Department of the Army
Lineage and Honors
THE 856th RADIO RESEARCH DETACHMENT
On April 6, 1966 the 856th Radio Research
Detachment was reborn and assigned to the 199th Light Infantry
Brigade.
Most of the missions of the U.S. Army Security Agency were highly
classified during the war effort. Secret cover designations
(radio research designations) were used in lieu of the actual
unit designations on unit lists and reports. So the 856th Army
Security Agency Detachment became the 856th Radio Research
Detachment (RRD) for service in Vietnam
The 856th RRD was the only direct support unit to the 199th Light
Infantry Brigade (LIB) to deploy with the 280-man advance party
to Vietnam in November 1966. The 199th LIB, trained for
counterinsurgency warfare, provided security in the III Corps
tactical zone around the Long Binh complex, the Bien Hoa Air Base
and other vital areas in and around the city of Saigon. The 856th
RRD at that time was a 51 - man unit; an infantry officer
(usually a captain) was the unit's commanding officer. The unit
commander worked in coordination with the 199th's infantry
commanders, offering them a means to check their signal security
and improve their communications capabilities.
The overall mission of the 856th RRD was to locate enemy radio
transmitters (enemy crystal radio sets) by use of triangulation
techniques. The unit used three direction - finding tracking
teams located at three different listening post sites, usually
forming a triangle with one another .They intercepted, located
and pinpointed Viet Cong transmitters. This information was then
forwarded to the base camp operations center tor interpretation
and analysis. If the information was good, an artillery barrage
would be called in on the enemy position.
As the result of the unit's Vietnam service. it received the
Valorous Unit Award for combat actions during the Tel Offensive
of 1968, three Meritorious Unit Commendations ,three Vietnamese
Cross of Gallantry - with Palm awards. and two Vietnamese Civil
Action Honor Medals (First Class).>
856thRRD
Defending Long Binh
By William E. Rowe
During Tet 1968, the 856th Radio Research Detachment went from listening to the enemy's radio traffic to fighting the enemy firsthand.
At 0230 hours on January 31,
1968, a red alert sounded for the entire Long Binh compound,
better known there as "LBJ," a play on words on the
initials of President Lyndon Baines Johnson and the U.S. Army
Vietnam confinement facility known as "Long Binh Jail."
At 0300, everyone in my unit took up fighting positions either in
the operations building or along our bunker line. Half awake, I
stumbled around my sleeping area trying to find my clothes; I was
the last operator to take up a fighting position along the bunker
line. At 0330, a rocket and mortar attack began zeroing in on the
LBJ compound and the Bien Hoa Air Base. The Tet Offensive of 1968
had begun.
More than a month earlier, my direction finding team had set up a
listening post (LP) on top of a star bunker overlooking the
hamlet of Ga Ho Nail. The concrete bunker contained gun ports for
two .50-caliber machine guns and several slots for smaller
automatic weapons. Located about 1,500 meters below the unit
operations building. We used the call sign of Lima-Papa- Charlie
(LPC) to bring up our "Driftwood" network. The
Driftwood net consisted of three LP sites that formed a triangle.
We located the second LP site to the right, in front of a guard
rower that overlooked Ga Ho Nai The third LP site, located to our
left. sat on the perimeter of the Bien Hoa Air Base near the
175th Radio Research Company.
The Morse-code intercept operators, or "ditty-boppers"
as we were known, determined the location of enemy communication
devices - enemy transmitters, usually hand-held 3 crystal radio
sets. The Viet Cong sent their coded messages to one another
using these devices. We determined the coordinates of a
transmitter by using triangulation methods among the three LP
sites. We then called the coordinates in to our operations
building, where the transmitter's location was then verified on a
topographic map by our unit commander. If there were no friendly
forces within the area, the identified transmitters were fired
upon from a nearby fire support base (FSB). The FSB's artillery
walked their howitzer rounds out every 10 meters in a north-south
awl east-west pattern for up to 100 meters in each direction.
On January 4, 1968 members of our unit, the 856th Radio Research
Detachment (RRD) began constructing two combat bunkers along our
unit's perimeter . The bunkers were to house two M-60 machine
guns, with an 81 mm mortar resting on the top of each bunker.
