Mail.Jewish Mailing List Volume 26 Number 62 Produced: Thu May 22 0:26:00 1997 From: kennethgmiller@juno.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 01:32:35 EDT Subject: What is a Rabbi? For a very long time, I have wondered exactly what is meant by the word "rabbi". Or more precisely, what is the distinction between a person who has "semicha" (ordination), and a person who has not been so ordained? In The Handbook of Jewish Thought, Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan explains that there are two kinds of ordination. The first entitles one to be a member of the Sanhedrin, but he writes (10:39) <<< The traditional ordination was thus abolished in the year 4118 (358 c.e.). The Sanhedrin and other duly constituted courts cannot be established until this ordination is reinstituted. >>> My question concerns the second kind of ordination. Rabbi Kaplan continues (10:40) <<< What is called "ordination" today is not true ordination, but rather a certification that the individual is expert in certain areas of Torah law. Moreover, it implies that he has the permission of his teachers to render public decisions; without such permission it is forbidden. Such ordination, however, in no way implies competence to serve on the Sanhedrin. >>> If other modern authorities hold slightly different views than Rabbi Kaplan, please don't nitpick, as my question will probably still apply. Also, let me point out my guess that when Rabbi Kaplan wrote "certain areas", he was alluding to the idea that even today's "ordination" can be of several types; "Yoreh Yoreh", for example, certifies an individual to rule on ritual law only, while "Yadin Yadin" covers halachic civil law as well. The distinctions do not affect my basic questions. My first question is this: What sorts of decisions can a person render even is he is not ordained? Obviously, semicha is not required for very basic questions, for if it were, all Torah discussion (such as is common on Mail-Jewish) would have to cease. So does anyone explain exactly where the fine line lies? Question two: I have heard from many sources that the Chofetz Chaim was in fact *not* a rabbi, and did *not* have semicha, until very late in his life, well after he had written the Mishna Brurah and most (all?) of his other famous works. (Stories about when and why he finally got that semicha can be posted to another thread.) How can this be? In countless places, the Mishnah Brurah cites a hotly debated question, and then takes it upon himself to render a decision for the public. How does this fit with Question One, above? Some might resolve that contradiction by pointing to the letters which are printed at the beginning of the Mishna Brurah, from Rav Yitzchak Elchanan Spector and other famous sages of the generation, which certify the Mishna Brurah as worthy of being disseminated to the public. Perhaps this is an implicit sort of semicha, as it certifies the author's writings to be a fit source of halachic decisions. But if the Chofetz Chaim felt that way, he would have said so, and not bothered to get an "official" ordination. Or maybe I don't have that story straight. In any case, the people whom I've discussed these questions with are not very bothered by them. I have detected a very blase attitude from many people towards the whole subject of semicha, like it is only for shul rabbis or something. Many years ago, I suffered an almost terminal disillusionment on discovering that my gemara teacher, who I revered and respected, who was referred to as Rabbi So-and-so, whose word I relied upon for major decisions as if he spoke the very Word Of G-d [Why not, that's what rabbis do, isn't it?] --- was actually not a rabbi, had not ever gotten semicha. So Question Three is: Are the sayings and writings of an educated layman different than those of an ordained rabbi? I have always thought (but I've never been able to confirm) that the distinction is when I ask a question, and the person I asked is wrong. If I act on the word of a rabbi who was wrong, then I have done my job, and I have either not sinned at all, or at worst it is considered an "oness", for I was not at all responsible for the sin. But if I am relying on a layman, then I must take responsibility for my actions and bear my sin. Is this correct? Finally, Question Four: Under extreme circumstances, a man can marry a second wife if he has a "Heter Meah Rabanim" - literally, "Permission from a hundred rabbis". If a "rabbi" does not have semicha, can he be one of those hundred? Thank you all for your time and consideration. Akiva Miller (the former Keeves@aol.com) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Mail.Jewish Mailing List Volume 26 Number 63 Produced: Fri May 23 0:23:38 1997 From: dr@socrates.insight.att.com (David Riceman) Date: Thu, 22 May 1997 11:00:22 -0400 (EDT) Subject: the Function of Semicha This is a somewhat confused answer, based solely on memory, because I've had a rather hectic week-and-a-half. The most enlightening discussion I recall on this subject is a response of the Rivash. The gemara says that two types of people destroy the world: those who are moreh horaa (explained below) when they are incompetent, and those who refrain from doing so when they are competent. There are, however, caveats. Even a competent person may not be moreh horaah if he's under forty (with certain unusual exceptions), in the presence of his teacher (without explicit permission), or in the presence of a greater scholar (with lots of exceptions). Presence means a distance of around 10 miles, so these are non-trivial conditions. Semicha is (a) a certification by your teachers that you are competent, and (b) permission by your teachers to be moreh horaah in some version of their presence. This is commonly called yoreh yoreh. Yadin yadin is a different concept. The reish galuta in bavel (and the moral equivalent in eretz yisrael) had the authority to appoint judges (whether through the permission of the gentile rulers or through some purely halachic mechanism is a machlokes rishonim). Yadin yadin is the delegation of the authority to judge (there are lots of details I'm too lazy to go into). In principle a person can neither be moreh horaah nor judge unless he knows the entire corpus of halacha; that principle is almost universally ignored. Being moreh horaah refers specifically to deciding which halacha is applicable to a particular circumstance. There's a machlokes rishonim whether codifying a law has any halachic significance, but it is certainly not the same as being moreh horaah. So that Rabbi Kagan, when he wrote the Mishna Berurah (and several other of his books) was not being moreh horaah. The rabbi who, when asked a particular sheilah, read out the answer straight from the Mishna Berurah, was. I hope this helps. David Riceman (still under forty) ----------------------------------------------------------------------