The Careless Tipple

read on - if you've a thirst for knowledge

Subject: The FAA's 5 percent Solution
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1999 20:25:34 -0500
From: John King <[email protected]>
To: IASA Safety<[email protected]>, Ader <[email protected]>,
"Babin, Jacques" <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" <[email protected]>,
Bert Wertejefelt <[email protected]>, Bill Hogan <[email protected]>, Bob Rowland <[email protected]>,
David Evans <[email protected]>, Edward Block <[email protected]>,
Omega Systems Group Vernon Grose <[email protected]>, Patrick Price <[email protected]>,
res gehriger <[email protected]>, max lenz <[email protected]>,
Paul Koring <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" <[email protected]>,

To all:

Reading the FAA's July 1998 Aging Transport Non-Structural Systems
plan and the FAA's January 1999 MD-11 Airworthiness Directive (AD),
something is missing - references to the TYPE of wire insulation
installed. The 'top concerns' in this 'Systems Plan' focuses only on
the mechanical aspects of wire failures, i.e. "wear limits, split wires,
Circuit breakers". See page 48 of 56 in this document at
http://www.FAA.gov/AVR/AIR/hq/plan_R7C.pdf  

Interestingly, in page 49 of this document, 'database shortcomings'
are mentioned. Indeed they've landed well 'short' when listing smoke-in-the
cockpit incidents. Barely a few dozen back to 1985 can be found and
NONE use the word 'Kapton, Poly-x, etc. See the attachment for a more
complete menu of troubled wire insulation TYPES the FAA will not talk about.

In that AD, you may have noticed the only wires to be inspected are
those readily found when opening a handfull of panels. This does not
address the wires running within the bundles nor the far greater percentage
running through inaccessible areas. I doubt more than 5% of the wires
could ever be seen.

In both these documents, wire TYPE is not being addressed and neither are
the problems of self-ignititing, self-fueling or excessive smoke
generating insulation TYPES determined in those FAA Tech Center Reports.

I call this the FAA's 5% Solution to the problems of Aging Aircraft Wiring.

Regards to all,

John D. King

IASA Safety wrote:

Nick und Rossco
As FAA lic mech JohnDKing points out, the FAA's "initiatives" (i.e.
enforced responses) as a result of the Canadian TSB's great concerns
about their aircraft wiring discoveries have been watered down to specifically:
a. MD11's (an Airworthiness Directive to look at specified wiring
harnesses and panels)
b. wiring installation techniques and practices generally (no specific
mention of Dupont's Kapton or its Raychem alternatives/derivatives)

By artificially re-focussing and generalising concerns, the FAA once
again staves off any day of reckoning with regards to the lethal
properties of particularly inappropriate types of wiring insulation.
This policy perpetuates the deception of the Ageing Aircraft Initiative
(aka the Aging Transport Non-Structural Systems plan ).

It's very much akin to the British government addressing cracked eggs
when the problem was salmonella or transported beef refrigeration when
the problem was BSE's incubation into humans as Creutzfeld-Jacob new
variant disease.

As you know, the FAA has always denied any need to test and certify
wiring types. It has never displayed any concern about wiring as an
accident cause per se. Beyond the mechanical aspects of wiring
degradation/installation (chafeing, nicks and cuts, clamping etc), wire
is just wire.
It is an exercise in pretextual obfuscation and should be condemned as such.

As an interesting sideline, Rossco. Why don't you ring the NSW Fire
Brigade HQ (Statistical Div) and ask what percentage of residential
house fires they attribute to electrical wiring.Then ask them: "Is it
the wire itself? Is it due to the installation? Or is it due to the
insulation and its degradation over time?"

Some day soon the loop will be closed by irrefutable evidence that
wiring insulation can be (and was) a primary aircraft accident cause.
That wiring loop will then become an FAA garotte.

IASA

[email protected] wrote:

Amen, I have been battling the FAA for the last few days on this very issue.
They say they might not allow me to inspect the a/c due to liability issues. I
said I would sign a disclaimer. Not good enough they say. The form that will
be used for the inspections has been in development since 6/98 and was just
finalized to not include type of insulation. I insisted .... they said it would be
cost prohibitive. I said I would do it for free. I said it was also agreed to at
the last Mtg.1/20/99 ...... they said the ATA MTG the next day, they decided only
when a problem with wire shows up will it be identified. I countered by saying that
if they don't know the particular failure modes of the various insulation
types they would not be looking for it. It all boils down to the industry
realizing that if passengers/pilots wise up to the insulation-type issue, they may refuse to
fly those jets. General Electric just sold 42 DC-9s in bulk. They say it is because
of noise requirements by 2000. Type is the genesis to this whole issue. If
they can negate it now, it will never be heard of again. This is the BIG ONE
and I am allowed to pitch my case 3/30/99 to the subcommittee. I need support now.

ED

                                                    (the one that outsold DUFF)

                    (i.e. despite the fact you couldn't care less, it still hits the spot. 

                                   FAA inspectors the World over swear by it).

regards

IASA

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