CHAPTER SIX

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TRUTH BREAKS THROUGH
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Despite everything the British government did - the pressure on
witnesses, the Public Interest Immunity Certificates, the attacks on
the press - despite all this, two jurors refused to go along with a
verdict of lawful killing. Even at the inquest, flawed as it was, the
truth was powerful enough to occasionally break through the fog of
government lies.


THE COLD TRUTH OF SCIENCE

The forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsies and appeared at
the inquest was Professor Alan Watson. Watson complained of the
obstacles he had faced in conducting the post-mortems. He was unhappy
with the photographs sent to him, and had not seen the ballistics
report or the fully-clothed bodies. In addition he said that he had
not had the standard technical assistance and there had been no
X-rays. All of this had made it more difficult for him to determine
the direction of the shots, the distance from which they were fired
and whether the three were standing or lying down when they were shot.

He and other witnesses faced further difficulties arising from the
fact that the standard scene-of-crime procedures had not been followed
in this case. The scene was improperly preserved; bodies were removed
without being photographed in situ; bodies were stripped before the
Coroner saw them; cartridges were removed from the scene.

Watson detailed the appalling injuries suffered by the three and his
evidence of how these injuries could have been inflicted flatly
contradicted the evidence of the SAS soldiers:


MAIREAD FARRELL   According to the SAS, Soldiers A and B remained
behind Farrell and McCann whilst they shot them and this was the
pattern of fire: Soldier A fired one round into Farrell's back,
Soldier B fired another round into her back and then several more
rounds into her.

Farrell ended face down on the ground. But Watson testified that both
of the bullets which hit her in the head entered through her face.
This meant that she was fired on from the front or side. He concluded
that she was first shot in the head whilst facing the gun and then was
hit by further bullets to her back: 'If it had been the other way
round, the three shots in the back would almost certainly have knocked
her to the ground and she would have had to turn her face back towards
him'

In other words, Soldiers A and B's stories cannot be true. There is no
way she could have been shot in the face from behind as A and B
maintained. Furthermore the wounds in her back, according to Watson,
indicated that they had been fired from the same gun, at close range
(powder burns on her jacket indicated she was shot from as little as
three feet away) and whilst she was falling to the ground or face down
on the ground. The explanation which fits both her injuries and
witness statements is that having been shot in the face she fell to
the ground stunned and had three bullets fired into her back at close
range.


DANIEL MCCANN   According to the SAS the pattern of fire was: Soldier
A fired one round into McCann's back, then a further three rounds -
one to the body and two to the head. Soldier B claimed he fired an
unknown number of rounds into McCann. 

McCann, like Farrell, ended face down on the ground. Professor Watson
testified that one of McCann's head wounds was superficial, possibly
caused by a ricochet or a bullet coming out of Farrell's body. It was
the other head wound which caused the major brain damage. According to
Watson, it was fired from behind. Paddy McGrory asked him: 'What about
this one at the back of the head? Is the explanation or the only
explanation for that that he just had to be lying down when that was
inflicted or at least very low down?' - Watson replied: 'Yes, I think
so. That is my explanation. It suggests that the chest wounds came
before the head wound.'


Later witnesses were to testify that they had seen the SAS standing
over McCann and Farrell and heard gunfire. Professor Watson's evidence
supports this. Both McCann and Farrell were shot to the ground and
then shot again to finish them off.


SEAN SAVAGE   According to the SAS they were moving towards Savage
when they heard gunfire (McCann and Farrell being shot). Soldier C
shouted a warning and Savage turned towards them. Soldier D fired
straight into the front of Savage and then fired a further eight
rounds. Soldier C fired several rounds. They claimed that the force of
the shots caused Savage to corkscrew to the ground and that shots
entered his head just before it hit the ground.

Savage fell face upwards onto the ground. Professor Watson described
Savage's wounds as 'like a frenzied attack'. Paddy McGrory asked
Profesor Watson: 'So the scenario that fits your evidence as an
expert, and this evidence here, is that he was brought down, possibly
from the back, and then four bullets fired into his head?' Professor
Watson replied: 'That is right. He may have had one of these in the
face; he may have been facing and...turned round, and fallen to the
ground and had these others.' Later, in an interview he was to say:
'It looks to me as though he was probably shot down and then, whilst
on the ground, other shots were put into him.'

