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The definition of usefulness proves tricky, in many ways similar to the definition of CAUSE. If we accept the doctrine of universal causation, then, by our previous definition, one must accept the doctrine of Universal Usefulness, that is, that everything is useful for anything. Though perhaps irrefutable, this is an absurb statemtnt. A dead dog may indeed be useful for the purposes of extinguishing a forest fire. It it's effect is so minute that it would be ridiculous to attempt to use the canine carcass forth purposes of firefighting. The distinction lies, as we shall see later, in much the same place that the distinction between REMOTE CAUSE and IMMEDIATE CAUSE exists.
(may in fact mirror its causal cousin.)
But first we must return to the task at hand. The most acceptable way of defining USEFULNESS, rather than the previously attempted "positive" defining method, would seem to a a list of criteria to judge whether something is ueful or not.
A primary characteristic of a USEFUL thing would be APPLICATION. (applied usefulness). This would include objects (and ideas, see later paragraph) that could be forced to act upon something else, causing a response. In short, the applied usefulness of an object is it's ability to cause.
Example: For the purposes of freeway construction, a dead dog would have no use. Others may find use for it, but we must consider USE as divisible into seperate universes within a universe. SOmething can, obviously, be more useful for one thing than another. The dog, for instance, could be used for food to feed the workers, or as fuel to burn to power the equipment-
REMOTE application can be used to decide if somethingi sueful or not. If someting has only the power to cause something REMOTELY, (think of Copi's remote cause), then we could define it as not useful. For instance, the birth of a child may ahve motivated one of the workers to become a low-wage worker, paving the way for cheaper and hence more efficient construction. But the brith did no actual work on the freeway. It merely virtually (distantly) caused the worker to seek cheap employment. THe infant's birht is not a direct cause of the freeway's construciton.
In the same manner, the advent of some mythical, cheaply produced food may allow the construction workers to perform more efficiently in their duties, but it does not physically cause the construciont. One can say that anything in the past helped the construcition of the freeway. After all, blahblah....an endless course of nonsense could ensue.
And there is no refuting such ideas, at least in the context of the laws of universal causation. We must therefore make a distinction between "remotely useful" things and "truely useful" things.
A worker could eat a hearty supermeal, allowing him to work for day unrested. He uses a mgnetic hoe to smooth and add more pavement to the freeway. The food obviously aids in construction, but it is not "useful" for the sake of our definition.
That having been accomplished, we return to our origional goal-