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Michael Kadish
4/16/95
.7
When the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is taught in school, it is virtually always approached from the same angle. America was an innocent bystander, a country that had chosen to remain out of the fight. A vicious, deliberate, and total surprise bombing suddenly "blasted" the United States into a determined war effort with but one senator opposing the entry . The attack is viewed by many to be so gruesome as to rationalize the later atrocity of dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While the A-bomb attacks have often since been detailed and debated, many of the circumstances surrounding Pearl Harbor have been forgotten. America was hardly the sheep it pretended to be. The U.S.'s story left some definite problems in this tragedy that may indicate the attack was not just an evil Japanese plot, but possibly a conspiracy in which America took part.
The recording of Pearl Harbor's place in history, and the view of it in most people's minds, was probably best stated by Franklin D. Roosevelt himself in a speech made the next day, December 8, 1941. "It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days, or even weeks, ago. During the intervening time, the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the U.S. by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace." In truth, many parts of this quote are quite ironic, as quite the opposite occurred.
Yes, the distance was, as F.D.R. pointed out, substantial, but not in the manner implied. The distance from Japan to Pearl Harbor is and was approximately 4,000 miles, or four days by submarine . It is very interesting that the Japanese were able to bomb and surprise so many soldiers and ships. Why was the territorial Naval Base of a peaceful nation so thriving with troops and ships so close to international waters? Were the Japanese concerned that one of the most powerful nations declaring itself neutral suddenly amassed a huge number of troops and ships within a four day striking range? Amazingly, we appeared to be very prepared to be unready for the destruction of 188 aircraft, 18 major ships and 2500+ casualties . This put the United States in a Catch 22. If we were able to sustain that much damage, something must have been in the planning stages to use that high a number of troops. After all, it was only a four day voyage from the U.S. to Japan as well. We conceivably had set up the problem, yet the Japanese are blamed.
Throughout the war propaganda was used by both sides. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, India, Singapore and Australia feared being bombed, while only Singapore had an historical excuse to be scared. While its Axis allies were attacking all nations in a quest for world domination, Japan throughout history would offensively only attack Oriental countries. Bombing the U.S.led to an international fear of the Japanese.
America had also fallen in the trap of persecuting, fearing, and hating the Japanese. Life magazine wrote of the typical Japanese as "a funny little creature with buck teeth, strutting arrogantly over the map of Asia, a silly grin on his inscrutable face, with horn-rimmed glasses covering slanted slits of eyes." We also created the infamous not-quite-concentration-but-internment camps. We were doing our best to make Japan look like evil aliens, caricaturizing them all, even the civilian children.
Why was America preparing to be at war not only physically, but also emotionally? Obviously our abundance of troops could be explained as an end to the Great Depression, but the U.S., a neutral nation, had no need to focus on creating "magic." "Magic" was the code name for decoded Japanese messages. The Japanese had an incredibly intricate code "purple" which, according to records released in the last twenty years, we had already broken before well before we went to war. We already knew military secrets, but what could we do with them? F.D.R. had started out with a laissez faire policy, but by 1940 was already highly against the Nazis and its Axis allies. We were of course supporting the Allies, giving arms to Britain and China, and then freezing Japanese assets and creating an embargo. We jumped slowly, getting ready to be called into war, each jump upward lowered the Depression but pushing us forward into war.
Obviously the administration's foremost goal was to destroy the worst depression ever seen and, as has been shown since, military build-up is a temporarily successful act to meet such a goal. With our neutral stance becoming more and more of a charade, two Japanese ambassadors, Saburo Kurushu and Kichisaburo Namura, were called to negotiate with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Most historians agree that the Japanese leader at the time, Prince Konoye, genuinely wished for peace and thought that America was too powerful a nation to fight.
However, midway through the discussions, two important events occurred. First, Admiral Yamoto conceived the top secret Pearl Harbor plans. This extreme action was only to be used if the peace talks were unsuccessful. In addition, Prince Konoe was replaced by General Hideki Tojo, who most historians agree was more than ready ready to use the Pearl Harbor back up plan in first string.
Several messages deciphered through "magic" at this time made the U.S. aware that Japan was ready to bomb an island. The unknown was which one. Most American leaders assumed that in all probability, it would be the American-owned Phillipines, due to its short distance from Japan.
Another good bet was that the most powerful American leaders--F.D.R.; Truman; Hull; Harry Hopkins, an advisor; Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior; General Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff; and Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, were all very strong supporters of one of the three sides of the war issue. Those three choices included: 1) simply build up the military but do not risk lives; just kill the Depression. 2) Build up the army and prepare to go to war, or 3) Sit on the exact middle of the fence and let the wind and gravity eventually pull the country in. It is logical that most believed in number three, as that would be most helpful to the world and eventually accepted by this country. We would only fight if we did not throw the first punch. Therefore, we were waiting for some kind of attack.