Beyond the bunker line, we extended several rows of concertina
wire - three on the bottom row, then two, and then one on top. We
placed many Claymore mines in the middle of the wire , right in
front of our bunkers .
Then strange things began happening around our barracks and our
LP site. On January 13 ,a barracks adjacent to ours blew up: a
Claymore mine ripped one half of it apart. Later that same day an
explosive device destroyed an ammo bunker near our barracks. On
the 15th my team took heavy sniper fire while working our
equipment on top of the star hunker. We were trying to get a fix
on an enemy transmission that seemed to he coming from right
under our bunker.I told myself, "This guy is close!"
The enemy transmitter, a squawker came over the airways as if he
were going to knock the headset right off my head "This guy
is situated where he can watch us work our equipment" - that
thought kept buzzing through my head. Every time I tried to get a
fix on him, he would stop sending. Then he would start again.
This dog and pony show went on for about 30 more minutes As he
started sending, his buddy, a sniper, would take several pot
shots at us. Sometimes the sniper fire became so intense it made
us dive off the top of our LP site and take cover inside the star
bunker. We finally called detachment headquarters over the
Driftwood net and told them about our situation. They calmed us,
saying they would take care of the sniper for us.
A few minutes later, several choppers landed in an open area in
front of our bunker. We told them the sniper fire was coming from
a house, or hooch, with a blue roof, about 770 meters to the left
and out in front of our LP site. Soldiers from the 199th Light
Infantry Brigade (LIB) got out of the choppers and started to
sweep the area. A firefight broke out about 10 minutes into the
sweep as the grunts approached the sniper's hooch. Then the
firefight proceeded westward toward Saigon along Highway 1. For
about an hour. fierce fighting took place hooch to hooch. That
night, after the fighting ended the 199th LIB counted xx dead
enemy soldiers. The transmitter and his sniper buddy were gone.
The 199th learned from its intelligence-gathering ettorts and
from information supplied to it trom the 350th's tracking teams
that the enemy dead were from the 274th and 275th 7th Viet Cong
regiments, whose objective was to overrun the Long Binh compound.
the Bien Hoa Air Base, and several other locations in and around
the Saigon area.
The 275th Viet Cong Regiment included a good number of North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars. Just coming off the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, they provided well- trained replacements to the regiment.
The province local force battalion (the D445 Viet Cong Battalion
ot Phuoc Tuy province) also supplied needed replacements to the
275th VC Regiment. No one knew anything about the 274th VC
Regiment a possible sister unit to the 274th VC Regiment.
Everyone figured it contained the same organational structure and
troop strength as the 275th.
After the firefight we passed this information to the Military
Assistance Command. Vietnam (MACV) located in Saigon at the Tan
Son Nhut Air Base. We also told MACV headquarters personnel about
reports of the planned attack on the Bien Hoa Air Base and
several sites in Saigon such as the MACV headquarters building ,
the U.S. Embassy, the relay station, the radio station ,and the
Phu Tho racetrack.
We reported that the Viet Cong regiment planned to attack the
Long Binh complex and the II Field Forces headquarters located in
the LBJ compound. MACV headquarters personnel sloughed off this
information They ignored intelligence reports indicating the Viet
Cong were assembling in tunnels, caves and foxholes in a grave
yard located in front of the guard tower LP site that looked over
the village of Ga Ho Nai.
On january 21. 1968 the 856th RRD got a new company commander
Captain Walker, M, Runyon . As his first order, he assigned Meg l
sound-activated LP team in front of the graveyard area .Runyon
hoped to verify the whereabouts of the reported enemy positions
in the area. lan Campbell and a guy named McBain were the two
ditty-boppers assigned to the LP site. Campbell had taken an
advanced course In direction-finding techniques at Fort Lewis
Wash. before arriving at the unit. Campbell and McBain had worked
together for several months
The two members of the noise/voice LP reassigned to the guard
tower site were Martin and Browning .They were new to the
unit.and had been in-country for a short rime. and had taken
their in-country training at a centre located on the LBJ
compound. They used electronic listening devices buried or set up
along NVA or Viet Cong supply routes,to determine enemy movements
and the content of enemy voice transmissions. In addition to
listening for Viet Cong voice communications, Campbell said he
used a special direction finder-calibrating transmitter that
transmitted on an even frequency in the band between 285 and 315
kilocycles or on a frequency of 480 kilocycles For two days
.Martin and Browning tried to intercept enemy transmissions in
the graveyard area but heard nothing. No enemy movement was
detected.
