I. Structure of the Parliament - One or Two Chambers?

Participants discussed the structure of the Parliament and whether a bicameral or a
unicameral Parliament would be more appropriate.  In particular, the discussion included a
broad overview of the merits and limitations of bicameralism.

Arguments in favour of bicameralism suggested were:  Allows for more
comprehensive representation and provides elements which are not present in the
unicameral system because the governement (executive branch) can be helped and
supported by a second chamber; bicameralism assures more sustainibility, especially
in a country which goes through rapid changes; it assures better legislative work and
can be considered as an implementation of the separation of powers idea inside the
parliament by providing guarantees to avoid legislative despotism -- such as may be
the case when the government (executive) has little power toward a unicameral
assembly.

Arguments against bicameralism suggested were:  The necessity of the unitary
character--representation should have as characteristic the peoples’ sovereignty very
simply demonstrated and implemented through a single assembly; the risk of
complicating more the relationship between the parliament and the government;
increased difficulty in the resolution of conflicts that might arise between  two
chambers; in modern democracies,  bicameralism is not to favored because it can
create wholly contradictory political groupings, e.g., you might have a conservative
upper house and liberal lower house; or alternatively they could be exactly the same
and duplicative; bicameralism is a characteristic of a federal state and not necessary
for a unitary state.

One participant expressed concern that a bicameral parliament might slow down the
democratization process and negatively affect the country during its dynamic
transition and swift phases of societal evolution; the participant feared that defining
the authorities of each chamber would take a lot of time and that consensus would
most likely not be reached on the issue.  For this reason, the participant supported
maintaining the current unicameral structure.


II. Number, Composition, and Internal Organization of the Parliament
 
Participants spoke about the organization of Parliament, in particular the functioning and
structure of its leadership (Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson(s)) and the number of
parliamentarians.  Discussion focused also on the impact of internal migration on
representation.  It was stated that the country lacked the necessary tradition regarding the
practical functions of a parliamentary structure.  A participant noted foreign models which
give a lot of authority and permanent responsibilities to the Speaker of Parliament.

It was suggested that the current leadership of one Chairperson [Speaker] and two
Vice-Chairpersons in parliament was functional--although the positions should be
paid at different pay scales.  Another stated that the Chairperson’s position should be
clearly defined in the parliamentary regulations, so as to give the Chairman
permanent duties within the powers granted to him/her.

In relation to the number of deputies, it was suggested that, as in other countries, the
number of representatives should be based on criteria related to the number of
persons living in a particular area.  While at the same time, it was noted by a
participant living outside the capital that population is shifting dramatically due to
rapid urban migration and while a deputy may start with a mandate from a certain
defined population, by the end of his term, he may not represent the same number of
electors and the same type of constituent issues.  Another problem raised was the
alienation of constituents by their deputy once the deputy is provided a home in
Tirana.

III. Definition of Legislative Terms

NGO participants raised the issue of defining legislative terms for members of parliament
and the parliament in general.  Participants noted that recent parliamentary elections were
premature and thus serve as examples of shortened legislative terms.   Furthermore,
participants did not generally support the use of such mechanisms on a routine basis.

Participants argued that shorter terms had a negative impact for the following
reasons:  the costs of elections on the state and political party budgets; and the effect
of new elections on the stability of the nation, the ability of policymakers to realize
commitments, and the normal daily life of citizens.  However, one participant pointed
out that tension is not created by legislative terms, but by political parties whose
maturity is still at an infantile stage.

It was suggested that maintaining the current four-year legislature was in line with
foreign examples and the experience of stable democracies, and that it would provide
the stability to develop policies and a more sophisticated class of politicians.
However, a couple of participants noted that shorter terms could be employed and
that political turnover can have beneficial effects.

With regard to whether there should exist in the Constitution fixed dates as to when to call
the newly elected parliament, participants discussed a couple of concerns.

One participant suggested that  there should be a General Parliamentary
Commission, and the right to “self-call” should be sanctioned to avoid confrontation
in the form of a veto by the heads of state--as in the past of the Republic.

Another person noted that there is a difference between the call of the legislature and
the call of the session. The latter one is fixed, and there should be foreseen a time limit
by which the parliament must issue a “self-call.”
 

IV. Creation of Technical Commissions in Parliament

Participants discussed the parliamentary commission structures.  Participants noted that
commissions could be of both a permanent and temporary nature.

An NGO representative cited the need for permanent technical commissions for issues
such as agricultural, and the creation, as needed, of provisional commissions to
address urgent needs in an area.

