LONDON
he dramatic surrender by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic last
month came only three days after the United States and Britain finalized
plans for a massive ground invasion of Kosovo -- code-named "B-Minus" --
to be launched in the first week of September.
Britain had agreed to contribute the largest
contingent of 50,000 troops to the 170,000-strong force -- "almost the
entire British army," said one military source.
Details of the operation were revealed during
a monthlong investigation by the Observer.
The invasion was intended to last six weeks,
ending before the first snowfall of the season. In a series of on-the-record
interviews, senior British military figures disclosed that Britain had
offered the NATO supreme allied commander, Gen. Wesley Clark, 50,000 soldiers
to form the core of the invasion force.
Gen. Sir Charles Guthrie, chief of the British
defense staff, said it would have caused Britain "great difficulty" to
contribute such a large force, but it is "a great credit" to Britain that
it had been in a position to do so.
Gen. Guthrie acknowledged that leaving a formal
NATO decision on ground troops as late as July was making it "jolly tight."
Gen. Guthrie's deputy, Air Marshal Sir John Day, said NATO had been "within
days" of making a formal decision on ground forces and expressed confidence
NATO allies would have agreed.
He disclosed the buildup of NATO forces around
Kosovo's borders, announced on May 25, was a "a subtle way" of both moving
to a full invasion force and cutting the time needed between a formal decision
and the arrival of troops.
Marshal Day and NATO sources believe Mr. Milosevic
had become aware that President Clinton was ready to commit ground forces
when he capitulated. Other NATO sources believe Mr. Milosevic was informed
of U.S. thinking, adding that "two or three incidents" during the war suggest
vital intelligence was passing to Belgrade.
Gen. Guthrie told allies the Serbian army
was "militarily overrated" and described it as "bully boys good at killing
women, children and old people."
Adm. Sir Ian Garnett, director of British
joint operations, said the initial border defenses would have been "a tough
nut to crack," but once the invasion force was inside Kosovo with flatter
ground, the Serbs "would have stood little chance."
He added it would have been vital to invade
before winter because tanks and soldiers would not have been able to maneuver
"wading through snow."
It is also clear for the first time that Gen.
Clark fought an intensive battle with senior figures in the Clinton administration,
especially Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, to win approval for the
ground force.
Gen. Clark appointed a secret planning team
at NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, nicknamed the Jedi Knights, to prepare
options for the ground force. He finally received U.S. approval to send
a heavy engineering brigade to build the key supply routes through Albania
to the Kosovo border, the precondition for a land invasion.
The Jedi Knights relied heavily on British
plans for a ground invasion that the British Ministry of Defense began
drawing up on June 12, 1998. The Ministry of Defense prepared six different
plans of attack, including an option for the full invasion of Serbia itself.
When asked whether Britain had lobbied for
a ground force invasion of Kosovo, Gen. Guthrie conceded: "We were more
forward in our thinking and planning than a lot of people were."
With the approval of the British government,
Gen. Clark was given access to details of the private phone conversations
between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Mr. Clinton to ensure that
he had a full understanding of the thinking of two of the most pivotal
figures in the alliance.
Marshal Day also revealed that senior politicians
from continental Europe, especially the Italians, privately assured the
British that their calls for bombing pauses were for domestic consumption
and did not represent their true private views.