Three of the bullets that entered Savage's head as he lay on the
ground left clear strike marks on the pavement underneath. Spent
cartridges were found about four feet to the right of his head. The
pathologist acting for the family, Professor Derrick Pounder,
supported Watson's view that Savage had been shot whilst on the ground
and stated that in his view the bullets had been fired by someone
standing at Savage's feet.

The SAS story that Sean Savage was facing them as they fired is
contradicted by the fact that five bullets hit him in the back. Both
pathologists testified that his wounds indicated that he was shot in
head whilst on the ground. The pattern of strike marks on the ground
made this clear. For bullets to leave strike marks around where
Savage's head had lain must mean they were fired from above and hit
the ground.

Savage, like Farrell and McCann, was finished off by the SAS as he lay
dying on the ground. That was the verdict of science at the inquest despite
the obstacles that had been placed in the way of the pathologists.


THE BOMB THAT NEVER WAS

O had told the inquest that the British believed the IRA would use a
remote controlled device in Gibraltar. British reasoning, according to
O, was that the IRA would not risk repeating the civilian casualties
caused by the Enniskillen bomb which had contained a timer device.
Quite how this ties in with the British reason for shooting the three
- that they were about to trigger a remote controlled bomb in a public
street full of Sunday strollers - O did not care to say. As it happens
the bomb found in Spain, and alleged to be the one which would have
been used in Gibraltar, had a timer device.

The non-existent remote controlled bomb figured large in the British
case for shooting the three. Indeed, listening to British evidence at
the inquest, it was sometimes difficult to recall that the bomb in
Gibraltar never existed.

Given that so much of the case rested on the British 'belief' in the
bomb, it is worth noting the scientific testimony on the question at
the inquest. Dr Michael Scott, an electronics expert, testified that
to detonate a remote controlled bomb required pushing two separate
switches. Moreover, he said, if the device was prepared to the point
that only one push would set off the bomb there were obvious dangers
of accidental detonation. In other words had the three carried a bomb
with them, it would have been unlikely to have been of a sort that
would require a simple push of a button. Yet it was this 'going for
the button' that Soldiers A to D all thought they saw. Moreover, as it
is easy to accidentally trigger such a one-stage device, shooting the
person carrying it could have triggered it.

Dr Scott added a further point: a bomb in the Changing of the Guard
area could not have been set off from where the suspects were shot,
one and a half miles away. To do so the signal would have had to
travel through blocks of flats, 40-feet thick city walls, a castle,
part of the edge of the rock of Gibraltar and many houses. Dr Scott
had tried to transmit such a signal and failed and said categorically
that it was impossible. He also pointed out that Soldier G (who had
examined Savage's car and reported it to be a suspect car bomb because
it had an aerial) would have only needed to unscrew the aerial to make
it unable to receive a remote controlled signal and therefore make it
safe.

The authoritative evidence of Dr Scott worried the British
considerably so they brought in two witnesses of their own. The first
was Captain Mark Edwards of the Royal Corps of Signals who was asked
on the night of Scott's evidence to do various tests around Gibraltar.
He conducted tests from various sites in Gibraltar to see if a voice
transmission and a single tone signal could be received in the guards
assembly area. Even with the luxury of time and no pressure, he had to
revisit one third of all the test sites because of problems he faced
in getting a signal through. He had to try using two frequencies and
power ratings. By perming the frequencies and power ratings he still
found that in some areas the signal did not come through, in some it
was broken and in some it was successfully transmitted. From the Shell
Garage where Mairead Farrell and Daniel McCann were shot, he found
that using one frequency he could not get through at all and on the
second frequency and power rating he got through with voice and a
single tone. Further up the road he could not get through except with
an intermittent tone. The obvious point is that if it is so unreliable
to send a signal, then it makes it even more unlikely that Farrell or
McCann would have committed instant suicide in the vague hope of
getting a signal through.

Whereas Captain Edwards admitted he knew nothing about bombs, only
signals, the second witness Alan Feraday, Principal Scientific Officer
in the Royal Armaments Research and Development Establishment, seemed
not to know a great deal about signals. He got himself into a mess by
saying that although Dr Scott was theoretically correct that removing
the car aerial would make a bomb safe:

    'I think it would be an extremely foolish thing to do. First of
    all, that is absolutely and completely against all explosive
    ordnance disposal procedures and teaching to the army. Long ago it
    was found at cost in Northern Ireland that walking up to any
    suspect device or suspect item was a foolish thing to do, and
    remote means are used.'