Early on the morning of January 30 1968 Charlie (the Viet
Cong)struck along a 600-mile front. More than 100,000 NVA and
Viet Cong, cadre members attacked cities and military
installations with Hue,Saigon, Phu Bai, Bien Hoa, and Long Binh
taking the brunt of the attacks. Two main force units of the Viet
Cong 5th Division, the 274th and 275th Viet Cong regiments
attacked the Bien Hoa Air Base and the II Field Forces
headquarters at the Long Binh compound. Both sites were hit with
heavy rocket and mortar fire, automatic-weapons fire and intense
small-arms fire.
The rocket and mortar attacks came from two locations, Thu Duc
and a village named Hoa An. The rockets and mortars coming from
the Thu Duc site were right on the money, walking those mortars
and rockets across the LB] compound toward the 199th's helipad
and our unit's bunker line. Brigade intelligence located the
rocket launcher. Aerial observation, on station over the Bien Hoa
Air Base at that time, pinpointed the exact location of the
launch site. An artillery barrage, called in from the 2nd
Battalion, 40th Artillery, destroyed the Thu Duc site with a
direct hit.
Part of the aerial observation team was an AC-47 gunship, or
"Spooky". They located the Hoa An launch site by
observing muzzle flashes coming out of the area. The enemy rocket
barrage had followed a path down Highway 1 instead of walking
their rounds at an angle across the LBJ compound toward our
bunker line. When the Viet Cong gunners (at the Hoa An site)
realized they were walking their rounds in the wrong direction,
they changed the direction of fire and aimed them toward our
bunker line. A lightning-quick burst from Spooky's Gatling guns
destroyed the Hoa An launch site before any of the rockets or
mortars reached our bunker line.
Coinciding with the rocket and mortar attacks were probing
attacks by another Viet Cong battalion along the eastern and
southeastern perimeter boundaries of the compound. The probing
attack units included Viet Cong sapper squads. Another Viet Cong
battalion infiltrated near the area of the 3rd Ordnance (Long
Binh) ammunition dump. In a few moments, the huge dump became a
fireball, the shock of the explosion echoing over an area of 50
miles. As the ammo dump burst into flames, secondary explosions
erupted in other storage areas, and for the next three days,
fires burned out of control. The 199th LIB let each storage area
explode until the entire dump blew itself up and out.
All told, five or six Viet Cong battalions attacked the LBJ
compound. Another unit assaulted the 12th Aviation Group and its
helipad from the west, and a Viet Cong machine-gun company
infiltrated southwest of the 199th Brigade's main base, with
orders to wipe out the helicopters that rested on the brigade's
helipad. Several battalions of the 275rh Viet Cong Regiment
assembled in front of our unit's bunker line for a frontal
assault. They had been hiding in tunnels and foxholes in the area
for about two weeks, awaiting orders from Hanoi to start their
attack on the compound. If successful, their attack could take
them all the way into Saigon.
For the next 2 1/2 hours, the Viet Cong initiated probing attacks
against our bunker line and other positions along our perimeter.
A signal company and a military police detachment manned two or
three other perimeter bunkers with fewer than 10 soldiers. Our
unit numbered 51 members. Most of my buddies were in the
operations building setting satchel charges and incendiary
grenades to all the filing cabinets, equipment (radios and
receivers), maps and reports-everything that should not fall into
the hands of the enemy. We were stationed at the weakest section
of the perimeter and outnumbered by who knew how many. We didn't
like the odds.
The Viet Cong approached our unit's bunker line about five times
trying to get through the wire about 50 meters out in front of
the bunkers. Each time they attacked some would get hung up on
the wire. Each time they attacked, we went crazy, yelling
expletives as we went out to meet them, yelling and firing each
time they approached. A mound of enemy dead was forming in front
of the concertina, body upon body.
The frontal attacks lasted for another two hours. After each
advance, we would pace up and down the bunker line, nervously
anticipating the next attack. After each attack, the mound of
enemy dead got bigger and bigger.
