The law of nations is a law of sovereigns. In free states, such as ours, the sovereign or supreme power resides in the people. In free states, therefore, such as ours, the law of nations is the law of the people. Let us again beware of being misled by an ambiguity, sometimes, such is the structure of language, unavoidable. When I say that, in free states, the law of nations is the law of the people; I mean not that it is a law made by the people, or by virtue of their delegated authority; as, in free states, all municipal laws are. But when I say that, in free sates, the law of nations is the law of the people; I mean that, as the law of nature, in other wards, as the will of nature's God, it is indispensably binding upon the people, in whom the sovereign power resides; and who are, consequently, under the most sacred obligations to exercise that power, or to delegate it to such as will exercise it, in a manner agreeable to those rules and maxims, which the law of nature prescribes to every state, for the happiness of each, and for the happiness of all. How vast - how important - how interesting are these truths! They announce to a free people how exalted their rights; but at the same time, they announce to a free people how solemn their duties are. If a practical knowledge and a just sense of these rights and these duties were diffused among the citizens, and properly impressed upon their minds ; how great, how beneficial, how lasting would be their fruits! But, unfortunately, as there have been and there are, in arbitrary governments, flatterers of princes; so there have been and there are, in free governments, flatterers of the people. One distinction, indeed, is to be taken between them. The latter herd of flatterers persuade the people to make an improper use of power, which of right they have: the former herd persuade princes to make an improper use of power, which of right they have not. In other respects both herds are equally pernicious. Both flatter to promote their private interests: both betray the interests of those they flatter. It is of the highest, and, in free states, it is the most general importance, that the sacred obligation of the law of nations should be accurately known and deeply felt. Of all subjects, it is agreeable and useful to form just and adequate conceptions; but of these especially, which have an influence on the practice and morality of states. For it is a serious truth, however much it has been unattended to in practice,that laws of morality are equally strict with regard to societies, as to the individuals of whom the societies are composed. It must be owing either to ignorance, or to a very unjustifiable disregard to this great truth, that some transactions of public bodies have often escaped censure, nay, have sometimes received applause,though those transactions have been such, as none of the individuals composing those bodies would have dared to introduce into the management of his private affairs . . . .

Opinions concerning the extent of the law of nations have not been less defective and inadequate, than those concerning its origin and obligatory force. Some seem to have thought, that this law respects and regulates the conduct of nations only in their intercourse with each other. A very important branch of this law - that containing the duties which a nation owes itself - seems to have escaped their attention." the general principle," says Burlamaqui,"of the law of nations, is nothing more than the general law of sociability, which obliges nations to the same duties as are prescribed to individuals. Thus the law of natural equality, which prohibits injury and commands the reparation of damage done; the law of beneficence, and fidelity to engagements, are laws respecting nations, and imposing, both on the people and on their respective sovereigns, the same duties are prescribed to individuals." Several other writers concerning the law of nations appear to have formed the same imperfect conceptions with regard to its extent. Let us recur to what the law of nature dictates to an individual. Are there not duties which he owes to himself? Is he not obligated to consult and promote his preservation, his freedom, his reputation, his improvement, his perfection, his happiness? Now that we have seen the law of nature as it respects the duties of individuals, let us see the law of nations as it respects the duties of states, to themselves: for we must recollect that the law of nations is only the law of nature judiciously applied to the conduct of states. From the duty of states, as well as of individuals, to themselves, a number of corresponding rights will be found to arise.

A state ought to attend to the preservation of its own existence. In what does the existence of the state consist? It consists in the association of the individuals,m of which it is composed. In what consists the preservation of this existence? It consists in the duration of that association. When this association is dissolved, the state ceases to exist; though all the members,of whom it was composed, may still remain. It is the duty of the state, therefore, to preserve this association undissolved and unimpaired. But this, as in many other instances, a difference between the nature of states and the nature of individuals will occasion, for the reasons already mentioned, a proportioned difference in the application of the law of nature. Nations, as well as men, are taught by the law of nature, gracious in its precepts, to consider their happiness as the great end of their existence . . . .