But of course this was precisely what SAS Soldier G had done - he had
walked up and examined the car and its aerial!

Secondly he was forced to admit that the IRA would have used a signal
encoder device which would have made the remote control detonator even
bulkier to carry'. Captain Edward's tests were done without using this
device, the equipment which would actually be used to detonate a bomb.

Thirdly, Feraday had to admit that even if a signal could get through
from one position, the bomber might only have to take a few steps to
put himself in a position where the signal could not get through.

The British, who have spent many years developing anti-bomb expertise,
cannot have been ignorant of these points at the time of the
shootings. Nor can they have been ignorant of the fact that the IRA
has never exploded a remote controlled bomb out of sight of the bomb.
The catastrophic possibilities involved in exploding a device out of
sight are too great and it is not done.

The SAS are highly trained to respond to such situations. Their rules of
engagement allow them to shoot if they have a reasonable belief that their
or other lives are in imminent danger. In Gibraltar their belief that the
three were all going for a button was extremely unreasonable. 

1. They must have known the IRA had never exploded a remote control
bomb out of sight.

2. They must have known that the three would not know whether a signal
could reach the non-existent bomb and were, anyway, unlikely to take
such a risk in order to blow up an area which at that time contained
no soldiers.

3. They were aware that they were dealing with experienced IRA
volunteers who could have nothing whatsoever to gain by trying to
detonate a bomb once they had been challenged. It would not have
allowed them to escape and on the contrary would have led to their
immediate deaths.

4. Detonating a bomb is not a one-stage action of going for a button.
If a bomb is in a state of readiness to be detonated by one touch then
it would be hazardous in the extreme to shoot the person with a
detonator because either a shot could detonate the bomb or the person
could fall on it.

5. Soldier G by going up to the suspect car, acted, according to Army
testimony, in a way British soldiers are trained never to do.

All of this adds to the argument that the British knew full well that
there was no bomb in Gibraltar on 6 March. It also raises the question
of why British intelligence officer O had briefed them to expect a
remote controlled bomb given that this must have been at best hardly a
possibility. The SAS knew they were on sticky ground on these points
and so they bolstered their case in the time-honoured fashion: they
told another lie. They claimed that in January a car had been found in
Belgium with IRA bomb-making materials, including a remote controlled
device capable of operating over long distances. It is now known that
the Belgian car contained explosives, detonators and no remote
controlled device. Moreover it has not been shown to have any
connection with the IRA. The Belgian government did not contradict
these outright lies which the inquest heard. Perhaps they, like Spain,
were made an offer they could not refuse.


THE SIGNAL FOR THE AMBUSH

There was one factor which was common to many of the witnesses'
evidence, both civilian and police. This was the question of the
sounding of a police siren some seconds before the shooting of McCann
and Farrell. SAS Soldier A claimed that he heard the police siren just
after he had finished shooting Farrell and McCann. However, other
witness are virtually unanimous in their having heard the siren
seconds before Soldiers A and B started firing. Surveillance officers
M, H, I, K, L, Special Branch Officer P, off-duty PC Parody, both the
Proettas and Victor Adams all heard the police siren go off a second
or two before they heard shots fired.

The significance of this did not become clear at the inquest but has
since become very obvious. At the inquest Inspector Luis Revagliatte
claimed that he and other police officers were at the traffic lights
in Smith Dorrien Avenue on routine patrol when a message came through
from the police station saying they must return there immediately and
urgently. Revagliatte instructed his driver to pull out of the line of
traffic and to drive down Winston Churchill Avenue (that is, past the
Shell Garage where McCann and Farrell were shot). The driver put on
the siren and flashing light. Revagliatte claimed that he knew nothing
of the pursuit of the three that was going on that day. As they drove
past the Shell Garage, the police occupants of the car claimed they
heard shots and returned to the Shell Garage.