By this time, several unit members were running low on
ammunition. Two sergeants went to look for more ammo in the motor
pool area and in our storage conexes, but returned empty-handed.
When the word went around that we were running out of ammunition,
the guys along the bunker line went manic. Those not swearing
loudly were praying, preparing for close-in fighting. We knew if
we did not get more ammunition it would he a one-on-one struggle
for each of us.
Suddenly, it was unnervingly quiet. We waited as the great mass
of crouched figures steadily approached . What remained of the
275th Viet Cong Regiment came at us over the moundof dead VC one
more time! Our orders were to hold our fire until the Viet Cong
came up on the wire. The waiting was agony. When we could wait no
longer, we started to run toward the wire to meet them head on.
Soon, though, we had reason to race back toward our bunkers. We
heard them before we saw them Spooky and six Huey gunships,
coming in low from behind our operations building. Spooky made a
pass at the rear of the advancing Viet Cong and let loose with a
seven-second barrage from its miniguns. The Hueys from A Troop,
3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, came in from the front, firing
their machine guns and rockets. Spooky circled and came in for a
frontal assault on the paralyzed Viet Cong, then made a second
pass, spraying the area with another seven-second minigun
barrage. The Hueys circled the area and attacked the VC from
their rear, firing their machine guns and rockets.
On the ground, there was more bad news for the VC. A platoon of
armored personnel carriers (APCs) from D Troop, 17th Cavalry, and
a platoon of tanks from the 11th Armored Cavalry came up and took
firing positions along our bunker line. The APCs and tanks fired
at point-blank range directly point-blank range directly into the
mound of enemy dead. Jeeps with rear-mounted M-60 machine guns
raced in and out of the into the mound of enemy dead. The Jeeps
raced in and out of the area all night long, creating havoc in
the rear of the fleeing horde of Viet Cong.
Two companies from the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry (of the 199th
LIB), smashed into the rear of the fleeing Viet Cong, cutting off
their retreat. For the next three days the 199th LIB remained in
blocking positions.
On February 5,1968, we woke up with our backs resting against the
inside baggie wall of the second combat bunker. We looked at each
other as we silently passed a canteen of water around. Our shirts
were hanging open, soaked with sweat. Every so often we blinked,
trying to orient ourselves as to time and place.
Our First Sergeant stuck his head into the bunker, told us to go
out to the mound of enemy dead and take part in the body count.
When we got out to the mound, we stared in horror.A puff of smoke
came up and out of the middle of the mound as we looked at the
twisted bodies of dead Viet Cong. I turned my back and vomited.
We staggered back to the bunker line, unable to perform the body
count.
About 0930 the next day, we again went out to help with the body
count. And again, as we approached the mound of enemy dead, we
backed off. Once again the stench stopped the body count. The
mound still smoldering after five days, disappeared when they
brought in the Rome plows to bury the dead. The plows pushed
about 400 dead Viet Cong into a low drainage area to the right
and in front of our bunker line.
Captain Runyon closed down the Driftwood net right after the Tet
Offensive,as there were no ditty-boppers left to man the PRD- 1
direction finders. Fort Devens (my advanced individual training
school) had stopped graduating ditty-boppers; there were then no
replacements for the Morse Code intercept operators. Fort Devens
told the research units to make do with what they already had.
We could feel the concept of the war changing. We were told we
were going back on the defensive once again. After Tet, the Viet
Cong became less important. Most VC units ceased to exist after
the fighting ended. Countrywide, more than 38,000 enemy soldiers
died; 7,000 became POWs. The NVA regulars who did not take part
in the fighting in great numbers became the predominant fighting
force.
More than 400 Viet Cong died in front of our bunker line. More
than 960 Viet Cong died around the LBJ perimeter during the first
18 hours of the Tet Offensive of 1968. Viet Cong losses also
included 32 POWs, and another 42 became detainees. The 199th LIB
captured many VC weapons, including 78 semiautomatic and 68
crew-served weapons. Nine members of the 199th LIB died during
the attacks; 55 were wounded. None of the 856th RRD members was
killed or wounded.
Three years after Tet, on March 6, 1971
the 856th RRD was inactivated in Vietnam.
These pictures were sent to me by
"Dave Parks"