War in Dagestan

In August the Caucasus again exploded into war as Islamic fighters crossed the Chechen border into Dagestan.
Yet this time, at least on the battlefront, Moscow seems to have won the first round.

The context
Dagestan is not so much a war waiting to happen as several. This republic of 50,000km2 is home to a little under two million people, divided among 33 ethnic groups and 81 different nationalities. This provides ample scope for territorial and ethnic disputes. The Nogai resent the resettlement of Avar refugees from Azerbaijan on their land; Lezgin nationalists dream of a common state with Azeri Lezgins. The Kumyks are resisting the settlement of Laks in their territories, while the Laks and the Chechen-Akkintsy are in dispute over Aukhovsky region (and some Chechens want to see a united Chechen-Dagestani state). Terek Cossacks also continue to assert their right to the region.

The list of potential disputes is long and insoluble. Dagestani President Magomedali Magomedov has sought to co-opt the Dargins and Lezgins, especially by packing the republican security apparatus with them. To a degree he has managed to balance or pacify different ethnic groups, but his is a fragile regime, with minimal support within many of the country's ethnic communities.

Multi-ethnic societies have been known successfully to coalesce, but the engine of integration is generally economic prosperity. Dagestan, by contrast, is arguably the poorest region in the destitute Russian Federation. The economy depends largely on oil and electricity industries badly hit by a lack of adequate investment and the volatility of the region. The unemployment rate in the uplands is around 80%, the high birth rate is fuelling land hunger and the average wage is around US$17 a month.

Dagestan has a history of feud and insurgency. Parts of the country were first annexed by Peter the Great in 1722, but Dagestan means 'land of the mountains'; historically, its uplands have proved to be perfect bandit and guerrilla country. It took another century-and-a-half for the whole country to be brought under Russian rule, and only after the defeat of the legendary warrior hero Islam Shamil. There is a rich folk tradition of banditry and resistance.

The rebels
The insurgents of the 'United Headquarters of Dagestan Mujahideen' proved to be a motley collection of Chechen guerrillas, Dagestani rebels, Islamic extremists and mercenaries from across the Arab world and Central Asia. Notional first-among-equals of their leaders was Shamil Basayev, Chechen rebel leader, erstwhile prime minister and founder of the Congress of Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan (CPCD). Basayev's position is in many ways an ambiguous one. He is a staunch Muslim but does not share the extreme Wahhabism of many of his allies. However, he does strongly believe that Dagestan and Chechnya should be one state. Although a seasoned and wily guerrilla commander, this war saw him as much as anything else being used as a political figurehead. His CPCD was officially charged with forming new 'structures of Islamic self-government' in rebel-held areas. The brevity of the occupation and the opposition of many locals to their 'liberation' meant this was never a serious process.

The core of the insurgent forces, accounting for perhaps half of the rebel fighters, comprised the band of the guerrilla warlord known as Khottab. A Wahhabi Muslim from Jordan who joined the Chechen rebels in 1994, Khottab is an extremist who believes in the creation of a strict Islamic state in the Caucasus. Having fought against the Russians during the Chechen war of independence, he then went on to wage an open campaign against Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, whom he regarded as too close to Moscow. Khottab is considered to have been behind several attempts to assassinate Maskhadov, including a car bomb attack in March. Khottab had concluded a marriage of political convenience with Basayev, but in effect retained operational command and a veto on political direction.

The third element in the loose rebel triumvirate were the Dagestanis. The two key figures were Nadir Khachilayev and Siradjin Ramazanov. An ethnic Lat and former leader of the Union of Muslims in Russia, Khachilayev has a long pedigree of opposition to the Magomedov regime. In 1998 he launched an abortive attempt to storm the government buildings in the Dagestani capital, Makhachkala. Khachilayev escaped to Chechnya where he found sanctuary with Islamist guerrilla movements, eventually forging an alliance with Khottab. Despite their Dagestani origins, he and the self-styled prime minister of 'Islamic Dagestan', Ramazanov, proved essentially marginal, reflecting their failure to raise recruits to their side after they had launched their operation. The self-proclaimed Shura (Islamic council) of Dagestan welcomed the 'liberation' and declared an Islamic state, but it proved to have relatively little authority.

Estimates of the insurgent forces' strength have varied from 300 to over 2,000 (a field force of no more than 1,400 seems most credible). While mostly experienced veterans of the Chechen and other wars, they were lightly equipped. They possessed ample supplies of small arms, support weapons, mortars and appropriate ammunition, but they appeared to have only two BTR-60 APCs (quite possibly captured from government forces in the first days of the attack), a single 100mm T-12 anti-tank gun and a few truck-mounted ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns for use as fire support.

The government forces
Despite the initial poor showing of the government forces, Moscow and Makhachala were able to put together a relatively impressive fighting force, including light infantry units (drawn from the Spetsnaz special forces, paratroopers and marines) crucial to mountain and counter-insurgency warfare. Furthermore, while some units were reinforced with extra elements or specially formed by combining smaller elements from a variety of parent units, this was nothing like the wholesale assembly of ad hoc units thrown into Chechnya. In part, this may reflect the decision to promise troops serving in Dagestan the same bonuses as those sent to Kosovo: a monthly payment of around US$1,000, which is up to 200 times a conscript's usual wage. However, it also reflects the fact that the Russian General Staff has learned some of the painful lessons of Chechnya (and remembered some of those from Afghanistan, which it seemed to have forgotten five years ago).

