of anti-missile sites (to 2)
Rio Summit	150 States - UN	Agenda 21, Biodiversity, CO2, Endang. Species
Treaty of Rome	European Union	1957, Created original EEC
INF	US/USSR	Elimination of entire weapons class

These examples of agreements indicate cooperation is possible among nations on a variety of military, political, economic and environmental issues.

Strategic arms limitation agreements helped bring stability to the nuclear arms race between the US and Soviet Union and the elimination of an entire class of intermediate range weapons, under the INF treaty, set the stage for subsequent treaties by promoting trust among the two superpowers. Conventional arms limitations were possible because of the trust engendered by a verifiable INF treaty and because of Gorbachev's accommodation with the West. The treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union, aiding economic cooperation among Western European nations. Lastly, the Rio Summit demonstrated that nations can cooperate on such transnational issues as the environment, despite some criticisms of the treaty.

After participating countries craft these agreements, the final wording reflects both self-interest, albeit mutual gain, and globalism, due to compromises.

* Above Source: SLIDE 2 of SE508.ppt with speaker notes

From Stategic Assessment, Arms Control (SE508pr2.doc)

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT ) : (SALT I); US/USSR, first strike posture eschewed in favor of second strike posture. Ratified October 1972.

SALT II: US/USSR, signed 1979, never ratified, equal aggregate limitations on strategic offensive-delivery vehicles; Intercontinential ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine launched ballistic missles (SLBM), and heavy bombers. Both SALT I and SALT II were observed until 1986, when they were discontinued in reponse to Soviet violations.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START): September 1991, President Bush offered to destroy all U.S. nuclear artillery shells, stand down ICBMs scheduled for elimination under START I, end the twenty-four-hour runway alert status for nuclear bombers, and remove nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships, land-based naval aircraft, and attack submarines. As a result of this initiative, 90 percent of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons have been eliminated. Soviet President Gorbachev responded within a week with a similar initiative, promising to destroy Soviet nuclear artillery shells, take USSR bombers off alert, confine mobile missiles to their garrisons, and cancel several new weapons programs. Both countries also committed themselves to significant cuts in their strategic nuclear arsenals, pursuant to the conclusion of the START Treaty-which mandated reductions in the total number of deployed warheads to 6,000 each-on July 31, 1991.

START II; In the wake of the Soviet Union's dissolution, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed the Joint Understanding on Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms, which obligated both sides to cut their strategic nuclear forces below START I levels. The ensuing START II Treaty will, when ratified and implemented, reduce each side's nuclear war-heads to between 3,000 and 3,500. START II also eliminates heavy ICBMs and Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) on land-based missiles, promoting stability by focusing on weapons that lend themselves to first-strike use. Once START II is in force, the United States and Russia have pledged to consider further reductions in strategic forces.

Antiballistic Missile treaty (ABM) Treaty: limited the development and deployment of ABM systems. It also banned the deployment of regional defenses (except as allowed by Article III) and the creation of a base for nationwide defense such as the deployment of a wide-spread network of ABM-capable radars even if they were claimed to be for purposes allowed by the treaty. Article III specified the limited deployments of ABM systems that are permitted by the treaty as well as banning all other deployments of ABM systems. Only two sites were allowed, of which the centers for the sites must be at 1,300 kilometer (800 miles) apart, to preclude the two sites from forming the basis of a national ABM system. Each site could only have a radius of 150 kilometers, meaning that all systems and components must be inside this radius. The only allowed deployments at each site were fixed land-based ABM interceptor missiles and launchers. Each side was limited to 100 ABM launchers equipped with l00 ABM missiles. ABM radars were also limited in location and capacity. (Source Maj Ernst, Hosug, Rossi, and Thompson SE508pr1.doc)

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) The NPT struck a bargain between the nuclear weapon "haves" and "have nots." The non-nuclear weapons states pledged to forgo such weapons (Article II) and to accept internationally monitored safeguards on their nuclear programs (Article III). In return, the nuclear weapons states pledged to offer the non-nuclear weapons states assistance in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article IV) and to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (Article VI).

