Those dissatisfied with the decisions of a public body can use judicial review ('JR') to determine whether something illegal, irrational or unfair occurred in the decision-making process.
JR has been used against taxation authorities, the media, utilities
and financial service regulators (the BCC, the DGES, SIB, PIA, Pensions
Ombudsman and SFO), professional bodies (the Law Society, ICCA, Bar Council,
medical, pharmaceutical and dentists' bodies), bodies awarding licences,
franchises and grants, and various government departments and agencies
engaged in regulation (DGFT, MMC).
The public/private divide
Judicial review is only available in respect of public law matters.
Yet it may be an abuse of court to use private law where the issue under
challenge is properly amenable to review. Much time and money has been
spent re-drawing the procedural dividing line, but recent cases (British
Steel, Mercury, Sheffield CC) all suggest that where the issues savour
of private law rights (in restitution, or to a salary or grant, upon satisfaction
of certain conditions), the courts will no longer force parties up the
public law route. However, JR may still offer advantages.
Public law bodies
The exercise of statutory functions, or functions which are 'governmental', will be reviewable. Statutory underpinning (eg mere acknowledgement of the existence of some non-statutory body) may suffice. The absence of any real choice but to submit to a non-statutory body's jurisdiction, if one wants to do business, may also suffice.
The adventitious existence of an apparently private body who is, in fact, willing to perform a governmental function, ought not to prevent JR, especially since arguably public functions are increasingly carried out by bodies constituted in private law. It has even been suggested that privatised utilities may be amenable to JR, in some respects.
Regardless of the particular function being challenged, the existence
of a contractual remedy against a body may preclude JR (eg Lloyd's, the
Insurance Ombudsman), while providing remedies against unfairness in private
law. But the Ross proceedings showed that non-members of SROs needed further
protection through JR and the same would apply to any member suggesting
that a regulatory body's rules were themselves, ultra vires.
The Public Law Domain
The challenged decision must also be in the public domain and not about
aspects of a public body's 'everyday' decisions about employees, contractual
powers etc. Therefore in Cobleigh, the Council's refusal to sell land was
not amenable to review.
Locus standi and capacity
The case of 'Brake' makes it likely that no legal personality is required. Anyone who has 'a sufficient interest' may commence JR. An applicant does not have to show the kind of damage required for contract, property or negligence cases. Types of connection found sufficient range from moral and public-spirited concerns, to geographical, financial and competitive interests. The recent Dixon case held that even if the applicant had no greater interest than members of the general public, he would not thereby lack standing. The threshold for locus at the leave stage is set only so high so as to prevent abuse. Only having 'no interest whatsoever' justifies the denial of leave. If an arguable case of misuse of power is made out at the leave stage, the court's only concern is to ensure that it is not being done for an ill motive. The nature and strength of the interest may be more relevant in the court's approach to the grant of relief.
Third parties may also get involved, if they are 'directly affected'
(see Muldoon for circumstances in which the Minister was not allowed to
intervene) and may put in evidence and make submissions. Typically, third
parties benefiting from a decision, now under challenge by a disgruntled
competitor, might intervene in this way.
Advantages – speed, flexibility and negotiating power
•Proceedings last 18 months on average, but may be completed within
a very short time in an urgent case. The decision in the Datafin case took
from 24 November (Take-over Panel's decision) to 5 December 1986 (decision
of the CA). •A written application and an affidavit are all that is needed
to apply for leave. •The procedural regime under Order 53 RSC is flexible:
proceedings may be continued as if begun by writ, and there is scope for
expedition, discovery and cross-examination. Interim relief principles
are also developing quickly. •Partial relief may be given, including severance.
Sometimes a judge will make it clear that illegality has occurred, but
relief will be denied, so that the accrued effects of the decision are
not overturned, but the law is clarified for the future (Argyll). •Furthermore,
'friendly' actions are not unknown, where the parties co-operate to obtain
clarification of ambiguous legislation. •Security for costs has recently
been obtained by a pharmaceutical body, when it was challenged on a statutory
appeal (Kansal). •The equivalent of a strike-out application exists by
way of an application to set aside leave, if the respondent establishes
that the application will clearly fail at the full hearing. Luton BC recently
succeeded in overturning leave for a taxi driver who had argued Article
30 grounds, with regard to the refusal of a licence. The council's policy
could not possible amount to a quantitative restriction because it applied
to all traders, regardless of their origins. •The stakes are often so high
that it is worth commencing proceedings, notwith-standing that the number
of successful applications at the final hearing stage is lower than in
other fields involving JR. •Interestingly, the percentage of successful
leave applications is higher than the average. Getting past the leave hurdle
can often provide useful publicity for commercial entities. •Many applications
are eventually withdrawn after leave is granted, as a result of further
negotiations, although an applicant's costs are not always allowed simply
because the respondent has changed its mind (see Church of Scientology).
Disadvantages – time limits, good faith requirement, alternative remedies, unpredictability and futility
•The maximum 3-month time limit and the law on what qualifies as a prompt
application, mean that applications must be commenced quickly. Niche expertise
and attention to detail can be costly in large and complicated matters.
•The effect of delay on third parties (or the administration) will influence
the court in either extending the time limit for good reason, or declining
leave on the grounds of lack of promptness. Delay proved fatal, notwithstanding
the likelihood of illegality, in the DTF case. There, a highly arguable
challenge to the Milk Marque Scheme would have had far-reaching consequences.
