GrammNet Issue 4/3/97.1 Dear Friend of Phil Gramm, I lost the most recent GrammNet list in a computer crash, and had to go back to a list from December of 1995. I apologize if you had previously requested removal from the list. The following is the first of a series of occasional and irregular GrammNet messages I plan to send with information of interest to conservatives, libertarians, and other supporters of Phil Gramm. I frequently get asked, "Is Phil Gramm going to run in 2000." Unfortunately, I don't know, because so far as I know, he doesn't know himself. There is talk that a possible presidential bid by governor George Bush, Jr., of Texas could undermine Gramm's home base of support. That may be true. It may also be the case that, without a national reputation of his own, and with his name tainted by his father's Big Government policies, that Bush may not have much appeal outside of Texas. Other frequently mentioned candidates include Jack Kemp, Supreme Court Justice Antonio Scalia, Patrick Buchanan, Lamar Alexander, Steve Forbes, Colin Powell, Dan Quayle, and Senator Fred Thompson of Tennessee. I thought back in December of 1994 that Jack Kemp's time had come and gone, and while his selection as Bob Dole's running mate seemed briefly to revive Kemp's career, his dreadful defeat at the hands of the wooden Al Gore seems to reconfirm the notion that Kemp is no longer viable. While Scalia might be a good pick, I think that the notion of him running again is mostly a pipe-dream of conservative black economist and syndicated columnist Thomas Sowell. On the other hand, the Steve Forbes candidacy began primarily as the pipe-dream of another syndicated columnist, Robert Novak. Yet Scalia, unlike Forbes, probably has more power remaining on the Court; why would he resign that power for what would be simply a shot at--not a guarantee of--the presidency? This is an unlikely candidacy. Buchanan will doubtless be back with another round of blaming the nation's woes--both real and invented--on dark-skinned foreigners, large corporations, and Jews. That's too bad, because Buchanan is the candidate most likely once again to ensure that no conservative candidate can get a majority of Republican primary votes, handing the nomination to another Big Government Republican like Bob Dole. One can only hope that after the lies Buchanan told about Alan Keyes, Medicare (which lies he stole directly from Clinton), and American Jews that most conservatives will dismiss Buchanan as the hate-mongering demagogue that he is. Alexander did reasonably well in the early primaries by pretending to be conservative on economic issues while hedging his positions on social issues--not to mention by coming off as a nice guy, which played particularly well here in Iowa. With no Dole or other Big Government Republican as heir apparent, Alexander could do quit well in 2000 if he were to run. And with Buchanan in the race splitting the social conservative vote and scaring economic conservatives into supporting someone with a murky position on social issues, Alexander could be poised to get the 2000 nomination. Although Forbes has some good economic views, his socially liberal history coupled with his waffling on gun control makes him at best suspect to social conservatives and even some libertarian conservatives. Ultimately, his obsession with the flat tax as a cure-all for the ills of society made him unattractive as a candidate, and brought the notion of a flat tax under fire. Although the conventional wisdom in 1996 held that he would definitely run again in 2000, and it could still be right, I've heard almost nothing about it happening again. Frankly, Forbes could do more to forward the flat tax by remaining a neutral supporter of the proposal. The only one about whom I've heard less than I have about Forbes is Colin Powell. Colin who? I suspected that if he didn't run in 1996 he'd find his window of opportunity closed because American have such sort memories. The Gulf War will be almost ten years old by the time the primaries roll around again in 2000, suggesting that Powell's popularity will have evaporated to a large degree. Furthermore the reasons he didn't run in 1996 will still be relevant in 2000: he's willing to be the nominee if the GOP will anoint him, but he isn't willing to suffer the scrutiny and criticism of economic and especially social conservatives. Although liberals in the media will probably start talking him up again, in hopes of getting a stealth liberal candidate, I suspect that once again he won't run. Quayle, on the other hand, has seen his reasons for not running in 1996 disappear. His children are older now, and the prospect of not being able to overcome Gramm's money advantage has been dulled, if not dismissed entirely, by Gramm's poor showing against poorer candidates in 1996. Furthermore, Quayle remains popular with social conservatives despite--or perhaps because--of his pummelling at the hands of the liberal media. Quayle particularly appeals to the more mainstream social conservatives who might not care too much about limiting government, but also don't care for Buchanan's hate-mongering demagoguery. Quayle could easily emerge as the candidate of mainstream social conservatives if Gramm declines to run in 2000. Quayle's main drawbacks are his lack of sophistication and apparent commitment on economic liberty issues, and his inarticulateness. His