Five countries had openly developed nuclear weapons before the NPT was negotiated, but after the NPT came into force in 1970, this trend stopped abruptly. India tested a nuclear device (euphemistically called a "peaceful nuclear explosion") in 1974, Israel developed a nuclear arsenal of at least several dozen weapons, and it is likely that Pakistan has the capability to constitute nuclear arsenals on short order. However, even these three nuclear threshold states, who have never signed the NPT, have not openly deployed nuclear arsenals. South Africa clandestinely built a small nuclear arsenal, but dismantled it and joined the NPT. Other states have taken actions that indicate an interest in a nuclear weapons option, but none has gone as far as the four mentioned above. The NPT attached a political cost to nuclear proliferation, even for countries not party to the treaty. It also established incentives not to proliferate, like peaceful nuclear cooperation for treaty parties and enhanced confidence that neighboring states are not developing nuclear weapons.

When the NPT was negotiated several countries were unwilling to accept a permanent treaty, demanding instead a review conference after twenty-five years. In May 1995, the nearly 180 parties to the NPT met in New York and decided to extend the NPT indefinitely. The treaty called only for a majority of the parties to decide, but the United States and its allies had engaged in a global diplomatic campaign to gain widespread support for the treaty, which resulted in a consensus decision to extend the NPT without conditions. A limited extension had been suggested by many developing states as a way to lever further arms control progress from the nuclear weapons states.

Conventional Arms Forces in Europe (CFE): (1990) Treaty designed to regulate, in a verifiable way , the levels of key types of military equirment - including tanks, armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters, artillery and fixed- wing combat aircraft - held by NATO and Warsaw Pactin the Atlatinc -to - URALS xone of application. Treaty limits the deployment of the kinds of equipment necessary for combined arms attack. Joint Consultative Group is the implementing body. 18,000 (6,000 Russian) items destroyed prior to NOV 95 deadline.

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF): signed 1987, eliminated entire class of nuclear delivery vehicles - ground launched missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 km. First agreement that elminated existing nuclear weapons delivery systems. Pre-cursor to START, began with the US offering to cancel deployment of US intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe in exchange for elimination of similar Soviet weapons.

RIO SUMMIT: In 1992, over 150 heads of states and hundreds of representatives from intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations met to discuss and sign two treaties, one on climate protection through the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions and another on the protection of endangered species and biodiversity. Many people believe the commitment of the signatories to spend billions of dollars to protect the environment is an example of globalist cooperation, while others point out that the vague wording in the 700-page document allows nations to maneuver around those portions that would adversely affect their economic interests. Whether the treaties will actually achieve their goals remains to be seen, but the final wording of the treaties reflected both globalist and realist interests. (source McLaughlin, Maj SE508PR5.doc)

TREATY OF ROME: In 1957, Belgium, Italy, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany signed the Treaty of Rome, creating the European Community (EC) and its economic pillar, the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC created a common market for European products (initially coal and steel but agricultural products were later added) and eliminated trade barriers and tariffs among the members. By 1979, membership had grown to 12 countries, as Denmark, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain joined the original six. The European Union (EU) evolved from the EC in 1993, when the members took another step toward economic and political integration by agreeing to establish a single, common currency and a common defense and security policy. This political integration meant the members were willing to cede some sovereignty in order to reach an agreement on mutual economic and defense issues. By 1996, Sweden, Austria, and Denmark had joined the EU.

While these 15 countries have cooperated to derive economic benefits and achieve common political goals, complete integration into a "United States of Europe" remains to be seen because the members still retain their national ambitions. Moreover, national identity remains strong, with most members refusing to cede too much sovereignty to the European Parliament over local issues. The political, ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity among European countries will continue to shape national as well as regional policies regarding economic and political integration. (Source Maj McLaughlin, 508pr4.doc)

508.2 Comprehend the motives for entering into international agreements.

Arms control is an integral part of our national security strategy. Arms control can help reduce incentives to initiate attack; enhance predictability regarding the size and structure of forces, thus reducing fear of aggressive intent; reduce the size of national defense industry establishments and thus permit the growth of more vital, nonmilitary industries; ensure confidence in compliance through effective monitoring and verification; and, ultimately, contribute to a more stable and calculable balance of power. (source National Security Strategy for Engagemetn and Enlargement, 1996 SE508PR3.doc)

508.21 Discuss the motivations of the various signatories of treaties, summits, and agreements, and what factors compel the signatories to enter into and abide by these avenues of influence.