One participant noted that technical commissions must exist because each field has its
own specialists.  Another participant felt that the  creation of technical commissions is
not a constitutional issue, but rather a matter for the Regulations of the Parliament.
One participant asserted that, as a rule, technical commissions, when created, exceed
their powers.  Thus, when created, their powers should be clearly defined.
 

V. Compatibility of a Deputy's Mandate with the Post of Minister

Participants addressed the issue of whether the mandate of a deputy was compatible with
holding the post of minister.  Some participants did not find the positions compatible
because it reduces independence of separate powers and creates a conflict of interest for
the individual government representative holding two positions.  One participant supported
the idea of holding both positions, stating that in a parliamentary republic there is not any
conceptual incompatibility.

One constitutional expert cited examples of different countries, those accepting the
two-position system, e.g., Britain, and those finding dual positions incompatible, e.g.,
France. The same participant also noted that the two-position option was equally
accepted in both draft constitutions of 1994--although prepared by two parties with
opposing ideas.


Another participant added that it was imperative that the Constitution specify a
particular option and not leave it open to the political parties as it would be a critical
point of debate. A singular position should be included in the Constitution if the
government is to be under the control of the parliament.

The difference in immunity for a minister and a deputy was noted, as well as the fact
that one person cannot keep both.
 
A participant also raised the issue of the three-position status of the Prime Minister
and that such positions are an extreme burden on one person, giving no chance for
one to perform any of them well.

 A participant also raised the fact that those members of parliament directly elected
by their constituents would be ignoring those votes if its mandate was abandoned.
 

VI. The Right of Legislative Initiative

Participants discussed at length the issue of how broad the legislative initiative should be.
NGO representatives strongly supported the idea that the current subjects possessing the
right of legislative initiative (one deputy of Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the
President, and 20,000 voters) should be expanded to include the right of NGOs to present
laws to the Parliament.  NGOs are a new reality in Albania society.   They serve as
mediators between the governors and their electorate in a functioning democracy, and
participants discussed whether an NGO right to initiate legislation should be reflected in the
Constitution.

Participants pointed out that the Constitution should sanction the right of NGOs to be
heard, and it might be sufficient to include details in the Regulations of the
Parliamentary Commissions on the right of NGOs to express their opinion and be
heard when drafts are presented.

One participant raised that point that if an NGO has 20,000 members, it should have
legislative initiative; while others conceded that past experience showed that raising
20,000 signatures was an extremely hard job, and NGOs should have an easier route
to Parliament.
 
Others noted that the role of NGOs should be promotional, and they should only play
a lobbying role to persuade those with the right of initiative to introduce a draft law.
It was noted that a way for NGOs to more simply introduce their draft law is to get
the support of one deputy.  Thus, the right of initiative of one deputy should be
preserved and would serve NGOs in raising policy alternatives.

An opposing argument given was the fear that each NGO might present a law to
Parliament creating a chaotic situation; at the same time, the participant suggested
limiting also the President’s right of initiative.

 Others supported maintaining the current rights of legislative initiative.


VII. Procedure for Drafting Laws and a Citizen’s Right to Raise Matters in the
Parliament

This issue raised debate not only on the direct issue but also on how detailed the
Constitution should be.  Participants supported the right of citizens presenting a draft law to
be heard, on two levels:  1) the constitutional right of the public to be heard; and 2) the right
to be heard (meaning transparency in the parliament) deriving from the Regulations of
Parliament.  Others debated whether Albanians should be “constitutionalizing” the law -
should all possible procedures of law be included in the Constitution.  One person made the
point that this issue should definitely resolved in the Constitution and that an appropriate
place for the right of citizens to be heard would be in the chapter on Human Rights and
Freedoms.  It was also added that NGO participation should also be referred to with regard
to a citizen’s right to be heard.

VIII. Organization and Proclamation of a Referendum

The participants debated the need for the referendum, its status with regard to other laws,
and criteria on which it should be used.  Most participants agreed that referendums should
only be used in resolving major issues and in the case of the Constitution.

Participants stated the Constitution should clearly define when, on what issues, and
who has the right to call a referendum. Others stated that only referendum criteria,
rather than a specification of issues, should be provided for in the Constitution.

Some participants supported the need to give a referendum a priority role, and it’s
power to prevent parliament from supporting a law in contravention of the result of a
referendum should be defined.
 
Others suggested that a referendum should only play an advisory role, noting that
referendums always contain the danger of populism by politicians. In a parliamentary
state, it was noted that the priority should go to the law and, the referendum comes
after, having a counseling character.  For example, it can be used in an advisory role
to address conflicts which arise, such as for the form of regime addressed in June
1997.