Even though the application was made just within the time limit, leave
was refused. Conversely, in the NFU case, where UK regulations concerning
quota were found to be unlawful and disproportionate under EU law, the
claims were out of time. The case proceeded because it was held that the
grant of relief would not inevitably cause chaos in the industry. •The
requirement, at the leave stage, of utmost good faith, upon affidavit,
puts a heavier burden of disclosure on the applicant and his advisers than
would be the case at a similar stage in private law proceedings. •Alternative
remedies must usually be exhausted first, partly in order to reflect Parliament's
intention that specialist bodies should control specific types of disputes,
and partly to keep the JR lists moving (see Capti-Mehmet). This may prove
particularly difficult to surmount in taxation matters, or where Parliament
has provided procedures for appealing against regulators' findings. •A
party can succeed at the leave stage, and at the full hearing, but still
be denied a remedy, in the court's discretion. •Even more frustrating must
be to obtain a remedy, and then find that the public body makes the same
decision second time around, on lawful grounds or by way of a fairer procedure.
This happened in the Tobacco Securities case where the company established
that it had not been given an adequate chance to make representations as
to why its manufacture of oral snuff sachets should be continued. The ban
was confirmed later, after the medical evidence relied on by the authorities
had been properly disclosed. •Interim relief is very rarely granted, even
where a decision as to the legality of UK or EU legislation depends on
a reference to the ECJ. A recent example where the applicant failed in
this regard is British Telecommunications plc. The court took into account
that BT was a hugely successful company and that its losses, if the national
regulations remained in force, pending a ruling, would only dent, rather
than destroy it. •Further, it is very unusual for a JR court to award damages
at the final hearing, unless the wrong made out is a breach of EU law (in
Francovich circumstances) or some other private law wrong, such as a recognised
tort or trespass.
Recent examples of JR in the commercial arena
Illegality
In International Traders' Ferry Ltd, the company established that a decision to reduce police presence in a port area suffering disturbance, was unlawful, because it amounted to a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on exports under EU law. The CA held, however, that proper policing was obviously an aspect of public policy and that even if the police had acted in contravention of Article 34 or disproportionately, they were entitled to rely on Article 36.
Unreasonableness
In IFA's Association, pensions mis-selling guidance from the SIB was challenged for unreasonableness. The application was dismissed because it was not possible to say that the guidance required IFA's members to take action which would invalidate their liability insurance. Later, in a JR of the PIA's implementation of the SIB's guidance, the court held that since the PIA has such wide discretion in deciding what it should do in the interests of the industry, and given the crisis brought about by the mis-selling scandal, it was difficult, if not impossible, to say that the regulator had acted irrationally (Lucas Fettes).
Irrelevant considerations
In Kingston upon Hull, the Minister had purported to establish the outer estuarine limits of the Humber and Severn Estuaries under UK Waste Water Regulations. The decision-maker had asked himself whether secondary sewage treatment would be an appropriate use of resources and then moved the boundary to give effect to his conclusion that it would not. The court held that salinity was a relevant consideration, but that costs consequential upon the designation were not.
Fairness
In Paddock, the court held that giving 6 days' notice to street traders of a hearing to investigate corruption allegations was not unfair. Adequate notice depended on the extent of the issues and evidence to be canvassed. In this case the applicants had had notice of the case against them for 2 years and had known for one month that they risked disqualification from trading.
In Milner, the court again considered the requirements of natural justice by reference to the nature and effect of the decision being challenged. The determination of this particular body was not a finding of wrongdoing, or a punishment, nor did it revoke some long-standing right of the applicant related to his livelihood. It merely frustrated the applicant's ambition to specialise in plastic surgery, without rendering him jobless. In the circumstances, the duty of confidentiality owed to professional referees was not to be overridden.
In Moore, a FHSA refused to accept written representations from doctors about an application to open a chemist's shop nearby, notwithstanding the fact that the relevant regulations required the authority to have regard to any available information it considered relevant. A further regulation gave a right to anyone who thought they may be affected by such sales, to make written representations. The court held it was so obvious that the doctors' views would be relevant, that any opinion to the contrary, might well be regarded as perverse. Given the fact that the doctors would lose the right to provide a pharmacy themselves, if the chemists' applications were accepted, no-one with any sense of fairness could refuse to consider their information.
Legitimate Expectation
In Unilever plc, the Revenue had allowed a company to operate an extra-statutory
procedure for the assessment of company profits which had worked harmoniously
for many years. Suddenly the Revenue objected that no claim for loss relief
had been made within 2 years of the end of the accounting period, as required
by statute, and refused in its discretion to allow relief to be claimed
out of time. The court held that the rejection of the company's claims
was so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power and irrationality.
Conclusions
JR is specially significant for business, industry and the professions, because of the increase in regulation of these sectors, and because it provides a weapon for use by or against competitors. Courts tend to take a strict approach to allegations of illegality, a flexible one to procedural fairness cases, and a more generous approach to respondents challenged on the basis of unreasonableness. Arguments in favour of a generous approach are that regulators must act with speed and certainty, and that even the possibility of recourse to the courts creates lack of confidence in the market. These have not found favour, so far as amenability to review is concerned, but they have affected the courts' approach to discretionary matters, such as the implications of delay, the grant of interim and final relief and, of course, costs.
Even an unsuccessful JR may have a significant ripple effect, and the procedure should be regarded as part of the extended armoury of every litigator.
Belinda Schwehr – Rowe & Maw's Public Law Group
This article first appeared in the October 1997 issue of The In-House Lawyer, published by Legalease.
© Rowe & Maw 1997