Usually the States own self interest. Nation-states assess the value of entering into agreements. These interest may change which causes shift in partnerships or alliances over time, leaving states to pursue their own self interest. (for summary of agreements see 508.11).

Prior to SALT, and later START, the Nuclear Arms race was becoming cost prohibitive for all parties concerned. All sides sought equality and parity in end strength reductions and capability.

508.3 Comprehend the implications to the current system of treaties and agreements as current trends begin to shape the future international system.

Future arms control efforts may become more regional and multilateral. Regional arrangements can add predictability and openness to security relations, advance the rule of international law and promote cooperation among participants. They help maintain deterrence and a stable military balance at regional levels. The United States is prepared to promote, help negotiate, monitor and participate in regional arms control undertakings compatible with American national security interests. We will generally support such undertakings but will not seek to impose regional arms control accords against the wishes of affected states. (source National Security Strategy for Engagemetn and Enlargement, 1996 SE508PR3.doc)

The three-phased approach, identifying long term nuclear policy tied to an end state, maintaining a superior force structure, and negotiating from a position of strength, has proven effective by both the US and Soviet Union. This systematic approach to nuclear policy becomes even more critical in a period of uncertainty. Without the direction established by long term nuclear policy, the US will at best waste valuable resources and money and at worst face a global disaster. (Source Maj Ernst, Hosug, Rossi, and Thompson).

508.31 Explain how the changing environment places strains on international agreements, and what resources signatories bring to bear to enforce compliance.

The political, ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity among European countries will continue to shape national as well as regional policies regarding economic and political integration. (Maj McLaughlin)

Former treaty members dissolve or break down and potentially lose control of weapons (ex. USSR and eastern Europe). The problem is convince emerging states to assume the commitment of the existing treaty.

While successful arms control agreements can limit the spread and reduce the number of weapons and otherwise enhance security and stability, standing alone they seldom prevent a state that is determined to acquire such weapons from doing so. They can, however, raise the political or economic costs to such a degree that many states will forgo the use or acquisition of these weapons. Whereas arms control agreements at the height of the Cold War were designed to cap or limit buildups and modernizations, the post-Cold War role of arms control agreements is to manage weapons reductions that are already underway, because countries are cutting spending in what they perceive as a less threatening environment. A major issue is adjusting Cold War-era agreements to retain their arms control accomplishments while permitting responses to the changed post-Cold War threats, e.g., permitting defenses against rogues with missiles within the framework of the ABM Treaty and promoting stability in the Caucasus while preserving CFE limits on conventional forces. In zones of regional conflict, the pressing arms control problem is to prevent the spread of advanced weapons technology. Global regimes to contain or roll back weapons of mass destruction are more or less in place, with the exception of a comprehensive test ban treaty and confirmation of signed treaties. Progress has been made to safeguard nuclear technology and material, as well as to limit the spread of missile technology. Efforts are underway to supplement these agreements with cooperative security-building measures. (Source Strategic Assessemnt, 1996 SE508PR2.doc).

READINGS:

Majs Ernst, Hosug, Rossi, and Thompson, Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control: A Comparison

Strategic Assessment 1996, Arms Control

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, Arms Control

European Economic and Political Integration

Rio Earth Summit Summary

READING RATIONALE:

Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control: A Comparison gives a concise picture of the purpose and key players involved in the formulation of the SALT, START, ABM, NPT, and INF agreements, and what motivated each player to negotiate. The Strategic Assessment 1996 and NSSEE 1996 articles discusses the most current arms control issues in the international arena. The European economic and political integration and Rio Earth Summit readings discuss non-military issues influencing regional and global cooperation.