Pure Politics

Pratice makes perfect when dealing with Iraq

Gwynne Dyer

The Telegram, November 15
 
 

All eight confrontations have been over Saddam�s attempts to stop UNSCOM. There was always a compromise in the end

By my count, this is the eighth �confrontation� between Saddam Hussein�s regime and the United States (with Britain and a few other Western powers in tow) since the Iraqi dictator�s forces were expelled from Kuwait in 1991. If practice makes perfect, they should be about ready for the big time now.

All eight confrontations have been over Saddam�s attempts to stop the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) from eliminating his remaining weapons of mass destruction. But there was always a compromise in the end: Saddam made promises of compliance (which nobody believed), and the inspectors went back to work. This time is different.

In a classic Saddam miscalculation, he banned surprise inspections by UNSCOM in August. Last month, thinking that President Bill Clinton would be so weakened by the mid-term Congressional elections that he could take no action abroad, Saddam raised the stakes by ending all co-operation with UNSCOM inspectors until sanctions are lifted.

Wrong again: the elections were effectively a vote of confidence in Clinton. And that led directly to Wednesday�s urgent withdrawal of all UN personnel from Iraq on what amounts to orders from Washington � which suggests that air strikes are imminent.

Moreover, they may be far heavier than the pinprick raids of the past. The US and British attacks will probably target Iraq�s air defences, suspected strategic weapons, and the Republican Guard, Saddam�s own special troops. But the goal will not really be to get UNSCOM back into operation. Quite the contrary.

Over the past seven years, UNSCOM has done some useful duty. It has destroyed 38,000 shells and bombs loaded with poison gas, and 480,000 litres of chemical warfare agents. It has eliminated 48 ballistic missiles, and has ensured that Iraq�s nuclear weapons programme stays dead. But as Saddam�s regime gradually regained confidence after the shattering defeat of the Gulf War, UNSCOM�s successes have grown fewer and fewer.

 

The goal will not be to get UNSCOM back into operation. Quite the contrary.

It has not managed to track down Iraq�s nerve gas facilities, though it did find hard evidence that the lethal gas has actually been loaded into warheads. It has not found the black hole: 17 tonnes of biological growth medium that would allow the regime to produce three times the quantity of anthrax toxin it has admitted to possessing. And the increasingly defiant behaviour of the Iraqi regime makes it unlikely that it ever could.

Saddam began the last confrontation, in February, by declaring that a number of huge areas around the country were presidential palaces and therefore immune to inspection. The Western allies threatened to rain destruction down on him from the air if he didn�t let the UNSCOM inspectors in. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan flew to Baghdad at the last moment and got Saddam�s agreement to let them visit the palaces if they behaved respectfully and didn�t do it too often.

It was all pure theatre. Saddam was deliberately tweaking the UN�s tail, hoping to split the hawks on the Security Council - the United States and Britain - from the French and Russians, who would really rather end sanctions so they can make pots of money by trading with Iraq.

The United States huffed and puffed, but clearly did not believe that bombs would gain the inspectors entry. And Kofi Annan collected a little diplomatic credit by brokering a deal that gave both sides a pretext to avoid immediate shooting (even though nobody really believed it would be kept).

While Saddam waited for the next opportunity to press his advantage, however, a basic re-think was going on in Washington.

 

The radical solution is to stop trying. Bomb the stuffing out of Iraq�s military the next time Saddam stages a crisis, but accept that the result will be that UNSCOM is never allowed to operate in the country again.

You cannot treat a nation of 20 million with a ruthless dictator like an occupied country (which is what complete freedom of inspection for UNSCOM implies) if you are not willing to commit the troops and actually occupy it. Instead, your unenforceable demands simply give the dictator the ability to stage a crisis whenever he wants � and with each fudged outcome, he erodes your credibility a little more.

The radical solution is to stop trying. Save face by bombing the stuffing out of Iraq�s military the next time Saddam stages a crisis, but accept that the result will be that UNSCOM is never allowed to operate in the country again (for bombing alone cannot bring Saddam to his knees).

You won�t be able to monitor Saddam�s strategic weapons programs directly any more, but it wasn�t working anyway. And if your intelligence is good enough, you still retain the option of bombing any new Iraqi weapons systems before they can be used.

Saddam missed this shift in American thinking. All he saw was growing pressure from France, Russia and China to end sanctions on Iraq, and growing reluctance among his Arab neighbours to provide bases for any further strikes against him. So Saddam, as usual, overplayed his hand.

By openly defying the UN resolution on arms inspection just as his friends on the Security Council were making progress in their campaign to end sanctions, Saddam has infuriated the Russians and French. The Clinton administration delayed its response until after the elections, but it is secretly hugging itself with delight.

It can now counter-balance Saddam�s victory over UNSCOM (which was inevitable in the long run) by a spectacular aerial bombardment of Iraq � and Saddam is so clearly in the wrong in disobeying the Security Council�s resolution on Iraqi strategic weapons that his campaign to end sanctions has been set back for a long time.

Once again, the cleverest fool in the Middle East has walked into it with his eyes wide open. And once again, a lot of Iraqis will suffer: those who die under the bombs, and the far larger number who are dying of disease and malnutrition because of the sanctions. But Saddam himself, of course, will not be hurt at all.

Air strikes had been recalled minutes before they were due to hit the previous day, after Dyer had filed his report. This strategy was the one the US/UK used in December, at the 9th time of asking. Crisis 10 had not arisen in the following two months.
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