inarticulateness makes Republicans think twice about his electability in a general election. However, I saw Quayle put in an excellent performance as moderator of the Iowa Straw Poll in August of 1995. It's clear that when he has a good speech-writer and rehearses well that he can come across quite favorably, in part by making fun of his own shortcomings. The self-deprecating strategy has worked wonders for Al Gore, and so far seems to work for Quayle too. If Quayle retained a good speech writer and a heavy-hitting economic team, he could actually emerge as the mainstream conservative candidate, assuming the Gramm doesn't run. Fred Thompson, a pro-life libertarian-conservative, was once equally popular among the pro-life activists and the mainstream libertarian voters who read REASON magazine. However, so apparent waffling on abortion has injured his socially conservative base, while his recent decision to investigate legal Republican fund-raising along with illegal Democratic fund-raising has probably slit his throat with most Republicans, conservative or not. Of course, by 2000 many voters may have forgotten about it, but don't count on the conservative activists forgetting. What about Gramm himself? If he wants to run again, he needs to learn from his past mistakes. While the Dole-Buchanan axis ambushed him in Louisiana, the Gramm campaign made a number of strategic errors which helped set the stage for that ambush. Gramm made his first mistake early on, going to Cato Institute--an influence libertarian think-tank in Washington--and talking about how much money he had and could raise. (So far as I know, Gramm still holds the one-night fund-raising record of $4.1 million.) Gramm thought he needed to prove he was a serious candidate, and didn't realize they already took him seriously and wanted a rousing policy speech. His attempt to impress them with his viability therefore backfired, making him look like a crass politician instead of the committed conservative that he has always been. The Cato debacle had wide-ranging consequences. Not only were the Cato folks turned off by Gramm's performance, but so were the entire Beltway and syndicated columnist community of conservatives who do so much to shape conservative voters' opinions of national figures. The Cato debacle added to the perception that many conservative elites had about Gramm that he wasn't likeable--an impression taken from the fact that he'd rather spend time in his district with constituents or at home with his family then hobnobbing with them. Thus for instance, Robert Novak began a long series of columns in which he praised Gramm's policy views but trashed Gramm's personality and pushed for the candidacy of Steve Forbes. The Forbes candidacy clearly tore away from Gramm a significant portion of Gramm's economic conservative supporters, just as the Buchanan candidacy--also supported to a lesser degree by Novak--tore away from Gramm a chunk of Gramm's social conservative support. (Ironically, Buchanan supporters were accusing Gramm of being too interested in economics, while Forbes supporters were saying that Gramm was "in bed" with social conservatives.) If Gramm is going to run again, he is just going to have to hobnob with the conservative elite and stroke their egos. Gramm's strategy regarding the contests before Iowa was also flawed. He should either have ignored Alaska and Louisiana as most of the candidates did, or lived in each state until it's contest like Buchanan did. Going half-hog in both states just guaranteed that when Buchanan won in both places it would look like he'd actually beaten Gramm, rather than that Buchanan mobilized a hand full of unrepresentative supporters in irrelevant contests. This change of strategy is particularly perplexing given the extreme emphasis Gramm put on doing well in straw polls. Louisiana more than anything probably killed Gramm's candidacy, and the story there is complex. It began with the Louisiana GOP conservative establishment deciding that they could give Gramm a boost in Iowa by having a caucus before Iowa in which Gramm would wins hands-down. They figured that they'd hold a handful of district caucuses which only they would be able to find, and give Gramm all the state delegates. They didn't count on Buchanan using money contributed by Dole's supporters to mobilize the Ku Klux Klan vote and get them to the caucus meeting places. So what looked like and easy victory for Gramm turned into a marginal victory for Buchanan, which in the calculous of politics translated into a rout, allowing the liberal media to give the impression that Buchanan, not Gramm, was the real conservative alternative to Dole. Not until the day that Gramm dropped out of the race did the liberal media reveal the Buchanan-KKK connection. Furthermore, with Dole pretending to stay out of the Louisiana caucus, all Gramm's supporters in Louisiana did was alienate Iowa Republicans who are defensive about our first in the nation status--after all, if we weren't first, who would come and spend their money campaigning in IOWA? Furthermore, as Senate Majority Leader, Dole was positioned to schedule a vote on the farm bill on the day of the Louisiana caucuses, forcing Gramm to choose between abandoning the state to Buchanan on the most important day of campaigning, or missing the vote. When Gramm missed the vote--he vote was needed to pass the bill--Dole, aided by his friends