This would have worked well, except that we were preparing to be punched in the Phillipines. Instead, the U.S. troops were stealthily, painfully, accurately, and quickly kicked at Pearl Harbor. Evidence shows we were not surprised at being bombed. F.D.R. was having dinner with friends when the bombing orders first came off the wire. Some of those present at that dinner remember him turning to them and saying, "This means war." This would sound ominous, except that the dinner was on the sixth of December! Nothing was done about the report, however.
In addition, there were three unusual "false alarms." The Fleet Commander at Pearl Harbor received a message saying midget submarines were approaching. It was quickly assumed to be a false alarm. Then blips appeared on the radar screen. Those were soon explained as being Flying Fortresses and also were ignored. When the fist wave of bombers approached, they were not intercepted by General Marshall. Then, much too late to prevent the massive destruction and deaths, General Marshall shouted something interesting. Grabbing the microphone, he yelled, "Air raid Pearl Harbor! This is no drill!"
One would have assumed that the Japanese would surely have found such a major American fleet fight ready, but as Commander Mitsuo Fuchida said as he saw nothing but the sunlight, "Tora, Tora, Tora!" Translated, that means "Tiger, Tiger, Tiger!" Deciphered, it reported that indeed the Japanese attack caught the U.S. by surprise.
The Japanese may not have expected to be able to take the Americans by surprise, but it was not surprising they found us asleep. "A Japanese attack on Hawaii is regarded as the most unlikely thing in the world, with one chance in a million being successful," it had been reported on September 6, 1941, in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.
Such a statement implied not only was the U.S. assuming the Hawaiian Islands would be safe, but also it expected an attack on the Phillipines. Not only were we expecting the Phillipines to get hit, we wanted it. We were sure that those Islands were the target, and indeed they may have originally been. It was relatively close to Japan and the people are Oriental. Remember that in the past, Japan had only hit Oriental nations. The U.S., although aware of that fact, apparently forgot that Japan's attack rule was only used in offensive measures.
Before "magic" received the wire, we were sending arms, planes, and ships to the Phillipines, and evacuating many. This trick worked well when tried in Europe. The battle eventually had a movie made about it and is often mentioned in bloopers and blunders books, but the trick failed miserably in Japan. They realized the islands were deserted and instead went after those whom they feared--the GIs. Thus, to the Japanese, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a defensive tactic.
One common pattern stands out in this war. The Axis always seemed to take the high road, while the Allies took the low road. We were not above taking a corpse and turning it into a soldier. They would aim at the soldiers rather than the artillery. We would then expose how they created and tortured a scapegoat when we in fact had done the same. We would expose the horrors of their war tactics, yet we bombed civilians with the A-bomb and fire-storm bombed the German population. We pretended not to notice our economic success; they started the war calling it the end of their economic failures. The Japanese would, if called on, fly Kamikazes, while we were arguing with Britain who should make the dangerous raids. European Axis had kept the skins of its European trophies, giving the meaty colonies to Japan. Although we just kept storming them and hoping for success.
So, what do all these questions mean? We who believe in conspiracies hold Pearl Harbor up there with with J.F.K., Vietnam, and Roswell. Pieced together, here is a scenario of the tragedy. Wanting desperately to end the Depression, our military is enlarged. We lean more and more towards war. Japan watches as America, starting neutral, turns into a bully. First, arms are sent to the Allies; then assets of the Axis powers are frozen. Demanding to know what further steps will be taken, Japan sends two ambassadors to negotiate with the perceived bully. Not initially wanting to pick a fight, they nevertheless see Americans begin to treat the Japanese with disdain and turn them into scapegoats. American troops are deployed ever closer, inching towards Japan.
Meanwhile, the Americans appear to await eagerly the "inevitable" war but still refuse to throw the first punch. hoping to destroy the bully analogy. The Phillipine Islands are basically offered to the Japanese as a bombing target in order to allow the U.S. to enter the war without many casualties.
The Japanese, however, saw where the human threat to Japan lied--Hawaii. General Marshall realizes the tactical mistake but cannot prepare the troops in time. Japan, without realizing it, prepares what becomes an incredible surprise attack. Proud of their good fortune, Japan bombs away and essentially destroys the entire fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor.
The United States, having lost face, turns to shaming the Japanese and resorts to name calling in an attempt to justify all further actions against Japan. Japan is presented as back-stabbing- cheaters not playing by the rules which the U.S. had in fact established. The glory for the United States comes four years after the disgrace and devastation at Pearl Harbor. The moral of all this? Must be to play dirty.
Mr. O'Conner 4/5/95 Jacksonville Florida 3:02 PM
Prange, Gordon W., et al. Dec.7 1941 The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988, p. 392.
Kimmett, Larry and Regis, Margaret. The Attack on Pearl Harbor. Seattle: Navigator Publishing, 1991, p. 28
Ibid., p.126.
West, W.J. Orwell: The War Commentaries. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, p. 11.
Bachrach, Deborah. Pearl Harbor: Great Mysteries Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc., 1989, p.18
Ibid., p.26
Deighton, Len. Blood, Tears, and Folly. New York: HarperCollins, 1993, p.222
Bacher, p.13