As it is, in general, the duty of the state to preserve itself; so it is in general, its duty to preserve its members. It owes it to them, because their advantage was the final cause of their joining in the association, and engaging to support it; and they ought not to be deprived of this advantage, while they fulfill the conditions, on which it was stipulated. This duty the nation owes to itself, because the loss of its members is a proportionable loss to its strength; and the loss of its strength is proportionably injurious both to its security, and to its preservation . . . .

When a nation has a right, and is under an obligation to preserve itself and its members; it has, by a necessary consequence, a right to do everything , which, without injuring others, it can do, in order to accomplish and secure those objects. The law of nature prescribes no impossibilities: it imposes not an obligation, without giving a right to the necessary means of fulfilling it. The same principles, which it lawfully may,for the preservation of itself and of its members, evince its right, also to avoid and prevent, as much as it lawfully may, everything which would load it with injuries, or threaten it with danger.

It is the right, and generally it is the duty, of the state, to form a constitution, to institute civil government, and to establish laws. If the constitution formed, or government instituted, or the laws established shall, on experience, be found weak, or inconvenient, or pernicious; it is the right, and it is the duty of the state to strengthen, or alter, or abolish them . . . .

A nation ought to know itself. It ought to form a just estimate of its own situation, both with regard to itself and to its neighbors. It ought to learn the excellences, and the blemishes likewise of its own constitution. It ought to review the instances in which it has already attained, and it ought to ascertain those in which it falls short of, a practicable degree of perfection. It ought to find out what improvements are peculiarly necessary to be promoted, and what faults it is peculiarly necessary to avoid. Without a discriminating sagacity of this kind, the principle of imitation, intended for the wisest purposes in states as well as individuals, would be always an uncertain, sometimes a dangerous guide. A measure extremely salutary to one state, might be extremely injurious to an other, What in one situation, would be productive of peace and happiness, might, in another, be unfortunate cause of infelicity and war. Above all things, the genius and manners of the people ought to be carefully consulted. The government ought to be administered agreeably to this genius and these manners; but how can this be done, if this genius and these manners are unknown? This duty of self-knowledge is of vast extent and of vast importance, in nations as well as in men.

To love and deserve honest fame, is another duty of a people, as well as of an individual. The reputation of a state is not only a pleasant, it is also a valuable possession. It attracts the esteem, it represses the unfriendly inclinations of its neighbors. This reputation is acquired by virtue, and by the conduct which virtue inspires. It is founded on the public transactions of the state, and on the private behavior of its members . . . .

Happiness is the centre, to which men and nations are attracted: it is, therefore, the duty of a nation to consult its happiness. In order to do this, it is necessary that the nation be instructed to search for happiness where happiness is to be found. The impressions are made first, sink deepest; they frequently continue through life. That seed, which is sown in the tender minds of youth, will produce abundance of good,or abundance of evil. The education of youth, therefore, is of prime importance to the happiness of the state. The arts, the sciences, philosophy, virtue, and religion, all contribute to the happiness, all therefore, ought to receive the encouragement of the nation. In this manner, public and private felicity will go hand in hand, and mutually assist each other in there progress . . . . But nations are not only forbidden to do evil; they are also commanded to do good to one another. The duties of humanity are incumbent upon nations as well as upon individuals . . . .

It is a truth certain in the law of nature, that he who has made a promise to another, has given to that other a perfect right to demand the performance of the promise. Nations and the representatives of nations, therefore,. ought to preserve inviolably their treaties and engagements: by not preserving them, they subject themselves to all the consequences of violating the perfect right of those, to whom they were made . . . . In public as in private life, among sovereigns as among individuals, honesty is the best policy, as well as soundest morality. Among merchants, credit is wealth; among states and princes, good faith is both respectability and power.