in the liberal media, made a big story out of Gramm supposedly not caring about farmers. Of course, that was sheer nonsense, as Gramm voted for the bill when Dole re-scheduled it--cleverly AFTER the Iowa Caucuses so that Gramm couldn't claim before the Caucuses that he'd voted for it. Dole's manipulation of the farm bill was devastating for Gramm in Iowa. Gramm's Iowa campaign headquarters was so inundated with calls about the farm bill vote that Gramm had to switch to an automated phone system less than a week before the Iowa vote. So the lessons for Gramm in 2000 are: don't mess with the primary schedule and; don't assume that just because the conservative GOP establishment of a state supports you that they can deliver a victory for you. Next time around he'd be better off to focus on Iowa as the first test and forget about the upstart wannabe contests. Gramm also erred seriously in his TV ad campaign here in Iowa. For one thing, he hoarded his money until the end under the theory that only the last-minute spending affects the outcome of the vote. However, with other candidates advertising early and with voters fed up with "negative campaigning," his late ads had little impact. Furthermore, his ads were very serious, policy-oriented spots at a time when the most effective ads were Alexander's feel-good goofy ads. I wrote repeatedly to the Gramm campaign in Washington and begged them to produce two of their own feel-good ads: one showing Gramm in loving embrace with his wife, and the other showing what popular Republicans like Ronald Reagan and Charleton Heston have said in praise of Gramm. Only three days before the Iowa vote did they actually run the first ad, by which time it was too little, too late. They were never able to create the "warm-fuzzy" feelings about Gramm that Alexander engendered with his own ads. Now supposedly Gramm is uncomfortable with his smile and that accounts for his serious demeanor in his ads. If Gramm really wants to run again, he has to add a very high proportion of feel-good ads to his repertoire. He's got so show that charming, teddy-bear smile and disarming sense of humor which work so well in person. Another critical error came about as a result of hiring a pollster rather than a seasoned campaigner to run his campaign in Iowa. The pollster focused on getting volunteers to call huge lists of registered Republicans in an effort to drum up support. He also relied on members of the NRA and national right-to-life organizations to get out the gun-owners and pro-life people in Iowa. This too was a failing strategy. By contrast, the Buchanan and Keyes campaigns worked through the churches, where they were actually able to mobilize the grassroots of the pro-life movement. Next time around Gramm needs to mobilize the grassroots himself with a similar strategy, and not concede the church vote to single-issue candidates. And he needs to take the same grassroots strategy out to the gun clubs in Iowa as well. A final mistake Gramm made was refusing to attack any candidate except for Dole. In the beginning the strategy made some sense--attack only the front-runner or you make the other candidates you attack seem more viable. But once Buchanan started lying outright about Gramm (and Keyes, and Forbes, and even Dole, whose record was so poor that one hardly needed to lie to trash Dole) and gaining a great deal of attention from Buchanan's buddies in the liberal media, Gramm needed to counterattack. He needed to point out the 180-degree turns that Buchanan had done on policies, including Buchanan's support for the author of Roe v. Wade. But, contrary to the liberal media myth of Gramm, he's too darn nice. He just wouldn't go after Buchanan, or later, Forbes. Next time around, if he wants to run and win, Gramm is going to have to not pull any punches when he gets attacked. One of the reasons I supported Gramm in 1996 and would like to see him run again in 2000 is because he's one of the few national Republican figures who appeals to all the different sorts of conservatives: social conservatives, economic conservatives, libertarian conservatives and fiscal-only conservatives. The last Republican with that sort of appeal was Ronald Reagan. But back in 1980, we conservatives were mature enough to know that we needed each other to win, and were willing to settle on a candidate we all liked, even though he didn't march in lock step with any one of our conservative subgroups. By 1996, having tasted victory in 1994 and impatient with the Bush-Clinton roll backs of the Reagan Revolution, we had regressed to a state of political immaturity. The 1994 elections weren't won by pro-lifers, pro-gunners, supply-siders, deficit-reducers, or any other conservatives single-handedly, although many of us seemed to think we alone handed the GOP victory in 1994. So in 1996 many, many of us demanded a candidate who would give us chapter and verse, and say nothing we didn't want to hear. In other words, we acted like Democrats. Is it any wonder that when we acted like Democrats we got a candidate who couldn't beat the Democrats? We will never beat them by being like they are. We win when we all get together behind a candidate who offers us much, but not all of what we'd each like in an ideal world--a ideological yet pragmatic conservative who can win the general election, someone like Phil Gramm. Sincerely, David B. Levenstam, CPA, MT, MA Gramm in 2000!