All this sounded rather strange at the inquest. Several witnesses
testified that it was the turning on of the siren that had startled
McCann and Farrell and made them look round. Seconds later they were
dead. Even during the inquest observers were asking why should the
Gibraltar police, aware that orders had been given to apprehend the
three and that the operation was underway, ask the police car closest
to the scene to return to the station? Why should these officers have
been on 'routine patrol' in the very area which was crawling with MI5
watchers, SAS men, Special Branch police and others without knowing
what was to take place? And if the Gibraltar police were too short of
manpower to evacuate the suspected bomb area why did they still have
routine patrols flitting about? Are we to believe that Sunday
afternoons in Gibraltar are sufficiently packed with illegal incidents
to routinely require police inspectors to be driving around?

It all sounded rather thin. The suspicion was of course that the siren
was the agreed signal for the start of the operation. But this could
not be proved at the inquest. However, evidence has now come to light
that does give heavy backing to the belief that the siren was an
agreed signal. Inspector Revagliatte did not tell the whole truth to
the inquest. He left out one significant fact. On Sunday 6 March he
just happened to be the head of the Gibraltar police firearms team for
the operation.

It is a fact that several armed Gibraltar police were part of the
operation on 6 March. And where was their boss, Inspector Revagliatte,
as they readied themselves for action? According to him, he was
blissfully unaware that they were doing anything at all and was out on
a routine Sunday patrol.

Nothing of the official role of Inspector Revagliatte was heard at the
inquest. Instead they heard the cock-and-bull routine patrol, siren
accident story. Of all the stories from the Gibraltar killings,
Revagliatte's is the hardest to swallow. It is quite unbelieveable
that the head of the firearms team should not know what was going on
and yet should just happen to be cruising past in his car and switch
on his siren a second before the SAS opened fire.

Revagliatte's official role as head of the firearms group for the
operation and the fact that he turned his police siren on as he drove past
McCann and Farrell point to only one thing: he gave the signal for an
ambush that had been planned and prepared for months.


THE EYEWITNESSES

Several witnesses saw parts of the ambush and were prepared to say so.

Standing at the window of her flat, Carmen Proetta heard a police
siren and looked out. She saw a police car stop opposite the garage
and saw men get out of it. The men with guns ran towards McCann and
Farrell who turned and raised their hands in the air. She heard shots
and Farrell fell followed by McCann. She saw a man with a gun pointing
down at the bodies and then there were more shots.

Max Proetta saw roughly the same as his wife but additionally recalled
that as they watched the shootings Carmen had said to him 'Los estan
rematando' ('They're finishing them off').

Mrs Celecia also stuck to her testimony that she had heard shots
coming from the direction of where McCann and Farrell lay on the
ground with a man standing over them pointing a gun down.

Strange evidence came from Officer I, a member of the British
surveillance team. He first told the police that he had seen the two
being shot on the ground but at the inquest qualified this by saying
'or in the process of falling'.

Stephen Bullock said that as he and his wife were walking down Smith
Dorrien Avenue an armed man pushed between them and joined another
armed man. They crouched behind some bushes looking towards Landport
tunnel. Then he heard a police siren and gunfire coming from the
garage. He saw McCann being shot by a man standing on the road. McCann
was falling backwards with his hands raised over his shoulders. Then
Bullock looked again at the two armed men he had seen. They were
watching the shooting of McCann and Farrell. Then they turned and ran
towards Landport tunnel and within a few seconds there was the sound
of gunfire from the direction of the tunnel.

Robyn Mordue saw Savage coming towards him and was then pushed to the
ground. Whilst on the ground Mordue heard gunfire. He saw Savage
falling to the ground and then heard more shots. He saw a man standing
over thc body with his gun pointing downwards.

Diana Treacy testifed that she was walking towards Landport when two
men came running towards her, one of whom had a gun. She saw the man
with the gun shoot Savage in the back without warning and saw Savage
fall to the ground. She heard three to five shots and then ran away.

Several witnesses, including non-civilian witnesses, testified that
one of the soldiers shooting McCann and Farrell was standing on the
road as he fired at them, not behind them. The Proettas and Mrs
Celecia testified that they heard gunfire coming from a man standing
over the two after they had fallen. Two witnesses saw McCann or McCann
and Farrell with their hands up. Their evidence ties in with that of
the pathologists far more than does the SAS evidence. It adds further
weight to the view that McCann and Farrell were fired on without
warning: that Farrell was shot in the face from the side; that the two
were shot again after they fell.