The government forces were made up of three main elements: light and airmobile infantry units able to operate in the mountains and in small ambush and assault forces; larger mechanised units to seal areas off and maintain rear area security; and artillery and air support elements able to interdict supply lines and box the rebels in. Most of the 'teeth' were drawn from regular army units, with the exception of the Interior Ministry's Internal Troops' 102nd Brigade and Rus' commando force and the local Dagestani OMON riot police. Makhachala has long expected an incident of this sort, and since its OMON troops proved so ineffectual in 1996 when Chechen rebels seized hostages in the Dagestani village of Kizlyar, it has put some of its scarce resources into turning this force into, in effect, a small local army. The Dagestani OMON force numbers almost 1,000 men and, bar the absence of armour and artillery, they are equipped as motorised infantry. The force even has a number of BTR-60 and BTR-70 APCs and heavy support weapons.

At the end of 1997 the republic also began raising a volunteer territorial militia. Despite inflated claims of up to 13,000 members, during the emergency its ranks were swelled with reservists and volunteers to around 5,000. Their training and equipment was minimal, making them little more than a home guard force, but their numbers helped secure the government's rear areas and their very presence helped legitimise the government forces, neutralising the charge that this was merely an attempt by Russian 'imperialists' to control the Caucasus (Dagestani OMON or volunteers were often shown on local TV reports, presumably to drive home this message).

The Chechen connection
While the rebels came from Chechnya, it should not be forgotten that they are as opposed to Chechen President Maskhadov as to Moscow and see Maskhadov as little more than a quisling. It is therefore not surprising that this should prove an issue on which Moscow and Grozny, however quietly, have a common interest. Shortly after the rebel attack the Kremlin asked Maskhadov if he wanted to contribute troops to the operation. Not surprisingly, he declined: his army is largely made up of former guerrillas of the anti-Russian war of independence, like himself, and he already faces claims of being too keen to co-operate with the former enemy. However, Chechen forces, including relatively élite elements trained and equipped for mountain warfare, did begin moving into positions along the border with Dagestan. The intention was obvious: to be the anvil to the Russians' 'hammer', blocking the insurgents' supply lines and trying to prevent retreat into Chechnya.

Maskhadov was able to derive political and military advantage from the incident. It allowed him to distance himself from the rebels, who had been launching cross-border attacks into Russia for months. He also renounced claims to territory outside Chechnya's borders, and Moscow was reminded of the advantages in having a leader with whom it could work in Grozny. Newly appointed Russian Prime Minister Putin, a pragmatist at heart, has drawn a clear distinction between Maskhadov and the insurgents. The incident has also encouraged other leaders in the North Caucasus to work with Maskhadov, and it helped his efforts to persuade clan leaders and remaining autonomous warlords in Chechnya that they should support him against the Islamic forces, whose activities were stalling hopes of (Russian-supported) economic reconstruction, and perhaps threatening to provoke Moscow into new efforts to re-impose central control over the region. This may even have been the intention when, on 17 August, Maskhadov announced that Russian armour had crossed the border into Chechnya. He soon retracted his statement, claiming misinformation, but it did help concentrate minds on the dangers of Chechnya remaining a haven for cross-border terrorism. Maskhadov also used the war in Dagestan as an excuse to declare a one-month state of emergency.

Prospects
The rebels clearly made a serious error in thinking that they could 'liberate' Dagestan so easily; they were complacent in their assessment of government forces and unrealistic in their expectations of local support. They surrendered their key advantages -- small-unit operations in the mountains and local support -- to fight the Russians in a more conventional conflict. It thus brought together the rebels into concentrations and situations where the Russians could get to grips with them and inflict heavy losses to their numbers and to their prestige. About half of the rebels seem to have been killed, captured or wounded, or have deserted. Having failed in a direct attack, the rebels may well have chosen to turn to terrorism to further destabilise Dagestan and the rest of the Caucasus.

The chance of further conflict remains high. The defeat of the rebels averted an imminent war and bought Moscow and Maskhadov a breathing space, but it has done nothing to solve Dagestan's underlying problems. Last month, the rebels struck again, spurred by a week of government attacks on Wahhabi strongholds in Dagestan. This incursion seemed no more likely than the first to dislodge the Russians, but it underlines how the rebels are down but not out.

There is also the newly armed volunteer militia to consider: a potential source of illegal weapon proliferation and inter-ethnic violence. Elsewhere in the North Caucasus, the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya is disputed, as are those fought over by Ingushetia and North Ossetia in 1991­92. Even Chechnya could explode into armed anarchy again if Maskhadov's efforts to pacify the country fail. Relations in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic between the dominant Kabardinians and the minority slavs and Balkars remain tense. Kalmykia has unresolved claims to the 'black lands' of Astrakhan. Poverty and criminality go hand-in-hand, and each wave of war and repression causes refugees and a legacy of feud. The Caucasian 'tinder box' will continue to spark well into the next millennium.

THE GOVERNMENT FORCES

Source: Jane's Defence Weekly

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(c) 1999 Dusan Rovensky
Researched by Dusan Rovensky (c) 1999