Participants also discussed the need to clearly define whether a referendum will have
a mandatory or counseling effect, and who will put a referendum into legal effect,
such as in the case when parliament takes the decision, its proclamation is made by
the President.

IX.  Approval and Amendment of the Constitution

The participants discussed the procedure to adopt and amend the constitution.  Many of the
experts agreed that the current draft Constitution should pass from the Constitutional
Commission to the Parliament and then to the referendum.

In order to increase longevity, participants discussed whether it should be approved in
the subsequent parliament by a simple majority (50%+1).  Participants expressed
concern that the subsequent parliament may later  try to narrow rights in the
Constitution.  Others feared the same and suggested it explicitly state that no changes
toward narrowing rights should be made.

An NGO representative suggested that the Constitution should not be held as a
hostage; the Party in power and the Opposition should sit down and discuss about
some particular issues, otherwise, if no consensus is reached, it passes to referendum.
It was agreed by another that other options should exist, giving possibility of
employing public tests in case politicians do not find suitable solutions.
 

X. Sovereignty

Participants agreed that the issue of sovereignty was important with relation to Albania and
its ratification of international treaties.  Participants agreed that the Constitution should
address the issue of whether to recognize the supremacy of international agreements and
laws and the need to pass implementing legislation when required by international law.

Participants noted the importance of international legal obligations and the need to
meet international standards of developed countries. One participant raised the issue
of  legislative vacuum--as in the case of the Constitutional Court operating without
the proper law even though it is expressly required in the Constitution.  The operation
of the Council of Ministers was also cited as not possessing a detailed  law although
contemplated in the Constitution.

A number of rights enshrined in the Constitution are not treated in other legal acts.
Participants noted that if Albania wants to adhere to conventions, it must not only
sign the convention but also it must assure its proper implementation.


 Participants in the Focused Discussion Groups  Legislative Powers
 March 19-20, 1998, Tirana


NGO Representatives
 
1.  Foundation for Reconciliation of Disputes
     Tomi Treska/Professor and Lawyer

2.  Young Lawyers Association
     Naim Isufi/Lawyer

3.  National  Union of Albanian Farmers
     Nesti Zoi/agronomist

4.  Union of Vlora Intellectuals
     Ylli Lalo/Oil Engineer
     Dhionis Andoni/Marine Officer
     Mihallaq Argjiri/Oil Engineer

5. Assistance Center of Business Associations/Korca
    Kostika Roco

6. Aquarius
    Adrian Vaso/Manager

7. Albanian Helsinki Committee
    Arben Puto / Historian

8. Center for Economic and Social Studies
    Ilir Gëdeshi / Economist
    Ejonta Pashaj/Economist
    Etleva Dashi / Economist

9. Foundation “For Juridical Culture”
    Ilir Dhima/Executive Director

Specialist

10. Luan Omari
      Lawyer/Public Law
      (Foundation for Juridical Culture)

11. Jusuf Alibali
      Lawyer/History of State and  the Law
      (Law Office of Jusuf Alibalit)
12. Ylvi Myrtja
      Lawyer
      (Secretary of National Chamber of Advocates)

13. Njazi Jaho
      Lawyer/Panelist
      (Albanian Helsinki Committee)

14.  Vjollca Mecaj
      Lawyer/Notary
      (Women Lawyers Association)

15.  Arta Mandro
       Lawyer/Professor at the
       University of Tirana, Law Faculty

16.  Paskal Haxhi
       Ministry of Justice
       In charge of “Drejtësia”
 
17.  Artan Hoxha
       Consultant in Economics Executive Director, Institute of Contemporary Studies
 
18.  Elio Mazreku
       Lawyer/Environment & Penal Law, “Aquarius” Association
 
19. Teuta Dilo
      Rector of the University of Elbasan

20. Banush Mezini
      Rector of the University of Gjirokastra

21. Aurela Anastasi
      Lawyer/Professor at the University of Tirana,
      Law Faculty

22. Vladimir Molla
      Judge/District Court of Korca

23. Blerta Kraja
      Lawyer/Journalist

Government Officials

24. Kristaq Traja
      Technical Staff for Drafting the Constitution

25. Genti Ibrahimi
      Legal Advisor at Ministry of Leg. Ref.

26. Andrea Lako
      Legal Advisor at Ministry of Leg. Ref.

27. Sokol Berberi
      Staff Lawyer of Albanian Parliament
 
Representatives of Political Parties

28. Petrit Kalakula
      Right Democratic Party

Observers

29. Council of Europe
      Giovanni Favilli

30. International Republican Institute
      Eric Heighberger