It is worth noting that on the day following the shootings the press
managed to find many witnesses who confirmed some of the witness
testimony at the inquest. At that stage the Gibraltar operation was
still seen as a triumph and the press did not know that the three were
unarmed. This is what the press said on 7 March, before they realised
that they had to be careful:

TIMES: 'Witnesses say that police in plain clothes jumped out of a car
and shot a man and woman dead.'

DAILY TELEGRAPH: 'Witnesses said police leapt from a car and shot
without warning at the head and chest of gang members.'

THE INDEPENDENT: 'The identity of the men who jumped from a car and
shot the trio near a petrol station as they headed towards the border
with Spain, remained unconfirmed.'

IRISH TIMES: 'Eye witnesses said...they jumped over railings and fired
on Farrell and the two men from a distance of four or five yards.'

Much of this confirms Carmen Proetta's statements but it is known that
she is not one of the witnesses referred to in these press statements.

Stephen Bullock saw the two SAS men who shot Savage watch the shooting
of McCann and Farrell and then run after Savage. Soldiers C and D who
shot Savage claimed that he was alerted by the sound of gunfire as
they were following him. Diana Treacy saw Savage shot in the back
with- out warning. She heard a maximum of five shots before she ran
away. Given that Savage was on the ground when she ran away and was
hit by at least sixteen bullets, this can only mean that he was shot
several times whilst on the ground. Robyn Mordue heard further shots
fired after Savage had fallen. This evidence is consistent with the
pathologists' view that Savage was shot whilst on the ground.

So too was the evidence of Kenneth Asquez before he became 'confused'.
Asquez's original evidence not only fits the known facts but also
contained details not public at the time. For this reason, as well as
the dubious nature of his later evidence, his statements should be
considered. His original evidence that he had seen a man standing over
Savage with his foot on his chest and firing down fits in exactly with
both the pathologists' views and with the pattern of strike marks
found on the ground where Savage's head had been lying.


A LOSING BATTLE

This was the evidence that was enough to split the Gibraltar jury. It
was evidence that, taken with other sources not revealed at the
inquest, made clear what actually happened in Gibraltar. The British
tracked the three, with Spanish help, to Gibraltar. They watched them
every moment they were in Gibraltar. The British knew that there was
no bomb which is why they made no efforts to deal with a bomb. The
three were not armed, did not resist and did not make 'movements'. The
SAS shot them down without warning and finished them off on the
ground. There is eyewitness evidence to support this. It is anyway the
known modus operandi of the SAS. After the killings the scene ofthe
crime was dealt with in a way that would cause maximum difficulty for
those trying to piece together what happened.

These are the classic hallmarks of a shoot-to-kill operation. The
similarities with the 1982 operations and others are striking. There
too intelligence and surveillance led to ambushes. There too the RUC
men who did the killings were whisked away to be briefed with a cover
story. There too the scene of the crime was, as Stalker stressed,
incorrectly preserved. There too press statements were issued which
were a tissue of lies. There too the officers concerned told lie after
lie and were indeed instructed to do so. There too those trying to
investigate met maximum resistance.

The odds against an unlawful killing verdict at the inquest had been
too well stacked. The inquest, with all the constraints imposed on it,
proved to be as flawed as the Coroner had predicted it would be.

Those who sought to get at the truth in the Gibraltar inquest fought a
losing battle. They faced a government that is not only prepared to
murder unarmed people but will also go to any lengths to cover up its
actions; a government equipped with massive resources and ruthless
determination. Witnesses - terrify them. The Spanish government - do a
deal. The press - use them for disinformation where possible and where
not possible, frighten them. The inquest - tell lies and if in
difficulty use Public Interest Immunity Certificates. This is the
arrogance of a government that thinks it can do anything it likes.

In Gibraltar the three were murdered in a government-sanctioned
ambush. At the moment that Mrs Thatcher, who is legally responsible
for the SAS, authorised the use of this assassination squad, she
committed murder as surely as if she had pulled the trigger herself.
The British government talks loudly of democracy and human rights but
uses the methods of fascist death squads. They have done so before in
Ireland (and elsewhere) and will do so again. They will do so as long
as they are allowed to get away with it. These are the crucial
questions raised by the murders: why was there no outcry of protest
about them in Britain? Why was the British government quite literally
allowed to get away with murder? Who were Thatcher's accomplices?

